European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Whitty Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope that the House does not follow that advice. I cannot support this Bill as it stands and in the context in which it is being proposed. I could simply say that as chair of one of those EU sub-committees which the noble Baroness commended earlier for their work, I should maintain a degree of neutrality and abstain—but the reality is that I do not want my name recorded as supporting the removal of my country from a European Union which, for all its imperfections and its failings, is the best hope for peace, prosperity, security and justice on a continent that has been scarred by war and oppression through previous centuries.

However, I agree—who cannot?—that the people have spoken. Not for the first time, I do not agree with them, but I accept that the decision was valid and I do not join some remainers who say that the vote was less valid because of its correlation with age, lack of educational attainment or distance from the M25. It was a valid vote and a clear vote. Indeed, after the vote I counselled some of my colleagues that we should not seek to frustrate the triggering of Article 50, and that the key point would be when the final deal was presented—and it should be presented to Parliament.

I have somewhat modified that view since the Prime Minister’s speech of 17 January. That speech and the apology for a White Paper that followed have frustrated the aim to which I thought the Government were committed of getting the best possible Brexit option, or even of exploring the range of options open to us. I co-chaired the two sub-committees that produced the report Brexit: the Options for Trade. I will make a somewhat more technocratic speech on that report when it comes before the House on 2 March. Suffice it to say for now that the big print is that in the whole range of witnesses from industry, business, academia, the trade unions, consumer groups, lawyers and other professionals, the vast majority argued that the least disruptive and to them the most attractive option for Brexit was retaining, for most purposes, continuing membership of the single market, probably in some form of EEA/EFTA-type deal. Most also argued that to cushion the change for British industry over the period, we would need some continuing engagement, at least in the short term, in the customs union, which would also alleviate the situation in Ireland, which many noble Lords have spoken about.

The 17 January speech slammed the door on both those options, and the White Paper made it even more explicit. It is not this House, the Supreme Court or the remoaners who have forced the Government into a position where they have restricted their options. Of course, it is possible not entirely to blame the Government. Those who were arguing that we needed a plan are probably deceived by what they wished for. What we now have, with the plan in the White Paper, is a rejection of the two most favoured options for British industry and a reduction of the forward strategies to a binary strategy in which we either negotiate—it would be quite a long negotiation—a complex free trade agreement with the EU, with probably unachievable bespoke sectoral agreements within it, or, if we cannot get such a deal, we have no deal and revert to WTO terms. In practice, that means not only with the EU but with most of the rest of the world. That is a terrible option for the United Kingdom, and it was not what was talked about in the heady days of the referendum campaign. Nor was it clear on 24 June or during all those months when we were simply being told that Brexit means Brexit. In fact, none of it was clear until 17 January—but I am afraid that it is clear now.

If this Bill, or something like it, had been put to us last autumn, I would probably have supported it, although I would clearly have pressed for better parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiating process, which we still do not have. We have been told that in order to maintain the confidentiality of the Government’s negotiating position, we should not expect a ball-by-ball commentary. That is fair enough, but in the 17 January speech, the Government in effect announced their negotiating strategy, not to a trusted parliamentary committee but to the world at large. This is not a game of cricket; it is not even a game of chess. It is more akin to joining 27 professional poker players, and before you have even sat down you have thrown away your two best cards and displayed most of your hand to the rest of the world. That is the exact negation of effective negotiation, and I am surprised and shocked that the Government are finding themselves in this position and are asking us, in effect, to endorse it.

I recognise the importance of the migration issue and that migration trumps—if I can use that term—issues of access to the single market. But no attempt has been made to try to get a deal on migration: something between absolute freedom and absolute control. Such a deal could have been possible, but now no longer is.

This House should not ignore the will of the people, and nor should it lightly challenge the elected House—but we are entitled to ask the House of Commons and the Government to think again and to reflect back to them the view of the vast majority of British business that they should not close all options and that we should look at that again. We are entitled to ask them to think again on that, as we are to insist on more effective parliamentary scrutiny.

I probably will not vote for this Bill, but if the burden of opinion in the Lords is to amend it, then none of us should be afraid of so doing because of the threats to abolish or reform this House. None of that cuts much ice with me; for 20 years I have sought the abolition of this House in its present form. But I hope that, for the reputation of this House, those who are more wedded to its present form will not be frightened into bowing down before that threat and failing to amend this Bill effectively.