The Government's Plan for Brexit

Lucy Frazer Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am going to make progress.

The minimum requirements of a plan are fivefold. The first—I have begun to touch on this—is the need for enough detail and clarity to end the circus of uncertainty that has been going on in recent weeks on issues such as the single market, paying for access to the single market, the customs union and transitional arrangements. The pattern and rhythm of those exchanges over the past few days and weeks is clear for all to see. One member of the Cabinet says one thing one day; another member of the Cabinet says something else on a different day; then a spokesperson says that no decision has been made. We have seen that pattern over and over in the past few weeks. That uncertainty causes anxiety across the UK, in businesses, among working people, and in our nations and regions. It has to end, as it causes more damage to the process than anything else at the moment. The House, the public, businesses, working people, the media and our communities are entitled to know the basis on which the Government intend to negotiate their future.

[Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the alternative to having a plan was no information until 2019. Does he accept that in the debate on 12 October he asked the Secretary of State whether we would have the same information as the European Parliament, where there is a mandatory obligation to inform the European Parliament of the negotiations? My right hon. Friend said very clearly that the answer was yes.

[Keir Starmer]

Yes; good. We are working with our European colleagues on that issue, but that is after article 50 has been triggered. We are discussing what comes before. Of course, there are stages in the process. The plan is important because it is the start of the process: it sets the scene and the direction of travel. Once article 50 has been triggered, MEPs will be involved in the process, because they have a vote at the end of the exercise. I acknowledge that the Secretary of State has said on a number of occasions that whatever information they have, we will have. I should jolly well hope so. The idea that MEPs would be provided with more information about the negotiations than us would be wrong in the eyes of everyone in the House. The Secretary of State made that commitment early on, and it was the right commitment to make. He will not be surprised to learn that I intend to hold him to that every step of the way. I am sure that we will meet at the Dispatch Box to discuss precisely that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

In a debate with much intense feeling, I would like to highlight the fact that there are some areas of common ground. First, there is acceptance across the House that there needs to be, and will be, parliamentary scrutiny. Secondly, and importantly, it has been accepted on both sides of the House that parliamentary scrutiny should not trump achieving the best deal for our country. In this debate and in the many that will follow, we must never forget that second point. Our overriding concern must be to get the right long-term arrangement for our country’s future.

I will outline the steps to which the Government have already agreed. This House has already resolved that there will be parliamentary scrutiny. In a motion agreed to by both sides of the House on 12 October, this House resolved that there would be

“a full and transparent debate on the Government’s plan”

and that the House should properly

“scrutinise that plan for leaving the EU before Article 50 is invoked”.

The Secretary of State confirmed in that debate a commitment that

“Parliament be kept at least as informed as, and better informed than, the European Parliament”—[Official Report, 12 October 2016; Vol. 615, c. 332.]

in circumstances where there is a mandatory obligation to inform the European Parliament. Through her amendment, the Prime Minister has now agreed to publish a plan, and the Secretary of State said today that it is inconceivable that there will not be a vote on the final deal. It therefore follows that there is already an agreed level of parliamentary scrutiny, but we must strike the right balance between parliamentary scrutiny and ensuring that we maintain the best negotiating stance.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

I was a remainer, too, and I welcome the fact that a statement of the broad parameters of the British negotiating position will be made clear, but does my hon. and learned Friend agree that we should never allow any demands for excessive granularity to undermine the UK’s negotiating position or the national interest?

[Lucy Frazer]

I absolutely agree. It is vital that we get the best deal—not that we have the power to determine the deal at every stage.

The Opposition have accepted at many stages that we must not tie the Government’s hands. In the October motion, it was accepted across the House that the process must

“not undermine the negotiating position of the Government as negotiations are entered into”.

The shadow Secretary of State stated in the course of that debate that

“navigating our exit from the EU will not be an easy process, and it will require shrewd negotiating”

and that we

“must put the national interest first”.—[Official Report, 12 October 2016; Vol. 615, c. 323.]

He accepted that there had to be a degree of confidentiality and flexibility. He repeated those very words today. Those statements, which the Opposition have repeatedly made, must be honoured and remembered, because we made some strategic errors when we first negotiated in Europe.

To the Spaak Committee meetings of 1955 that eventuated in the treaty of Rome, we sent a sole British delegate, a minor trade official called Russell Bretherton. He was eventually summoned home on the grounds that Britain should have no part in what a more senior civil servant described as this

“mysticism which appeals to European… federalists”.

Interviewed in later life about the experience, Bretherton said:

“If we had been able to say that we agreed in principle, we could have got whatever kind of common market we wanted. I have no doubt of that at all.”

Now, we have an opportunity to renegotiate our role in Europe and the rest of the world. I do not want to say to my children that we did not get the best deal because of our fear, our scepticism, our adversarial parliamentary system, political point scoring and, possibly, ulterior political motives. I do not want to say that we restricted ourselves in negotiating the right arrangement for our long-term future.