2014 JHA Opt-out Decision

Michael Ellis Excerpts

Monday 15th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend. I have already quoted him and cited the important probing that he did back in those days.

Labour Members have a choice: either they misled and exaggerated the nature of the opt-out they negotiated or the Commission and the EU are demonstrating bad faith now. This Government, this House and the British public will reward neither of those basic binary options.

The Opposition’s other line of attack is to say that the Government’s intention of junking at least 100 measures is trivial because they are meaningless or obsolete. That prompts the question of why the shadow Home Secretary’s party signed up to them in such an unblinking and unthinking manner in the first place. It demonstrates that Labour Members are the dogmatists, whereas we mean to scrutinise this stuff far more carefully and substantively, measure by measure.

The motion gives the House's endorsement to the block opt-out, but it defers any opt-ins pending consultation, parliamentary debate and approval. As we have heard, a major downside of opting back into any measure is the creeping authority of the Commission and the Luxembourg Court. I think it is acknowledged across the board, certainly by Conservative Members, that whatever we do about the opt-ins, that is a serious defect in our current relationship. I believe that the British Supreme Court should have the last word on British criminal justice matters, for example, on the extradition of a UK citizen or on policing operations. I do not understand why, having created the Supreme Court amid huge fanfare, Labour Members now want to give away jurisdiction and, in effect, emasculate the word “Supreme” in its name.

One need only look at the recent ruling by the European Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg on life prison terms, the ruling on Abu Qatada, or the ongoing saga of prisoner voting, to see what happens when we submit to European judicial jurisdiction, albeit one in Strasbourg rather than Luxembourg. If anyone thinks that the Strasbourg Court is activist, they should look at the record of the Luxembourg Court, particularly in the emerging area of justice and home affairs in cases such as the Metock and Pupino judgments. I recognise that opting back into measures without accepting the jurisdiction of the Commission and Luxembourg Court is technically not within the terms of this decision process. However, have Ministers raised this now as part of the Prime Minister’s wider commitment to renegotiate Britain's relationship with the EU? Has this marker been laid down for the future? That is a vital issue.

There are plenty of other precedents and models for a more flexible relationship on justice and home affairs. Britain is not formally a party to Frontex, the EU’s external border agency, because we want to keep our national border controls, but we co-operate on risk analysis and joint operations. Does this hurt our influence or operations? No, not a bit of it. Frontex executive director Ilkka Laitinen says:

“we do not see any difference between our UK colleagues and the others”.

Outside Europe, the Strategic Alliance Cyber Crime Working Group comprising Britain, the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia—some of our closest partners—collaborates on cyber-crime and intelligence under a non-binding framework. It is regarded as the gold standard of operational co-operation. In terms of law enforcement co-operation at the operational level, Brussels is the odd one out in insisting that we sacrifice democratic control, bit by bit, as the price of operational co-operation. To what extent have Ministers explored these wider options for renegotiating our justice and home affairs relations with Brussels? I say that partly because it is a vital policy issue at stake but also because, at home and abroad, the crime and policing opt-out will be seen as a litmus test for Britain’s wider strategy of renegotiation. It is important for the credibility of that strategy that what we achieve on the crime and policing opt-out is understood as a point of departure, not the point of arrival.

Let me be clear about the positive alternative for our engagement with our EU partners on justice and home affairs. This is not all about knocking the European Union for ideological or dogmatic reasons. I see huge value in robust law enforcement co-operation at the operational level within Europe. The more flexible the EU can be on the structure of the legal form, the better operational friend they will find us in practice. Of course we want to exchange criminal records information, but we do not want the personal data of innocent British citizens washing around Europe, particularly with Governments—let us be honest about this—whom we would not trust to safeguard it. I have to say that I am not sure about trusting our own Government and Whitehall with lots of our personal data. If we do not trust Whitehall, what hope is there when it gets shipped off to Warsaw, Sofia and places like that?

Yes, we should engage in joint police operations, but there is no reason—none at all—for us to allow the initiation or oversight of such co-operation to be determined by EU authorities. There are also wider efforts to harmonise criminal law, which are wholly unnecessary and, to be frank, set a pretty bad precedent. Whether the question is which drugs to ban or how to define the delicate balance between hate crime and free speech, this House is the right place to pass British criminal law.

I want to touch on three specific measures. First, on Europol, I have no hesitation in saying that British police should share information and co-operate at an operational level. I worked directly with Europol and Eurojust when I was posted to The Hague during my time at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I see real value in the college structure that allows smoother day-to-day co-operation between national offices. Europol is not perfect as currently configured. It has all the features of bureaucracy and waste that we expect from the EU, including—believe it or not—the €35,000 contract it signed in 2010 to send flowers to itself.

For all its flaws, Europol serves an important function. However, it is not in the UK national interest to see Europol acquire supranational powers that trump national authority over our police. I am already nervous about the existing power of Europol to initiate investigations in the UK and the increasingly limited right to refuse.

The new regulation on Europol, which we will debate later, would also require UK police forces to give foreign police open access to their files. All this would be interpreted by the European Court of Justice. Step by step, the EU is heading towards a supranational model. What is our long-term vision? Should we not be saying, clearly and unambiguously, that we will not hold back willing EU states that want to go down this route, but that it is not a model we will subscribe to over the long term? I ask again whether Ministers have laid down a future marker on that point.

Secondly, on Eurojust, a college of collaborating national prosecutors is hugely beneficial. I would rather it did not splash out €300,000 on Mercedes-Benz, as it did in 2010, or €33,000 on its end-of-year bash, as it did in 2011. Still, co-operation is important.

The Commission, however, is poised to announce a new regulation to beef up Eurojust’s supranational powers and create the European public prosecutor. The announcement is expected shortly. In fact, it appears to have been delayed and one might wonder whether the reason for that was so that it would not take place before this debate, but perhaps we would flatter ourselves too much if we believed that. In any event, I ask again whether Ministers have laid down a marker whereby, if Eurojust evolves in this way, Britain must carve out a separate, bespoke relationship.

Finally, on the European arrest warrant, few Members would deny that fast-track extradition benefits the police, although I think that some of the representations from law enforcement agencies have been rather one-sided. Even Commander Gibson of the Metropolitan police has said that

“resources are stretched dealing with the amount of EAWs we receive”,

because the regime is lop-sided. For every EAW Britain issued in 2011, we got 33 back. We receive about a third of all European arrest warrants.

A lot of non-British nationals are involved and we do not have quite the same stake or interest in the safeguards to which they are subject, but the fact of the matter is that the increasingly broad net of the EAW sweeps up far too many innocent Britons who are, to be frank, hung out to dry by the British justice system.

[Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con)]

I was a fierce critic of the European arrest warrant, but does my hon. Friend agree that the changes envisaged by the Home Secretary make it completely different from that which has gone before? For example, the changes to proportionality restrict the extradition of people for petty and minor offences and the changes to bail mean that individuals can be bailed pending proceedings. There is also a change to charging decisions, because previously people could be extradited before the foreign country had even decided whether to charge them or not. Those decisions, taken by this Government, this House and the Home Secretary, mean that the European arrest warrant as we have known it will be completely different, so it can and should have our support.

[Mr Raab]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. I will come back to the proposals in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill and the extent to which we need to scrutinise them. I accept that this is an important opportunity to mitigate the blunt edges of the EAW, but the fact is that, at the moment, its broad net sweeps up too many innocent British nationals such as Andrew Symeou, Deborah Dark, Michael Turner, Edmond Arapi and, in my constituency, the retired judge Colin Dines, who suffered a stroke as a result of the pressure and stress of being subject to the warrant. We hope and expect that it will be dropped, but he and his family will still be left to pick up the pieces.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend and to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North (Nick de Bois) for the campaign that they have rightly pursued on behalf of that Enfield resident.

I made the point earlier about the distinction between our system of justice and certain others. Ours seeks to use proper evidence to identify individuals who are suspected of committing crimes, and then to proceed against them. We have to look at that in the context of other systems in which the investigation process is far too long and in which evidence that we would not regard as strongly probative can be used to launch an investigation that can result in someone being incarcerated for an inordinate period of time. The amendments to the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, which will amend the Extradition Act 2003, are vital in this context. I was delighted to see that one amendment provides that, in the absence of a prosecution decision, a court would have to consider that factor before allowing extradition. In fact, it would be barred where there was no clear prosecution decision to charge or try the individual concerned. I believe that the sort of monstrous situation in which Mr Symeou and others have found themselves can in large measure be avoided.

[Michael Ellis]

I hear what my hon. Friend says, but does he agree that the changes envisaged to the European arrest warrant as enunciated by the Home Secretary a few days ago make it a very different kettle of fish?

[Chris Bryant]

You’ve already made that point.

[Michael Ellis]

I see the Labour Benches are as full as I would expect them to be, which says something about the interest of the Opposition in this matter. Does my hon. Friend agree that the European arrest warrant will be something completely different because its charging decisions will be made beforehand, and that proportionality is another factor that must be carefully considered?

[Mr Buckland]

My hon. Friend is right to repeat a good point, and he should make no apology whatever for that. When I went to court I was always taught to make the point, make it again, and make it again if I thought the jury was in some way unsure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Reckless]

My hon. Friend is right to say that these matters could lead to significant delays in the courts, and a test of judicial review. Some of those procedures can go on for some time, and there would be the prospect of a number of appeals. I wonder whether the Government have taken the sequencing of these issues into account in their timing.

[Michael Ellis]

Would my hon. Friend accept that this concerns the potential retention of more powers from Europe, not more powers going to Europe for the first time? The provision to which he refers therefore does not apply.

[Mark Reckless]

No, I would not accept that for a minute. I was prepared for a repetitious intervention later, but my hon. Friend got in early. I must make some progress, and I will deal with his point.

The situation is the complete opposite of what my hon. Friend says. Under Maastricht—that great success hailed from the rooftops by an ex-Prime Minister who called it game, set and match to Britain—we had intergovernmental procedures and pillared structures, meaning that the Commission and the European Court of Justice would not be involved in foreign and justice and home affairs matters; they would be dealt with solely on an intergovernmental basis. Unfortunately, those pillars have been chipped away at, and with the Lisbon treaty, they were knocked over, hence today’s motion. The previous Labour Government could not say that the constitution was exactly the same as the Lisbon treaty—I am informed by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) that making out the two were different was one of the few face-saving fig leaves they picked on—and now these areas are being folded into the treaty structure originally envisaged under the Maastricht treaty. Rather than an opt-out from 130-odd measures, as the idea is styled, the proposal was—until the acceptance earlier of amendment (b), which was very significant—to opt into Commission enforcement of ECJ jurisdiction in 35 measures, including almost all of the most important.