European Union

Mark Reckless Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

It was stated earlier in the debate that there was some surprise at the British negotiating position in Europe and that other member states were not fully apprised of the stand that we would take. That came as a great surprise to me, because I think that the Prime Minister was incredibly clear about what he was going to do. Last week, he wrote an article in The Times setting out what he would do, and then when he got to the negotiating chamber, and had no alternative, he did what he said he would do. Perhaps if there was surprise in Europe it was at the fact that we have a British Prime Minister who actually does what he says he is going to do and does not roll over in the negotiating chamber at the last minute in the face of pressure from other countries.

The hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) said that when John Major was Prime Minister he secured, under threat of veto, the British opt-out from the single currency. That is quite right. To my mind, that suggests that it was his Conservative Government who kept us out of the euro by creating the mechanism by which we could stay out. However, that was not the only opt-out that he secured at the Maastricht negotiations; he also secured the opt-outs from the social chapter and the working time directive, which were given away by the Labour Government with nothing in return. One of the reasons we now have a big debate about returning powers to this country and to this Parliament is that those opt-outs were given away, together with the powers that went with them.

As the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) said, this is by no means a done deal. It is not true that we are isolated and that every other country is lined up against us and is committed to the compact that was set out by the eurozone members. It is clear from what we read in the European press today that the Parliaments of countries such as Denmark and Poland are raising severe doubts about what is in the compact. Speaking from the negotiating table itself, Hungary and the Czech Republic have said that they need to go back to their own countries to ask the permission of their Parliaments.

Given the wording in the compact, it is hardly surprising that people are starting to raise those concerns. For the sake of the record, I should like to share with Members some of the things that it says. For example, it says that the rule on deficit and debt reduction

“will contain an automatic correction mechanism that shall be triggered in the event of deviation. It will be defined by each Member State on the basis of principles proposed by the Commission…Member States shall converge towards their specific reference level, according to a calendar proposed by the Commission…the Commission will in particular examine the key parameters of the fiscal stance in the draft budgetary plans and will, if needed, adopt an opinion on these plans.”

[Mark Reckless (Rochester and Strood) (Con)]

Can my hon. Friend explain those repeated references to the Commission? I understood that the Prime Minister had said that we were not going to allow the fiscal union to use the EU institutions of the Commission and the European Court of Justice.

[Damian Collins]

My hon. Friend makes a perfectly valid point. Of course, this is only a communiqué produced by the eurozone countries, not a binding agreement. However, it is clear that these decisions will be taken at European level. It will be the Commission’s decision, or that of whatever European body is created to police this compact, to determine how quickly countries should reduce their deficit, to decide whether they are keeping on track, to propose what measures of intervention should take place if they fail to do so, and to create what it calls a common economic policy that is the stated aim and objective of these countries. If the eurozone members wish to proceed down that path, then that is a decision that they will take. It should be clear to all that Britain would never go down that path. We would never countenance such a transfer of power and sovereignty over our economic affairs to the European level. In setting out his objections and vetoing a treaty of 27, the Prime Minister clearly reinforced that point. There can have been no doubt and no surprise.

A question that has been asked is, what next for Britain and Europe? The summit in Brussels on Thursday and Friday was not about Great Britain, it was about the eurozone and its crisis. My concern, and that of other hon. Members, is that the crisis has not been fixed and that the measures that have been put in place do not provide the guarantees that the financial markets want. That makes it more likely that there will be a default in the eurozone, and that countries may leave the euro. The economic consequences of that are unknown, but most countries around the world predict that it will not help the world economy and, if anything, will make its problems greater. Europe has to overcome that problem.

European leaders may well reflect on the negotiations in Brussels and say that it would have been better to give the Prime Minister the concessions and reassurances that he was seeking rather than force us out and force us into using the veto, thereby delaying the possibility of a proper and sensible negotiation of a resolution for the eurozone crisis. That will be seen to be an error.

Turning to our own position, there has always been much talk about the amount of trading that we do with the European Union. As a bloc, it is worth more than 50% of our trade. Over the past 10 years, however, our trade with the developing economies around the world— Brazil, India, Russia and China—has been increasing, as has that of countries such as Germany. Those are large, developing consumer markets, and it is reasonable to expect our exports there to increase in relative terms and those to the European markets that have been the major home of our trade in the past to decrease in relative terms.