Multiannual Financial Framework
Debate between Mark Reckless and Brooks Newmark(12 years ago)
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Mark Reckless
No, and that is not a sensible point at all, because we have a one-off opportunity. It is this House that ultimately votes, so if any Government Members feel uncomfortable—not because of who I will be following through the Lobby, but because of who may be following me, in support of my Conservative amendment—I say to them: if we send the Prime Minister to Brussels telling him that it is acceptable to agree an inflationary increase, he may come back to this House having agreed that inflationary increase. We will then have to vote on primary legislation, in Committee and on Report, for that inflationary increase for the EU budget, all the way to 2020. If Members do not want that, they should vote today for my amendment.
The other strong argument for the amendment is this. Some people say, “We’re not going to get a real-terms cut,” but we will certainly not get one if we do not even try. If we use the veto, that is not a bad place to be; in many ways, it is better than where we would be with an agreed inflationary increase. There are two strong reasons for that. First, either we operate within a multiannual financial framework under the old, frozen ceilings carried forward, or we agree new ceilings going up by inflation, allowing higher budgets in future. Each of those budgets is always negotiated under qualified majority voting annually; the question is, where we have unanimity and where we need legislation, do we allow inflationary higher limits to 2020 or not?
Mark Reckless
If my hon. Friend does not mind, I shall continue, as others may like to come in
The second point is that if there is no agreement on a new MFF, the process of money being transferred from the budget towards the new member states will not continue. What happened, in that disgraceful decision in 2005 when Labour gave away the rebate, is that a process was put in place whereby the new member states do not pay towards our rebate in the way that the old member states do. If the Prime Minister vetoes an MFF package, that process of money shifting to new member states will be suspended; therefore, the process by which the rebate is given away will, at least for that period, be stopped, which is a significant gain for Britain. If there is an inflationary increase, as the Government propose, we will be looking at a net contribution going from £9.2 billion last year to £13.6 billion at the end of the process. We simply cannot afford that.
The European Commission put out its own press release, which asked the question: “What will happen if a new MFF is not agreed?” The press release states that failure to agree a new MFF
“would considerably complicate the adoption of new programmes. And in the absence of new legal bases, including their indicative financial envelopes, no commitments could be made…those multiannual spending programmes…the 2014 budget would probably only cover the agricultural payments and the payments on outstanding commitments,”
and that organisations
“benefiting from EU-funds…would face severe drawbacks.”
If hon. Members are prepared to vote through primary legislation—later, when we get that chance—and if they are happy with an inflationary increase in the EU budget, plus everything else that will happen because of the continued loss of the rebate if that is agreed, they should vote for the Government motion. If hon. Members think that the European Union has too much money and that its budget is too large and needs to be cut, they should support my amendment.