United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I will leave detailed discussion of Part 5 to colleagues, but I will just say that I find the idea of a UK Government knowingly and deliberately breaking the law—to wriggle out of a deal signed less than a year ago—repugnant. It is not something that this House should accept. In the justifiable outrage over Part 5, however, there is a risk that the other flaws of the Bill get lost. As the Constitution Committee has explained so well, it has significant implications for the UK’s devolved structure.

There are three elements that are necessary for the efficient operation of an internal market: rules for market access, a framework for agreeing minimum standards, and a mechanism for resolving disputes. This Bill provides only the first element, the market access rules. If the EU’s single market had worked with only market access rules, it would have allowed, say, Romania to reduce its standards so that its businesses could produce, for export, substandard goods that could be sold freely here. We would not have accepted that as part of the EU, so why would we think it appropriate for our own internal market? I do not often say this, but the Scottish Government are right: this Bill undermines their devolved competencies. This works both ways, and the UK Government should be just as worried about, say, Scotland reducing its standards and selling substandard goods into the rest of the UK. As the Welsh Government pointed out, it incentivises a race to the bottom.

To avoid this, a system for agreeing minimum common standards is essential. We have heard that good progress has been made towards agreeing common frameworks, but the Bill completely ignores them. Indeed, it would undermine them. I would go as far as to say that, if the Bill is not amended to take account of the common frameworks, including the necessary flexibility described by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead, it will be more damaging to the UK’s internal market than no Bill. Like the Constitution Committee, I question whether this Bill is really necessary. Perhaps the Minister could explain why the common frameworks have been ignored and how a race to the bottom will be avoided.

The third element required for an internal market to work is a mechanism for dispute resolution. To be acceptable to all parties, any mechanism needs a high degree of independence, all parties should be represented, and it must have the ability to resolve disputes. The Bill creates the Office for the Internal Market, but that is neither independent nor representative. And it cannot actually resolve a dispute: all it can do is issue advice and reports. Does the Minister not see a contradiction in being ready to die in a ditch to prevent the European Court being the arbiter of a trade deal, but not allowing an independent arbiter in our own internal market?

There is general agreement throughout the UK—and I agree with it—on the need for an efficient internal market, but this Bill does not achieve that. We must adopt a more consensual approach between the UK’s constituent parts. After all, there is one overriding requirement for an internal market: the parties must want to be part of it. This Government in particular must know that the heavy-handed imposition of rules from the centre can lead to countries wanting to “take back control”. If the Government want to keep this kingdom of ours united, they would do well to remember that.