Syria

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Wednesday 6th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

The right hon. Gentleman correctly draws attention, as I have done, to the extent of the human suffering. The fact that the United Nations has launched the largest ever financial appeal for humanitarian assistance underlines the catastrophic scale of that suffering. We must all remember that that is the background to the situation and to deciding what we have to do.

The right hon. Gentleman made some recommendations towards the end of his remarks, some of which we have done, including work to unify the Syrian opposition, which, of course, is what we did for many months. They have been unified, to the extent that it can be practically achieved, in the Syrian National Coalition and we have recognised that group as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. I do not suppose that any opposition or political grouping will be perfect in the eyes of this or any other country, but I do not believe that there will be a better attempt or greater success at unifying the Syrian opposition than the national coalition.

It would be wonderful if some of the right hon. Gentleman’s other recommendations could be achieved, including Russian and Chinese agreement to impose an arms embargo by the whole world on Syria. We would, of course, support that—we will go over this ground in our meetings with the Russians this afternoon and next week—but I have not seen any prospect of Russia agreeing to such an arms embargo. It is a good thing to wish for, but in practical, diplomatic terms there is no possibility at the moment of it being achieved. That is the background to the decisions that we have to make. Many things would be far preferable, such as an immediate agreement on a negotiated political transition in Syria.

The right hon. Gentleman asked, rightly, how seriously we should take the offers to negotiate. Having talked to President al-Khatib of the national coalition last week, I believe not only that his offer is sincere but that he would love it to be taken up and that he really would negotiate with members of the regime without prior insistence on the departure of Assad. However, President Assad’s insistence during his weekend interview that the regime is ready to negotiate is something that we have heard for two years but that has never turned into actual substance. Of course, we will discuss with Mr Brahimi again this afternoon whether those statements can be used to bring both sides closer together. It is part of his job to try to do that. The evidence of the past two years, however, is that, in current circumstances, offers to negotiate by the regime are not sincere, are not followed up and do not lead to the sort of progress that we all want to see.

It is against that background of diplomatic deadlock and political stalemate while tens of thousands die that I argue that we have to do what we can in a very cautious, considered and clearly thought-out way to try to change that situation and to save human lives as best we can, working at all times with our partners and allies, including those in the Arab world. There is a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League today.

We will continue to use every diplomatic effort, but the situation that the right hon. Gentleman and I are describing cannot remain static. He is quite right to say that the international community has been an abject failure collectively. The United Nations Security Council has not shouldered its responsibilities. We have tried many times to put that right, but our resolutions have been vetoed. We have been working in the last month since Mr Brahimi’s last briefing to the Security Council to find a new common way forward for the council—we will discuss that again with the Russians in the coming hours—but that common ground has not emerged in a month of discussions behind the scenes in New York.

Given that situation, we all have to ask ourselves whether we are going to hold our policy completely static or show that we are prepared to change as the situation deteriorates—reluctantly perhaps, and cautiously at all times. I argue that we must be prepared to show an increased level of support for the opposition, and that it has to take a practical form if we are to exert any pressure on the regime—and, indeed, on Russia as well—to successfully negotiate on this matter. The parameters have, I hope, been clearly set out in my statement. They are clearly set out in the amendment to the United Nations arms embargo. It is amended, not lifted. The arms embargo remains in place; these are specific exemptions for non-lethal military equipment and for technical assistance for the protection of civilians. I have just given examples of what that means in practice.

As for the future, the EU sanctions have now been rolled over, with that amendment, for three months. There will therefore be a further discussion in May about the renewal of such sanctions, and the Government—and every Member of this House—will be able to form their views on what we should do, in whatever situation we have arrived at in May, about further amendments to the embargo, if they are necessary. I think the parameters are clear. The policy is clear, and above all I want to make it clear that its direction is clear: we must be prepared to do more in a situation of such slaughter and suffering, and a more static policy would not measure up to the gravity of the situation.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

While I welcome the tone of the Foreign Secretary’s speech and the specific measures that he has announced, I regret to say that I cannot see how any of them will have any serious prospect of reducing the length of the conflict or preventing the massacre of tens of thousands more Syrians. Will he accept that, until such time as the Syrian opposition have the military equipment that will enable them to defeat the Assad regime and thereby bring the conflict to an end earlier than would otherwise be the case, we will continue to see tens of thousands of people being killed and the extremists in the opposition benefiting from that delay? What would the Foreign Secretary have to be persuaded of, in order to accept that giving military support to the opposition in a controlled and responsible way is indeed necessary?

[Mr Hague]

What I—and, I suspect, most of the House—would have to be persuaded of is that there was absolutely no alternative remaining. My right hon. and learned Friend has put the case—for a long time, actually—for going much further than I have proposed today in regard to the arming of the opposition movements in Syria by western countries. The difficulties involved in doing that have partly been set out by the right hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), but we also have to recognise that that conflict in Syria is already militarised. Opposition groups have access to substantial quantities of weapons, and those weapons are already inside Syria. There is such a flow of weapons. I therefore believe that it is right for the development of our policy to be graduated, for us to show our readiness to deliver increased assistance and for the European countries and the United States to be willing to amend our policy if the situation continues to deteriorate, but in a way that will command general support and that will pose the least danger to the increased militarisation of the conflict. That is why I think this is the right balance to strike, rather than moving to the position that my right hon. and learned Friend has consistently advocated.