Ukraine: Update

Debate between Matthew Offord and Ben Wallace

Monday 16th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, those supplies will become even more important and I will do everything I can to stimulate more of them. If right hon. and hon. Members have companies in their constituency that are keen or are facing barriers to do that, they should ensure that I am made aware and we will see what we can do. In the next few months, we have to do everything to stop the targeting of cities and infrastructure, and to help Ukrainians to see it through and defeat Russia. Targeting civilian blocks in Dnipro does nothing but commit murder.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

The removal of Russian forces from cities such as Kherson has led some civilians to return to their homes, even though the areas are contaminated with explosive weapons. Last week, as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on explosive threats, I met a Ukrainian MP who is seeking to put together a civil de-mining programme. Can the Secretary of State ensure that his officials will be available to meet me and other interested parties to put together a programme to help people as they return to conflict areas in an appropriate and timely manner?

[Mr Wallace]

I or my officials will be delighted to meet my hon. Friend. He will have noticed that in the statement, I announced £28 million for minefield breaching and bridging capabilities—combat engineering that is desperately needed.

Middle East: Security

Debate between Matthew Offord and Ben Wallace

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

No. The United States has said that it has deployed many of its troops in response to the rhetoric coming out of Iran, to ensure that it protects its forces, and of course that is the right thing to do. We have sent a small team to ensure that our military planners are properly enabled, and we have changed the posture of our forces in Iraq to ensure that they are currently focusing on their force protection. That does not mean that we are preparing to do anything else, nor does it mean that the United States is.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

In the last six months alone, Iran has disregarded four tenets of the JCPOA. In addition, Iran has refused to answer questions from the International Atomic Energy Agency about uranium particles found at a previously undisclosed location. We should not forget that the JCPOA allowed millions of pounds, in addition to manpower and resources, to pour into Syria to continue that war and kill thousands of people. Does the Secretary of State agree that it is simply incorrect for anyone to say that the JCPOA is alive and well?

[Mr Wallace]

I did not say the JCPOA was alive and well and all business as normal; I said it was not dead. The JCPOA is a deal that I believe was the right thing to do. I remember, even before it was formed, that I and even the Leader of the Opposition would urge the Bush Administration to talk to the Iranians to engage and seek a way through, and we came to an Iranian deal that we thought was correctly monitored and that the European powers thought was a good way through. However, my hon. Friend is right: it is not just that the United States withdrew; the Iranians have tested every single inch of the written agreement. That does not detract from the fact that we believe the JCPOA is the right way forward, and we will invest our time and effort in trying to make sure it has a future.

Far-right Violence and Online Extremism

Debate between Matthew Offord and Ben Wallace

Monday 18th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend knows all too well the cost of terrorism and indeed, in the society in which he lives, the cost of division. We have offered to the New Zealand authorities any help they wish to have, either in the intelligence or the police space, and we will continue to do that, as we will with the Netherlands authorities following the attack today. Ultimately, we must make sure that, when it comes to saying what is acceptable and what is not acceptable, linking violence and politics is not acceptable. That is a good starting point. We must make it very clear across our political discourse that the first point is that that is never acceptable—it is never acceptable to invoke that and to say that people should be lynched. We should never ever invoke violence in the same breath as politics.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

I feel that it is a matter of some regret that this urgent question has been framed as one of right-wing extremists, because there are also left-wing extremists; this is terrorism, pure and simple. I am proud that my first question in this House was to ask for the finances to provide security at Jewish schools in my Hendon constituency. Indeed, the Community Security Trust is based in Hendon and provides that security. Now we need to make the same call on behalf of Muslim schools and Islamic institutions in our constituencies. Will the Minister take that suggestion to the Treasury and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and ask for resources to be made available to these communities, because any kind of extremism is not acceptable?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend is right. As I said in my statement, as the threat moves, we will tack with it. The Home Secretary’s first point of call is within the Department and then it is the Treasury. We are determined to make all our places of worship safe, and we will do what is necessary.

Proscription of Hezbollah

Debate between Matthew Offord and Ben Wallace

Thursday 25th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

No. I should press on before giving way.

The Government do not condone any terrorist activity and we continue to press Hezbollah to end its status as an armed group and to participate in the Lebanese democratic process on the same terms as other political parties. As hon. Members will be aware, groups that are not included on lists of proscribed organisations are not free to spread hate, fund terrorist activity or incite violence as they please. Not being proscribed does not mean that groups can do lots of things that we would view as illegal.

[Dr Offord]

Let me cut through the rhetoric and ask a simple question: what does the Minister think is the motivation of British nationals flying the flag of a foreign political organisation whose stated aims are to kill every Jew and to annihilate the state of Israel?

[Mr Wallace]

I am not going to speak on behalf of protestors walking down Oxford Street whom I have never met. I listened to the points my hon. Friend made earlier about frustrations with the police taking action, and what I will say is that the police already have comprehensive powers to take action against individuals under criminal law, regardless of whether an organisation is proscribed. The hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) also made that point from the Opposition Front Bench.

Whether it is part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, or part 3 itself, which is about racial hatred, that Act gives police the powers to prosecute people. It is perfectly possible for someone to stand up with a national flag and incite hatred or religious hatred, and to then find themselves prosecuted for and convicted of a criminal offence. Not proscribing Hezbollah in no way prevents the police or the Crown Prosecution Service from taking action against that type of incitement. I certainly hope that the CPS and the police listen to the concerns expressed by Members today—I shall certainly raise those concerns when I next see them.

I heard the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers) that not proscribing Hezbollah somehow hinders our police; it absolutely does not. Those people might be involved in drug dealing or money laundering. I was previously Minister for Security; I am now Minister for Security and Economic Crime. There is a plethora of offences on the statute book and powers that we can use to weaken Hezbollah and prevent it from doing things that are illegal either in the criminal space or in ways that go against our national security. This does not hinder the police in the way being alluded to, which is that without the proscription of the other half, this country will somehow be unable to protect its citizens and its interests from Hezbollah’s actions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I hear what my hon. Friend is saying. There are lots of reasons, but perhaps I can offer the House one reason. Members may not agree with it, but it is one that I felt at first hand when I was in Lebanon on behalf of the Government. We believe that the best way to weaken Hezbollah in the region and further afield is to have a strong state of Lebanon. The stronger the state of Lebanon, which represents multi-faith groups, has a democracy and Speakers of Parliament and recognises the individual religious minorities in the country, the weaker Hezbollah will be. It is not in our interests to have a weak, fractured Lebanon.

We should not forget that Hezbollah’s birth and strengths started in the civil war of Lebanon, when Lebanese were killing Lebanese, Druze were killing Muslims, and Muslims were killing Christians. We think that the way to ensure that Hezbollah is contained and persuaded to follow the course of peace—I listened to the hon. Member for Dudley North (Ian Austin) who may or may not believe this and many of us may agree with him—is to have a strong state of Lebanon. That is in our interests.

The British Government assist with aid, help to train the Lebanese army, so that it can defend the state, and encourage Ministers of all faiths in that Government who believe in Lebanon, rather than in a non-military actor or an overburdened group of one minority or another. That is one logical reason why I believe we have to take some of these difficult decisions and find a balance.

When one visits Lebanon and meets the Ministers struggling to survive in a rough neighbourhood, trying to build a nation state and living with a shadow over their shoulder, as we have discussed, one realises that their best defence is a strong and capable state of Lebanon, with all its safeguards and its constitution. They would be worse off, the region would be worse off and we would be worse off if that state was weakened by a fractious civil war.

[Dr Offord]

That is all very well about Lebanon, but my concern is the constituents of Hendon, when they cannot go into central London and the police are overstretched, when they are spat at and called Nazis and when people are vile and anti-Semitic towards them. My concern is the people of Hendon—the people of this country.

[Mr Wallace]

I have listened to my hon. Friend. First, the people of this country will not be better off with an even more fractious, divided and murderous middle east. Secondly, he will know that many of the things he has just mentioned are already criminal offences and can be prosecuted.

[Dr Offord]

Then why aren’t they?

[Mr Wallace]

Well, as I said earlier, that is a matter for the police, if people are spitting and inciting hatred. In this country, we have operational independence between Ministers and the police. We can talk about whether we are giving them the right resources—we regularly do across the Dispatch Boxes—but fundamentally what will protect my hon. Friend’s constituents, whether they are Christian, Jewish or Muslim, is for Parliament to give our law enforcement and security organisations powers and to fund them, so that they can use those powers to keep us safe by dealing with the threat based on intelligence, as we receive it, and ensuring that we deradicalise people who might be attracted to hate.

If my hon. Friend’s constituents are being abused, that is not a failure of the Government; it is a question to ask the police. We will help him ensure that the police deal with that, but I have to say that it is not because of the partial proscription or de-proscription of Hezbollah. He must understand—I am sure that he does—that a stable middle east is the best way to provide long-term peace for Europe and the United Kingdom. We do not want an unstable middle east at all.

I have listened to the debate and heed the very valid points that have been made by Members on both sides of the House. My commitment as Security Minister is to continue to keep groups such as Hezbollah under review. We will continue to talk to our friends and allies in the region and around the world, but we will fundamentally focus on what we need to do to keep the United Kingdom safe, for the short and long term. I will certainly do my best to encourage the police, other political parties and all our supporters and friends to ensure that hate is not tolerated, no matter who it is aimed at.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Matthew Offord and Ben Wallace

Wednesday 2nd March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

No, I do not accept that. The changes to the welfare system have proved that what we should do is make work pay. It is having a positive effect, as we see an increase in employment in Northern Ireland. More people and families are going out and securing a wage. That is the best way to lift people out of poverty.

[Dr Matthew Offord (Hendon) (Con)]

7. What steps the Government are taking to support the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the security services in tackling terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Iran (Joint Plan of Action)

Debate between Matthew Offord and Ben Wallace

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Offord]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. He has asked a question, as identified by the House of Commons Library, on the effect of the P5 plus 1, Iran and the joint plan of action, and the continuing manufacture of new centrifuge devices. We know that the technology, which has many applications, continues to be used, but we do not know for what purpose. That remains a great concern, and I do not believe the joint plan of action addresses it.

On Iran’s agreement to freeze the enrichment and halt the production of uranium, Iran has halted the installation of new enrichment centrifuges and has ceased the installation of new components at the Arak reactor. It has allowed the IAEA to make inspections at Natanz, Arak and Fordow. I acknowledge that the regime has granted the international community some concessions. We must be aware, however, that in return, the P5 plus 1 agreed to provide £6 billion to £7 billion in sanctions relief, of which roughly £4.2 billion would be oil revenue frozen in foreign banks. The P5 plus 1 allow temporary relief on some sanctions, including trade in gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, auto parts and aircraft parts. The P5 plus 1 have also agreed not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months during the agreement.

Although the interim accord interrupts Iran’s nuclear progress for the first time in nearly a decade, it requires Iran to make only a modest draw-down payment on the central problem. Iran has benefited from disproportionate sanctions relief in exchange for cosmetic concessions that it can do away with in a matter of weeks. It has been rewarded with sanctions relief despite remaining unbowed in its demand to continue uranium enrichment, which is the root of the international community’s concern. Most importantly, the deal fails to dismantle many of the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without the requirement to dismantle a single centrifuge, Iran will remain a threshold military nuclear power. It will retain the capability to break across that line at any time it chooses.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend dispute the national intelligence estimates from the United States of 2007 and 2012, which directly contradict his proposition that Iran is on the verge of being able to break out in such a way? The United States national intelligence estimates are major pieces of work, and they are not done lightly. Does he dispute them?

[Dr Offord]

Yes, I dispute them. I am not a chemical engineer or a nuclear engineer, but on the basis of my research and the evidence I have read, I dispute those estimates and I maintain that Iran is on the verge of making a breakthrough. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), said in the House on Monday, with as many as 10,000 centrifuges in operation already, Iran retains the capability to break out and produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in as little as two months. The deal does not roll back the vast majority of the advances that Iran has made in the past five years, which have drastically shortened what nuclear experts call its “dash time” to a bomb—the minimum time that it would take to build a weapon if Iran’s Supreme Leader or military decided to pursue that path.

Most concerning of all, the world’s leading powers have tacitly recognised Iran’s right to enrichment, which has been the Islamic Republic’s key demand for many years. The interim agreement states that the permanent deal will involve

“a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters”,

but the deal abandons the demand made by the six United Nations resolutions that Iran must halt all enrichment. That may undermine confidence in global non-proliferation norms. Iranian state media carried boasts by, among others, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Affairs Minister Javad Zarif that the US had caved in on its long-standing position and recognised Iran’s right to enrich. President Rouhani said:

“No matter what interpretations are given, Iran's right to enrichment has been recognised.”

He went on to say:

“"Do you know what the Geneva agreement is? It means the superpowers’ surrender to the great Iranian nation. The Geneva agreement means that the world accepts [Iran’s] civil nuclear technology, which we achieved through the efforts and the sacrifice of our young scientists”.

The agreement does not stop Iran enriching uranium to a low level of 3.5% or compel it to dismantle any of its existing centrifuges, which can be used for military purposes. Iran can continue to enrich uranium with its 10,190 operational IR1 centrifuges. They are in addition to 8,000 machines that have been installed but are inactive. Iran can also continue to build new centrifuges to replace those that wear out.

The situation has not been lost on the Iranian rulers. In January this year, President Rouhani said that there would be no destruction of existing centrifuges “under any circumstances.” Iran’s Foreign Affairs Minister said in December last year:

“The structure of our nuclear program has been maintained and the 20 percent enrichment can be resumed in less than 24 hours”.

A month later, he said:

“We did not agree to dismantle anything”.

In January, Iran’s Parliament introduced a Bill to step up enrichment to the threshold of 60% fissile purity. That would put Iran on the technical verge of 90% fissile purity, which is enough for the core of a nuclear bomb. At least 218 of the Iranian Parliament’s 290 members have expressed support for the measure. The Bill’s supporters say that uranium refined to 60% concentration would be used to fuel nuclear-powered submarines. Some analysts have speculated that the Iranian Government might be using Parliament as a bargaining tool in nuclear talks with the P5 plus 1, because they would have no choice but to obey such a Bill if the Parliament passed it.

The deal also leaves untouched Iran’s portfolio of 1,008 installed advanced IR2m centrifuges, which can speed up break-out times using 3.5% enriched uranium. This month, Iran revealed that it had developed a new generation of centrifuges that are 15 times more powerful than those currently in use, and Iranian officials have stated that the centrifuges do not violate the joint plan of action. Although enrichment using those machines has not started, the vast majority of them are fully installed and under vacuum, which means that Iran could quickly begin feeding natural uranium into those cascades and more than double its enrichment capacity.

Centrifuges are not the only concern. Iran is in the process of constructing a 40 MW heavy water research reactor, for which there is limited peaceful civilian purpose. When it is operational, that facility at Arak will be able to produce plutonium, which is one of two substances that can form the core of a nuclear weapon. Iran is not required to dismantle the incomplete heavy water research reactor or convert the plant into a light water reactor, which would be less useful for military purposes.

Under the joint plan of action, Iran agreed to freeze progress on the Arak heavy water research reactor and not to commission it or transfer fuel or heavy water to the site. It also agreed not to produce or test additional fuel or install remaining components. The interim deal does not explicitly prevent Iran from manufacturing components offsite for Arak’s nuclear reactor that could then be installed later. Iran claims that its purpose is only to make medical isotopes and conduct research, but western countries believe that it could also produce plutonium, which is the plan B route to producing a full nuclear weapon.

The one mechanism we held over Iran was the sanctions, but the interim deal has unravelled the internationally imposed sanction regime that has taken years to enforce. Sanctions were having the desired effect, so why did we take a step back from a method that was working and put trust in a state that has given us no reason to assume that that trust will be guarded? However limited, the relaxation of sanctions will relieve the pressure that has brought Iran to seek an agreement, by giving direct financial relief and indirectly restoring confidence in the Iranian economy.

Many nations and companies—as well as the Iranians themselves—have interpreted the recent agreement as the beginning of the end of the sanctions regime. It is likely that a number of countries will apply pressure to resume trade with Iran, including its former key trade partners, such as South Korea, Japan, India and China. Within weeks of the interim deal, Iran’s petrochemical sector alone had appreciated by $9 billion—that is a capital gain of almost 40%, generated entirely by a new market psychology that bets on the end of sanctions. On top of that, Iran is already making efforts to recapture its dominant role in OPEC.

All of that goes to ensure that the agreement is rewarding Iran despite the fact that its long history of clandestine nuclear activities, support for international terrorism and repeat calls for the destruction of Israel are cause for legitimate trepidation and scepticism over its intentions. Although President Rouhani’s negotiating team has reportedly been more constructive in talks, supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say on major issues, including national security and Iran’s nuclear programme. Most worryingly, Iran continues to support terrorism in the region. It is a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hamas, Hezbollah and insurgencies against allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran agreed to the deal as part of a long history of exploiting international talks to buy time and further advance its nuclear programme. The six-month timetable to reach a final agreement could be extended by a further six months by mutual consent. President Rouhani has previously spoken of Iran buying time to advance its nuclear programme. In 2004, he gave a speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, in which he explained how he was playing for time during the nuclear talks he was conducting with the EU3. He said:

“While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the [nuclear conversion] facility in Isfahan. By creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work there”.

Answers to the parliamentary questions I have asked provide little assurance that the IAEA will ensure that inspections take place. Iran has agreed to the IAEA conducting only limited inspections at the main enrichment facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Its history of deception about its nuclear projects requires higher levels of accountability. Iran is not required to provide unfettered access to its full portfolio of nuclear facilities, including many underground and undeclared sites where the USA, Europe and Israel believe that hidden enrichment facilities might exist. It is not possible to rule out the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran without it agreeing to allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections anywhere beyond declared atomic installations under the agency’s additional protocol regime.

Iran is still not required to grant IAEA inspectors access to the nuclear-related Parchin site, a suspected weapons-testing facility, but it is required to declare all facilities containing nuclear material under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under the joint statement on a framework for co-operation between Iran and the IAEA, Iran has agreed to give the IAEA information on the 16 sites designated for the construction of new nuclear power plants, clarification about its announcement about new enrichment facilities, and information about all new research reactors. Fully verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities will require a level of co-operation and information-sharing between the IAEA, the western powers and Iran that is probably unprecedented for one country’s nuclear programme.

The overt military actions of missile development are also of concern. The interim agreement does not include a promise by Iran to abstain from pursuing work on ballistic missiles or weaponisation. UN Security Council resolution 1929 requires Iran to cease activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

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[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) on securing this debate. Iran is a topic that often needs a good airing. At this critical time, it is important that we give strong scrutiny to the Geneva accord agreed at the end of last year.

First, may I declare my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests? I am chairman of the all-party group on Iran and have been for the past eight years. I have twice visited Iran—including recently, three or four weeks ago. I have also visited on a number of occasions the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna at the United Nations.

We always have to go back to the beginning on Iran. We have to remember that the nuclear programme for Iran did not start last Tuesday or last year; in fact, it started in the mid-1960s, when the Shah was in charge—funded by the United States, ironically. General Electric came to its aid, to develop the first reactor in the heart of Tehran. Iran has had nuclear ambitions, whether civil or military, for decades. They have been part of its psyche. It lives in a rough neighbourhood; it has rivalries that we can, perhaps, only understand as having similar aspects to those in the cold war and with the Soviet Union; and it is surrounded by ethnically and religiously different economic and military rivals. That has often driven some of its insecurities.

The history of the nuclear programme is long and sporadic and it has jumped, depending on which country has helped Iran. The Russians helped it build a reactor in the past, the United States has done so and I suspect that the North Koreans have, too. Certainly, other members of the international community have stuck their oars in. That is why there is a rather illogical, sporadic and often bizarre civil nuclear programme.

Iran is not the only country in that region to have a civil nuclear programme. The United Arab Emirates is developing one right now, as we speak. Many middle east countries have sought to acquire nuclear technology. The most striking examples are India and Pakistan, which developed in total secrecy a nuclear weapons programme that ended up in actual nuclear weapons. We in the west either chose not to know or did not seem to know.

The process goes on. It is not new. It has, unfortunately, become entwined with the Iranian psyche and its view of itself in the world. However, let us remember that middle east politics is often as much about rhetoric as about action. Throughout the 1980s, for example, at the height of Ayatollah Khomeini’s rhetoric against the country of Israel, Israel sold Iran nearly half a billion dollars’ worth of arms. In fact, Israel broke the UN sanctions on arms embargo to Iran and Iraq in that period. It suited Israel at that stage to ignore the rhetoric and to side with Iran against Iraq, while the west was unfortunately supporting Iraq, by supplying it with some pretty dubious methods.

We have to go forward. In 2001, Iran helped the west bring down the Taliban. We might remember the Lion of Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was the west’s favoured leader of the Northern Alliance—the man who was going to liberate Afghanistan on our behalf. The irony was that he was Iran’s man in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance helped America and Britain in their targeting and intelligence gathering against the Taliban.

Throughout these processes, Iran has stepped forward, sometimes against its nature, but sometimes for its own self-interest, and it has often been rewarded by immediate rejection. The “axis of evil” phrase was used discended on Iran, despite its assistance to the British and Americans in getting rid of the Taliban.

Trust is the problem in much of this, whether in respect of the nuclear programme, human rights or exporting terrorism. The Iranians’ knowledge of Britain’s poor behaviour towards it in the last centuries is better than mine. The Iranians understand that we supported the constitutional revolution in 1906 and then undermined it, when we removed the democratic constitutional revolution, to put in a Shah, and then we moved that Shah when he became too friendly with the Nazis. Then we moved their Prime Minister in the ’50s and put in another Shah. They understand that we—the United Kingdom—play power games and that we are not to be trusted, in the same way that we, quite rightly, have every reason not to trust Iran in the near future.

We have not trusted Iran on its nuclear programme. It has hidden things and has certainly done its best. There is proof that, in 2003 and 2002, it acquired from the AQ Khan network—not funded by Iran, but by one of its regional rivals—military plans for a weapons programme.

Trust is failing on both sides. That has been the real issue. I do not argue with my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon that, really, at the heart of the Geneva accord, the issue is about trying to fix this trust and to see what steps we can take to build together. We will have to stick our neck out to build that trust. That is the problem. I understand; if I was living in Israel right now, I would be worried about that. It is not me under direct threat from Iran. In fact, British national interests and British security are not threatened by Shi’a Islam, but by Salafist Sunnis emanating from al-Qaeda. They are the people who will blow up our trains and tube stations. That is nothing to do with Iran; that is to do with other major players in the region, who are either tacit or have yet to deal with that problem.

If I was in Israel, of course I would be worried and rightly so. But I also recognise that, within Israel, there is a split about the extent to which the Iranians are rational or irrational and how much Iran really wants to do nuclear damage or blow up Israel. Meir Dagan, the ex-head of Mossad—not a boy scout organisation—said on the record that Iran is rational and that he does not think it intends to go to that next step.

Nevertheless, the situation is real and we should look at the facts and the evidence as they are presented. The first things that I look at are the national intelligence estimates of the United States, the first of which, in 2007, was made under George Bush. The estimates are put together by the National Security Council, the CIA and the Pentagon. President Bush was not known as a dove on any areas in the middle east, but the national intelligence estimate produced at the time said, “We do not believe—we believe they did previously—that they are now on the verge of a break-out”. That is an important document. It was dismissed at the time by the hawks, but in 2012, under President Obama, another one appeared that effectively reaffirmed that national intelligence estimate.

[Dr Offord]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s counter-view on some of these issues. It is easy to talk about organisations presenting reports. I have found the 2012 Institute for Science and International Security report, containing information from former weapons inspectors, who disagreed with Binyamin Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly in 2012 and felt that Iran would have a nuclear capability within months. It is okay to say that certain organisations say that is not possible. Equally, it is valid to say that other organisations contradict that point of view.

[Mr Wallace]

I register the point, but these are not national institutes. This is the CIA and the Pentagon—okay, they do not have the best track record on intelligence, but they never gave the benefit of the doubt to the doves; they always gave it to the hawks. These are major national institutions—Government organisations—that share intelligence with Israel and all the other allies that we have, so they are certainly serious. It is important to look at that fact.

We should not pass over the grand bargain offered by Iran in 2003. The grand bargain was something that every hon. Member in this Chamber would have signed up to tomorrow. It was an offer by Iran to suspend enrichment; to join the additional protocol, with further and more intrusive inspection than even Britain has under the non-proliferation treaty; and to demilitarise Hezbollah. It was even to have gone as far as to recognise Israel, which many countries in the middle east, which may be against Iran but are not necessarily allies, still do not recognise. They may help Israel, but they still have not taken the next step. That grand bargain was rejected out of hand by the White House.

People sitting now in Iran would say, “Hang on, we offered all this and this was all thrown away”. That goes back to the heart of the matter. The trail of trust has been full of missed opportunities on both sides. We really need to try to rebuild it. I commend this Government, the Obama Administration and the P5 plus 1 for sticking their necks out.

I do not mind who visits Iran. I have been to Iran, but I do not approve of what the Iranians do to Christians, Baha’is or other minorities. I condemn that absolutely, but I believe that visiting Iran does not mean supporting Iran. If people criticise or propose policy against a country, it is a good idea for them to take time to visit that country. That is important. I do not sit around and get involved in debates on Israel because I have not been there. One day I might decide to do so, mainly because it affects other middle east policy that I might want to discuss. Going there is important.