Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Malcolm Rifkind Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Kensington) (Con)]

In the short time available, I shall concentrate my comments on two matters: first, the conclusions we should draw from bin Laden’s demise, and secondly, the remaining challenges faced by the international community with regard to Libya.

Bin Laden’s demise was of course an historic event. We should not underestimate the significance of the US special forces operation, or of the extraordinary intelligence operation that their achievement represented. The timing of the operation is significant in that it happened right in the middle of the Arab spring. What could better demonstrate the ultimate irrelevance of what al-Qaeda has to offer? There is reason to believe—a massive amount of evidence has emerged from throughout the Arab world—that the lure and attraction of, and the significance of and interest in, al-Qaeda are beginning to wane. Al-Qaeda not only does not feature in the demands of the hundreds of thousands of people who demonstrate throughout the Arab world for reform and change, but it has been positively rejected by many as they advance claims for universal values.

However, if we begin to believe that the attraction of al-Qaeda is waning in the Arab world, I caution the House against coming to a similar conclusion with regard to Pakistan. We are in a very different time zone there when it comes to the possibilities of change. Bin Laden may have been of Saudi or Yemeni origin, but we should remember that ultimately the al-Qaeda movement originated in south Asia, not in the Arab world. We also know that that happened in the context of experiences in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is perhaps significant and not irrelevant—I do not want to anticipate events—that the only revenge act so far in response to the assassination of bin Laden has come not from al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban, but from the Pakistani Taliban, who feel, and who have expressed sympathy for al-Qaeda and endorsed it.

That is significant for how we see developments in Afghanistan. There is a powerful argument for saying that if our original purpose for going into Afghanistan was the threat of al-Qaeda operating from within the country, that reason is now much less valid than it has been at any time in the past few years. However, the question of the timing and method of our withdrawal from Afghanistan must take into account not just the implications within that country, but to an even greater extent, the possible consequences for the destabilisation of Pakistan. Up to now, we have primarily worried about the consequences of al-Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban using the border as a refuge zone, but in some ways, things are now the other way around. As the right hon. Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) said, the problem in Pakistan is of far greater significance to the wider stability of the world, and it must be given priority. I hope that that is taken into account.

On Libya, I pay tribute to what has already been achieved. There is no doubt that Benghazi would have experienced an incredible massacre, and that Misrata would have been overthrown by Gaddafi, but for the efforts that have been made. However, those who have warned of the dangers of stalemate pose a real question. Without wanting to criticise the Government—I am aware of the international constraints on what they can do—there is a fundamental inconsistency in arguing that the mission is purely humanitarian at the same time as making it clear that it cannot be completed until we have, in effect, regime change.

The question, therefore, is this: how does one square that circle, and can it be squared in a way that does not breach the UN resolution? Whether we like it or not, that is the framework within which we must operate. As I see it, there are only three ways in which that stalemate can be broken over a reasonable period of time. First, implosion in Tripoli is quite possible. In the past few months, a significant number of leading Gaddafi adherents have defected. It is not impossible or inconceivable—it could happen next week or next month—that many of the senior adherents who remain, including generals and Cabinet Ministers, will simply fade away and disappear. I suspect that even Gaddafi’s immediate family will eventually not wish to share his bunker. Saif al-Islam and some of his colleagues might prefer to be in the south of France rather than the quagmire that Gaddafi’s regime could become.

That is one option, but we cannot count on it, and certainly not in any short time scale. The second option is a very slow process of gradual disintegration of the regime. That might be happening already because of the combined impact of economic sanctions and the fact that the oilfields are primarily in the east of the country, with very little utilisable refining capacity in the west, plus all the other forms of political, diplomatic and other pressure that is being put on the regime. However, by itself, that will not deliver the outcome that we need to bring this matter to a conclusion for many months, and possibly for several years. It is a serious option, but do we want to contemplate that the international action will take that long?

That leads me to the third option. What do we do, and what can we do within the UN resolution, to help the insurgents who are struggling for freedom and the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime? We have had a crucial watershed in the past couple of weeks in how the British and other Governments treat those insurgents. This is perhaps the first debate in which they have not been described as rebels. For many months, that was the description used not just in this country, but elsewhere, but that is no longer the case. The insurgents have been invited to open an office in London, they are being treated as serious politicians, and they are rightly considered to have greater legitimacy than the Gaddafi regime, which I welcome. However, we also know that they do not have the military capability to achieve the result that we all want.

The question is whether that can be achieved within the terms of the UN resolution. If it requires us—I do not complain about this—simply to protect civilians, what happens if there is hand-to-hand fighting in Misrata or Tripoli? It could not be stopped by air power or an international coalition; it could be stopped only by the people on the ground. Only they could protect civilians in such a situation. Therefore, I argue—and I believe that some of the legal advice agrees—that if we could be satisfied that the provision of military assistance to the insurgents would help to protect civilian lives and deal with the threat to civilians in Libya, it would be consistent with the resolution. In those circumstances, that kind of help should be considered. In reality, of course, that sort of help is already being given. The French, the Qataris and several other countries are already providing it, whether or not they acknowledge it publicly.

Were that help to be provided—I am talking about training as well as weapons—two things would happen. First, those around Gaddafi would know that the game was up, and gradually, as the insurgents became more of a disciplined, trained military force, it would become obvious—in their view, as well as in ours—that the regime was finished. Secondly, Misrata and the east of the country would gradually be united under insurgent control, and Gaddafi’s remaining power would be so restricted as to be insignificant. That is the real challenge, not just for the British Government, but for the international community, and I believe that we can respond to this situation positively within the terms of the UN resolution.