(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt seems to me that this is not a very substantive issue; it is a procedural issue. The Government have not taken a view as to whether counter-terrorism should be transferred into the NCA. The NCA is not even up and running yet. It requires the assent of the House before we get to that stage, and we have said that when the NCA is up and running, that is something that the Home Secretary may wish to consider.
If the Government recommend at a future date that counter-terrorism functions should be transferred to the NCA, there is, as I have just explained, a provision for that to be considered in great detail. I will repeat it briefly in case hon. Members did not latch on to the point—that is why I made it before giving way: there is a duty on the Home Secretary to consult persons affected before laying a draft order, then there is an opportunity for Committees of either House to scrutinise the draft order, and I said that I envisage that task falling to the Home Affairs Committee, a cross-party Committee chaired by a distinguished member of the Opposition, and then the draft order must explicitly be approved by both Houses.
When it comes to deliberating on the content of the proposal, as distinct from the parliamentary mechanisms—the merits or otherwise of counter-terrorism being exercised by the National Crime Agency—if that process of deliberation is necessary, because the Government regard that as a wise way to proceed, there will be the opportunity for Members to make their views clearly known. But the question we are considering is whether it is suitable and appropriate for that provision to be made in the Bill, using the super-affirmative procedure. I hope that the House is persuaded by what I have just said about there being ample opportunity to debate the substance of these matters and that it is therefore an appropriate way to proceed.
The Minister describes a substantive and exhaustive process of parliamentary scrutiny. Is he aware that the Home Affairs Committee has already considered the issue and that we recommended—unanimously, I believe—that the transfer of counter-terrorism powers from the Met to the National Crime Agency should take place once that agency is up and running and when the Government believe it is the right time to do it?
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s interest in the matter. I am cautious about getting ahead of ourselves. We envisage the National Crime Agency coming into operation fully on 1 October, but of course that is subject to the House giving its assent to that proposition during the two days of deliberation on Report and Third Reading, and we should not take the wishes of the House for granted. Then Royal Assent is necessary. The NCA will have considerable and wide-ranging powers, and I think everybody would accept that it is sensible for it to bed down and establish itself.
There is a perfectly legitimate debate to be had about where this extremely important function should be exercised. I listened carefully to my hon. Friend. He puts forward a point of view that many people agree with, but there are people who will take a contrary view. There will be a suitable time to deliberate on the matter. I want to assure the House that we believe that the super-affirmative procedure will allow more than adequate time for that debate and for those issues to be properly aired. Any decision to give the NCA a counter-terrorism role will be an important one; we have no wish to diminish, impede or lose those aspects of the current arrangements that work well.
Let me proceed a little and then I will give way.
The table in paragraph 9 sets out the “relevant NCA provisions” that do not extend to Northern Ireland. Notable among those provisions that will not apply are the ability to designate NCA officers with the powers of a Northern Ireland constable in schedule 5, the oversight of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland in schedule 6, and, importantly, the duty of the Police Service of Northern Ireland to co-operate with the NCA and other duties in schedule 3. Importantly, the new schedule also provides a series of order-making powers in paragraphs 1 to 5 so that, should the position of the Northern Ireland Executive change, the NCA provisions can be extended to Northern Ireland, subject, of course, to the agreement of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
As I have said, I regret that it has been necessary to table new schedule 1. This does not, however, mark the end of our negotiations on the role that the National Crime Agency should play in Northern Ireland. I fervently hope that the narrowing of the NCA’s remit in Northern Ireland will be a temporary measure. We will continue to strive for an equitable agreement between the parties in Northern Ireland and, once secured, this new schedule will ensure that we have the necessary order-making powers to give effect to such an arrangement. I hope that that has provided clarity on this important issue.
Will the Minister clarify whether the two strands of his speech interact? If powers were transferred from the Met to the NCA and the NCA was unable to conduct anti-terrorism work in Northern Ireland, would that provide a contrast with the current situation? If the transfer happened without the changes that the Minister hopes for, would the Met be able to pursue anti-terrorism work in Northern Ireland that the NCA could not?
Although the Met takes the lead, each individual police force is responsible for its own activities. An important change is the NCA’s ability to task police forces—in other words, their sovereignty would no longer be absolute, because the NCA could, in extremis, require a police force to undertake certain actions. That is not the case with the Metropolitan police. It is conceivable that some in Northern Ireland will be unwilling to be tasked in that way, but a lot of collaborative work takes place in any case. Activities that fund terrorism, rather than terrorism itself, would come under the category of serious and organised crime, which could be dealt with.