Arms Trade Treaty

Debate between Martin Caton and Nia Griffith

Thursday 12th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Martin Caton]

I completely agree; my hon. Friend has made it unnecessary for me to give part of my speech, but I will mention an alternative option, if the worst comes to the worst, for trying to get something really valuable.

I am chair of the newly formed all-party group on weapons and protection of civilians. We have made it our first priority to work for an arms trade treaty that is robust and workable. We were persuaded to do so by the group of non-governmental organisations that make up the Control Arms Coalition—organisations that have been working for many years to try to achieve the objective of such a treaty.

What do we mean when we call for a robust and workable arms trade treaty? We can achieve it by bringing together countries’ existing obligations and commitments, and other widely accepted norms of state behaviour, under international law and applying them to the trade in conventional weapons.

In practice, that means establishing in international law a binding obligation to prevent transfers of weapons if the arms would pose a substantial risk of being used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or to undermine socio-economic development and poverty reduction goals. States should be required to conduct rigorous case-by-case assessments of all proposed imports, exports and international transfers of conventional arms to enable them to prevent those that breach the criteria of the treaty.

[Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. I know that he recognises the excellent work done by NGOs on this issue. Does he agree that any treaty needs to address the whole issue of resale? An awful lot of arms get transferred to countries that use them inappropriately.

[Martin Caton]

That is absolutely right. As I am sure that the Minister will report, there is a real danger in negotiations at present; some states are trying to reduce various things that should be covered. We want a comprehensive treaty.

The treaty needs to cover all types of conventional weaponry, munitions, armaments and related articles used for potential lethal force in military and law enforcement operations, as well as their parts and accessories, machines and the technologies and expertise for making, developing and maintaining them. It must have strong and effective implementation systems, including a public and transparent reporting mechanism, good monitoring, reporting and verification procedures, and provisions for settling disputes over suspected violations of the treaty. To achieve that, the treaty must also provide institutional support and periodic review for those states that do not have experience of enforcing a high standard of arms transfer control. That will require both resources and technical assistance.

The treaty must create an international framework of legal obligation, but it must be implemented nationally. Arms transfer decisions will still have to be decided by national Governments, but under the treaty they will be obliged to deny any transfer that breaches the arms trade treaty criteria.

When the all-party group decided to prioritise securing the treaty, we set ourselves the task of convincing the UK Government to fight for the sort of robust agreement at the UN that I have just described. We secured a meeting with the Minister, who is leading on the issue, and his diplomatic team, along with the NGOs that I have mentioned. We were very pleased to learn at that meeting that we did not have to convince the Minister or his team; it became apparent that their objectives for a strong, effective treaty mirrored ours pretty well. That has been further confirmed at a joint public meeting in Westminster, at which the Minister spoke, organised by our all-party group and the all-party United Nations group, chaired by Lord Hannay of Chiswick.

The Governments of some other nation states are, however, either opposed to such a comprehensive treaty or, at best, sceptical about it. The objections and reservations vary from state to state, so there is a real and challenging job to be done at the UN in the next couple of weeks if we are to secure our shared, progressive objectives. Given the nature and structure of treaty conferences, it is difficult during the process to get an accurate overview to help to assess the prospect of a successful outcome, but from the reports that I have received, the signs appear to have been positive and less positive so far.

The Control Arms NGOs are pressing for what they describe as a bullet-proof treaty, and they have presented a 600,000-signature petition to Ban Ki-moon. Parliamentarians for Global Action has delivered a petition signed by 2,053 Members of Parliament from 96 countries, including, of course, from this Parliament. However, a small minority of sceptical states have managed to get the NGOs excluded from a substantial part of the conference.

The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, showed appropriate leadership in his opening statement to delegates when he said:

“You will need to agree on robust criteria that would help lessen the risk that transferred weapons are used to commit violations of international humanitarian law or human rights. You will also need to define the scope of the treaty to cover an extensive array of weapons and activities and that leaves no room for loopholes. Our common goal is clear: a robust and legally binding ATT that will have a real impact on the lives of those millions of people suffering from the consequences of armed conflict, repression and armed violence.”

Swansea Coastguard

Debate between Martin Caton and Nia Griffith

Monday 12th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Martin Caton (Gower) (Lab)]

In April, together with five other south Wales MPs, I responded to the original coastguard reform consultation exercise, “Protecting our Seas and Shores in the 21st Century”. In that response we expressed our reservations about the whole approach being proposed and the absence of alternative options. We argued that the proposals were so seriously and dangerously flawed that they should be withdrawn to allow proper consideration of a new plan, built on the skills and expertise of our coastguard, that properly rewards them for their work and provides them with adequate equipment and systems to deliver a service fit for the 21st century. That remains my position. I believe strongly that, in Wales, Holyhead, Milford Haven and Swansea should all be kept open as 24-hour coastguard stations.

However, I will not use my time this evening to repeat arguments made in that consultation process and in earlier, more general debates about coastguard reform in this House. Instead, I want to concentrate on the case for the retention of Swansea maritime rescue co-ordination centre, which is based in Mumbles in my constituency. The Swansea centre is by far the busiest on the Welsh coast and, indeed, one of the busiest in the country, dealing with more incidents every year than Holyhead and Milford Haven put together. It is responsible for the whole coast from Carmarthen in west Wales to Gloucester in England and down the Bristol channel on the English side as far as the Cornish border. In doing so, it liaises with six police forces and a large number of other professional and voluntary emergency services. It has a range of expertise and a track record that is second to none. It also provides the base for the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s regional business unit, which deals with accounts, surveys and so forth.

In the original consultation document on the reform plans, it was proposed to retain Swansea coastguard, albeit on a daylight hours basis, and close Milford Haven. Then, in July, the Secretary of State for Transport reversed that recommendation in his statement on coastguard modernisation. I do not know whether the Minister has any idea of the alarm and outrage that have been aroused in the Swansea area and spread around the south Wales coast and down the other side of the Bristol channel as a result of the statement.

[Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, as the highest concentrations of incidents are on the Gower and north Devon coasts, it is positively perverse to consider closing Swansea, which is the busiest station with the more detailed knowledge of the greater area?

[Martin Caton]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend.

People who know the coast and the waters covered by the Swansea centre cannot believe that the Government are proposing that there should be no coastguard station anywhere on the Bristol channel. These people know how dangerous a place the channel can be. It has the second highest tidal range anywhere in the world, which is potentially a fantastic resource for power generation, but also a source of increased risk to people on the sea and the coast. They have seen the increase in shipping traffic in recent years and, even more so, the massive growth in coast and marine leisure activities in the area, which has put more and more demands on our coastguard, but demands that the Swansea station has always been able to respond to.

There is a massive campaign, centred in Swansea, but involving people around the Bristol channel. It is cross-party, involving Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Labour and Plaid Cymru supporters, and many more people of no political affiliation. A “Save Swansea Coastguard” petition has so far attracted more than 100,000 signatures, and I understand that the number of individual responses to the new consultation on the changed recommendation that call for Swansea to be saved will be at least in the hundreds. Today, that campaign brought its message to the House via the River Thames.

In a letter to me on 16 December 2010, the Minister wrote:

“On the basis of an evaluation of the existing sites and the facilities available at them, it is proposed that three of the proposed sub-centres be located at Falmouth, Humber and Swansea.”

This evaluation was on the basis of a location assessment document that provided the criteria for comparing the existing stations. We can only hope that this was a comprehensive piece of work, because it was the basis for deciding which network of centres could best deliver the service on which this country’s marine and coastal safety depends.

I was therefore surprised that the Secretary of State, in announcing the changed proposal, felt able to say:

“In the light of a further review of the potential costs of vacating the existing sites in Swansea and Milford Haven which has shown that there are no financial reasons to favour either location”,

and then go on to say,

“we should retain the coastguard centre at Milford Haven rather than the centre at Swansea.”

I think that that is wrong. The Swansea centre is a freehold building with a long-term ground lease, providing long-term security of tenure. There is virtually no rent. The Milford Haven site is rented at something like £25,000 a year.

Both the Secretary of State and the Minister for Shipping have also maintained that, from an operational point of view, Milford and Swansea are level pegging, but in fact Milford and Swansea have never been equivalent in operational capacity—if an objective judgment is made. One way to make one is to employ the very location impact assessment criteria used by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to choose the best sites for the future coastguard network.

I am grateful to have received from the MCA a copy of the document setting out those criteria. When we study it, we find that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to believe that it was used at all in deciding between Swansea and Milford. One important factor that the MCA highlights is the need to make best use of the agency’s existing property portfolio. It states:

“This is particularly the case where there are other MCA functions currently co-located with an MRCC”.

Swansea shares its centre with the MCA regional business unit and a radio site.

Another criterion to be employed, according to the MCA, is population. It states:

“Sub-centres would most sensibly be located in areas with a reasonably large population and pool of job seekers to facilitate future recruitment”,

and that is significant when considering Milford and Swansea, because in recent years the agency has found it difficult to recruit in Pembrokeshire. In fact, of the past six coastguards appointed to Milford Haven, only two have been from Pembrokeshire; the rest came from other parts of Wales, including Swansea. In addition, the location impact document states that

“it makes sense to have the sub-centres evenly spread.”

Switching from Swansea to Milford, however, makes them less evenly spread.

Finally, the agency states that

“the broad co-location of a co-ordination centre with the volunteers of the coastguard rescue service, other search and rescue partners and local regional resilience fora is a factor in the overall assessment of preferred sub-centre locations”.

Again, Swansea is the better site—even more so because so many Swansea coastguards are also volunteer rescue officers.

So, using the MCA’s own location assessment document, we find that Swansea outscores Milford on just about every criterion. Swansea is by far the better location, but a sensible location assessment process should look at other factors: the quality of communication links by road, rail and air; the comparison of facilities and space at the centres; the comparison of broadband links at the centres; and hotel space availability in case of major incident. Again, Swansea proves the better option by a long way.

I hope that in responding the Minister will be able to tell me whether those MCA criteria, and the other factors that I have suggested, were used in deciding between Swansea and Milford. He should be able to do so, because we know that the decision was made by Ministers, not by the MCA.