Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I begin by paying tribute to the shadow Home Secretary and the Opposition for deciding to give their full support to this measure. It is always reassuring to the nation as a whole when political parties come together—we do not do it very often—on an issue of national security. Especially with emergency legislation, that has a powerful and beneficial impact, and reassures many members of the public who might otherwise be concerned.

The Intelligence and Security Committee has considered the Bill, and we have taken evidence from the intelligence agencies on its content. If we were concerned in any way that the Bill simply added to the powers available to the Government and that they were using a fast-track procedure to implement it, we would not be able to recommend its endorsement, but we are satisfied that that is not the case.

I have listened carefully to some of the comments by those on both sides of the House who are opposed to the Bill and have criticised it. Part of the argument is that it is shocking that, when the European Court of Justice has repudiated the directive, we should defy that decision. They have not taken the trouble to read properly what the Court said. It was clear. It did not oppose the retention of data under national laws based on the directive. I shall quote the judgment:

“the retention of data for the purpose of their possible transmission to the competent national authorities genuinely satisfies an objective of general interest, namely the fight against serious crime and, ultimately, public security.”

The Court’s objection—it was an understandable point—was that the directive contained insufficient proportionality and safeguards. The directive covers 28 countries, and some of them did not have previous legislation or experience in this area and simply implemented everything that the European directive seemed to permit them to do. However, as the shadow Home Secretary rightly said, that has not been the practice in the United Kingdom. Most of our safeguards had already been introduced, and continue to apply.

Let me remind those who have criticised the proposal what the safeguards include, which are far broader than the narrow approach of the directive. First, for any intelligence agency to use the powers, it has to satisfy not just itself but the Secretary of State and Parliament that to do so is in the interests of national security, fighting serious crime or protecting economic well-being, which is linked to national security. If it does not meet that requirement, the agency cannot use the powers in the first place.

Secondly, the European Court directive allowed data to be retained for up to two years. In the United Kingdom it has never been retained for two years; a maximum of a year is allowed. That is a considerable improvement. Many countries do not have the system that we already have of the interception of communications commissioner, who is able to examine the use of the powers and report both to Parliament and to the Secretary of State if he thinks that they are being used in a disproportionate way or not for the purpose that Parliament intended.

It is therefore an important consideration that the United Kingdom happens to have this experience and has used the powers in a proper and responsible way—we are not the only country, but it does not apply to all 28 members of the EU.

[Caroline Lucas]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman cites the interception of communications commissioner as some kind of safeguard, but is he aware that the commissioner has recently ruled that there has been

“significant institutional overuse of existing powers”?

That same commissioner is already warning us.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

We will have to see the context in which the commissioner made that remark, but I have read his report and he gives a clean bill of health to the intelligence agencies on communications data, which is what we are talking about here. He has answered many of the criticisms that have been made elsewhere and said that they are unfounded and unjustified. I am sure that the hon. Lady has read that report. Perhaps she should re-read it and then she will remember the point that she momentarily forgot when she intervened.

The other important part of the Bill relates to questions of extraterritoriality. This is a difficult and sensitive issue, because obviously many communications service providers are not UK companies and would be reluctant or might refuse to recognise any restrictions imposed on them. I shall read out one sentence from the explanatory notes that have been prepared for the benefit of the House on this part of the Bill, which explains why this is an important and justifiable provision. The explanatory notes state on page 4:

“While RIPA has always had implicit extraterritorial effect”—

the Government themselves have said that it is extraterritorial—

“some companies based outside the United Kingdom, including some of the largest communications providers in the market, have questioned whether the legislation applies to them. These companies argue that they will only comply with requests where there is a clear obligation in law.”

In other words, up till now it has been implicit that the legislation is extraterritorial—that has certainly been the Government’s view—but that has never been spelled out explicitly. That is what the Bill now seeks to rectify, and we are told in the explanatory notes that some of the communications providers based outside the United Kingdom have said that that is what they are looking for. If it is an explicit obligation, they will be willing to comply with it. If it is not, they will have to consider whether they wish to do so or not.

There will be other providers which, even with that explicit statement, still decline to co-operate. Our Government have to decide what they will do to try to change that situation, because it is a very unsatisfactory one. We are talking about companies that operate within the United Kingdom. We are not talking about what they are doing in America, France, Germany or other countries. They should co-operate in the way that United Kingdom companies co-operate and in a way in which some overseas companies are prepared to co-operate. They recognise the public interest, and they recognise the need for these provisions in the battle against serious crime in particular, not to mention terrorism and such matters.

The House and the public can be reassured that what is in the Bill is not what we have been told is in it. Its purpose is to maintain the current situation. To oppose the Bill would create an enormous risk, if indeed the provisions, which are currently in regulations, were challenged before the courts and were then struck down. Therefore I certainly and, I think, my colleagues on the Intelligence and Security Committee, recommend these provisions to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Dewsbury (Simon Reevell), because although none of us remotely underestimates the difficulty of finding a proper balance between liberty and security—some might come down in different places on that—I say with respect to those who are criticising the data retention practice in the United Kingdom, rather than the policy of the EU, which is greater, that there is a fundamental logical fallacy in what they are arguing, as the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) exposed powerfully. It is this: where there is a suspect for a crime, it is for a crime that has been committed in the past. The police will not know who that suspect is until they come to the police’s attention, at which point they have to get historical evidence. These days, part of that historical evidence will be in data records. They have to be able to access everybody’s data records in order to find those of one particular person, because the police, no more than the rest of us, are not given powers of clairvoyance with which to anticipate who is and who is not to be a suspect. Unless or until I hear from opponents of this Bill and of data retention how the police can be expected to identify in advance those who are going to be suspected of crime, I have to say that the whole logical basis of their argument completely falls away.

I always listen with interest to the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). Indeed, there are areas where I have been in concert, if not conspiracy, with him. I think I am correct in saying that he said that Parliament has been a weak defender of our liberties in this field over the past 20 years. With respect, I beg to differ. Forty years ago, almost to this month, after six hours of questioning by former police officers as part of my security vetting procedure, I was interviewed by a senior officer of the Security Service. He explained to me that a file had been kept on my family since at least since 1961, when I was 15 and my sister, who was the subject of one of the original reports, was 17. In order to identify a discrepancy that had arisen between what I had said and what they thought they knew, he had to show me my file—a big, thick manila file was produced. He went on to question me as to what contact I had had as president of the National Union of Students at the end of the 1960s and the early ’70s with the student national organiser of the Communist party. I said that I had met this man from time to time at a pub in Covent Garden. “Oh yes,” he said, “You met that man at the Sussex Arms in Covent Garden on these dates, and this is what you discussed.” I mentioned that in my book and it is a great tribute to the modern Security Service that it and the Cabinet Office approved of my relaying of the story.

At that stage, however, we were in the area of the secret state. There was no parliamentary oversight whatsoever of the intelligence or security agencies. The telephone tapping that happened to me and my family was the subject of no statutory warrant whatsoever. The past 30 years have seen this House progressively doing its duty by the citizen—from the Telecommunications Act 1984 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 through to, I am proud to say, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—to ensure that the necessary powers of the state to detect and prevent crime and to secure national safety are the subject of proper controls.

Of course, as technology changes, the law should take account of it—both sides of the House are agreed on that—but RIPA was a huge advance in terms of human rights, and that was how I introduced it to the House back in 2000. It is simply a matter of record that that Act applied overseas and there has been dispute subsequently about its exact wording. That is all that is being corrected by this Bill and I defy anybody to challenge that.

There is one area in which this Bill will, indeed, change the law. Clause 3 will change the basis for obtaining a warrant for intercept on grounds of economic well-being. At the moment, in RIPA, economic well-being is the sole criterion without condition. In future, it will be subject to the interests of national security.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The right hon. Gentleman may be unaware that there has been a European directive since the late 1990s that links economic well-being to national security issues. It has been implemented in the United Kingdom through a code of practice, which is unsatisfactory, and it is that code of practice that will now appear as primary legislation.

[Mr Straw]

I am aware of that, but the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be the first to accept that there is a world of difference between something in a code and something in a Bill. I note that not one critic can find the words to commend the fact that this Government, with support from the Opposition, are going to strengthen provisions, rather than diminish them.

As the right hon. and learned Gentleman has generously given me an extra few seconds, I will also address data records. Before the Telecommunications Act 1984 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994, data communications of all sorts were collected without any statutory control. That, too, has been the subject of repeated strengthening of the law, to protect the citizen. I hope this House will pass this sensible, necessary and very modest measure.