European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Marcus Fysh and Joanna Cherry

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing this matter to the Floor of the House. I was made aware of it just before I got to my feet. If the Financial Times report is correct that the Government are going to give special deals for certain professions, that will come as a great shock to the other professions that will not get such a special deal, and a particular shock to cross-party colleagues in the Scottish Parliament who have asked for a separate deal on immigration in Scotland, as have Unison, the chambers of commerce in Scotland and the Institute of Directors. I look forward to the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union coming to the House to explain what is going on here.

To returning to the issue of legal certainty, the Institute for Government looked carefully at different tests that might be put on this Bill to direct the courts, and expressed the view that if Parliament passes the buck on this question to the judges, it will leave the judges open to fierce political criticism. We have already seen the sort of fierce political criticism that the judges got earlier this year, and regardless of the different views we might have about the British constitution, all of us can probably accept that the independence of the judiciary is a fundamental part of any constitution that recognises the rule of law. We perhaps do not have to look too far from home in the EU at present to see a judiciary that is not independent, but I digress.

We need an independent judiciary in this country, and we have one, but it has to be protected from criticism because judges cannot go into print to defend themselves when criticised. We must provide the courts with a specific legal test on the face of the Bill governing the treatment of Court of Justice case law after Brexit, and that is what my amendment 137 seeks to achieve.

[Mr Marcus Fysh (Yeovil) (Con)]

Does the hon. and learned Lady agree that one aspect of the legal certainty that the Government should consider is that, as our relationship with the EU evolves, we do not want our judges to have to make decisions that might affect our commercial policy, or indeed our diplomatic policy, towards the EU?

[Joanna Cherry]

My amendment 137 seeks to ensure that:

“When interpreting retained EU law after exit day a court or tribunal shall pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court.”

The Minister questioned the term “due regard”, but it is not unknown to international law. The Lugano Convention on the mutual recognition on enforcement of judgments, to which EU and non-EU states are signatories, talks about paying “due account”, but I have followed the recommendation of the organisation Justice that it is clearer and better English to talk about paying “due regard”. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, we have a duty to take account of decisions of the Court of Justice, so paying “due regard” to taking account of such decisions is not a phrase unknown.

This amendment is not a Trojan horse designed to continue references after Brexit, and I say that as someone who does not want Brexit to happen. It is designed to create certainty for individuals, businesses and litigants, and also for the judiciary. It would leave it open to British courts to disagree with the Court of Justice’s interpretation, even if its case law was relevant to the case. It would not—as the Government’s current draft does—give an unfettered, politically controversial discretion to consider or ignore Court of Justice decisions as our courts saw fit.

The test set out in my amendment has three advantages. First, it would create legal certainty for individuals and businesses. Secondly, it would provide political cover for the courts. Thirdly, it seems to fit with the preference of the judiciary, who want a clear instruction. In recent evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Lady Hale, the new President of the Supreme Court, said:

“It should be made plain in statute what authority or lack of authority, or weight or lack of weight, is to be given to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union after we have left, in relation both to matters that arose before we left and, more importantly, to matters after we leave. That is not something we”—

she means “we, the judges”—

“would like to have to make up for ourselves, obviously, because it is very much a political question, and we would like statute to tell us the answer.”

In my submission, under my amendment, statute would tell the judges the answer.

That is not just my view. The Institute for Government looked at the various options and concluded that the wording that I now propose would license courts in the UK to refer to the Court of Justice’s reasoning in future judgments without making those Court of Justice judgments binding on the UK courts—