(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI think we all believe that it is important that where lone parents can work, they should work, because that helps to boost their income and that of their family. Guidance is given to personal advisers on jobseeker’s allowance to ensure that the sanctions regime is applied appropriately to lone parents, as in the case of all jobseekers.
What, hitherto, has been the fraud and error rate in child benefit?
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThat is the Treasury’s latest estimate, and it is a number that we are going to stand by.
In his opening speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) said that he wanted to restrict the tax relief to the basic rate, but subsection (3) of new clause 1 would not have that effect. It suggests that the relief could be obtained at the highest marginal rate that a person paid. He has used the 1990 legislation, whereas in the 1994 legislation the relief was restricted to the basic rate.
Why does my hon. Friend think that the social insurance systems on the continent, where there is much more blurring between the public and private sectors, produce much better health outcomes? Also, why does he think that the Major Government followed this policy, which we all supported at the time? Why is this proposal different from the policy of the Major Government, which we all—or some of us—supported?
I am pleased that my hon. Friend added that qualification. I entered the House only in 2001, so I was not in a position to support the Major Government or to disagree with them. We need to look at this measure on its own merits.
I would say to my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley that the way in which his new clause has been drafted means that tax relief could be gained at someone’s highest marginal rate, which could mean relief of up to 50%.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberLet me remind the right hon. Gentleman what he said about Ireland on 8 May 2007:
“The Irish economy has enjoyed a good deal of success over the past few years. The corporation tax regime has contributed to that, but there have been a number of other factors”.––[Official Report, Finance Public Bill Committee, 8 May 2007; c. 19.]
The truth is that the Irish economy, like our economy under the previous Government, had a banking sector that was poorly regulated and out of control. It is because we have tackled the legacy of the Labour Government that we are in a position to help Ireland.
Given the misery that economies on the periphery of Europe, such as Ireland, are suffering from the imposition of a single currency throughout Europe, will my hon. Friend advise his European partners that any future plan should be motivated by what the markets demand, and not what grandiose politicians want?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. He may have read the shadow Chancellor’s remarkable statement last week, that the euro had had no impact on the problems in Ireland. It is important that the right mechanisms are in place to tackle the problems in the eurozone, and that those solutions are owned by the eurozone. That is why the permanent mechanism that will replace the financial stability facility will be a eurozone-only body.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI thank you, Mr Speaker, for that encouragement and guidance, and I apologise for being generous in taking interventions. Let me make rapid progress.
On the issue of sanctions, the same principle applies for those eurozone countries that are in breach of the stability and growth pact excess deficit procedures. In the run-up to the crisis, there was a lack of fiscal discipline, for those inside and outside the euro. Despite the existence of the stability and growth pact and the excess deficit procedure, the eurozone was still undermined by a failure to exert fiscal discipline, and a number of member states in the eurozone have to take tough action to tackle the deficit.
To avoid a recurrence, the Commission and member states in the eurozone have sought to reduce the discretion on the application of the sanction process. The position reached by eurozone countries is set out in the taskforce report. Again, it is worth reminding the House that the sanctions regime does not apply to the UK by virtue of protocol 15 of the current treaty.
(14 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House approves the proposals for simplifying the Government’s spending controls and financial reporting to Parliament, as set out in the paper, Alignment (Clear Line of Sight) Project, Cm 7567, of March 2009, and the response of October 2009 to the relevant report of the Liaison Committee (Second Special Report of the Liaison Committee, Session 2008-09, Financial Scrutiny: Parliamentary Control over Government Budgets: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2008-09, HC 1074).
The motion seeks the authority of the House to implement changes to the structure and content of the Supply estimates that set out departmental spending plans and are subject to approval by the House. These changes stem from work that began under the previous Government, and which has enjoyed cross-party support throughout. The aim of the changes is to provide a simpler and more effective system of public spending control.
As hon. Members will remember, the previous Government announced in the Green Paper, “The Governance of Britain”, in June 2007 that they would simplify the spending control framework and the Government’s financial reporting to Parliament further to enhance consistency and transparency at all stages of the process—budgetary spending plans, parliamentary Supply estimates and expenditure outcomes in resource accounts. That will lead to the following: a simpler and more transparent system, making it easier for Parliament to understand and challenge Departments; a strengthening of the existing budgeting framework by underpinning it with parliamentary control; and the streamlining of Government spending documents, making it easier to understand what is happening with public money.
Government’s and Parliament’s control and scrutiny of public spending is currently managed against four different frameworks. First, there are the national accounts, an integrated set of economic accounts covering the whole of the economy. Those accounts are produced by the Office for National Statistics in accordance with the European system of accounts 1995. National accounts are used to determine fiscal performance. Secondly, there are budgets, which are defined by the Treasury and used to control public spending. Budgets are allocated by the Treasury in spending reviews and reported on to Parliament at successive pre-Budget reports and Budgets. Certain elements of budgets are aligned to national accounts definitions. Others, such as those introduced with the move to full resource accounting and budgeting in 2003-04, relate to commercial-style accounting concepts and are designed to improve value-for-money incentives in Departments.
Thirdly, there are Supply estimates, which seek annual parliamentary authority for the expenditure of individual Departments following the plans set out in spending reviews. Estimates are largely, if not entirely, aligned to generally accepted accounting practice—GAAP—accounting definitions, rather than to national accounts, although they do not encompass all of the departmental expenditure and income that would be accounted for under GAAP. There are significant differences between estimates and budgets: about a third of departmental spending in budgets is not included in estimates, and about a sixth of what is included in estimates is not in budgets. Fourthly, there are resource accounts, which report Departments’ actual spending during a particular financial year, following GAAP, as adapted for the public sector. That means that there are some substantial differences compared with budgets and national accounts.
Those four frameworks have developed in different ways over the years for good reasons, since they serve different purposes. However, the result is significant misalignment between the different frameworks, with only two thirds of Government expenditure fully aligned across budgets, estimates and resource accounts.
Current misalignments can broadly be broken down into two categories. First, there are differences in the various boundaries—the entities and spending included in budgets, estimates and accounts. Those cover both different types of income and expenditure within the budgets and the different treatment of entities within respective boundaries. For example, the spending of non-departmental public bodies scores in budgets, but the grant-in-aid paid to those bodies scores in estimates and resource accounts, not their total spending. Secondly, there are differences in the policies. Specific transactions are often treated differently between the three frameworks. Examples include capital grants, provisions and other non-cash items within budgets.
At present, there are significant differences between the ways in which the three main elements of the public spending control framework define and treat expenditure. Those three elements are: departmental budgets as set by the Treasury; departmental Supply estimates as authorised by this House; and departmental resource accounts presented to this House after the year-end. To give just one of many potential examples, departmental estimates and accounts currently include only the spending of the relevant Government Department, whereas budgets also include the expenditure of any non-departmental public body for which the Department is responsible. This means that Departments have different controls against which to manage, and that it is very difficult to track spending from plans through to out-turn. That, in turn, limits the scope for effective parliamentary scrutiny and adds to the complexity of managing public money; it also requires time and effort to reconcile the frameworks.
The principal aims of the proposed changes are therefore to increase the transparency of public spending information; to improve accountability to this House and to the wider public; to make it easier for Government Departments and other public bodies to understand the controls to which they are working; and to provide a more efficient control framework that builds in the right incentives to deliver better value for money.
As I have said, the different frameworks have developed in different ways over the years, and for a range of reasons. For example, international standards have helped determine the definitions of expenditure currently applied within both accounts and budgets, with budgetary definitions being determined by Government but supporting internationally recognised fiscal definitions, and accounting policies reflecting international financial reporting standards adapted for the public sector context. Some misalignments between those frameworks will inevitably remain. What matters most is that they occur only where there is good reason, and that they are properly understood and kept to a minimum.
Budgets and estimates will be fully aligned under the new framework. The remaining misalignments will be with resource accounts—amounting to about £22 billion—where enforcing alignment would be contrary to the principles of the alignment project. By far the largest example, amounting to £19 billion, is the treatment of capital grants paid by Departments to the private sector, local authorities and public corporations. That is because capital grants are treated as resource spending in departmental accounts, reflecting international financial reporting standards, but as capital spending in budgets, reflecting national accounts treatment. As hon. Members will recognise, this is not a straightforward area.
Nevertheless, there is much improvement that can be made while adhering to these standards, and the alignment project represents an excellent opportunity to achieve greater consistency between the different frameworks. The main changes designed to achieve the aims of alignment are the extension of the departmental estimates and accounting boundaries to accommodate non-departmental public bodies and other bodies classified to the central Government sector, bringing their expenditure within the coverage of estimates presented to Parliament for approval. The power to do that, through a Treasury Order listing the bodies to be consolidated into estimates and accounts, was provided in part 5 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
It is worth spending a couple of minutes reflecting on the different nature of non-departmental public bodies, which vary enormously in size and in the functions they carry out. Consolidation will include bodies that spend very large amounts of public money, such as the Environment Agency and the Legal Services Commission, which will be consolidated within the estimate and accounts of, respectively, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice. Both those bodies spend over £1 billion per annum. Some of these bodies are charities—the national museums and galleries, for example—and others have statutory independence, so it is important that we create alignment in a way that neither constrains their freedom to act nor puts their status at risk. The provisions of the 2010 Act, approved by this House earlier this year, include protection for that independence, so that we can combine operational freedom with financial accountability.
Does my hon. Friend recall that in 2007, the Treasury Committee acknowledged
“that the requirements of the alignment project mean that it is not possible for Parliament to maintain control over gross totals. We are concerned that without adequate levels of information regarding income, Parliament’s authority may be diminished.”
How can the Minister reassure Parliament that our authority over Supply will not be diminished in any way following alignment?
No, I want to make some more progress. A number of Members on both sides of the House wish to participate in this debate, and I am conscious that there is also private business after this.
I want to talk now about the next stage of the alignment process: the coverage of estimates and budgets by including all non-voted budgetary expenditure and income in the estimates presented to Parliament. Parliament will not be asked to approve this spending as it will already have separate legislative authority, but Members will see the full picture of departmental budgetary expenditure. For example, spending financed from the national insurance fund will now be included in the accounts and the estimates, even though it does not have to be voted on annually. Going back to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh), we will align the treatment of income in estimates with budgetary controls. Income will be retained by the Department, provided it is of a type allowed to be netted off budgets and included in the description of income in estimates. To this end, a new description of all relevant categories of income will be included in estimates and replicated in Supply legislation. That will ensure that such information is disclosed in the estimates, and those bodies will therefore be accountable for those sums.
We will simplify the presentation of expenditure information by fully aligning budgets and estimates, reducing remaining differences with accounts to those that are absolutely necessary, and providing clear reconciliations between any necessary misalignments that remain.
Let us get this absolutely clear. Although the Treasury originally said that there might be a problem with this information coming to Parliament, the Financial Secretary is going to make sure that it is fully available because he appreciates that this is an incredibly complicated and difficult matter for Members of Parliament to come to grips with. There is no point in having an alignment project if less information ends up coming to Parliament and the situation is less clear than it was before. I think that my hon. Friend has given us the necessary reassurance, but I wish to press him, so that there is no doubt that we will get just as much information as we have always had.
My understanding is that that is the case. What we will also be able to do—this deals with something that frustrated me when I first came into the House—is track information from budgets set by the Treasury to estimates and to the out-turns. That consistency of information will help Members of this House to hold the Government to account on how public money is being spent.
These changes have been the subject of constructive cross-party consultation over the past three years. During the previous Parliament, the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury submitted three memorandums on alignment to the Chairmen of the Treasury Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and the Liaison Committee, in November 2008, March 2009 and February 2010. The March 2009 memorandum contained detailed proposals for achieving alignment and was published as a Command Paper. All the Committees indicated their support for the proposed changes, and the Liaison Committee took the lead in providing detailed responses. I am grateful to that Committee for its engagement with, and support for, the alignment proposals throughout. The Committee noted in its report on financial scrutiny published in April 2008 that the alignment project was “potentially an historic development”. I fully endorse that view.
The Liaison Committee published a further report in July 2009, which was, again, strongly supportive of the proposed changes. It also made reference to wider issues related to the parliamentary scrutiny of public spending, including the number of days available for debates on the estimates and the outcome of spending reviews, and the scope of such debates. This Government’s establishment of the Backbench Business Committee represents a significant step forward in this area. That Committee has at its disposal 35 days in each Session, some of which are taken in Westminster Hall, to schedule debates on subjects of its choosing, including the scrutiny of public spending.
This Government are fully committed to enhancing transparency in public spending and supporting effective scrutiny by this House. We have already published data held on the Treasury’s public spending database going back to 2005-06. Further measures are being taken that will see details of all new spending of more than £25,000 published from November 2010.