Chilcot Inquiry and Parliamentary Accountability Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Chilcot Inquiry and Parliamentary Accountability

Martin Docherty-Hughes Excerpts
Wednesday 30th November 2016

(7 years, 11 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Martin Docherty-Hughes Portrait Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
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I also congratulate the hon. Member for Witney (Robert Courts) on his maiden speech, although I note that he had 12 minutes, while I had only six for mine. I have a feeling of déjà vu.

As I did in the two previous debates on this issue, I start by declaring an interest: my brother served on the frontline in Iraq and served two terms of active duty in Afghanistan. I do not therefore participate lightly in this debate.

Many in this Chamber and outside never thought we would reach this point in placing a motion before the House with cross-party support calling on the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee to conduct a further specific examination of this contrast between public and private policy and to report to the House on any actions it considers necessary. It was a disastrous series of events that still dogs the path to peace in the middle east and has played a part in undermining unity in the western democracies against an expansion in non-democratic forces both near and far. It was the former Member for Sedgefield who stated the obvious. We need only look at a section of a note from him to the then President of the United States headed “Extending War Aims”:

“There is a real willingness in the Middle East to get Saddam out but a total opposition to mixing this up with the current operation. All said: we know what you want, you can do it, but not whilst you are bombing Afghanistan....I have no doubt that we need to deal with Saddam. But if we hit Iraq now, we would lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU and my fear is the impact of all that on Pakistan. However, I am sure we can devise a strategy for Saddam deliverable at a later date.”

It would seem that the soothsayer whispering a self-fulfilling prophecy in the ear of the then President of the United States had a clear picture of the outcome of the decision to invade Iraq: Saddam removed—done; losing support in the Arab world—done; allowing the Government of the Russian Federation to cast themselves as a defender of state sovereignty—done; a divided Europe—done; undermining the stability of the state of Pakistan—done; inflaming a sectarian divide—done; undermining the credibility of liberal democracy—done. Therefore, to restore the integrity of our sense of democracy it is critical that the House recognises that the inquiry has substantiated the fact that the former Member for Sedgefield and others misled Parliament on the development of the then Government’s policy towards the invasion of Iraq.

This position cannot and will not—at least not in this debate—go unchallenged. Even the former Member for Sedgefield’s advisers suggested in their evidence to the inquiry that a decision to support regime change in Iraq had been made by the time of, or at, the Crawford Ranch summit in April 2002. For example, Sir David Manning, foreign policy adviser to the former Prime Minister, gave evidence to the inquiry, stating:

“On the one hand the prime minister was very clearly urging the president”—

of the United States—

“to go back or adopt the UN route and coalition strategy but was absolutely prepared to say that at the same time he was willing to contemplate regime change if this didn’t work.”

Fundamentally, as far as I and my SNP colleagues are concerned, this undermined the credibility of the UN and its ability to play its true role in delivering peace.

In May 2005, The Sunday Times published a leaked classified document written by the Cabinet Office’s defence and overseas secretariat, entitled “Iraq: conditions for military action”. It stated:

“When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April, he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met”.

Then in a memo dated 28 March, ahead of the summit, Colin Powell himself told the president:

“On Iraq, Blair will be with us should military options be necessary.”

If we can achieve anything in this debate, surely, as I have stated previously, it must be to enhance the debate about the nature of our constitutional democracy and the duties of the Government in their attitude to war and peace. I will reiterate again, as I did on the publication of the report, that the words,

“I will be with you, whatever”,

will be forever associated with the former Member for Sedgefield and will be his political epitaph. They will forever live, too, in the scars of those who were casualties of the war, whether members of our armed services or Iraqi civilians, and of our democracy itself. That is the true legacy of

“I will be with you, whatever.”