Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Watson of Wyre Forest Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. Indeed, subsections (2) and (4) define economic well-being in terms of the interests of national security.

The ECJ ruling in April was critical of the data retention directive because it said it did not contain the necessary safeguards in relation to retained data. I said that to the House last week and referred to it earlier this afternoon. Of course that ruling did not take into account the different structures, regimes and domestic laws that are in place in individual member states. Our communications data access regime, primarily governed by RIPA, has strict controls and safeguards in place. The data can only be accessed when it is necessary and proportionate for a specific investigation, and access is limited and subject to a strict authorisation regime, which was specifically endorsed by the Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill. Clause 3 provides an important clarification in that it makes it clear that the statutory purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK can only occur when it is in the interests of national security. That is already the position, but the Bill puts that position beyond doubt.

Part 2 of the Bill deals with the question of interception. The House will know that interception can only take place when a warrant has been authorised by a Secretary of State, when he or she considers it to be necessary and proportionate and when the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by other means.

[Mr Tom Watson (West Bromwich East) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary has been very kind this week. May I just ask her this question? The former head of GCHQ told me last week that the Wilson doctrine extended to all the digital communications of parliamentarians. Will she confirm that the effect of that is that only MPs and peers of the realm are excluded from this legislation?

[Mrs May]

Obviously, the Wilson doctrine applies to parliamentarians. It does not absolutely exclude the use of these powers against parliamentarians, but it sets certain requirements for those powers to be used in relation to a parliamentarian. It is not the case that parliamentarians are excluded and nobody else in the country is, but there is a certain set of rules and protocols that have to be met if there is a requirement to use any of these powers against a parliamentarian.

In relation to intercept, I mentioned the need for agreement from a Secretary of State. If the National Crime Agency wants to listen to the telephone calls of a drugs trafficker, or the Security Service wants to read the e-mails of a suspected terrorist, agreement is needed from a Secretary of State first. I see warrant applications day in, day out, and can personally attest to the care with which they are prepared, the seriousness which those applying for them attach to complying with the statutory restrictions and the gravity of the cases with which they deal. Warrant applications provide the detailed intelligence background that forms the basis on which a person is being sought.

Ministerial oversight, which I share with the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, is a vital safeguard to ensure that this sensitive and intrusive power is used only when it is necessary and proportionate. But in the absence of explicit provisions in legislation, as has been mentioned in a number of interventions, some overseas companies have started to question whether the law applies to them. Indeed, as the Prime Minister said last week, some companies are already saying that they can no longer work with us on interception unless UK law is clarified immediately. This Bill does exactly that.