Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Martin Horwood Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Cathy Jamieson (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab/Co-op)]

I welcome the opportunity to contribute to the debate, and, in particular, to follow so many hon. Members with great expertise in the matters that we are discussing. I do not claim to have such expertise, but it is important to put on record some of my concerns and those conveyed to me by constituents, including women—I note in passing that I am now the only female Member in the Chamber.

It is important for us to debate a situation that continues to develop on a daily basis in Libya, as well as wider issues relating to the middle east and north Africa. There are far too many of those issues for me to be able to cover them in a short speech, so I shall focus on matters involving Libya.

Like many other Members, I thought long and hard before deciding to support the Government in their Libya mission. I am not naturally inclined towards armed interventions, and many of my constituents expressed concern about what such an intervention would lead to, but—albeit with a heavy heart—I felt it necessary for us to enforce UN security resolution 1973 in view of the rapid deterioration towards a one-sided armed conflict and the humanitarian crisis that was likely to follow, particularly given the number of non-military casualties.

I have no doubt that the British forces have performed their role in an exemplary and professional fashion, as they always do, and that they have contributed significantly to the protection of the civilian population. As we have already heard, however, the challenge now is to define our future role and establish at what stage we will feel able to withdraw. Regretfully, I have to say that there currently seems to be a lack of strategic direction. In recent weeks, the Government appear to have made tactical and operational decisions that begin to depart from the original mandate of protecting civilians. The Government’s decision to provide telecommunications, body armour and a number of military advisers seems to me, and to many of my constituents, to have more to do with a military situation developing on the ground in Libya than with simply enforcing the resolution. I also regret having to express the view that the Government have failed to communicate to the public, and indeed to Parliament, the exact role of those people in a developing situation. For how long will they be deployed, and how does their role relate to the wider remit of protecting civilians? Those questions remain unanswered.

It seems that none of the measures represents a breach of the mandate provided by the United Nations and approved by the House, but they suggest a move towards measures that are beyond what I expected in supporting the Government when we debated the issue. Perhaps, when he winds up the debate, the Secretary of State for International Development will identify some specific issues and make the case for the strategic role of the advisers in resolving the crisis. Specifically, the advisers are there as a result of the Foreign Secretary’s assertion to the House on 26 April that

“it is impossible to see a way of securing the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolution while Colonel Gaddafi remains.” —[Official Report, 26 April 2011; Vol. 527, c. 40.]

A number of Members have commented on that statement. Is the mission now to remove Gaddafi at all costs, rather than simply to ensure the protection of civilians? If the Foreign Secretary’s statement is informing strategic military decisions, the Government must be absolutely clear and up front. That is vital in the context of some of the comments made today about a possible move towards identifying different targets.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

Does the hon. Lady appreciate the distinction between the wishes of the British Government, in terms of someone who is now wanted by the International Criminal Court, and what the UN resolution sanctions in terms of the military mission by the international community? Those are two different things.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

In the House on 21 March, the Prime Minister said in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) about the current violence in north Africa and the middle east:

“I agree with the hon. Lady that there will be lessons to learn from the conflict for the future.”—[Official Report, 21 March 2011; Vol. 525, c. 707.]

I want to focus on one area where I believe that there is a very important lesson to be learned—arms export policy. That question arises because in the two years prior to the Arab spring, under both the current and previous Governments, arms export licences for weapons that can be used for internal repression were granted on an extremely wide scale throughout north Africa and the middle east, and those export licence approvals have been shown to have been grievously mistaken.

The policy was clearly stated on 18 February by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt):

“The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts or”—

this is the key policy statement—

“which might be used to facilitate internal repression.”

The recent Committees on Arms Export Controls report sets out quarter by quarter since the beginning of 2009 the details of the arms export licences that were approved in each period. That shows, for example, sub-machine-guns and sniper rifles to Bahrain, and components for semi-automatic pistols and sub-machine-guns, artillery computers, combat shotguns, intelligence equipment and small arms ammunition to Libya. Since the publication of that report, the latest quarterly report has been published, taking us up to the last quarter of 2010—in other words, to a matter of two or three weeks before the start of the Arab spring. It shows that even in that period we were exporting equipment for sniper rifles to Bahrain and components for combat aircraft, military equipment for initiating explosives and weapon night-sights to Libya.

If one Government statement reflects the over-optimism that has afflicted both the current and the previous Governments about the risks that are run in exporting certain types of weapons to authoritarian regimes, it is to be found in the 2008 annual report on strategic arms exports. There was a case study of a licence application for armoured personnel carriers for Libya, which concluded:

“There remain wider human rights risks in Libya, but it was judged very unlikely that these vehicles would be used to carry out abuses. As a result it was concluded, with reference to the Consolidated Criteria, that there was not a clear risk that these vehicles would be used for internal repression and the licence was approved.”

I think that conclusion was symptomatic of the policy followed by both Governments.

[Martin Horwood]

I strongly support many of the points that my right hon. Friend is making, and it is absolutely proper to raise this issue. However, we both welcome the fact that the current Government have revoked more than 150 such arms licences granted by the Labour Government, and we both welcome the fact that this Government are currently actively reviewing the whole policy of arms exports.

[Sir John Stanley]

That anticipates the point that I am about to make.

Britain was, of course, by no means the only country to engage in this degree of over-optimism and, as has been said, the Government have sought to retrieve the position. First, they have announced the revocation of a substantial number of arms export licences. Indeed, according to the latest figures, between 27 January and 9 March this year more than 150 previously granted arms export licences were revoked. That serves to highlight the scale of the previous misjudgment.

Why, however, are those revocations limited to just four countries—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain? Why have there been no revocations of arms exports to Syria, for example? Why, too, have there been no revocations of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, whose British-made armoured personnel carriers have rolled into Bahrain and are therefore complicit, as it were, in the appalling abuses of human rights there? Of course, I understand that Saudi Arabia is big money, is big oil, and is useful intelligence, but can the Government really justify such a blatant degree of inconsistency in their revocations policy?

Secondly, I greatly welcome the review of arms export licences, but it has been initiated only in relation to north Africa and the middle east, while recent events also suggest that there are serious questions to be raised about arms export licence policy for weapons that can be used for internal repression in relation to authoritarian regimes worldwide. Sadly, authoritarian regimes extend from the boundaries of the European Union to the very furthest east. There are too many authoritarian regimes in Africa and some in central and south America. The current review should therefore be extended to cover authoritarian regimes worldwide. The Committees on Arms Export Controls has recommended that, and I earnestly hope that the Government will accept that recommendation and the other recommendations in our report.