Investigatory Powers Bill (Sixteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLucy Frazer
Main Page: Lucy Frazer (Conservative - South East Cambridgeshire)Department Debates - View all Lucy Frazer's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Owen, for what I anticipate will be our last debate in this Bill Committee as we take this clutch of new clauses together. I say it is our last debate, but in some ways new clause 25 concerns an issue that we have been debating throughout Committee, from the very opening sitting and through every sitting we have had since. The discussion has been to-ing and fro-ing over whether there ought to be more specific provision for weight to be given to privacy in each clause or each time a power is set out, or whether there ought to be some overriding clause.
The new clause is an overriding privacy clause that is consistent with the recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee. For the Labour party, it is an important provision, upon which we place considerable weight. In other words, somewhere in the Bill, there needs to be a recognition of the real rights and interests that are affected by the powers in the Bill. A clause is needed to ensure consistency through the Bill, as there are examples of different powers being dealt with in slightly different ways. That clause should also act as a reminder to decision makers about the key principles they are applying in pretty well all the decisions they make. Perhaps most importantly, the clause should reassure the public on the key principles that run through the Bill.
I will concentrate on new clause 25. Considerable thought has been given to how an overriding privacy clause could be put together in a way that has meaning—and therefore gives confidence to the public—but is not so detailed as to be impractical to operate as an overriding clause. The way that the new clause has been put together is that four important public interests are recognised in paragraphs (a) to (d).
First is the public interest in protecting national security. That runs through the Bill and is the starting point. The second is the national interest in preventing and detecting serious crime, which also runs through all the powers we have debated. Thirdly, there is the public interest in the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data. Now and again that crops up in the Bill, although not consistently, but it is an overriding interest. Fourthly, there is the public interest in the security and integrity of communications systems and networks. Those are the four powerful public interests.
Paragraphs (e) to (h) deal with the principles to be applied, including the principle of necessity and the principle of proportionality. As we have heard, there are examples where, although the Minister and the Solicitor General understandably say, “Well, of course that would be the reference point for decision making,” they are not on the face of the Bill. The new clause would provide the reassurance that that was the framework against which decisions were made.
As far as the principle of proportionality is concerned, the second limb of paragraph (f) is taken directly from the code of practice. It has been thought through and put into the code of practice but, for reasons I have argued previously, ought to be on the face of the Bill. Paragraph (g) deals with
“the principle of due process, accountability and respect for the human rights of those affected by the exercise of powers under this Act”,
and paragraph (h) deals with
“the principle of notification and redress.”
Now, they are principles and therefore are not fixed. The principle of accountability does not mean that everything must, necessarily, be transparent in the way it might be for other powers and duties in other Acts. The principle of notification does not mean there must always be notification. These are broad principles to be applied through the Act.
Whenever one tries to devise an overarching clause such as this, it is a careful exercise, or a judgment call, to try to decide what ought to be in and what ought not to be in. That is why the new clauses that follow are in the nature of a menu or suite of options. I am grateful to the Public Bill Office for giving me guidance on how to devise a number of clauses that would allow the Committee as a whole to look at each of these eight provisions and take a view on which ones ought to be included in an overarching privacy clause. My strong preference is not to get to new clause 26 and onwards, because I do not think that would be a particularly satisfactory way of dealing with an overarching privacy clause.
May I indicate, absolutely clearly and transparently, that I will listen carefully to what the Government say? In other words, I do not pretend for a moment that these new clauses could not be improved upon by different drafting. The issue we are probing is whether in principle there ought to be an overarching privacy clause, or an overarching set of public interests and principles, and if so, what broadly speaking would be included in them.
In that sense, new clause 25 can be properly described as a strongly probing clause. In other words, what we want to draw out are the views of the Committee on what an overarching clause ought to have in it; and if it is then necessary to have another joint exercise at drafting such a clause, then so be it.
I rise to speak as someone who, as a lawyer, will have interpreted clauses such as this to advance a particular case, giving weight to a particular clause or using it to enhance a case or stress a particular fact. To take paragraphs (g) or (h), for example, when we have already discussed notification perhaps not being necessary, they might be construed as saying that notification was necessary in a particular clause where it has no meaning at all. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman acknowledge that, in inserting in an overarching clause, we might be hostages to fortune, by including intentions that we did not intend in specific provisions?
I am grateful for that intervention; there are really two answers. The first is that it has been the constant refrain from the Minister that most of these principles run through the Bill and that therefore they are unnecessary, although I would say it is necessary to flush them out in this form.
To give another example, when the Human Rights Act was being passed, there was a real concern about how freedom of expression would operate in practice, and the Government of the day were persuaded that there ought to be a clause that really indicated to the courts that special consideration or weight ought to be given to freedom of expression.
All that has meant in practice is that the courts, when dealing with freedom of expression, have looked carefully at that clause and given it due weight. It works pretty well in practice; it does not tie the hands of a court. However, it is a reminder to a court of what the most important public interests were in the view of those passing the legislation and what the principles running through the Bill were. More importantly, it was a reminder to decision makers. For every case that goes to court, there are however many hundred thousand decisions that are made by decision makers on the ground.
I have some experience in Northern Ireland of working with the police over there in implementing the Human Rights Act. Counter-intuitively in many ways, having statements of necessity and proportionality built into the decision-making process really helped them, because they were able to assess, probably better than most others, why they thought what they were doing was necessary, and able to articulate why they thought it was proportionate, and they actually came to very good decisions as a result of what might be seen as broad principles being built into their decision-making process.
Such a provision would assure the public as to how the Bill is intended to operate and what the strong currents going through it are. I genuinely think it would help decision makers in the fine decisions, when they are not quite sure where the balance lies, and it would be a reminder to the courts of the particular public interests and principles that Parliament intended to lay down as running through the Bill. The danger of such a clause is always that it will be overused by lawyers, but I do not think that is what has happened in practice with similar provisions.