(5 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and, in particular, I am grateful for his kind words about the civil service. One of the many things we have in common, as well as representing constituencies that voted leave and being opposed to a second referendum, is that both of us are huge fans of the civil service and appreciate the great work done by civil servants every day for all of us in this country.
The hon. Gentleman asked me to keep the House informed even as the XO Committee sits every day, and I will do my best to do so. I am certain there will be an opportunity for at least one more statement, and I will be happy to respond to any urgent questions in his or any other Member’s name that relate to our Brexit preparations.
The hon. Gentleman asked about 31 October and suggested that the date is artificial. I fear it is not, as the date is fixed in legislation as a result of the article 50 process and has been agreed with the European Union. One of the important things that all of us in this House need to bear in mind is that EU leaders have made it crystal clear that they want the deal done, and they want it done by 31 October. The reason why the risk of no deal has increased materially is that EU leaders have said we cannot be certain that an extension will be granted. In those circumstances, there is one way to bring certainty, and I know that the hon. Gentleman knows this in his heart. The way in which we can bring certainty is by voting for the Prime Minister’s deal.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the cost of preparation. One thing the Prime Minister has stressed, and which is absolutely true, is that once we leave with a deal, we will be outside the customs union and the single market, and much of the preparation that will have been done in advance of 31 October will enable businesses to benefit from the free trade agreement that we hope to conclude with the EU and the new trade agreements we will conclude with other nations. There is a bright future ahead but it requires all of us to listen to the voice of this country and get Brexit done.
I thank the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and his colleagues and officials, for all the work they have done to help minimise any potential disruption in Kent. Can he also reassure the House that the security agreement with the EU that will be needed to help protect us against any further vulnerability to terrorism or organised crime will be put in place as soon as possible? Can he say what that timetable might be?
My right hon. Friend makes a good point. It is the case that we co-operate with EU nations in a variety of forums, not just through the EU; that the security of all benefits as a result; and that many of the shared tools for law enforcement and national security that we have allow EU citizens to benefit from intelligence gathered by our agencies. We hope to conclude a new arrangement as quickly as possible, as part of our future partnership with the EU. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has written to Frans Timmermans, the Commissioner responsible for security, to say that in the event of no deal we continue to share access to tools such as ECRIS—the European Criminal Records Information System—SIS II and Prüm. So far, Frans Timmermans has not indicated that he would collaborate, but we believe it is in everyone’s interests to ensure that we would.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The hon. Gentleman elided several different subjects in his questions. On the substance of the Government’s policy decisions, it has been said already from this Dispatch Box several times that the review of 5G networks by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is a matter of public record. The Government have committed to telling the House of their conclusions once those decisions have been taken and approved at all levels within the Government and once we are ready to bring the information to the House. That will be the time for the House to learn what the Government have decided and to hold Ministers to account for their decisions.
I can reiterate to the House that the Government’s priorities for the future of telecommunications remain stronger cyber-security practices, greater resilience throughout telecommunications networks and diversity in the marketplace. Again, as has been said before from this Dispatch Box, this is a policy challenge that goes beyond a single company or even a single country, and we continue to work very closely with all our Five Eyes allies and with other international partners.
The problem with this particular case was not so much the material disclosed as the forum from which the leak came. The Prime Minister set up the inquiry and took the decisions she took yesterday to maintain the integrity and secrecy that is essential for the proper conduct of the business of the Government of the United Kingdom, whichever party happens to be in office. As far as I am aware, the inquiry was conducted on the basis of confidentiality throughout its proceedings. It came to conclusions that were reported to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and she took the decisions she announced yesterday.
This boils down to what is set out in paragraph 1.6 of the “Ministerial Code”:
“Ministers only remain in office for so long as they retain the confidence of the Prime Minister. She is the ultimate judge of the standards of behaviour expected of a Minister and the appropriate consequences of a breach of those standards.”
Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is not only the work of our intelligence and security services that could be compromised by unauthorised disclosure but the Council’s access to information and advice provided by our allies on a top secret basis? Can he reassure us therefore that our allies have been reassured in turn that this sorry episode will not be repeated?
Appropriate contact is of course being made with our key allies, as my right hon. Friend would expect. He is absolutely right. I, like he, can recall discussions that involved not only material of the highest level of classification within the UK Government system but the sharing of information disclosed to us in confidence by key allies. Without going into detail—for obvious reasons—I should remind the House that among the subjects discussed at the National Security Council in the last year alone have been our analysis of and response to the chemical weapons attacks in Salisbury and our analysis and response to the civil war and conflict in Syria. I think that Members on both sides of the House will appreciate the importance of these discussions remaining confidential at all times and of all participants having full confidence that that will continue to be the case.
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberI believe it would not have been right if I had not listened to the concerns expressed in the House. I listened to those concerns and I am working—discussions are continuing—with the European Union in relation to how we address them. It will then be for Parliament to decide but, at that point, Parliament and Members of the House will have a responsibility. The decision they come to will be about whether or not to deliver on the vote of the referendum in a way that protects jobs and our security.
Given that the Prime Minister has listened and is still trying to improve the deal, would the deal be more palatable if the timetable for starting on and agreeing the terms of future trade were as firm and as legally binding as the timetable for paying over all the billions?
My right hon. Friend makes an important point. From the Council conclusions, there has been further progress in relation to the EU’s commitment to starting the next stage of negotiations, but it is important for us to continue to discuss the issue he raises about getting that confirmation and certainty—he refers to legal certainty—as to when those negotiations can start, and when it is the determination of both parties to ensure that those negotiations end. We want that trade deal in place by the end of December 2020.
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe question of our future—[Interruption.] No. I believe that we can be economically better off outside the European Union. The problem is that there are those who think the only factor that determines how well off we are in the future is whether or not we are a member of the European Union. I differ. Our future is in our hands. It will be our decisions, in many areas, that will determine our prosperity for the future.
Nobody can now doubt that the Prime Minister has tried her very best. Are we not none the less being asked to take a huge gamble here: paying, leaving, surrendering our vote and our veto without any firm commitment to frictionless trade or the absolute right to dismantle external tariffs? Is it really wise to trust the future of our economy to a pledge simply to use best endeavours?
The position on the nature of the political declaration is exactly what I set out in response to the question from the Chairman of the Exiting the European Union Committee, which is that it is not possible for us to sign that legal treaty on a free trade agreement with the European Union until we are outside the European Union.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. There is considerable interest, which is to be anticipated, but I make two points to the House. First, there is a statement to follow, in which there may well be considerable interest. Secondly, we have a substantial debate on the remaining stages of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, necessitating brevity in this session, from Back Benchers and Front Benchers alike, and the non-participation of people who arrived after the Prime Minister had delivered her statement.
Although the opening of accession talks with the Government in Skopje is to be welcomed, will the Prime Minister also confirm that, irrespective of Russia’s views, future membership of the alliance is open to any other country that meets the membership criteria, including other countries in the western Balkans?
Yes, I am happy to give my right hon. Friend that confirmation. Indeed, we look forward to seeing others aspire to membership of the NATO alliance. It is important that they meet the criteria for membership. At the NATO summit, Montenegro was of course sitting around the table, having already become a member of the NATO alliance, and we were pleased to extend that invitation to Skopje. Other countries could follow, provided that they meet the criteria.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberIn relation to the timing of trade deals with America, or indeed with any other country, the right hon. Gentleman knows full well that we are not able to put those in place until we have fully left the European Union. We will be able to talk about these issues—to sign and negotiate those treaties—in advance of that.
The right hon. Gentleman talks about the backstop. The point of the backstop is that it is there if, as at 1 January 2021, the future customs arrangement between the United Kingdom and the European Union is not in place. As I said last week, it has always been the case that we believe that the best way to address the issue of the border in Northern Ireland is through that overall relationship between the UK and the EU. We want to ensure that that is in place as soon as possible after the end of December 2020, and we preferably do not want to see the backstop having to be used at all.
Given that it is nearly four years since 10 British citizens were murdered when flight MH17 was destroyed over Ukraine by a Russian missile launcher and the west is still trying to refute Russian denials of responsibility, can the Prime Minister tell the House how the very welcome rapid response mechanism agreed in Quebec will help us to better challenge Russian misinformation with much faster truth?
My right hon. Friend raises a very important point. The point of the rapid response mechanism is that it will be able to do that in two ways. First, one of the key things is to have faster attribution when these events happen; of course, we have only relatively recently seen a final attribution in relation to the Russian role in MH17. It is about being able to work together to achieve faster attribution when incidents happen and then—this is the crucial point—to co-ordinate activity to counter exactly the propaganda that he mentions. Working collectively will have a much greater impact than individual states trying to work on their own.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis was a limited, targeted set of strikes by the United Kingdom, the United States and France. The targets were carefully chosen, and the intention was to degrade the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capability and to deter its willingness to use those weapons. Nobody should be in any doubt about our resolve to ensure that we do not see a situation in which the use of chemical weapons is normalised.
Does the Prime Minister accept that the public well understand that when our forces need to act quickly, decisively and safely, in concert with our allies, it must be right to authorise strikes without giving notice? Is it not also clear that if the use of chemical weapons goes completely unchallenged, dictators in other countries will use these awful weapons to suppress opposition?
I thank my right hon. Friend for his comment. In fact, the 2016 written ministerial statement from which I quoted earlier was made in my right hon. Friend’s name. It states:
“In observing the convention, we must ensure that the ability of our armed forces to act quickly and decisively, and to maintain the security of their operations, is not compromised.”
It is important that we are able to do that, and I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe must start with the events in Salisbury. What happened to Sergei and Yulia Skripal on 4 March was an outrageous act committed with callous indifference towards the wider community in Salisbury, including those brave police officers who had to respond to and investigate the incident. Our first thoughts must remain with Mr Skripal and his daughter as they continue to fight for their lives in an NHS hospital, and with Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey as he continues his recovery.
Based on the analysis conducted by Government scientists, there can be little doubt that the nerve agent used in this attack was military-grade Novichok of a type manufactured by Russia. Since that analysis was revealed by the Prime Minister two weeks ago, the Russian state has had every opportunity to offer a plausible explanation as to how a nerve agent stock of this type came to be used in this attack. It has offered nothing concrete in response except denials and diversion. Indeed, the only solid assertion that it has offered so far in its defence was that all stocks of nerve agents were destroyed many years ago—an assertion that has been contradicted by intelligence reports. That suggests that just over a decade ago Russia invested in the use of nerve agents and developed new stockpiles of Novichok to that end. There is clear evidence that the Russian state has a case to answer, and it has failed to do so. We can therefore draw no other conclusion than that Russia has a direct or indirect responsibility for this.
We have supported actions taken. We have also condemned the Russian Government for including in their tit-for-tat retaliation a totally unnecessary and counterproductive decision to close the British Council offices in Russia which have done so much to promote better understanding and closer relationships between our two countries. It is a matter of deep regret to all of us that on issue after issue, and not of our making, UK-Russian relations now stand at such a low ebb.
The Leader of the Opposition has condemned Russia’s retaliation, but he has not yet clearly and unequivocally condemned the attempted murders themselves. Will he now take this opportunity, without further caveat, to absolutely condemn the Russian Government’s involvement in these attempted murders?
I have very clearly condemned what happened and those who perpetrated this attack.
On 14 March, the Prime Minister said:
“there are other measures we stand ready to deploy at any time should we face further Russian provocation.”—[Official Report, 14 March 2018; Vol. 637, c. 857.]
Does she consider the expulsion of 23 British diplomats and the closure of the British Council a further provocation?
In the light of the poisoning of the Skripals and the murder of Nikolai Glushkov, what advice and support are the police and security services giving to high-profile Russians living in Britain, or indeed any other Russian national living and working in this country?
What plans does the Prime Minister have to publish and table the Government’s version of Labour’s Magnitsky amendment to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill which was blocked in February? We have been assured that that will deliver all the powers that we were demanding—including by my right hon. Friend the shadow Chancellor in his response to the Budget and the Finance Bill—even before the Salisbury attack, to punish Russian abusers of human rights, but we are still waiting to see it published.
I begin by paying tribute to my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench. They have met the challenge of Salisbury clearly, firmly and deliberately. The response of the international community today simply underpins the resolution they have shown in dealing with this crisis.
The strength of our response, however, only underlines how our policy towards Russia has not worked. Yes, it was well intentioned, yes it was rational—we wanted to see Russia as a partner and a part of the rules-based international system—but it has not worked like that. Our actions have not deterred Russia from repeated misbehaviour. After Georgia came Crimea. There were sanctions. After those sanctions, thousands of Russian troops were deployed in the Donbass, and we had the shooting down of MH17, including the murder of 10 of our own citizens. Our response to the murder of Litvinenko clearly did not deter the attempted Salisbury murders. So we have to do more.
I note and welcome that the Government have reserved the right to deploy other measures beyond the expulsions—measures that must surely include making it more difficult for those close to the presidential Administration to do business, raise funds or buy property here in London.
Let me offer the House four thoughts, none of them particularly original. First, we must rise to the challenge of fake news: the ability of sophisticated enemies like Russia to obfuscate what should be clear, to foster conspiracy where none exists, and to tell blatant lies when they are pushed into a corner. It is the speed with which Russia is able to do that, using propaganda, social media, the “bots” and all the rest of it, that requires our response to be so much quicker. We need to deploy faster truth. I appreciate the difficulties of revealing or sharing intelligence, but when we have photographs of a mobile launcher that brought down an aircraft, and when we know that an agent as powerful as Novichok could only be developed in the highest-grade, most technically advanced state laboratory, we need to get those facts out far, far more quickly.
Secondly, this was an armed attack on a member of NATO. Under article 3 of the North Atlantic treaty, which is not quoted in the Chamber as often as article 5, NATO members agree
“to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”.
NATO must now renew its focus on the Russian threat. It must use the July summit to modernise its decision making, to make possible much more rapid deployment of troops and planes across NATO’s internal border, and, above all, to beef up its strategic communications, which are so often much less than the sum of their parts. We need a faster and more coherent response from NATO.
Thirdly, whether we in the House are remainers or Brexiteers, we need to come together now to support the security partnership that the Prime Minister described so well in her Munich speech. One obvious way in which to reinforce the security of what continues to be our continent is to help to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, which means—even as we leave the European Union—supporting the fledgling European energy market. I was delighted to note a reference to that in the Prime Minister’s earlier Mansion House speech. It means helping to increase diversity of supply across our continent, encouraging dual flows and shared coding, promoting more interconnection, and using our technology and our regulatory experience to continue to play a leading part in making the European energy market much more resilient.
Finally, we need to strengthen our defences. Yes, the Prime Minister was right to remind the House that we have had a rising defence budget since April 2016, and yes, we do meet the 2% target, but Russia is not spending 2% of its GDP on defence; it is spending more than 5% of its GDP on defence.
Does the former Secretary of State for Defence consider that spending 2% of our GDP on defence is not enough?
That is precisely the point that I am about to address. Russia is spending 5% of its GDP on conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber and hybrids, and, as we now know, on a completely illegal chemical weapons programme. As my hon. Friend has pointed out, the NATO 2% is a minimum and not a ceiling. I think the House should consider this—and I do not make the point in a party political way. In the last year of the last century, the Blair Government were spending 2.7% of GDP on defence. That was before 9/11, before Daesh terrorism, before Kim had his nuclear weapons, before cyber-attacks on our own Parliament, and before Russia became more malignant again. I was in the House in 1999, and I do not recall anyone suggesting that our armed forces were overfunded then.
If we want to continue to lead in NATO, on the ground in the Baltics, in the air over the Black sea, and in the North sea and the north Atlantic in anti-submarine warfare, if we want to go on playing our part in the counter-Daesh coalition, if we want to prop up fragile democracies in Afghanistan, Ukraine and Nigeria, if we want to go on contributing to United Nations peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa, and if we want to maintain a presence in the Gulf and recommit ourselves to protecting international trade routes in Asia-Pacific, we must will the means to do so. That means that, along with the modernisation programme that I know my right hon. Friends are now considering, we must now set our minds—and this is the answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh)—to a higher defence target. I have said publicly that I think we should commit ourselves, under the next spending review, to meeting a target of at least 2.5% of GDP by the end of the current Parliament.
If there is one thing that Salisbury has taught us and we have learnt all over again, it is that what Russia really understands is weakness—countries that will not stand up for themselves, will not protect their people, and will not protect their values and the freedoms that they enjoy. We have never been such a country, and Salisbury should remind us all that we never should be.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThere can be no more important decision for this House to take than the renewal of Britain’s independent deterrent. The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), who is a friend of mine, did this House a disservice by criticising us earlier for groupthink. I have sat through every minute of this debate, and all the speeches, on both sides of the argument, have been powerful and passionate.
I pay tribute particularly to the speech of the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), who argued in favour of the motion, but equally to that of the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), who argued against it. I will also remember the speech of the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Toby Perkins), which was based on the evidence. He started on the other side of the argument, he listened to the evidence and over the years he has changed his mind. I also pay tribute to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt). He, too, opposes the position of his Front-Bench team. He said that he was a solo voice, but he is no less worthwhile for that. He made points about technology that I will reply to a little later.
If there was an example of groupthink, it was to be found in the Scottish National party—a party that ignores at least half of Scottish public opinion, and a party that is content to dispense with our deterrent but happy to cower under an American nuclear NATO umbrella.
The decision we are taking tonight is to approve four replacement submarines to serve us through the 2030s, the 2040s and the 2050s. Tonight, we make a judgment for the long term as to what we need as a country to keep our people safe, when we cannot know what nuclear threats may emerge 30 or 40 years from now. We can, in this House, all agree that a world without nuclear weapons would be a better world, but we have to face facts. The threats we face are growing. There are 17,000 nuclear weapons out there, and the Prime Minister reminded the House today of the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and the increased threat from Russian forces. Nuclear weapons are here, and they are not going to disappear. It is the role of Government to make sure that we can defend ourselves against them.
Defence, the No. 1 duty of Government, starts with deterrence—the principle that the benefits of any attack would be far outweighed by the gravity of its consequences for an aggressor. The point about deterrence, and our nuclear capability, is that it places doubt in the minds of our adversaries, whether they are nuclear states or rogue states, so that they can never be sure how we would retaliate. That is why the deterrent is not redundant. It is being employed every day and every night. We must be realistic about the growing nuclear threats to our country, and we must be equally realistic about the fact that the deterrent is a policy that we cannot now afford to relinquish.
That is why this Government are committed to building four nuclear ballistic missile submarines to replace our ageing Vanguard fleet when it goes out of service in the early 2030s. That commitment was clearly stated in the manifesto on which we were elected to govern, and it will enable us to maintain the unparalleled protection from the most extreme threats that our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent has afforded this nation, without a moment’s pause, for nearly 50 years under successive Conservative and Labour Governments. As the 2013 Trident alternatives review made unequivocally clear, no other system is as capable, resilient or as cost-effective as the Trident-based deterrent. There are no half measures here: a token deterrent would be no deterrent at all.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, speculated that our submarines might somehow become obsolete through new technology, but that is not the case. Submarines are designed to operate in isolation, and it is hard to think of a system less susceptible to cyber-attack or one better protected in the hiding place that is the ocean. Those who query whether our submarines would remain protected against such attacks should consider why the United States, Russia, China and France are now spending tens of billions of pounds renewing their own submarine-based weapons.
Let me turn to the question I was asked about cost. Yes, the Successor submarines are a serious investment. The cost of building the four boats is £31 billion spread over the 35 years of their life, with a £10 billion contingency on top. The in-service costs remain unchanged at, on average, about 6% of the annual defence budget.
This is the last opportunity for the Secretary of State. Please will he tell the House before we vote this evening what the total through-life cost of Trident renewal is? What is it?
Many Members have been in this debate all day and will have heard me give the cost for building the four submarines and the proportion that the costs will take when the submarines are in service.
My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), the hon. Member for Stirling (Steven Paterson) and the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) asked about the delivery of the Successor programme. It will be managed by a new delivery body for the procurement and in-service support of all nuclear submarines. That will ensure that, unlike in previous warship programmes, the submarines are delivered on time and on budget. If they are not, the principal contractors involved will suffer penalties as a result.
Finally, I was asked about disarmament. We certainly want to see a world free of nuclear weapons. We have made significant reductions to our nuclear forces. We have cut our nuclear stockpiles by over half since the end of cold war. I reduced the number of deployed warheads on each of our submarines from 48 to 40 last year, and we are continuing work to reduce our stockpile to no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s. We continue to play our part in talks through the non-proliferation treaty, and as has already been said, Britain has been leading the way in trying to get other countries to make progress, collectively, towards disarmament.
In conclusion, our continuous at-sea deterrent may have been born of the cold war, but it is no relic of the past. The cold war itself has been succeeded by a complex environment of emerging threats, rogue states and unpredictable non-state actors, some of whom have nuclear weapons, while others are intent on getting hold of them. Those threats will not disappear because we refuse to look at them. On the contrary, we must confront them head-on. We cannot predict the future, and we should not gamble with the long-term security of our citizens by assuming that no extreme threat will emerge while so many nuclear weapons remain. That is what this Government intend to do by replacing our Vanguard submarines to sustain the deterrent that has protected us successfully for so long.
As we contemplate this fundamental decision, I urge Members across the House to do what successive Governments have done and to do the right thing, not just for today, but for tomorrow, and vote to maintain our nuclear deterrent for as long as security conditions require it.
Question put.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. The hon. Member for Sevenoaks (Michael Fallon) has an intriguing approach to indicating his desire to be called—he raises his eyebrows in a very pointed fashion—but I can assure him that I was going to call him anyway.
Is it fair that businesses outside London and the south-east must compete for staff against public offices whose pay and conditions are set nationally? If local pay works so well and flexibly for the Courts Service, why would we be squeamish about extending it?
At the risk of my hon. Friend’s eyebrows going into overdrive, may I say that no final decisions have been made? He makes the argument. We have invited the pay review bodies to look at that proposal but no decision will be made until the evidence has been properly examined and the existence or otherwise of a strong rationale has been established.