(9 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe double voting does not only apply to Members from England; it applies to Members from England, Wales and potentially Northern Ireland, if the issue is devolved to one Assembly but not the others. If there is a matter that is not devolved to Wales, Welsh MPs would be involved in that second lock on legislation. That is right and fair, because it ensures that those who represent the relevant constituencies have a say on how the law is made and a block on it, but, crucially, they cannot make the law unless all UK MPs support it in a majority.
What would happen in the case of a welfare reform Bill, which we would be told applied to England and Wales because, on paper, Northern Ireland would have welfare reform devolved? As we see from the Treasury, this is entirely karaoke legislation and the money will not flow unless the Assembly passes the legislation that has already been passed here. Would Northern Ireland Members be told that they did not count in the double majority for welfare legislation?
The hon. Gentleman makes a very interesting point. I think this is covered in the Standing Order, but it may need further revision. The Standing Order makes provision for the Speaker to certify that where a matter is about to be devolved, it has already been devolved and therefore in the legislation should require an English vote. It therefore follows logically that if a matter is about to be undevolved, because the relevant devolved Assembly cannot come to a decision, the Speaker ought to certify differently. It may be that the Standing Order needs an amendment to clarify that, but it is certainly within the spirit of the Standing Order as currently written. It is ensuring an equality of all Members of Parliament because no legislation can pass without a majority in this House.
(9 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberI agree that it would be better for the decision to be made by the electorate—by the court—but is not the problem with the pledge being determined by the court that the pledge is fundamentally political rather than legal?
I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point, but it can be legal up to a point; there could be some matters on which a clear-cut judgment could be made. I have chosen to offer the route through the court simply because it seemed to me that there was a will or a mood in Committee saying, “Well, if we’re going to allow any element of public petition to recall, then going to an election court could be the way that could be done.” I have simply taken that point and offered this new clause to try to test Members on whether they will follow through on the logic of the argument they made in Committee.
I do not commend the model in new clause 5 above all others. I still prefer the open rolling petition around a clear issue, but, again, I think that the open rolling petition should be on the basis of a pledge. I think the pledge as the basis for those petitions would create a much clearer standard for the public. It would also create a clearer standard for MPs, who would know, if they had committed to the pledge, whether they had abided by the code of conduct and could show whether they had upheld the standards of public life. That should not be too much to ask. MPs should not feel, “Oh, it’s hard to prove that we have upheld the standards of public life or lived up to the code of conduct.” It would send a very dangerous signal if Members felt that a pledge about the MPs code of conduct and the standards of public life would be difficult to uphold or could be abused in some untoward way. Then we would be seen to be trying to find ourselves some highly privileged protection where we decide that we always know best, even about the worst that we have done.
That is the simple point of new clause 5, which I do not intend to press to a Division. Its purpose is to ensure that if we are to improve the Bill, we take into account the absence from the Bill of a clear tool available to the public. Also, we need to make good the serious omission that we have all acknowledged—in circumstances where there is no serious job description for MPs, where is the bottom line? The new clause offers a bottom line.
My hon. Friend is right; there are aspects of the money laundering regulations that set thresholds. For example, someone can bring only £10,000 into the country in cash—such a rule applies to many countries around the world in their equivalent currencies—and certain sums have to be reported, if they are cash transactions, by banks and so on. One part of the rules also deals with aggregations. Using a succession of small transactions is one way in which money launderers try to launder money, because the rules on higher sums have become relatively effective. Before legislating we should always want to look carefully at whether regulations that are already available could improve the system. The use of the two I have mentioned, relating to knowing one’s client and money laundering, would put a strong burden on the payday loan companies to ensure that they were lending to people they at least knew really existed and about whose financial circumstances they knew something. They would, thus, be able to lend to people who had a better chance of paying back.
The issue of people having a better chance of paying a loan back is important, because payday lenders have a cavalier approach to how they lend and so they build into their interest rate a high level of default, which means that people who can pay back, even though they may not be the greatest debtors, pay a much higher interest rate than would otherwise be necessary for them. If the business of the payday lenders was more tightly regulated so that they knew their underlying client and if the level of bad debt was brought down, the rate of interest would come down and the problem would be reduced in that natural and evolutionary way, rather than by trying to set caps and controls.
I have great difficulties with caps on interest rates, for the straightforward reason that no business is going to make a small loan if the interest rate is capped, because the administration of that loan will simply be too expensive to make it worth while. A £100 loan is likely to involve £5 to £10 of administration, whether that loan lasts for a day, a week or a month. So the rate for a week is extraordinarily high because it is being compounded over the course of a year. Setting caps is therefore not the right way to proceed, because it takes away the ability to borrow from the people who are most in need of these smaller sums at the bottom end of the scale.
The truth is that the bigger the borrower someone is, the better the interest rate they are likely to get. The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) talked about the Conservative party borrowing at 3.5%—of course it borrows at that rate. People who are borrowing millions of pounds pay low rates of interest, because usually there is some collateral against the loan, they are more likely to have a track record on lending and the interest rate covers the administrative cost. Where someone is paying 3.5% on a £5 million loan, the administrative costs are comparatively negligible. On a £100 loan repayable within a week, the 3.5% is so negligible that it would not begin to cover the administrative costs, and so what does the holder of capital do? They do not make the loan to the individual who needs it to get through that weekend. We must be careful about what we seek to regulate. If we seek to regulate one aspect of the system, we may well find that the unintended consequence is that the people who are most in need of this source of borrowing are cut out of the market altogether. In that case, they have no alternative but to go to the loan shark.
Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise that what he has just mentioned is already in statute among the things that the regulator would have to consider in relation to any of its other powers or options?
The Bill is calling on the regulator to exercise those powers and I know that there was a vote in this Parliament to encourage the regulator to investigate the issue. That takes me back to my point and that of the hon. Member for North Durham: Parliament ought to decide these matters. We cannot simply say that this is too difficult for us to do, with all the resources we have and as the representatives of the British people, and that we will therefore hand it over to these grand panjandrums. Parliament’s job is to set the laws, not to delegate the powers to set the laws to unaccountable and unelected bodies. We have to stand at the next election saying, “These are the laws that we have passed,” not, “Well, we think this is frightfully difficult so we have decided on a quiet Friday that we will not do it ourselves but will past it on to the FCA.” That seems to me to be not only an abandonment of our duty but most unsatisfactory from the electorate’s point of view.
The electorate cannot hold the FCA to account. I do not even know the name of the chairman of the FCA, which is a lacuna in my knowledge that I probably ought to put right speedily. He is probably a very great man, but he is not accountable to the people of North-East Somerset. That is unfair on my constituents. There ought to be accountability on these crucial decisions that will affect their lives. There is no question about the fact that payday lending is an important part of the lives of people who are involved in it, and a very difficult one.
The hon. Gentleman must forgive me, but I think I recall him saying in a previous debate on possible financial regulation that Parliament should just leave things to the Governor of the Bank of England’s eyebrow, the way things had always been done.
The great thing about the Governor of the Bank of England’s eyebrow is that it is not a matter of statute. We have not put it in statute—indeed, I cannot think how that the statute would be phrased—that the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, her Lords temporal and spiritual and her House of Commons have decided that the Governor of the Bank of England’s eyebrow should have legal force. It is not an accountability issue. I must confess that such legislation was rather better drafted under Henry VIII than nowadays. The language used in the section I read out has the greatest attractiveness and beauty, whereas ours is rather more mundane, but even in the 16th century—before the Bank of England was even founded—the Governor’s supercilious qualities could not have been brought into statute law.
Let me move on to one of the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), who made an absolutely fabulous speech and covered the issues with the greatest intellectual rigour. He got into the question of supply creating its own demand and demand creating its own supply. There is an important quality about demand creating its own supply and that is that it tends to reduce prices. If we regulate, we find that we interrupt the natural creation of the supply that comes through. Let us look at it this way: if more payday lenders come to the market, they provide excess capital that is available. They want to lend it out and they have it on their books. They then have to advertise and build up the market. They produce the supply available, but others are doing the same. There is then an excess supply in the market and the demand will fill it up, but only if the price falls. If we regulate in such a way as to reduce the supply that is coming on board so that that excess of credit is not made available in the market, the price will increase as there will be fewer people participating in the market.
I am grateful for that suggestion; I think it is a very useful one. I would be very happy to see a levy brought in under the Finance Bill. I have no objection to a levy being placed on these people; it is just who places it. It needs to be placed by Parliament because that is a hard, constitutional right and power, not by an independent regulator.
Would not the answer then be simply to say that any levy proposed by the regulator would be subject to a resolution of Parliament?
The hon. Gentleman has found a brilliant middle way. I do not usually like third ways, because one is going down the middle of the road and is most likely to get run over, but on this occasion I am in cross-party agreement with him.
To have the matter come before Parliament in such a way that Parliament can say no is infinitely preferable. I would also like it to be back-dated to cover the other levies. This House ought never to give up its powers accidentally because, in a sort of fit of absent-mindedness, we have passed the ability to tax to other independent, or nominally independent, bodies. That would be an error.
I want to indicate firmly that I think this Bill is very good in its intention but not in its practice. That is true of a lot of Bills on Fridays, and that is why the Government so often oppose them. I absolutely accept that there is a problem and that payday loans are an unattractive part of the capitalist system, but this House must always be careful that the solution is not worse than the problem.
As I said, the problem, in essence, is one that has existed from time immemorial. It is not a new problem that we have suddenly come up against, and unfortunately it is not one to which there has ever been a neat and easy solution. Caps have been tried again and again. A cap was the idea of the Council of Nicaea in the 320s AD, and it was repeated under Henry VIII in 1545. Those caps did not work and there is no reason to suppose that new caps will work. Why? Because people need to borrow the money when they need to borrow it, and therefore they will go out and find it one way or another. The more they are pushed into an unregulated and almost criminal arena, the worse it will be for them. It is therefore very important that this House does not rush to do something because it seems like a good idea when in reality it will not solve the problem and risks making it worse.
This House ought never to legislate when solutions already exist on the statute book. We see this time and again. In both Division Lobbies, the Acts passed, going back to the last war, are listed in volumes of ever-increasing thickness. The problem is that these volumes have laws going into them that are reprinted, re-enacted and re-passed because nobody bothered to look back to see whether they were already on the statute book and whether there might be a better answer already there just waiting to be implemented if only people had the gumption to get on and do it.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs a Scottish nationalist, the hon. Gentleman speaks for himself on that. As an Irish nationalist, I have a different view on a number of his points.
In the part of the world I represent, I clearly say to people, “There is no acceptable level of sectarianism in our streets,” but the message from the Committee is that there is an acceptable level of sectarianism in our statutes. We are removing the bar on someone who marries a Catholic from succeeding to the throne, but we are not removing the grossly arcane and offensive language that remains on the statute book. We are saying, “That’s okay.” We have statements from the different Churches that have been consulted that they are just about okay with the compromise, but I am not comfortable with such received sectarianism.
Does the hon. Gentleman share my view that, by amending the statutes, we are saying that all the provisions are modernised, and that the Act of Settlement and all its anti-Catholic provisions are acceptable in a modern world with a few words changed? Does he share my view that that is offensive to Her Majesty’s loyal Catholic subjects and possibly more offensive to republicans?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point, which reinforces exactly the one I am making. The Committee will take a deliberate decision to amend only the legislation it needs to amend, and will not take the opportunity to do away with the offensive, discriminatory and provocative language. Such language will remain on the statute books—the language of the law of the land—which is offensive. Why would the Committee take a decision at this point in the 21st century not to make laws of our time and for the future?
To my mind, it is not acceptable for people to be satisfied by such received sectarianism, and it is a matter of sadness that it remains. That is my difficulty with clause 2. I welcome the fact that it makes a difference, but I have a fundamental problem with the fact that it says, “Everything else can stay the same. That’s okay. We’re happy with that sort of language.” We should be repulsed by the language that the Committee says should stay on the statute book.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am very sympathetic to what my hon. Friend says. This is something of a puzzle to me, because the Labour Front-Bench spokesmen on this subject are among the most civilised members of the Opposition, and it seems uncharacteristic of them to table such a motion—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I felt sure that they would be delighted to be flattered by me, of all people. What I have said about them is true, however; it is recognised by those on my own Front Bench.
However, the motion before us is extremely overstated. It uses the language of chaos and disaster, as did the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr Byrne), and calls on the Government “urgently to set out” plans. In contrast, the Secretary of State answered every question that was put to him. He was willing to listen, and he is doing something that, in principle, those on both sides of the House agree with.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way during his praise of the Secretary of State. Last week, the Secretary of State refused to accept a reasonable job offer and incurred no sanction. If that is okay for him, why is it not okay for others?
That was a most brilliantly phrased intervention. In turning down the opportunity to be Lord High Chancellor—one of the most ancient posts in the land, and one that most people would be honoured to hold—the Secretary of State showed his commitment to ensuring that the reforms will work. In turning down a promotion, he showed his nobility. Having listened to his speech in the debate today, I wonder whether there ought to be an amendment to “Erskine May”, so that when an argument has been comprehensively won by a Minister at the Dispatch Box, the debate could simply end, to a round of applause and cheering, with no further need for discussion.