Adviser on Ministerial Interests

Debate between Michael Ellis and Andy Carter

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Michael Ellis]

The intent of the motion, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, is to stymie the Prime Minister’s power to have his own Ministers. [Interruption.] He knows full well that that is the intention behind this reckless motion, which seeks by proxy to turn those constitutional principles on their head, and would surely be a recipe for constitutional gridlock and confrontation. Hon. Members should perhaps consider for a moment what would happen under this new regime when the Prime Minister of the day disagrees with the parliamentary adviser. If the Prime Minister were to disagree with that adviser, he would be put under pressure to not have one of his own Ministers.

[Andy Carter (Warrington South) (Con)]

I heard the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle). Could the Minister clarify that, if that Select Committee should wish to appoint an adviser, it does not need a motion of the House to do so?

[Michael Ellis]

Clearly, it is for that Select Committee to decide how it conducts its own affairs, but certainly as far as this motion is concerned, it would be unconstitutional. Rather than allowing the Executive to reflect on the role of the independent adviser, this motion is preoccupied—as I think the House knows—with immediate and short-term considerations seeking to capitalise on a current vacancy, which the Opposition are seeking to do for politically expedient reasons, without taking full account of the constitutional implications. The now repealed Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 is a prime example of what happens if one alters critical parts of the constitution without care.

According to the motion, referring back to what the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle) said, it would be for the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to appoint an individual to the new position of adviser on Ministers’ interests—not “adviser on the Committee’s interests”, but “adviser on Ministers’ interests”—and it would be for PACAC to refer matters that that Committee believes warrants consideration to its new adviser. With or without PACAC, that adviser would be able to instigate consideration of a matter, so the motion is an attempt to give the impression that powers have been transferred from the Executive to the legislature.

Given its novel character, perhaps it does not come as a surprise that the proposal stands in direct contradiction to the principle acknowledged in the code of conduct for MPs and the associated guide to the rules. That current document, which the House has approved, clearly states that

“Ministers are subject to…guidelines and requirements laid down by successive Prime Ministers in the Ministerial Code”.

The guide to the rules clearly recognises that those requirements

“are not enforced by the House of Commons”.

The Opposition are seeking to reverse that agreement by the House.

The challenge to constitutional norms is not confined to the operation of the Executive. The motion also proposes to change the way in which Parliament and its Committees conduct their work.