Standards in Public Life

Debate between Michael Ellis and Jackie Doyle-Price

Tuesday 5th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

Well, in the first place, what I have set out to the House is a principle of natural justice that is true in every case. It would be true in the case of an allegation against anyone, in any circumstances. It is fair to complainants and those subject to allegations alike, and it applies all the time, so it is not a question of the individual facts that the right hon. Gentleman is alluding to. It is an overarching principle of fairness in life, which is to act on evidence, rather than gossip, innuendo and rumour. It may be that that gossip, innuendo and rumour later turn out to be true, but when persons in authority have to make decisions, they should do so properly and for good reason.

[Jackie Doyle-Price (Thurrock) (Con)]

I have listened to my right hon. and learned Friend very carefully, and I hear what he says about natural justice, but the Government Whips Office is meant to organise us to get the Government’s business done. That involves providing a safe space for discussions about policy issues, where there are differences on them, and a safe space for welfare. Notwithstanding what he said about natural justice, the very whiff of rumour and historical incident, which Simon McDonald referred to in his letter today, should have been enough to tell the Prime Minister that that appointment was not wise, and that he could have made use of the talents of the hon. Gentleman in question in a different Department, as he had done previously.

We have a real problem here. No. 10 has addressed the issue of its knowledge of these events with varying degrees of honesty; there has been, I think, half a dozen different variations in what it has said. I am very fond of my right hon. and learned Friend, and I think he is on a really sticky wicket today, but the way we move on from this is through a complete reset of standards, and a complete reboot of the ministerial code. What does he intend to do to convey to this House that the provisions of the ministerial code are taken seriously by this Government?

[Michael Ellis]

I can assure my hon. Friend that the codes of conduct—the codes of practice—are adhered to firmly by this Government and supported by this Prime Minister. She will know that any Prime Minister—in fact, any Secretary of State, Cabinet Minister, any Minister of the Crown—will regularly be dealing with a vast quantity of information. It is a question not of honesty or dishonesty, but of recalling every fact years after the event. If the circumstances were such that they were not firmly crystallised in any individual’s mind at the time they were being given that information, they can easily not be recollected. It does not necessarily immediately impugn dishonesty if someone does not recall something years after the event, so I ask her to bear that in mind.

Adviser on Ministerial Interests

Debate between Michael Ellis and Jackie Doyle-Price

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

Clearly, it is for that Select Committee to decide how it conducts its own affairs, but certainly as far as this motion is concerned, it would be unconstitutional. Rather than allowing the Executive to reflect on the role of the independent adviser, this motion is preoccupied—as I think the House knows—with immediate and short-term considerations seeking to capitalise on a current vacancy, which the Opposition are seeking to do for politically expedient reasons, without taking full account of the constitutional implications. The now repealed Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 is a prime example of what happens if one alters critical parts of the constitution without care.

According to the motion, referring back to what the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle) said, it would be for the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to appoint an individual to the new position of adviser on Ministers’ interests—not “adviser on the Committee’s interests”, but “adviser on Ministers’ interests”—and it would be for PACAC to refer matters that that Committee believes warrants consideration to its new adviser. With or without PACAC, that adviser would be able to instigate consideration of a matter, so the motion is an attempt to give the impression that powers have been transferred from the Executive to the legislature.

Given its novel character, perhaps it does not come as a surprise that the proposal stands in direct contradiction to the principle acknowledged in the code of conduct for MPs and the associated guide to the rules. That current document, which the House has approved, clearly states that

“Ministers are subject to…guidelines and requirements laid down by successive Prime Ministers in the Ministerial Code”.

The guide to the rules clearly recognises that those requirements

“are not enforced by the House of Commons”.

The Opposition are seeking to reverse that agreement by the House.

The challenge to constitutional norms is not confined to the operation of the Executive. The motion also proposes to change the way in which Parliament and its Committees conduct their work.

[Jackie Doyle-Price (Thurrock) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right when he quotes the code of conduct. However, without an ethics adviser to the Prime Minister, we as Members of this House are held to higher standards of behaviour through the code of conduct than Ministers are, including the Prime Minister. What can my right hon. and learned Friend tell us about how, going forward, the Prime Minister and the Government intend to ensure we can expect all Ministers to be held to the highest possible standards, just as we in this House are?

[Michael Ellis]

I can certainly say to my hon. Friend that those sorts of questions are being worked through now in detail.

As I said, the challenge to constitutional norms is not confined to the operation of the Executive. The motion specifies that

“the Adviser may advise the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the appropriate use of its powers to send for persons, papers and records”.

The power of Select Committees to send for persons, papers and records is delegated to Select Committees from Parliament itself, and exercised by Members of this House as directly elected representatives. Although Select Committees already have the ability to appoint specialist advisers, introducing a requirement to appoint an adviser whose remit includes advising the Committee on how to use its powers would be different, unusual and undesirable. Although Select Committees may wish to draw on the advice of experts from time to time, this expertise does not ordinarily extend to advising Committees on how to use their historical powers to gather evidence.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Debate between Michael Ellis and Jackie Doyle-Price

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 14th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

Good constitutional practice involves protecting the integrity of the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary and, in our view, the proposals do that and this amendment would not, so I agree with what my right hon. Friend says.

[Jackie Doyle-Price (Thurrock) (Con)]

I sat on the Joint Committee that reviewed the 2011 Act and we spent long, productive and interesting hours looking at it. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is really unproductive to look at our future arrangements in the context of what happened in 2019, just as it is to look at them in the context of what happened in 2010? The beauty of our system must be that the constitution can flex. Those were particularly unique circumstances in 2019, and we should not let them affect what happens going forward.

[Michael Ellis]

My hon. Friend is completely right. In fact, it is difficult to expostulate all the different scenarios that may occur in future, so it is best to avoid that, but we know what worked well—the status quo ante the 2011 Act.

As I say, we have experienced the consequences of a statutory scheme and we know what happened in 2019, but the amendment is also dangerously silent on critical questions of implementation and is likely to have undesirable consequences for our constitutional system. For example, it is likely to have negative consequences for the fundamental conventions on confidence. The privilege to request that the sovereign exercise the Dissolution prerogative is an Executive function enjoyed by virtue of the ability of the Government to command the confidence of the Commons. That is the alpha and omega of everything, and should not unduly constrained by any sort of prescriptive parliamentary process that would be disruptive and unhelpful when expediency is essential.