Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord Weir of Ballyholme Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme]

30: Clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
“(e) is not substantially motivated by—(i) not wanting to be a burden on others or on public services,(ii) a mental disorder (including depression),(iii) a disability (other than the terminal illness),(iv) financial considerations, including a lack of adequate housing,(v) lack of access, or delayed access, to treatment or other service which a public authority is required (or can reasonably be expected) to provide, or(vi) suicidal ideation,”

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I have notified the Lord Speaker’s office and the Whips that I shall be moving Amendment 30, which stands in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster—who is unable to be with us today—and Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Empey. This group of amendments deals with the issue of motivation, and there is a level of link with the previous group, which dealt with eligibility. In the interests of time, I will allow the proposers of the other amendments to speak to those and will concentrate entirely on Amendment 30.

The purpose of Amendment 30 is largely to ensure that the Bill remains true to what I think is one of its key underlying principles: that when dealing with the substantial motivation of anyone applying for the assisted dying service, there is a critical, causal and direct link between that desire to have an assisted death and the terminal illness, and the application for an assisted death does not arise from a range of other motivations. Also linked to this is an attempt, at least, to ease the gap between two tensions that will lie within public policy should the Bill become law. Should it become law, the state will play a role in assisting the death of members of the public, while at the same time there is a public policy commitment and priority to try to prevent suicide. In many ways, those two objectives are pulling in opposite directions. Amendment 30 at least tries to create a little bit of clear blue water between the two; it cannot square that circle, but it goes some way towards dealing with the issue.

Sticking to the original principles of the Bill is all the more important because one of the most fundamental motivations behind it had to be abandoned from the face of the Bill. We know that the proposer of the Bill in another place, Kim Leadbeater, has said on numerous occasions—both before the Bill was proposed and during the debate on it—that it is principally about pain and suffering. Indeed, on one occasion, she made the comment to the then Archbishop of Canterbury:

“My proposed legislation is less about ending life, but very much about easing suffering and shortening death”.


I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will give us very good reasons as to why this is the case, but nowhere do pain and suffering appear as part of the Bill. That issue will be probed particularly by the amendments in this group tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey.

To ensure that there is that strong, critical, causal link between the termination of life being the motivator and the assisted death, Amendment 30 seeks to exclude six other areas that could be considered as substantial motivation for an assisted death. The first is a lack of access, or delayed access, to alternative medical treatments. I do not wish to reiterate the earlier debates we have had—for instance, on palliative care, or the question marks that are sometimes there about a certain level of postcode lottery in the NHS. Those issues have been debated already, but if we are to fulfil what I think is one of the key arguments for the Bill—that of bodily autonomy—and if there is to be autonomy, autonomy has to be real choice. If there is no reasonable opportunity for access to any alternative medications, it is not really a choice, and that should not be the motivation for an application.

Secondly—again, this was touched on during the debate on the last group—the substantial motivation should not be lack of resources. I agree on one thing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer: this should not discriminate against people on the basis of socioeconomic background. Therefore, lack of resources should not become a driver for the poor to go down this route because they do not have any other opportunity. This is not simply a hypothetical concern; we have seen it happen time and again, particularly in the Canadian example, in which people—particularly those with mounting debts, which are quite commonplace among those who are debilitated by illnesses—feel under massive financial pressure, and that the only route through is to have an assisted death. That should not be the principal motivator.

Thirdly, it should not be because someone feels themselves to be a burden. We have mentioned before that we will want to put in all the provisions that we can on the issue of coercion. However, what might be described as “soft coercion” is a feeling among those who are terminally ill that they are a burden on their family and loved ones, and perhaps on society as a whole, which acts as a driver towards assisted dying. Again, there is plenty of evidence that this is a major factor in other jurisdictions. For example, among those persons who applied for assisted dying in Oregon in 1997, around 13% indicated that feeling a burden was a substantial part of their motivation. That figure has now risen to 42% of those applying, and in other jurisdictions it can be even higher. We want to safeguard against that.