UK Policy on the Middle East

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

I congratulate you on your appointment, Mr Deputy Speaker. I also commend my hon. Friend the Minister and the shadow Minister for what were two powerful and profound speeches on an important matter.

The subject of the debate is the middle east. One might therefore expect it to be concentrated on the views of the Arab world, as well as on those of Israel, yet one of the great ironies is that the three most important countries involved in the region—in the sense of being engaged in proactive action at this moment—are Israel, Iran and Turkey, none of which is an Arab state. Part of the difficulty that we face has been the inability, for various reasons, of most of the Arab world to take the kind of proactive role that might have been expected.

In the time available, I want to concentrate on Iran. I want to ask a number of questions, but I want also to offer possible answers to some of them, including to the point raised by the hon. Member for South Antrim (Dr McCrea) in an intervention a few moments ago. The first question is: are we right to single out Iran for its almost-certain nuclear arms programme? Often we are told, “Well, there are other nuclear weapons states. Why should Iran be singled out in this way?” I believe that the answer to my question is that we are right to do so, and we are right for two reasons. Compared with the existing nuclear weapons states, Iran—or, more particularly, its President—has gone out of the way to be bellicose in his language, to be threatening to at least one other country in the region and to have aspirations for the aggrandisement of his country, with a willingness to use weapons for that purpose.

However, linked to that is the undoubted fact that, unlike in the case of previous nuclear weapons developments, undesirable though they might have been, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is painfully obvious not that it will use them directly, but that a consequence will be a destabilisation of the region and the almost near certainty of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey feeling it necessary to go in the same direction. Therefore, the middle east as a whole would become a region with a significant number of nuclear weapons states, with all the awful consequences that that could imply.

That is the first question. The second question is, therefore: is current policy working? Manifestly it is not. We all know that it was meant to be based on carrot and stick. What better carrot could there have been than President Obama’s offer of a grand dialogue with Iran and the normalisation of relations? Instead, that was thrown in his face. There were not even failed negotiations; the negotiations never began, because Iran rejected that possibility. We know also that sanctions—important though they are, and much as we welcome the latest decision by the United Nations Security Council—will not by themselves achieve a change of heart in Tehran.

I therefore come to the third question: is it possible that a policy of diplomacy and pressure could work? Is there a scenario in which it might work? The answer, I believe, is yes, if two conditions are satisfied. First, Russia and China are crucial, because although they supported the resolution last week, we know that their support is grudging. We also know that they have consistently taken on board their short-term considerations—in particular, their trade relationships with Iran and other aspects of their foreign policy—rather than standing four-square with the rest of the Security Council. Russia in particular, as a neighbour of the middle east and Iran, and with a large Muslim minority in its own territory, has as much to be concerned about by a nuclear-armed Iran as any country in the west, as does China, because of its particular position. Russia and China, therefore, if they look to their self-interest, ought to be able to share the position of the United Kingdom, the United States and others on the need for a total uniformity of view on the question of pressing Iran.

However, it is not just Russia and China; it is also the Arab states that I mentioned earlier. Anyone who goes to any of the countries of the region—and I have been to most of them—will find that, in private, people will say that they are as horrified as we are at the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. But try getting them to put their heads above the parapet—try getting them to support publicly what the United States and the Security Council are trying to do—and all sorts of reasons are given as to why it is too difficult, why it would be unpopular in their countries and why it all depends on what Israel does, along with various other excuses.

That would not worry me but for the consequence of that resistance to coming out and sharing people’s real views, which is that Ahmadinejad is able to say to the world, “This isn’t the international community versus Iran; this is simply the United States and its closest allies.” What we need is not a coalition of the willing, but a coalition of the relevant. We need those countries of the region to join the west—and, I hope, Russia and China—to take a common position on the issue. That is what happened in the first Gulf war, when Kuwait was being liberated. Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia publicly supported—with troops, as well as through diplomacy—what the United States-led coalition was doing. Pressure could work, therefore, but until that change takes place, it is less likely to do so.

The main point that I want to concentrate on in the time left is if the methods that I have described do not work—I refer now to the intervention of a few minutes ago—what then do we do? Do we simply say, “Well, that’s too bad. There’s nothing we can do”? There is the question of the military option. People have rightly pointed out that the downside is a pretty dreadful downside. If military action is taken by either the United States or Israel, it will almost certainly lead to Iran enabling Hamas or Hezbollah to become even more proactive and attack Israel, as well as fomenting mischief in Iraq, with the price of oil going sky high and the straits of Hormuz perhaps being closed.

All that is true, and I cannot say that it would not be likely to happen. However—and this is an important “however”—all those things would be relatively short-term events, and I stress “relatively”. They would last a few days or a few weeks, or perhaps two or three months. An Iran with a nuclear weapon, however, would be around for years to come—for ever. Therefore, it is not good enough simply to say, “There is a downside. Therefore, the military option cannot be considered at any stage.” We have to come to a judgment on the balance of advantage. Is the balance of advantage to accept major problems if military action was taken, if—and this is an important “if”—it would remove the nuclear threat from Iran?

However, everything that I have said on this issue depends on whether the military option is a real option. Would it actually deliver? That is the fundamental question that Britain, America, Israel and the wider international community have to consider. I do not have time to go into the detail, but I make the point that the objective must be to come to an honest judgment. If diplomacy fails, if sanctions do not work and if there is no peaceful alternative, then we will have to come to an honest view on whether the military option—whether by the United States or Israel—would destroy Iran’s nuclear capacity or, even if it did not, so degrade it as to make Iran unable to have nuclear weapons for a good few years to come.

I conclude by simply saying this. In this rather imperfect world in which we live, it is not good enough to ask, “What is the perfect solution to this dilemma?” The real question that we have to ask—or at least that Governments have to ask—is what is the least bad option? If the military advice was that we could either remove Iran’s nuclear capacity or degrade it for a long period, Iran must realise that, at some stage, that might be what happens. It would not be an ideal solution, but it might still be better than the alternatives.