Child Abuse Inquiry

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Monday 3rd November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

Is not an important dimension of this scandal—the Home Secretary signed off on all this—the fact that her Department made two utterly inappropriate, establishment-ridden appointments and then, to cap it all, drafted and redrafted a letter seven times in order to play down and disguise the relationship between Fiona Woolf and Lord Brittan, who was Home Secretary when all the Home Office files on this alleged Westminster and Whitehall child sex abuse mysteriously disappeared? Can she not understand that because of that background and despite her words today, which I welcome, she has already lost the confidence of much of the public about her capacity to conduct a highly sensitive inquiry of this kind in a properly objective and impartial manner?

[Mrs May]

I am afraid that I do not accept the premise of much of what the right hon. Gentleman said. For example, he said that all the Home Office files relating to these matters have gone missing, but that is not the case; and he made a number of other references. All I will say in answer to his question is that I am not conducting this inquiry; I have established the inquiry, and I have done so because of my concern both about the historical cases and about the continuing cases of child abuse and child sexual exploitation in this country. We should be ashamed of what has happened in the past and, sadly, what we see happening on our streets today. The panel will be conducting what I believe is a once-in-a-generation inquiry that will give us the opportunity to recognise the problems and failings of the past and ensure that we address them so that in future fewer children will become victims of this appalling crime.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

I feel uneasy about the Bill on several grounds. As I am sure that we all do, I clearly accept that there is a need for a new law in order to establish a proper legal foundation to balance the right to privacy with the requirement to ensure security, but it should not be done in this way. The Official Secrets Act 1911 was rammed through this House in just one day in an atmosphere of fear and we have had to live with the undesirable consequences of a national security concept with blanket coverage ever since. Has the House really not learned that telescoping proper parliamentary scrutiny is nearly always dangerous and can lead to unexpected outcomes as we helplessly watch the law of unintended consequences kick in?

The Government’s first argument for emergency legislation does not stand up. As many have said, the European Court of Justice ruling was on 8 April. The Government wasted more than three months without taking any action before suddenly, seven days before the recess, alleging that it is critical that the Bill be passed by the House in one day. That is either panic or a deliberate attempt to blackmail the House into undiscriminating compliance.

The Government’s second argument, namely that foreign-based phone and internet companies were about to stop handing over the contents of individual communications in response to a UK warrant, does not stack up either. It has been reported that communications service providers have said that they did not know of any companies that had warned the UK Government that they would start deleting data in the light of legal uncertainty. Indeed, the Home Office, according to the Financial Times, instructed companies to disregard the ECJ ruling and to carry on harvesting data while it put together a new legal framework. The Government’s alleged anxiety that they might lose access to stored data overnight is wilfully overdrawn.

The Prime Minister’s assurances are neither convincing nor effective. He stated, as echoed several times by the Home Secretary today, that the legislation will merely maintain the status quo. That is not true. It will impose for the first time a duty on foreign-based internet companies with subsidiaries in the UK to co-operate with surveillance requests by UK agencies. We were also assured by the Home Secretary last Thursday that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

“ensures that access to communications data can take place only where it is necessary and proportionate for a specific investigation.”—[Official Report, 10 July 2014; Vol. 584, c. 457.]

Again, however, that is misleading. Charles Farr, the lead Home Office official in this area, argued in his legal witness statement last week that general intercepts are permitted under RIPA because they are “external”, by which he meant that because communications travel via foreign server, largely based in the US, they can be intercepted indiscriminately even when there are no grounds to suspect any wrongdoing.

Lastly, the Prime Minister offered a number of specific measures to assuage the deeply held concerns about the Bill, but they do not really inspire confidence. He proposes a privacy and civil liberties board, which is of course welcome in principle but, considering that the Intelligence and Security Committee was not told about and did not find out about the indiscriminate tapping of overseas communications under the Tempora system, it is difficult to have trust in oversight boards having the resources, capability and access to scrutinise and deal with what is really happening within the security services’ manipulation of fast-changing communications technology.

The review of RIPA is long overdue and very welcome, but it is not a good omen that the circumvention of the RIPA rules to allow the indiscriminate mass surveillance that exists today is to be allowed to continue for another two and a half years without any attempt in the Bill to circumscribe those powers. The restriction of the number of bodies that can directly contact phone companies and demand access to data is, of course, right, but the current number is about 600, I think, and we are not told by how much it will be restricted. I welcome the sunset clause, but the end of 2016 is far too late. It should be for the end of 2014. For all these reasons, I cannot support the Bill as it stands.

Intelligence and Security Services

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

It is extremely welcome that Parliament is at last having a debate about the fact that a state employee can select on a computer any item about an individual—their address, phone number, mobile number, e-mail, passport number, credit card number or any of their log-ins to a web service—and thus access the content of their communications and details of who they communicate with, the full range of their internet use, their location and a great deal else. Of course, GCHQ is proud to insist that none of that is at all likely, because it always acts within the law—if only. Yes, the computer operator must provide a justification for the information that he is seeking, but that is not too hard when he is conveniently offered a drop-down menu to prompt his thoughts.

All such activity is supposed to be firmly controlled by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 but that Act is, I think, more about facilitating such exercises than curtailing them. RIPA is so poorly drafted—one almost wonders whether that was deliberate—and is open to such broad interpretation that it allows Government agencies such as GCHQ to do whatever they like. We are assured by the Home Office that it is concerned only with the metadata—the technical wherewithal of communications systems, rather than the documents—but the Snowden documents, as reported, tell us the truth:

“GCHQ policy is to treat it pretty much all the same whether it’s content or metadata.”

We are repeatedly given assurances that privacy is fully safeguarded, until we discover that the National Security Agency in the United States spends £250 million a year on weakening encryption. No doubt GCHQ is acting similarly on breaking commercially available security products.

The truth is, and has been for a long time, that the NSA in the States, via the Prism programme, and GCHQ in the UK, via Tempora, have acquired the capability to hoover up vast, untold quantities of personal data from the undersea cables that carry internet data on a colossal scale in and out of the UK, and to do that without any check or accountability. Does that matter? I think that it does. Tempora already allows GCHQ the capacity to collect more than 21 petabytes a day. To put that in context, it is the equivalent of sending all the data in all the books in the British Library 192 times every 24 hours. Two years ago, there were already 550 British and American analysts ploughing through the Tempora database. The balance between safeguarding personal safety and tracking down terrorism and serious crimes has unquestionably been drastically breached. The security agencies are operating under outdated law, despite the recent changes that we all know about, without a genuine public mandate.

What should be done? It was decided at the end of the previous Parliament that all Select Committees, except one, should be elected by the House, and not selected by the Whips and beholden to the party leaderships, as hitherto. The one exception was of course the Intelligence and Security Committee, which operates in a totally different way, untouched by the wave of accountability that swept through the Commons in 2009-10, in response to the revelations of the expenses scandal.

[Dr Lewis]

I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will—I suspect that he will—enlarge on that point, but will he mention the fact that that one Committee is different from all the others, because it is the only one that has access to highly classified material? Surely, that is the relevant point.

[Mr Meacher]

That is perfectly true. The real issue is whether that justifies its being outside the system of accountability of the Houses of Parliament. In my submission, it does not. Safeguards might be required, but not the construction of a different type of Committee, whose Chair and members are appointed by the Prime Minister, to replace as and when he or she wishes, and which sits in private.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman cannot get away with that. Is he completely unaware that the Parliament of which he is a Member passed legislation providing that from now on Parliament will have the last word on who is appointed to the Intelligence and Security Committee? If Parliament does not like the names recommended by the Prime Minister it can reject them, and continue to reject them until it is satisfied with the names brought forward.

[Mr Meacher]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is correct, but the question is whether that is an effective way for the legislature to make the choice. It is all very well to say that there is a provision that will work if it is used diligently and systematically by the House. I submit that it is not, and that we need to change it.

[Dr Huppert]

It might help the right hon. Gentleman to know that clause 1 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 states:

“A person is not eligible to become a member of the ISC unless the person…is nominated for membership by the Prime Minister, and…is not a Minister of the Crown.”

[Mr Meacher]

Of course, that is the point. The House can reject a name that is proposed by the Prime Minister. It cannot propose its own name, as happens with the other Select Committees.

When the Committee has completed an inquiry, often, of course, at the behest of the Prime Minister—although I am aware that it can pursue its own investigations—it sends its report directly to the Prime Minister. That is a secret back channel within the existing power structure, with no direct accountability to the public. The Prime Minister can modify the report in any way he or she chooses and then publish it without any indication of the changes, or publish it in redacted form, or not publish it at all. That is not serious scrutiny. It is a safe cover for the Prime Minister, to give the impression that a difficult and sometimes, for the Government, embarrassing issue has been properly investigated, when, in fact, MI5 or GCHQ disclose to the Committee only what they choose, and the Prime Minister reveals what he or she wants to. Genuine accountability in such matters is needed, and is long overdue.

The Intelligence and Security Committee should, like all other Select Committees, be elected by Parliament, although I think that the Government should choose the Chair. Where the security services are unwilling to disclose documents on national security grounds, the Committee should have the right to ask the Information Commissioner to review the documents and decide whether their disclosure would genuinely put national security at risk—in which case of course there would be no question of their being revealed—as opposed to merely being inconvenient to the security services or the Government, as has so often proved the case in the past. The Information Commissioner’s decision would be final, and the Committee’s report, once finalised, would be issued to the House for public consumption, not to the Prime Minister.

It will be said that we should trust the security services, which look after the nation’s safety—a vital role—and let them get on with the job. We did that, of course, and then found out, not from them but from the Snowden files, what the NSA in the US and GCHQ in Britain were really up to, including monitoring the phones of Angela Merkel and 35 other world leaders—one wonders how much else—and that all assurances about privacy were not worth the e-mails that they were written on. The Intelligence and Security Committee never found out or told us. We were assured by its current Chair—whom I greatly respect—that the security services always acted strictly in accordance with the law, that all operations were officially approved and that there was nothing to worry about. It was only later that we discovered that in fact GCHQ, through the Tempora programme, had devised a way of obviating all that.

It is high time, not for the ISC to tweak its existing work programme to respond to the global furore, as seems to be proposed, but for an independent committee of inquiry to be established to examine the issue thoroughly and systematically, taking full account of international experience, particularly in the United States, and to report to the House, not to the Prime Minister.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

These are serious matters, but may I start on a slightly lighter note? It has been reported today that Mr Snowden has obtained new employment in Moscow—this is quite true—on a Russian website. We have been told that which website it is could not be revealed on the grounds of security, so there is clearly a need for a Russian whistleblower, if not Mr Snowden.

In the time available, I will concentrate on two matters. The first is that the ISC is quite willing to be criticised, but I think that all its members would prefer to be criticised by people who have taken the trouble to find out what Parliament has approved in the past 12 months and how the new ISC has been constituted.

When the current Committee came into existence at the beginning of this Parliament, our first work was to review all the existing powers. We came to the conclusion that the original 1994 Act was out of date and needed to be replaced. We put a series of recommendations to the Government, who accepted 99% of them, and the Opposition were of a similar mind.

I remind right hon. and hon. Members, or those who are apparently not aware of them, of the fundamental changes that have been made. First, under the new legislation, we now report to Parliament, not to the Prime Minister. Secondly, as I have said, Parliament has the last word on who the Committee members are. Thirdly, contrary to the suggestion by the right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) that the Prime Minister should continue to appoint the Chairman, the Committee will in future choose the Chairman from among its own members. That is a big change.

My second point is that the powers have been transformed. For all the years since the Committee came into existence, we could not require intelligence agencies to give us information that they did not wish to provide. We could make requests, to which they often acceded, but we could not require them to do so. The new legislation requires them to respond and give us the information we seek.

Until now, the legislation did not even mention the most important part of agencies’ activities—their operations. Any Committee involvement in operations was incidental or at the request of the Prime Minister, or it was done voluntarily when agencies were willing to co-operate. Now we have not just the opportunity but the right to demand from the agencies all information regarding nationally significant operations, including retrospectively. They cannot refuse; it is our right.

The right hon. Gentleman and other critics may not be aware of this, and perhaps there is no reason why they should be, but I must tell them that one of the changes taking place—for example, in respect to our current inquiry on Woolwich—is that, although as part of our investigations the agencies normally sent us a report with such raw material or parts of their files as they thought appropriate, we now have the right, which we are exercising, to send our staff into GCHQ, MI5 or MI6 to look at files that are relevant to our investigation and they, not the agencies, decide what the Committee might want to see. To be fair to the agencies, we are doing so with their full co-operation. It is a cultural revolution in the agencies’ work to allow people who are not even part of their staff or involved in government into their building. That transformation in the Committee’s powers ought to be borne in mind by those who say that the present Committee—not the former one—does not have the powers to do the required job.

[Mr Meacher]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain why the Committee did not find out about the Tempora programme when it began to operate?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The right hon. Gentleman does not have the faintest idea whether the Committee was aware of programmes of any kind. We are given classified information, and the whole point of an independent Committee having access to top secret information, whatever that is, is that we do not announce what such information is. If he can devise a system whereby secret information can be made available to all law-abiding British citizens, without its being simultaneously made available to the rest of the world, I am interested in hearing about it, but I do not think that he is likely to meet that requirement.

In the short time available, I want to deal with the fundamental challenge mentioned by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who secured the debate, as well as by those who have supported him. Like others, they have said that we are living in a society in which, to use their term, there is “mass surveillance”. If that means anything, it is an accusation: the implication is that all our e-mails are or will be examined by GCHQ—as it chooses and by its own methods—as though something like that was now available. They seem totally to misunderstand or not to refer to the reality of what happens with modern technology, so in the brief time available, I will share with them what they ought to know. It is not secret, but is in the public domain.

Modern computers, which can indeed digest vast amounts of e-mails or communications data, are programmed to run using certain selectors, such as an e-mail address that might belong to a terrorist or some other information relating to terrorism. They are programmed to go through millions and millions of communications and to discard, without their having been looked at—no human eye looks at any of the e-mails—all those to which selectors are not attached.

Of the totality processed by computers, perhaps 0.01% will have selectors that the computer has been programmed to look for. The communications of the other 99.99%— covering virtually every citizen of this country, bar a very small number—are never even looked at by the computer, other than in relation to a selector, such as an e-mail address. Even for the tiny minority identified by the computers as potentially relevant to terrorism, if GCHQ, MI5 or MI6 want to read the content of any of the e-mails, they have to go to the Secretary of State for permission. Under the law, only if they are given permission can the content be read.

To say that we are living in a mass surveillance society is to make a wonderful allegation that sounds vaguely sinister, but the reality is that the e-mails of pretty well everyone in the Chamber are not being intercepted or read.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

It is also important to highlight that, at a political level, the intelligence agencies are ultimately accountable to the Prime Minister, but on a day-to-day basis it is Secretaries of State—primarily my right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary—who are responsible for balancing the need to protect national security and the need to fulfil their duty to protect the British public against the potential intrusion on individuals’ rights to privacy that could be caused by intelligence activity. I know from working alongside my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary how much attention she gives to that role.

The interception of communications commissioner also has such oversight in relation to that intelligence activity, and in taking decisions about whether to authorise the use of intrusive powers—for example, to intercept communications—he must be satisfied that such measures are legal, necessary, proportionate and carefully targeted.

[Mr Meacher]

On the question of legality, is it not the case that the Home Secretary was extremely keen to get the Communications Bill through the House of Commons in order to legalise activities that GCHQ had been carrying out for years, notably—as we now believe—the Tempora programme?

[James Brokenshire]

I say clearly to the right hon. Gentleman, as the Foreign Secretary said when he responded originally on this issue, that GCHQ and our intelligence agencies act within the law, a point rightly made earlier by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood).

The points about the proposals on communications data are about the changing nature of what we see, which includes ensuring that our law enforcement agencies are able to continue to do the job that they do today in bringing criminals to justice and using communications data as evidence in court. That is very different from the intelligence agencies’ roles and from GCHQ’s mission, which is external—looking outside rather than within the UK.

It is also important to note the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) about the role of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson, who has done some very important work and continues to do so.

It is this multi-faceted oversight that complements rigorous internal controls within the agencies themselves. The agencies’ recruitment and training procedures are all designed to ensure that those operating within the ring of secrecy can be trusted to do so lawfully and ethically. A culture of compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the law pervades everything that they do.

In the short time I have left, I should quickly address some of the points that have been raised. I can obviously assure hon. Members, for example, about the resourcing of the ISC. It has raised around a 30% uplift in its resources, and when it has a full staffing complement it will have more staffing than virtually any Select Committee. It is right to highlight the important work undertaken through the ISC and the changes that have been made to it by the Justice and Security Act 2013, which have been commented on by right hon. and hon. Members. An ongoing investigation is taking place into the events in Woolwich in May, work that the ISC is conducting very carefully and with great diligence.

This has been an important debate, highlighting the strength of the scrutiny that we have and the different layers of scrutiny that operate in this country. I believe that we have every reason to be proud of those oversight arrangements and of the work of our agencies.

Question put and agreed to.

Metropolitan Police Service

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Indeed. When Tim Godwin takes over as acting commissioner, he will obviously want to consider the steps that the Met can take, as he already has been doing, such as being more transparent about relationships with the press. Crucially, Elizabeth Filkin is being brought in to advise the Met on such matters, so that it can show the public that it has changed the way it deals with these things and increase the public’s confidence. It is also important to have the additional resilience that is brought by somebody coming in from the outside, so Bernard Hogan-Howe will take on the responsibilities of a deputy commissioner to enhance that work.

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

The Guardian produced abundant evidence several months ago that in handling phone hacking at the News of the World, the police had cut short their original inquiry, suppressed evidence, misled the public and the press, concealed information and broken the law. Why did the Home Secretary not take action then, when it was already perfectly clear that something was going terribly wrong at Scotland Yard?

[Mrs May]

The initial Guardian story that required investigation actually came in July 2009 under the last Government. That was looked at to see whether there was fresh evidence and a decision was taken that there was not. In September 2010, a question was raised about stories that had appeared in the American press. Again, that was looked at to see whether there was fresh evidence. At the time—[Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) asks what I did. I will tell him what I did. At that time, I came to this House and said that it was up to the police to investigate the matter and that it was not for politicians to tell police officers who or what to investigate. I said that the police should investigate any evidence, wherever it took them, and ensure that anybody who was guilty of criminal offences was properly brought to justice.

UK Passport Contract

Michael Meacher Excerpts

Thursday 2nd December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Michael Meacher (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab)]

For the past 40 years, the British passport has been produced in my constituency, first by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, then, when it was sold by the Government to venture capitalists, by Security Printing and Systems Ltd and, more recently, by 3M, which acquired the latter company in 2006. 3M has, to date, invested more than £20 million in the facility. I should add that the British passport is an intensely technical document, which has more than 120 overt and covert security features, ranging from reflective inks and holograms to features that only a trained eye or forensic examination can detect.

Having 40 years’ experience in producing this highly technical product to consistently high standards is no mean feat, and it was therefore gratifying for the staff at the production facility to learn that the Identity and Passport Service was rated as the top-performing public sector organisation by its customers. The survey carried out by the Institute of Customer Service was based on responses from 26,000 members of the public, who rated the IPS above names such as Royal Mail, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the Post Office. The chief executive of the IPS, Sarah Rapson, said on 13 April:

“This is a great confidence boost and confirms yet again that we have strong foundations in place to deliver the exemplary service we provide to our customers.”

How strange then that the Home Office is willing to dispense with that 40-year track record and put at risk the strong foundations to which Sarah Rapson was referring by taking the contract away from the incumbent and placing it with a company, De La Rue, whose track record in producing passports is limited and whose experience in producing passports to the volumes required by the UK is non-existent.

The appetite of Britons for overseas travel is as strong as ever and more than 6 million British passports are produced a year, the vast majority of which are renewals. The current set-up and production capacity at the facility means that, on average, passports are delivered to customers in a matter of days after the submission of their completed application. The quality is consistent, and quality assurance procedures are rigorous and regularly audited. I can say without risk of rebuttal that De La Rue, to which the British passport has been entrusted, has no great track record in the production of this quantity of passports.

It is well documented—I do not wish to dwell on this but it has to be said—that De La Rue has not exactly been short of problems this year. Its chief executive resigned in June following production issues at its banknote paper plant, which involved its employees falsifying documents—the Serious Fraud Office is currently investigating that little matter. Another SFO inquiry took place in 2007, during which the homes of employees were raided, and the company has also faced accusations of fraud in Kenya and price fixing in the US in the past 10 years. One has to ask whether this is really a company to which we should entrust the production of the British passport.

Let me turn to the awarding of the contract with De La Rue in June 2009 and the circumstances surrounding it. As has regrettably become the case in large Government procurements, this process is tortuously complicated and prolonged. Consequently, it is extremely expensive for the participants and for the person paying the bill, which in this case is the taxpayer.

There were a number of unsatisfactory elements to the procurement that in my view seriously call into question the integrity of the entire process. The first, which was well documented in the media at the time, was the role of Gill Rider, a non-executive director of De La Rue who was also an official in the Cabinet Office responsible for the recruitment of senior civil servants. One of the civil servants whom Gill Rider had a hand in recruiting was James Hall, who at the time of the procurement in question was the chief executive of the Identity and Passport Service. Another was Bill Crothers, who was the chief operating officer of the Identity and Passport Service at the time of the procurement. James Hall and Gill Rider had been colleagues together at Accenture for many years before joining the civil service, while Bill Crothers was also a recruit into the civil service from Accenture.

I accept that Gill Rider stood down when the matter was raised in the Home Office, but not before, and that was two thirds of the way through the two-year procurement process. Furthermore, she remained a shareholder of the company throughout. In addition, representations were made to me immediately after the announcement of the tender result in June 2009 by 3M, which said that it had found some of the processes used in certain phases of the procurement to have lacked fairness. It is only fair to add at this point that 3M was somewhat reluctant for me to secure this debate, because of its fear that raising such matters could compromise its relationship with the Home Office, a customer with which it has always had a tremendously strong relationship. I want to make it clear to the Minister that the reason I have done so is that the Government are unaccountably playing down or disregarding an enormous financial gain to the Exchequer—more than £100 million—at a time when they are also saying that colossal spending cuts have to be made, which seems perverse to say the least. Also, a large number of jobs will be lost to the UK—probably more than 100—at a time when the Government are desperate to stop unemployment rising, which again seems perverse.

Another disquieting aspect to the procurement process was the fact that former De La Rue employees sat as part of the technical selection panel on the bid. That surely cannot be right. Those people—presumably they were holders of deferred De La Rue pensions—should surely have been excluded on the grounds of a conflict of interest. In addition, on each occasion during the competitive dialogue phase, when each company had to express and present its ideas, 3M was asked to present before De La Rue. I do not want to make too much of that, but there was no drawing of lots or any other randomising procedure to balance out the advantage at a particularly sensitive stage of the process. I would add that, frankly, I am dissatisfied that the senior officials advising the Minister on our representations to him about a retender were precisely the same as those who were involved in the original reallocation of the contract. To me, that does not exactly suggest a genuinely independent re-evaluation of the issues. I mention these matters not to rake over the coals, but to explain and justify my strong belief that the original procurement was seriously flawed and that the new, non-exclusive passport contract should be retendered.

On 14 July, George Buckley, the chief executive officer of 3M wrote to the Home Secretary to make the case for retendering the contract. That offer was made—I think one can readily admit this—in response to the difficult economic circumstances that the country faces and to the call by the Government for proposals to save money. The offer was to reduce the cost of the new contract by £100 million over the life of that contract. That included savings from the change in Government policy on having secondary biometrics within the passport. In the current circumstances, £100 million is not a sum to be sniffed at. It is not far short of 1% of the entire reduction in spending cuts that the Government hope to make in this fiscal year; a reduction of that magnitude cannot be dismissed or disregarded.

On 4 August, a perfunctory letter—I say that with feeling because I have seen the letter from John Collington, a Home Office official and yet another Accenture employee—failed to acknowledge the new, reduced contract offer. That was not only negligent but dismissive, publicly indefensible and even contemptuous. On 15 September, accompanied by some members of 3M’s management, I met the Minister—I am grateful to him for that—to discuss a new cost model for the new UK passport contract. At that meeting, the same offer was made again in detail and was subsequently confirmed in a letter on 17 September from 3M’s UK managing director Jim McSheffrey.

The commitment was to reduce the cost of the passport contract by £100 million—from £400 million, where it is today, to £300 million for the 10-year-period. That was achievable due to the change in specifications, with secondary biometrics no longer being required on the UK passport, and by allowing costs to be spread over a number of future international contracts. I am fully aware that the Minister is sceptical that a saving as high as £100 million can be achieved, but my answer is that, although I cannot go into details now, for reasons of commercial confidentiality, the detailed breakdown of that £100 million is provided in specifics and in full in the letter of 17 September, which, of course, the Home Office has.

On 28 September a reply to 3M’s offer letter was written by the Minister’s Department and sent under his signature. I note that I was not copied into the reply, despite having instigated the meeting, but I shall not make much of that. The reply says that there is no

“convincing argument to change current arrangements”.

There is an ample case to be made for retendering the contract. The risks—given that there is an incumbent supplier still in place that is able to produce at volume—are minimal. Also, 3M produces all UK passports in the UK, thus maximising UK jobs and minimising the security risks of transporting blank passports from abroad, whereas De La Rue proposes to produce a proportion of the passports in its production facility in Malta.

If the contract goes ahead without retender, more than 100 jobs will be removed from the current operation. I understand that only a tiny fraction of those employees will find employment under the new contract. In addition to the £100 million that will be lost to the Exchequer if there is no retender, there will be a further cost to the Exchequer of more than £5 million in severance payments.

As the Minister will be aware, the current contract with De La Rue is on a non-exclusive basis, which means that it can be terminated at any time. A retender could be completed at minimal cost—and rapidly—to gain the benefits to the UK taxpayer of a lower cost contract. It is also the case, as the Minister will again be aware, that there is a requirement to benchmark the contract against other potential suppliers to ensure that the UK Government are receiving, and continue rightly to receive, value for money. That means that the Identity and Passport Service is required to check periodically throughout the life of the contract that it is receiving value for money.

In that context, on 5 October, De La Rue was due to start producing passports in volume. However, although it did produce its first passport on the day due, there has been a need for 3M to continue to produce the UK passport at normal rates owing to a significant slippage in the agreed programme on the part of De La Rue, despite the project delivery dates being a key part of the evaluation. As of today, most of the 3M employees on the contract remain, because the facility is still running at normal volumes, but within a few weeks, presses at 3M will get turned off for the last time. I do not think we can avoid the conclusion that the new contract has been unable to produce passports at the volumes required.

The Government have entrusted, under circumstances that I find deeply dubious, a critical piece of the national infrastructure—the production of the nation’s passports—to a company seemingly incapable of doing the job. I do not want to have to take this matter further with the Select Committees of the House, but the Minister should retender the contract before the Government lose £100 million of savings and the country loses more than 100 jobs.

[The Minister for Immigration (Damian Green)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) on securing this debate. Given that he made the point himself, I am sure that he will understand that it would be inappropriate for me to discuss detailed areas of commercial information at the Dispatch Box.

I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman is rightly concerned about the impact on jobs in his constituency. That is understandable and right—any Member of the House would feel the same. The loss of jobs anywhere is to be much regretted. As he said, the passport has been produced in his constituency for the past 40 years. I congratulate 3M and the predecessor companies on the work they did on the passport, and I am happy to reassure 3M that nothing the right hon. Gentleman has said will alter my or the Home Office’s attitude to it in any future Government business for which it tenders. We treat all potential procurement exercises fairly and equally, and we look at the competence of those involved and the price they are charging. The right hon. Gentleman is correct also that the Identity and Passport Service provides an extremely good service.

At that point, however, I parted company from much of what the right hon. Gentleman said. He will be aware that the contract for the printing of the British passport was granted under the previous Labour Administration, and I have no reason to believe that the tender process was anything other than fair and subject to open competition. He prayed in aid of 3M Sarah Rapson, but he will be aware that she became the head of the IPS only in recent months, so all the decisions he is talking about, and everything he is complaining about, happened before she became head of the IPS and said what he quoted her as saying, apparently in aid of his argument. At that time, 3M Security Printing and Systems submitted an unsuccessful bid, and the contract was awarded to De La Rue. It was signed on 2 July 2009, and the service commenced in October 2010.

The right hon. Gentleman made an explicit attack on what he described as the integrity of the process. I want to make clear—as, I am sure, would he—that that did not entail an attack on the integrity of those involved. He took the opportunity to name a number of officials, but I am sure that he was in no way attempting to attack their integrity. That would be wrong, and it would clearly also be wrong to attack the integrity of the Minister involved. The right hon. Gentleman said that the process was wrong. He knows, as a former Minister himself, that Ministers are responsible for the process, so attacking the process would be attacking the Minister as well.

The right hon. Gentleman also said one thing that was simply factually incorrect. He said that all the senior officials involved were still there advising me, as a Minister in the new Government. That is not true. James Hall, who was head of the Identity and Passport Service at the time, has retired, which means that the most important official who was involved when the decision was made is no longer there. I think it important to put that on the record.

[Mr Meacher]

The point that I was making is that the senior officials who attended on the Minister when we made representations to him were closely involved in the original allocation of the contract. I did not say that all the officials who were originally involved were there now, but those who played a significant part are still there, and I therefore do not think the process is genuinely independent.

The Minister questioned whether I had been right to say that the process had not been fairly undertaken. I will not repeat them now, but I presented three, four or five arguments in my speech which need a precise answer rather than just “I am satisfied with the process”.

[Damian Green]

It is not very surprising that some of the officials who were at the IPS a year or so ago are still there. I can reassure the right hon. Gentleman that no single individual or, indeed, small number of individuals could have decided the outcome of the bid. More than 25 evaluators were involved in the process. I am sorry that, when he intervened on me, the right hon. Gentleman did not take the opportunity to make clear that he was not attacking the integrity of the individuals involved. I had given him every chance to do so.

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I met him and representatives of 3M on 15 September 2010 to discuss their request for the contract to be retendered on the basis of the decision of the coalition Government to halt the second biometric in the United Kingdom passport. As I said then and will repeat tonight, I do not consider that either the right hon. Gentleman or 3M has presented any new information that would merit the adoption of such an approach. Nor, in particular, would it be appropriate to put at risk the continuity of the passport operation.

The right hon. Gentleman and 3M argue that savings of £100 million are to be had simply because the form of the passport has been changed through the removal of the second biometric. As I have said, I do not find that argument convincing. Moreover, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the approach to me was made only a few weeks before the new passport operation was due to begin. The main principle that guides me must be the preservation of the safety, security, smooth running and smooth production of the passport service, and the consideration that the right hon. Gentleman is inviting discontinuity must bear heavily on me as the Minister responsible for the passport service.

As the right hon. Gentleman has admitted, the IPS achieves a high level of public satisfaction in the quality and security of the service it delivers. That relies on its ensuring that all parts of its operation work effectively and efficiently, in the best interests of the customer and the wider interests of the UK economy.

The right hon. Gentleman cast doubt on the process. Of course, the IPS followed the EU procurement regulations process, which was initiated on 19 June 2008 by the issue of an Official Journal of the European Union notice. The award of the new passport design and production contract was necessary due to the current passport contract expiring on 4 October 2010. The Identity and Passport Service announced on 11 June 2009 that De La Rue had won the £400 million contract to produce the new British passport book over the next 10 years. That contract commenced on 5 October 2010.

The De La Rue contract represents better value for money and introduces a new design and improved quality for the customer. In addition, the tender process allowed savings on print costs to be made in relation to the current contract. The IPS ensured that all bidders were offered an equal opportunity to compete against the incumbent supplier, 3M SPSL. The objective of the procurement was to complete a fair, transparent, robust, defensible and fully auditable evaluation exercise that ultimately identified the most suitable supplier to deliver passport services. The supplier produces a secure, high-quality passport, and provides production arrangements at a competitive price.

There are about 48 million passport holders in the UK, which represents 80% of the eligible population. The new supplier is expected to produce up to 6 million passports every year. The current length of the contract ensures that there is the right balance between the level of investment required, the need for good relationships to be fostered, and the need for the IPS to remain flexible and responsive to the way in which the market changes over time.

The procurement process over which the right hon. Gentleman has cast doubt was subject to detailed and thorough assurance from Home Office Commercial, the Office of Government Commerce and an external audit, including a National Audit Office review to ensure that an objective assessment was reached. The awarding of the contract was based on which supplier offered the best overall solution and value for money, measured against a clear set of evaluation criteria, of which 3M was fully aware and against which it performed during detailed competitive processes.

[Mr Meacher]

The Minister is talking entirely about the award of the contract. I accept that I made comment about that, but the thrust of my argument was not going back over the past, but looking to the future, and the fact that 3M is offering a £100 million reduction in the cost, which is more than highly competitive and would avoid the loss of 100 jobs. Will the Minister please concentrate his remarks on why that is not acceptable, even if it requires a retender?

The Minister wants me to make a comment about integrity. I referred to the integrity of the process. I did not refer to individuals, but I do think there are serious issues about the conflict of interest of the various individuals to whom I referred.

[Damian Green]

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s clarification of what he is getting at when he speaks of integrity. I can only observe gently to him that the background of those who were senior in the IPS over a year ago was well known to him and to everyone else at the time. If he is so disturbed about it now, it might have been more useful to his cause to have pointed that out at the time to a Government of whom he was a supporter.

In a sense, that is irrelevant, because any Minister of any Government would try to make the best decision, but if the right hon. Gentleman is disturbed about the process and about the senior officials involved in it, the time to make that point is before a decision is taken, not a year afterwards. As I say, I have absolutely no evidence to suggest to me that anyone involved—the Minister or any of the officials—in a process which clearly I had nothing to do with, deserve any shadow cast over them. The right hon. Gentleman is making such an implication now. All I can sensibly do is observe that it might have been more helpful to his cause if he had made that observation at the time.

The right hon. Gentleman makes the point that 3M says that it could fulfil the contract now for £100 million less. As I have said repeatedly in private meetings and again this evening, I have seen no convincing evidence that backs that up. Again, 3M was given the opportunity to bid for the work at the time. The reasons that it was unsuccessful were fully explained to 3M. There is no economic reason why the IPS should seek to put its operation at risk by reopening a contract that is up and running and working effectively.

I have to end on that point, because that is the most important point for me. I must be responsible for an effective and efficient passport service. Asking me to put at risk—