Afghanistan and Pakistan

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

It would be foolish for anyone to suggest that NATO had not made foolish mistakes with regard to Afghanistan in recent years, or that the matter will come to a conclusion in the way that would have been hoped. It is equally unwise, however, for the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane) to suggest that the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will simply constitute a retreat, or for the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) to say that the whole presence in Afghanistan has been an unqualified failure.

Let me go back to the point that the House was reminded of by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron): we went into Afghanistan to ensure that the country could not be used again as a base by the Taliban. One only has to ask whether it was ever possible or realistic in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 for us not to have seen international action, given the Taliban’s refusal to deny sanctuary to al-Qaeda as a continuing base for terrorist operations at that time. The decision made at that time, with the unqualified approval of the United Nations Security Council, was the right one, and we should never lose sight of that fact. Mistakes have been made since then, as my hon. Friend has rightly pointed out, but the question today is not whether it was all a mistake but how we can maintain what has already been achieved.

I agree with those on both sides of the House who have said that al-Qaeda is now effectively out of Afghanistan. It is no longer able to use that country as a base, so there is no long-term rationale for the presence of combat troops there. That does not mean, however, that the matter is now entirely resolved. The question now is: how do we leave in a way that will not enable al-Qaeda to return? At the moment, we do not know whether by the time we leave there will be a coalition Government including the Taliban, or peace in Afghanistan—in which case we can be relatively relaxed that there will be no future for al-Qaeda there. It is equally possible either that the Taliban will not agree to a coalition Government and that we will leave without their being part of a joint agreement, or that they will be part of a coalition but will have their own agenda, which will be one that will not give us comfort.

Although I welcomed what the Prime Minister said today and have no difficulties with it so far as it went, it seemed to me that it left open certain serious gaps. He said that as far as the Government are concerned, our future relationship with Afghanistan after the withdrawal of our ground forces will be based on our diplomatic, developmental and trade relationships. He said that the only military dimension would be the support we would give to the development of a military academy. All of that is very sensible and desirable, but we have to ask about something that is not just a British problem, but primarily a problem for the United States. How can we help to ensure that an Afghan Government who may not have full control of all the territory of Afghanistan when we have withdrawn will be able to prevent the use of parts of the country that they might be unable to control, even with their fullest efforts, as a base for terrorist operations?

I believe that the international community, including Russia and China, should be arguing for two things. First, we should be asking for the basis of the withdrawal of combat forces to lead also to an agreement with the Afghan Government, because this can happen only with their support and agreement, and preferably to a treaty sanctified by the United Nations, for the continuing facility of air support for the Afghan Government if that should prove necessary. If there are areas of Afghanistan that the Government do not control, and if there is evidence that those areas have been infiltrated by al-Qaeda, we should have the legal authority—in co-operation with the Afghan Government and through the use of special forces and other means—to eliminate that threat if and when it arises.

We must remember that when the Taliban Government were eliminated, that was done not by NATO ground forces but by air power combined with Afghan Northern Alliance ground forces. In exactly the same way, at the end of current operations when all of our combat troops are withdrawn, having Afghan ground forces, which will be very strong, with the back-up of potential air support and the potential deployment of special forces purely to deal with terrorist threats, will be the way to provide the long-term security that the right hon. Member for Rotherham seemed to doubt would be available.

In the light of your comments, Mr Deputy Speaker, I shall keep my comments very brief, but there is a second proposal that should also be part of the international response. We know that Russia and China are just as concerned about a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan as NATO or the west might be—for obvious reasons, given their own domestic and internal problems. What is needed for Afghanistan, as part of that country’s future, is an internationally recognised declaration of neutrality. Afghanistan should become a neutral state, rather in the way that Austria became a neutral state in 1955 as a way of ensuring the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from that country and the ability of that country to develop in peace. Austria is now in a situation very different from that of Afghanistan. Only by having regional support for an independent Afghanistan that cannot give sanctuary to terrorist forces will we have the level of confidence that we need to produce the desired result.

[Mr MacShane]

I am conscious that others want to speak, but may I gently put it to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, for whom I have immense respect when it comes to foreign affairs, that China and the Kremlin might not be totally unhappy to see America and the west bogged down as badly as we are in Afghanistan?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

For other reasons, the right hon. Gentleman might be right, but we are not going to get bogged down because there will be a withdrawal of NATO forces. The Russians have said publicly, through the Foreign Minister, that a premature NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a disaster, so they are obviously concerned about the power vacuum that could result.

I believe that the real concern—this goes back to the struggles that there have been over Afghanistan for 150 to 200 years—is about Afghanistan’s future status. Of course the Russians and the Chinese will not wish to see Afghanistan as some American client state—why should they?—but there is no need for that to happen. It should not happen, and it must not be allowed to happen. Equally, Afghanistan will not be strong enough to defend itself without maximum international regional support from its neighbours—not just Russia and China, but India, Pakistan and Iran, all of which have an interest in the situation, and all of which could live with a truly neutral Afghanistan that was not the client state of any of the big powers.

We must not see the withdrawal of combat forces as the end of international military involvement. I hope that it will be, but there has to be a fall-back position if a terrorist threat re-emerges. The real solution is a combination of a treaty arrangement with the Afghan Government combined with an international status for Afghanistan, which the Afghan Government would welcome; they have already said that they would be interested in and attracted by such a proposal. That would give the kind of political and military security that ought to give confidence.

[Mr Baron]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the best way of achieving progress in talks with the Taliban is to make those talks unconditional?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

I do not have any privileged information, but I am pretty certain that they already are. Whatever the formal public position, there is no doubt that talks are going on and that Americans have been involved in discussions with the Taliban. I bet that they were not simply discussing what the agenda would be or what preconditions would apply. It is a slow steady process, and I am sure that it has begun. It should have begun some time ago, and I hope that it leads to progress, but we cannot assume that it will do so. Even with the best will on our part, there is no certainty that the Taliban will wish to co-operate. They may think that they can win without such an agreement, so we have to have a structure in place, both internationally and among western countries, that takes into account all the possibilities, including the Taliban not being willing to co-operate.