(8 years ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government how their plan to trigger Article 50 relates to the Conservative Party’s 2010 manifesto pledge to make “the use of the Royal Prerogative subject to greater democratic control so that Parliament is properly involved in all big national decisions.”
My Lords, the Government’s position is clear. Triggering Article 50 is a prerogative power and one that can be exercised by the Government. Parliament had its say in legislating for the EU referendum, which it did in both Houses and with cross-party support. Parliament was clear that it was for the people to decide whether to remain in the EU or to leave it.
My Lords, I personally regret that this issue has got into the hands of lawyers because I think that it is a matter of political integrity and constitutional principle. Has the Prime Minister now gone back on her decision to endorse this particular statement in the manifesto; or does she now suggest that this is no longer a big national decision; or does she no longer believe that we should take back control in the Westminster Parliament, because we keep being told that Parliament is sovereign; or is it all three of those reasons?
I need hardly tell the noble Lord that the manifesto to which he refers was succeeded by something called the coalition agreement to which his party was privy. In terms of that agreement and the ensuing coalition Government, the only provision that was made in relation to the royal prerogative was to provide for a fixed-term Parliament. I am sure that if the noble Lord was as exercised as he seems to be about this issue, his party would have had other things to say about it during the period of the coalition, but it was mute.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord is right that certain parts of the United Kingdom are better represented than others. I believe that for us to be effective as a House it is important that we all offer a range of backgrounds, experiences and expertise. However, because we are unelected and do not have responsibility to represent any parts of the United Kingdom, it is not an easy question for us to remedy, but it is certainly one that I shall reflect on.
My Lords, does the Leader of the House recall that all her colleagues in the Cabinet of the coalition Government supported the 2012 Bill which would have rectified the problem to which the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred? Does she also recognise that the House of Commons gave that Bill a huge majority, of 338? Does she further recall that the colleagues in the other House of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, played party games and prevented that Bill proceeding?
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will support the establishment of a Joint Committee to consider the recommendations of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee on the Strathclyde Review (Cm 9177).
My Lords, you get me either way.
We are considering the three reports carefully, one of which was published less than a week ago. We are doing so alongside consideration of the recommendations in my noble friend Lord Strathclyde’s review, on which the three reports are based. We will respond to those reports and my noble friend’s review in due course.
My Lords, does the Leader of the House now recognise, as do the three reports, that to a considerable extent the Strathclyde review was based on a false premise? We are not in this House challenging,
“the decisive role of the … House of Commons”;
what we are doing is seeking more effective scrutiny of Governments’ secondary legislation by both Houses of Parliament. Surely the right way to examine the range of options for Parliament is for both Houses together, MPs and Peers, to do so in a Joint Select Committee. Is the Leader of the House now listening to these three important committees of your Lordships’ House, or is she simply listening to No. 10?
My Lords, one thing that I know that we all agree on, from the many conversations I have had with noble Lords from around this House, is that we must protect this House’s role as an effective revising Chamber that holds the Government to account. I understand some of the points that the noble Lord makes, along with those that have been made by some of the committees of this House, and I will reflect on all the things that have been put forward. I think that it is premature for us to commission another review before the Government have responded to the review that they commissioned from my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. I need to be clear to the House that the Government are seeking something which is in the interest not just of the Government but of Parliament as a whole; that is, that the elected House has the final say on all legislation.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a fascinating and thoughtful debate. The contributions and the expertise that have been displayed in the past few minutes have been particularly helpful to your Lordships’ House.
I will refer briefly to two remarkable maiden speeches. My noble friend Lady Bowles brings not only professional expertise and experience to this House but particularly interesting experience from the European Parliament. The direction of travel there is to have more democratic control over secondary legislation while in this House this evening it looks as though we might be going in the opposite direction. That is a useful lesson for us. I suspect that the parliamentary experience and touch in the Treasury would never have let the noble Lord, Lord Darling, ride into this House and fall into the elephant trap that the present Chancellor fell into on 26 October. His expertise and experience will be welcome in this House, too.
If there has been a theme during the debate today, it is that this is not a new problem. It is complex, it is not simple—and to that extent we are all indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde for trying to simplify it—but it is not new. Therefore, it is up to us to realise that there is no novel, simple one act that could suddenly transform the situation.
As a non-expert, I have at least enough humility to listen carefully to previous wisdom. With the noble Lord, Lord Higgins, and my noble friend Lord McNally, I served on the Joint Committee that the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham, so brilliantly steered in 2006 which produced the report on conventions at the UK Parliament. I read again last night some of the excellent evidence that was put before us on 20 June 2006, when we heard from three distinguished witnesses. This was their first key statement:
“The only inference to be drawn from these proposals is that the Government intends further restriction of the freedoms and powers of the House of Lords. We would start from precisely the opposite premise—the freedoms of both Houses should be upheld and, where possible, extended. We further disagree with the government’s view that ‘codification’ is necessary as a prelude to the reform of the House of Lords. Even if true, which it is not, it could never justify further weakening of Parliament”.
The delegation that produced that evidence included Mrs Theresa May MP, then shadow Leader of the Commons and the noble Lord, Lord Cope, then Opposition Chief Whip here. It was led by none other than the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. Members of your Lordships’ House may have guessed that the evidence they gave was given on behalf of the Conservative Opposition. Colleagues may also recall that the Joint Committee was set up by the previous Labour Government because Mr Jack Straw wanted to clip the wings of your Lordships’ House—is that not, too, familiar?—as my noble friend Lord McNally reminded us today.
The evidence of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, continued powerfully:
“‘Codification’ could cause more problems than it solves … We therefore agree with the Government that it would be undesirable to legislate on the conventions and other relations between the two Houses. That would lead to judicial intervention in and resolution of parliamentary and political difficulties”.
I agreed then and I agree now, because there is a real danger that we could drift into justiciable decision-making, which would put us in a very awkward position.
This has been referred to during the debate today by a number of colleagues on all sides of the House, including the noble Lords, Lord Cunningham and Lord Higgins, from the committee, my noble friend Lady Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, who spoke forcefully a few minutes ago, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and, most recently, the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. That is a dangerous route for us to go down without thinking it through very carefully indeed—and I will come to how I think we should do that.
Those witnesses then turned to the specific subject with which we are engaged today. They said:
“The conventions on secondary legislation are equally well understood. We propose no alteration. We uphold the right of the Lords to reject secondary legislation, while considering its use should be exceptional in the extreme. However, there is an important balancing convention to this, namely that governments should not use their majority in the Commons to introduce skeleton Bills as a basis for introducing unamendable secondary legislation”.
There is nothing new under the sun. It has been said again today several times that we have skeleton Bills which have become more and more skeletal.
A reference was made earlier by, I think, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to the Childcare Bill. I draw the attention of the House to the work done on that Bill by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, and on which I serve. It pointed out admirably that the Childcare Bill was not sufficiently well thought through to put before either House of Parliament. It was indeed so skeletal as not to be worth consideration by either House. Some time ago in the debate the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, referred to this issue, as did my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace. We believe that that is a major problem so far as the House’s consideration is concerned.
Having previously argued that the convention on secondary legislation was “dead”, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, came before the Joint Committee with a slightly modified view. He said:
“However, on many, many occasions the House of Lords has asserted its unfettered right to maintain its power to throw out secondary legislation; I think the custom and practice that has built up, in combination with the long-stop power in the House of Lords, works extremely well”.
He has changed his mind since then.
There was a good deal of support from other witnesses and in the Joint Committee for that approach. I shall quote from the committee’s report. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, who has also spoken today,
“likewise argues against codifying a convention that the Lords do not reject SIs. He observes that:
(a) It is not agreed that there is any such convention;
(b) SIs do not normally involve ‘great issues of principle’, and any argument in Parliament is usually only about fitness for purpose;
(c) A rejected order can be re-laid;
(d) The power to reject supports the work of the SI Merits Committee;
(e) Power to reject orders under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill will be even more important than power to reject mainstream SIs”.
The work of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House makes his case even more powerful; it is a critical part of our job and it is very effective in undertaking that responsibility.
As has already been quoted once or twice in the debate, the eventual recommendations of the Joint Committee are unequivocal and bear repetition. The committee states that,
“we conclude that the House of Lords should not regularly reject Statutory Instruments, but that in exceptional circumstances it may be appropriate for it to do so. This is consistent with past practice, and represents a convention recognised by the opposition parties. The Government appear to consider that any defeat of an SI by the Lords is a breach of convention. We disagree ... The Government’s argument that ‘it is for the Commons as a source of Ministers’ authority to withhold or grant their endorsement of Ministers’ actions’ is an argument against having a second chamber at all, and we reject it”.
That, like every other recommendation of the Cunningham committee, was not only debated in both Houses but unanimously and enthusiastically approved by both Houses.
It was also welcomed enthusiastically—unsurprisingly, since we had accepted so much of his evidence—by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. I find it difficult, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones hinted earlier, to understand what precisely has happened to that noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. The contrast between the evidence to the Joint Committee, written and oral, and what we have heard today and read in his report is so remarkable that it makes one slightly suspicious.
My Lords, perhaps I may clarify that to the noble Lord, because he has made quite a meal of it. I stand by every word I said until 25 October of last year. On 26 October, it all changed. That was when I got my review. As a result of that, I conducted my review and produced it for the debate today. The noble Lord can poke as much fun as he would like about what I said, but, as I have just said, I stand by every word of it.
I do not think that the House fully understands that, and I think that it has taken a more measured view of these issues. Perhaps I may say that it has been all across the House. It has been remarkable how much consensus there has been in the debate today. These issues clearly are inappropriately dealt with by an internal government review. These matters are of great importance to the whole of Parliament—both Houses.
The memorandum from the Hansard Society sent to Members today makes a very powerful case on this point. The society suggests an independent inquiry. But I have been arguing for some weeks that an evidence-taking, properly constituted and properly advised Joint Select Committee of Peers and MPs would carry even more authority. During this debate, I have lost count of how many Members, from all sides of the House, have supported the idea of a new Joint Select Committee. It would meet the requirements of so many Members who have contributed today. The noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Cunningham, and a number of other Members have said that that is the appropriate way for Parliament together to think through these issues. This is not us against the House of Commons. It is both Houses of Parliament having to think together about how we best operate in undertaking our responsibilities to hold the Executive to account. That is the proper, effective constitutional role of the two Houses.
If we pursue option 3—a powerful case was made for option 2—there would be all sorts of difficulties. Every Member who said that they are in favour of option 3 also said that there were difficulties. Where are we going to elucidate how we can deal with those difficulties? The only appropriate way to do so is of course in a Joint Committee. If there is to be any revision at all of the way in which the two Houses interrelate, modifying the agreed position set out in the 2006 Joint Committee report, there must be a new Joint Committee to take evidence to make new recommendations.
I hope that the Leader of the House, in responding to this debate, will specifically answer that point. All sides of the House have said that that is the appropriate way forward and it is the one thing on which there is clearly a consensus across the House. I trust that when evidence is given to that committee by, I hope, a “Strathclyde mark 2”, he will be as forthright and as protective of the proper role of your Lordships’ House as he was when he was “Strathclyde mark 1”.
Okay, I am just going to make one simple point and then I really will move on. We are disagreeing because what happened previously were fatal Motions that we all understood to be fatal. On the Motions tabled in October, one side of this House is arguing that they were not fatal, the other side is arguing that they were. I am afraid that that disagreement is what has led us to have to ask my noble friend Lord Strathclyde to look at this issue and come forward with his report. He is trying to bring forward something which addresses the need of this House that has been outlined since 2000, when my noble friend Lord Wakeham first looked at this matter.
This House is influential when we act in a constructive and nonpartisan way. We do not need vetoes. The impact and effect that we have on legislation is very powerful, and we continue to have a very important role in our effect on the decisions that the Government make in legislation.
Many noble Lords said that this House should give up a veto only if there was some kind of trade-off for the Government to review how they use secondary legislation. This is a very important point. The speeches from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lady Fookes were very powerful and they make a really important point. I said the same to the noble Lord, Lord Richard, when I delivered the Statement before Christmas. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for acknowledging that any criticism that Parliament may have of Governments for the use of secondary legislation is not new.
I also say to the House that I do not think that things are quite as bad as the House suggests in terms of our approach to secondary legislation—I do not just mean the Government, I mean the House as a whole. There is always room for improvement, but the number of SIs over the past 20 years has been pretty steady.
The committees of this House are very powerful and respected. The committee chaired by my noble friend Lady Fookes does a very good job of scrutinising delegated powers in primary legislation. Very often, the Government respond constructively to its recommendations. In the work that this House does on primary legislation, a lot of the changes that it makes are around the powers. My noble friend Lady Fookes has put forward some good arguments and ideas about how we can improve within government, and I will certainly take those away.
We should not forget that when SIs come into Parliament they are scrutinised by a Joint Committee of both Houses, as well as by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee chaired by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne. The tax credit SIs went through that JCSI, which is chaired by a Labour Member of the other place. In its report, the JCSI did not raise any questions or concerns about that tax credit SI.
Some have argued for a period of delay. Some have argued that it would be essential for us to ensure that we would introduce debates for the House of Commons when it considers secondary legislation. What is important, interesting and helpful to me is that, although there are different views being expressed today about how to operate without a veto, there are many noble Lords at least discussing the idea of not having a veto but having a new power instead of the veto. I am grateful to noble Lords for that response.
As I draw to a close, noble Lords have raised questions about a Joint Committee. I have already said that the work of the Joint Committee in 2006 was incredibly powerful, but I do not believe that right now we need another Joint Committee. We need to look at the options that have been put forward by my noble friend, but I know that my noble friend Lord Trefgarne and his committee have committed to looking at what has been proposed, and I am grateful to him.
As for the Commons looking at this, it is clearly for the other place to decide how it should scrutinise secondary legislation. However, as my noble friend Lord Crickhowell has identified, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee in the other place has committed to look at what has been put forward by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. It has a hearing next week at which he is giving evidence, so the Commons is also getting on with its consideration of this arrangement.
If the Leader of the House is dismissing out of hand the idea of a Joint Committee, how can she guarantee that the two Houses will think about this problem together? Members on all sides of the House have said how essential this is. How will she ensure that that happens?
The point is to make sure that the House of Commons has the final say on secondary legislation. It has set out how it wishes to consider what has been put forward by my noble friend. He has put forward his options after extensive consultation with Members of the other place, as well as with Members of your Lordships’ House.
There is clearly much for me to reflect on from this debate. I will do so with my colleagues in government. I am sincere when I say that the contributions have been very valuable. We have not come to any conclusions in government.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I know that all noble Lords are always sceptical about what they read in the newspapers. I refer the House to what my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said yesterday when he was in the other place. He was very clear then about the role of this House. About Monday, the primacy of the House of Commons on financial matters has been respected by this House for over 400 years, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister alluded to yesterday when he was responding to a question. The noble Baroness makes reference to one of the amendments that have been tabled for Monday. If any of those amendments is passed on Monday, the statutory instrument will not have been approved and that will be in direct contrast to the House of Commons already approving that statutory instrument and reaffirming its view only this week when asked to consider it again.
My Lords, the exchanges have already touched on the constitutional role of your Lordships’ House. Has the noble Baroness read the article which appeared in the Huffington Post on Tuesday, which is clearly the result of a briefing from the Treasury, headed “Tories Threaten To Suspend House of Lords” and which says that:
“One option is to simply suspend the Lords’ entire business, and process bills purely through the Commons”?
Maybe she would care to explain how that could be achieved. Could she take the opportunity to have a quiet word with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, say that perhaps he is spending too much time with the Chinese, and remind him that the last person who attempted to shut down a House of Parliament was King Charles I? What happened to him?
My Lords, as far as the Government are concerned, this House has a very important role in scrutinising the Government’s legislation and I am very confident that all Members of this House want to do that effectively. I want to provide the opportunity for this House to discharge its very important responsibilities in a way which is consistent with its role and which respects the primacy of the House of Commons on matters financial, and I am confident that on Monday that is what Members of your Lordships’ House will want to do.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI always like to be helpful to the noble Baroness and give way when she asks, although it might have been better for her if I had not given her the opportunity on that occasion. Without being too unkind, she consistently refers to “we” and the Government. I understand that. But in this case—the proposal for the Joint Committee—the “we” in question is her role as Leader of this House. I say that in all sincerity. All I was asking was whether the Government were whipping their Members to vote against a Joint Committee, which would be very helpful to know. It was not a party-political issue when it was raised. It was raised by all parties and no parties.
I wonder whether this is the right moment to remind the House and the Leader of the House that what happened after she made that Statement by the Government about their lack of support for this proposal, was that this House, of which she is a servant, voted by 320 votes to 139 votes to express clear support for that mechanism. Is she now saying that she is ignoring a vote of this House?
I am not quite sure that that was an intervention on this speaker. The point I want to make to the noble Baroness is that, when a Motion is passed, it is the property of this body, of which she has the great opportunity to be Leader. I think she is probably not the only person in your Lordships’ House who aspires to that.
I want to go back to this. If there had been such a debate in the House of Commons, it would have given some comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that it had been properly considered by Members of the House of Commons, even if it had been rejected. It would have given us some confidence that it had been considered and that it was their considered judgment that they did not think it necessary. If it had been rejected, the House of Lords would have been able to say, “Right, what should we do? What processes should we go through to reassure ourselves that we can properly investigate and assess whether those measures have any impact on how we operate?”. That is all that was being asked. It would have been preferable to work together, for both Houses to examine this, rather than just one House—your Lordships’ House—looking at it alone. A debate in the other place on this issue prior to today would have helped inform our deliberations and discussions this evening. Very important constitutional issues are being raised. If any constitutional issue is rushed when it is not essential or necessary to do so, every opportunity should be taken to consider it properly.
I ask the noble Baroness a very specific question: has she at any time raised the request from the House of Lords for a Joint Committee directly with the Leader of the House of Commons or the Prime Minister, either in Cabinet or in a Cabinet committee? I appreciate that it is not always straightforward and easy. As the noble Baroness indicated, she has a responsibility as a Cabinet member, as a member of the Government and as the Leader of the Government in your Lordships’ House. However, she also, as she has been reminded by noble Lords, has a role as Leader of your Lordships’ House across the parties. I appreciate that it can be difficult; every Leader has to navigate that. However, the point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that the majority in favour of a Joint Committee was 101.
My Lords, I can respond directly to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, because I served on the Cunningham committee on conventions. There is no such convention on secondary legislation. Indeed, I recall a number of occasions when the Conservatives moved fatal, wrecking amendments to SIs during a Labour Government. His point can be dealt with quite quickly.
Normally my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness would lead for these Benches, but as Members will know he took a leading part on the previous debate on the Energy Bill. Since he has unique experience in this House, the other House and Holyrood—and in government at both ends of the country—I have benefited from his wisdom in preparing my contribution.
I and my colleagues have long argued that we need proposals for devolution within a federal constitutional framework, so we accept that there is a question to answer. We are not people who think that the English question is best not asked. Indeed, we gave evidence to the McKay commission on that basis—I was involved in that myself. We also acknowledge that the Leader of the Commons and the Procedure Committee in the other place have attempted to meet some of the concerns expressed in debates both in this House and in the other place during July. However, a number of other, very fundamental concerns remain. I shall touch on them speedily. Whether this is the only or best way to resolve them is still a matter for debate. I share the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and I will return to this point later.
Meanwhile, we should dispel some of the myths that grew up during the summer and were expressed in your Lordships’ House. First, there was an illusion that somehow these proposals affect only the House of Commons, are entirely discrete to that House and are appropriately dealt with by a simple introduction of new Standing Orders. Frankly, that has been blown to smithereens, not least in your Lordships’ House but also in the other place. I illustrate that by the fact that the revised proposals from the Leader of the Commons have now expanded the consideration of certified Motions or amendments relating to Lords amendments and other messages from one page to two. The proposed Standing Order 83O—not 830—which the Commons will consider tomorrow, is now very extensive. Page 27 of the new Explanatory Memorandum contains this firm statement:
“Paragraphs (2) to (6) ensure that English, or English and Welsh, MPs have the opportunity to veto Lords amendments that may make changes to the bill or parts of the bill that relate to England or England and Wales”.
Colleagues will recall that we were told there was no veto. It is now very firmly there. As the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has already indicated, this could relate to some extremely important decisions of Parliament. But what this does is to provide for a veto by a subset of that House. For the first time, one House of Parliament is to be overruled by a devolved mechanism in the other. Members of your Lordships’ House will note that there is now no hesitation in using the word “veto”. Members of the Government are fond of quoting the core importance of the sovereignty of the full Westminster Parliament—that is, the full House of Lords and the full House of Commons. Here we have an example of where a subset has a veto over the full Westminster Parliament. If that does not raise important constitutional issues, what does? Indeed, perhaps we should reflect that, topically, Holyrood, Cardiff and Stormont could ask: “What are the implications for us of this change?”. That brings me to my second major concern.
These proposals alter the delicate balance of power and responsibility between the two Houses of Parliament. Ministers have suggested—and it has been suggested again this evening—that in addition to monitoring and review undertaken by the Commons Procedure Committee at the end of this process, not in preparation for it, our own Constitution Committee might be involved in some way. I am the first to respect the work of the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, and his colleagues on our Constitution Committee. I just ask: what would happen if there were two quite separate investigations, monitoring and reviews of these processes, and they came to different conclusions? What do we expect will happen then? The Constitution Committee of our House reports to our House. The Procedure Committee reports to the House of Commons. What happens if they are not clearly in complete agreement? The noble Baroness has said that there will be a rigorous attempt to look at what has happened. I suggest that this is just a recipe for duplication, confusion and conflict between the two Houses.
I see that the noble Lord, Lord Young, is present. I am not sure what his new title is. He and I have sat on a number of Joint Committees. I think that they are an extremely important vehicle for the two Houses to reach sensible conclusions on all sorts of matters. Here is a classic case for this. The case for a Joint Committee of Peers and MPs proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and endorsed by a huge majority of your Lordships on 21 July, to which I have already referred, is clearly the sensible parliamentary way to approach this issue, with the whole of Parliament in mind, and to avoid the confusions that could otherwise occur.
As has already been said, tomorrow MPs will be invited to respond positively to the Motion of 21 July in your Lordships’ House, which was carried by a large majority. Sadly, this will not take the form of a proper response from the Leader of the Commons on behalf of the Government. No doubt the Leader of this House will be able to explain in her response at the end of this debate why we have not had the courtesy of a proper response from the other House. Instead, as has again been referred to, there will be an amendment endorsed by, I gather, several Members of several parties. I have counted six who have signed up to this amendment in the name of Mr Graham Allen, which reads as follows,
“this House concurs with the Lords Message of 21 July, that it is expedient that a joint committee of Lords and Commons be appointed to consider and report on the constitutional implications of the Government’s revised proposals to change the Standing Orders of the House of Commons in order to give effect to English Votes for English Laws, and that the committee should report on the proposals by 30 March 2016”.
That is not kicking the issue into the long grass but is a very sensible approach, not least, of course, because the Government have already said that there is no huge urgency for this. They are not anticipating in the immediate future that there will be any Bill which raises these particular concerns and different issues for different parts of the United Kingdom. That brings me to my third point.
This is a classic case of the dangers of piecemeal, ad hoc attempts to deal with apparent anomalies in our only partially written and codified constitution. Remove one anomaly and you create a potential host of others. If any Member of your Lordships’ House still thinks, after listening today, that this can be resolved in isolation, I suggest they look back at the debates in your Lordships’ House and, indeed, the other place in July which contain a wealth of practical experience. I refer to just a few who contributed in your Lordships’ House—the noble Lords, Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Lisvane, the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, the noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan—I hope I have pronounced that name right—and my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace, all of whom have a right to be heard by the Government, given their past responsibilities in Parliament and in government. If any Member still has further doubts, they should read the contribution of the former Attorney-General, Mr Dominic Grieve, in the debate in the Commons on 15 July. That leads me to my fourth point.
There is such a head of steam now for a constitutional convention of some sort. I am not suggesting that there is any one model. It is supported on all sides of your Lordships’ House and is evidenced by the Bill introduced by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed. Surely the Government must agree to see these proposals in their wider context. I confess that in the past I have been something of a sceptic of the sort of all-purpose constitutional convention—put it all in the pot, stir it around and hope consensus comes out at the other end—but the confusion over these proposals over the past few months surely adds strength to the argument heard regularly from the other side of the House that too many of these ad hoc piecemeal attempts to update our constitution are neither coherent or comprehensive. My noble friend Lord Purvis, whose service here and in Holyrood, and in the Scottish body politic generally, gives him special experience, will deal with this aspect in more detail later.
Therefore, I believe that there is some urgency now for agreeing to set up some form of constitutional dialogue which looks at the relationship between the different parts of the union and their various political institutions. I accept that to make it a success we should be clear about how that convention—whatever form it might take—should begin its work. There are all too often false parallels drawn between vague ideas about a constitutional convention for the United Kingdom and what happened in Scotland in 1996, but, as both my colleagues here will confirm, the Scottish convention was a process which started with some measure of agreement on the outcomes that the parties wanted. Indeed, the Conservative and Scottish National parties refused to take part precisely because neither would commit to that level of agreement, so we should seek some agreement on principles before setting up a convention. It is, of course, no coincidence that many Conservative Members are now ardent advocates of EVEL, when so much of their support comes from England, while, on the other hand, it is no particular coincidence that Labour Members are more prone to cavil about EVEL, when so much of their historic support was in Scotland. Therefore, a public element of any such discussion, or any other form of widespread consultation, must involve putting these political prejudices on a sort of jury trial. It could then be hoped that the outcome would command public confidence.
But if the Government are to achieve any consensus—indeed, any unanimity—in their own ranks, they cannot continue to adopt a narrow, partisan, piecemeal approach to these great issues. Today, I have reread Command Paper 8969, The Implications of Devolution for England, introduced by the now much regretted departed Leader of the Commons, William Hague, who claimed:
“Both the parties to the coalition wish to continue this major process towards decentralisation in England”.
The present proposals do not meet that challenge.
I note that my right honourable and honourable friends in the Commons have today tabled a further amendment to the Leader’s Motion as follows:
“This House believes that a constitutional convention should be established to report by the end of 2016 to ensure the legitimate demand for English voices to be heard on English matters is delivered within the context of a carefully considered settlement for the UK, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, England and the authorities participating in the Government’s devolution agenda”.
That should surely be the context for these discussions, not a little bit of ad hocery. It is certain that the proposals that will go before the other House tomorrow simply do not rise to the challenge of the White Paper of Mr Hague, as he then was. As a result, they will satisfy nobody. Those who favour an English Parliament—with the inevitable English Executive that would be required to implement its decisions—will attack them as a weak and weedy bureaucratic jungle. Incidentally, I do not know how many Members of your Lordships’ House have looked at the revised proposals but it is significant that the Leader of the Commons has not dared to produce a revised flow chart this time—I think it would look like somebody’s inadequate attempt at knitting. Those others, like many Members of your Lordships’ House, who identify constitutional hostages to fortune will plead for a more considered, comprehensive and consensual approach.
I think many Members of your Lordships’ House will join us in appealing to Ministers to listen to your House; to agree to a Joint Committee to examine these proposals more fully before experimenting with the current draft; to incorporate a sunset clause in the eventual changes to the Standing Orders; and, most important of all, to accept in principle the case for some form of convention to discuss the future of our part-written constitution in this era of post-devolution settlement.
My Lords, first, I will say that I understand the strategic objective of the Government, which is to enable a fairer system of sharing decision-making throughout the United Kingdom. Indeed, the statement that was made by the Prime Minister, with the support of the other leaders, the week before the referendum—which in my view had no purpose and no effect—made the discussion of these issues inevitable. That is my starting point, but I have grave concerns about the Government’s approach in addressing those objectives, especially the political implications. I will put my concerns as simply as I can.
The Government are rushing this issue when there is no need to do so. They have five years ahead of them—if you believe some of the more cynical commentators, perhaps an extended length of time in government even beyond that. As result of rushing, they are avoiding the reflection and consultation that are necessary, in absence of which they will inevitably produce a flawed solution. This in turn will lead to dispute and to grievances where none existed before. As the noble Lord, Lord Lang, said, grievance is the platform on which the Scottish nationalists produced almost every strategic objective they have. But if he believes that it is not possible for them to discover new grievances, I say to him that we should not help them in that task by mass-producing potential grievances out of a flawed scheme such as this. That is the politics of it. If I am right, in attempting to solve one political dilemma—the West Lothian question—the Government will introduce another more dangerous one, satisfying neither the English nor the Scottish, and further prising apart the union. In short, where they set out to establish a level playing field, they are actually laying a potential minefield, politically. That is my concern.
I will just deal with a couple of those issues. I cannot for the life of me understand the haste with which the Government are trying to rush this through. Indeed, if anything, they are increasingly dealing with the issues presented in an offhand fashion. Several other noble Lords have mentioned this as well. I welcome the involvement of the Constitution Committee but the reality is that, a few months ago, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, pointed out, this House voted by an overwhelming majority for the consideration by the Commons of a Joint Committee on these issues. That would have been a wise course in my view, yet the Government did not even deign to respond to that advice from this Chamber, as has been pointed out. I would like to believe that they were too busy. I would like to believe that it was delayed in the post. I would like to believe that there was some serious reason why they found it impossible over those few months to respond to us. I suspect, however, that their position was more influenced by the old adage that it is easier to seek forgiveness after the event than to ask permission before it.
Everything that the Government have done suggests to me that that is not only discourteous but extremely unwise, because consideration of this issue would benefit from the wisdom and experience of those of us who have for 40 to 50 years been through the question of the British constitution and the politics of nationalism —including English nationalism.
As the former Leader of the other place, will the noble Lord confirm that the Government could redeem themselves now if they ensured, as they are in a position to do, that Mr Graham Allen’s amendment, which is supported right across all other parts of the House, is not only tabled but accepted for debate in the House tomorrow and they persuade people to vote for it?
Indeed, that would be extremely helpful. It is no coincidence that the potential alibi has been presented tonight, but we may well discover tomorrow that it is a non-existent alibi.
I make no personal attacks on the Leader of the House. She assured us tonight that she would be ever vigilant in monitoring what was going on. I believe her. I recall that some 50 years ago, we had a Scottish goalkeeper called Frank Haffey who was ever vigilant. He carefully monitored the ball as it entered the Scottish net nine times in a game against England. There is a difference between monitoring and vigilance on the one hand and action on the other. The action is necessary to address the questions that arise.
I will raise only a couple of the questions on the current proposals tonight. The first is on stage 1, the certification procedure, which was mentioned by the Leader of the House. The new procedure is intended to apply to government Bills, individual provisions and secondary legislation which are certified by the Speaker as containing English and Welsh provisions only. Under the revised Standing Orders, the Speaker of the House will have an important role in certifying whether a Bill or part of a Bill relates exclusively to England or to England and Wales.
I have to say that that is an enormous, onerous responsibility. In the interests of good governance and public transparency, it would seem appropriate that the Speaker in that case should be obliged by Standing Orders to publish the criteria, the principles and the legal advice that he will apply in reaching such determinations. However, no such provision is presently made. Anyone who is experienced in deciding such issues from a Scottish point of view knows that they are extremely complicated and will be more complicated when it comes to deciding on this provision.
On the question of whether the Speaker has the necessary advisory resources to address such a task, I have grave doubts. I have to say that they are not dispelled by the most recent revisions to the proposals, which were mentioned by the Leader of the House. She mentioned the revised proposals after consultation on the question of certification: how the resources and expertise available to the Speaker would be enhanced. Let me just read from the briefing on what the proposals amount to. I will not go through all the clauses, but it states:
“These new additions enable the Speaker”—
it says here with authority—
“to consult two backbench MPs to assist him in the process of certifying bills, clauses and schedules as relating exclusively to England or England and Wales, should he wish to do so”.
So the action after the consultation on the vital issue of resources is to extend to the Speaker the facility of the advice of two Back-Bench MPs—should he wish to use it. Well, there you are. We can all expect that that will add definitive expertise to the Speaker to make such decisions. That does not hearten me that the Government have learned from anything that has been said.
Secondly, on the test, of course revised Standing Order 83J sets out the consideration and certification to be given by the Speaker but, as I said, it is not an easy task to determine that a Bill, clause or schedule relates exclusively to England or to England and Wales and is within devolved competence. Whether a Bill applies only to England is not determined simply by looking at the extent provisions. It requires a significant constitutional and legal assessment of the measure, how it may operate in practice and what its legal effect may be.
At present, the proposal contains two tests: a territorial test and a content test. A number of serious questions arise even before we consider the omission, which is the purpose test, because the purpose is a third area that ought to be an essential element in deciding whether or not the proposals apply. Let me ask the question simply: would it include an English Bill or clause analogous to a Bill, or a clause which concerns a reserved matter but which applies, whether exclusively or not, to Scotland? The example was already given by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, of the Partnerships (Prosecution)(Scotland) Act 2013. Would it exclude all Bills or clauses which, under the current definition of the Sewel convention, would require the consent of the Scottish Parliament, such as the Scotland Bill, which affects the competence of the Scottish Parliament or Government?
I confess that I am not a lawyer. I am not complaining about that, nor am I boasting about it, but as far as I can see the revised Standing Orders do not clarify those essential questions, nor do they set out the criteria and principles by reference to which the Speaker will determine whether a Bill or clause falls within the proposals. As I said, these are elementary questions which are outside the omission of the purpose test, which is essential, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, outlined in our July debate.
The Government have obviously decided that it is worth countenancing all those risks: that they will lay the minefield and then we will all walk through it for years to come. I hope that they will weigh those risks heavily, because it is at least questionable whether the game is worth the candle as regards these proposals.
A House of Commons Library standard note of 4 December entitled England, Scotland, Wales: MPs & Voting in the House of Commons observed the statistics on voting on Bills in the House of Commons. Of approximately 3,600 Divisions between June 2001 and September 2014, a total of 22—that is, 0.6%—would have concluded differently had the votes of Scottish MPs not been counted. It may be proper to address this question, as I said at the beginning, but to rush ahead with the present proposals and all the risks when there is no major practical problem to face on the basis of those statistics seems irresponsible for a Government who supposedly stand for the retention of the United Kingdom. You cannot discuss the constitutional aspects of this without the context of the politics. Do not wittingly mass-produce grievances which could otherwise be avoided.
I will not say much about scrutiny but, at the very least, the Government should provide for the utmost scrutiny of the operation of this through the Procedure Committee of the House of Commons. That should be done in a more formal fashion. Even before that the Government should be willing to embark on the widest possible consultation so that these proposals are placed within the wider constitutional objectives.
The Government may consider all these matters trifling details. They may consider them small mines in the minefield, but their potential number is so huge that it will produce the political basis for the grievance politics of the SNP and friction between England and Scotland over an extended period of years. If we are going to address the question of fairness to the English, no one in this House would object, but we need to do it in the context of the wider constitutional settlement and the political implications of what we are doing. I hope that even at this stage the Government may be persuaded to change their approach because the constitution of this country, the country itself—the United Kingdom—and its unity deserve better than we are being provided with at present.
The process that the Speaker has to follow in order to certify Bills will apply. As regards Bills being subject to the certification process, there is no separate arrangement for a separate kind of Bill. Each Bill that is introduced into the House of Commons will be subject to that certification process. If there are aspects of a Bill which concern only England or England and Wales, they will follow the respective process which will allow for the English, or English and Welsh, MPs to have a greater voice and say on the decisions that affect only their constituents. That is what the English votes for English laws arrangements mean.
This is probably a good time for me to move on to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and others about the veto of English MPs and other matters of that kind. The important thing to stress is that what these provisions do is give a stronger voice to English MPs. We are not removing power from any Members of the other place. It is about giving a greater voice to English MPs. As far as a veto is concerned, the point that I have made in previous debates, and I stress again, is that what English MPs will not be able to do is initiate something without the approval of the whole House. They cannot overrule the whole House but neither can the rest of the House overrule them. It is about a power to stop something which directly affects their constituents and nobody else’s. It is not about them having a power to introduce something which would be for the benefit of their constituents only, without the support of the rest of the House.
Dancing on the top of pins at this time of night is not a happy experience. What is the basic difference in principle between a veto that stops something happening and, in the terms that the Leader has been explaining, one that prevents something from being initiated by a group? It is playing with words. It is semantics. If there is a veto, there is a veto, and that veto is going to be exercised—for the first time ever in the Westminster Parliament—by a smaller group than the whole Westminster Parliament, including, as we discovered earlier today, matters that come from this House to the other place.
I will come in a moment to ping-pong and how amendments made by this House are considered by the other place, but I disagree with the noble Lord about his interpretation of what I am saying. I am very clear that there is a difference between somebody having the power to stop something and somebody having the power to force something through that others are not in agreement with.
Moving on to this House, and to pick up the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, as I have already said, our powers remain exactly the same and our procedures are not affected. We will be able to consider legislation in the future in exactly the same way as we do now. When we amend legislation and we send a Bill back to the other place, the Speaker will have to certify our amendments again. He will certify whether the amendments that have been made—
I just do not accept that argument. The House of Commons will consider our amendments. If we have decided to make amendments that affect only a certain group of constituencies, the English MPs, it will be for them to be able to send them back to us. The key thing which addresses the sovereignty point is that, in the end, both Houses have to agree. We will keep ping-ponging until we reach agreement.
Please let me make some progress, because I think that noble Lords want me to move on. On the issue of a Joint Committee, I fully accept and understand that when this matter was debated earlier, in the summer, this House was absolutely clear in its view that it wanted a Joint Committee of both Houses to look at the constitutional implications of English votes for English laws. As has been highlighted, I am the Leader of the House as a whole as well as the leader of the party in government and a member of the Government. I assure noble Lords that of course I made it clear that that was a firm view, resoundingly expressed by your Lordships’ House but, as I said earlier, and as I said when we debated this matter a couple of months ago, the Government are clear in their view about not wanting to delay the implementation of English votes for English laws.
My right honourable friend Chris Grayling has replied by approaching the Constitution Committee, as was outlined. Several committees in another place have been looking at the Government’s proposals: the Procedure Committee, the Public Affairs and Constitution Committee, and the Scottish Affairs Committee. The Government do not feel it necessary to create yet another committee to examine the matter, but I am grateful that the chairman of the Constitution Committee in your Lordships’ House, my noble friend Lord Lang, and his colleagues, have agreed to consider what the constitutional implications of the proposals may be and to feed in to the review to which I referred. I am grateful to my noble friend for what he said this evening about that work.
I think that all Members of your Lordships’ House appreciate the difficulties with which the Leader of the House is faced on this issue. I have one very small suggestion. In my experience, if the Government were to say that they wish the particular amendment which responds to the Motion from your Lordships’ House, the Speaker would be bound to ensure that there was an opportunity to vote on it. That is surely the very minimum that we should be asking the Leader of the House in the other place to do: simply to make sure that there is a proper response by the whole House of Commons to the whole House of Lords.
That matter now sits in the House of Commons. I am the Leader of the House of Lords. I am not the Leader of the House of Commons, as is very clear. That is something that we will now have to leave with the House of Commons and see how it wishes to consider it.
I shall draw to a conclusion and make a couple of brief points. Several points were made this evening about noble Lords feeling that this House is being ignored by this Government and that we are not taking seriously the need for our legislation to be properly scrutinised and debated in your Lordships’ House. I absolutely reject that opinion. Although we are no longer in coalition and this is a new Government, it is worth remembering that in the previous Parliament 21,000 amendments to government legislation were tabled in this House and 6,000 of them were passed or accepted. That is a measure of how seriously this House is taken and of the importance of its work. In the past few weeks, acknowledging the need for greater time to be applied for debating government legislation, we recommitted parts of the Energy Bill when we wanted to bring forward government amendments to it. The Government responded to the Secondary Legislation Select Committee when it asked for more information on a piece of secondary legislation. So I can assure noble Lords that I take very seriously indeed the role of this House and the need for it properly to scrutinise government legislation, and I will continue to do that—and I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, for his remarks.
Points were made about the need for a constitutional convention for this and other matters to be considered. Noble Lords will have heard other members of the Government say from this Dispatch Box that we do not believe that a constitutional convention is the right way forward. We were very clear in our manifesto about the changes we want to make to provide greater devolution to all parts of the United Kingdom, and we made much of that during the general election campaign. Having been elected, we are seeking to deliver those commitments in our manifesto—and they include English votes for English laws.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere is a convention that if a new Peer is a special adviser, they will be able to participate in the Division Lobbies but not contribute to debates. We do not necessarily know what decisions those individual special advisers will make as far as when they will make changes that will allow them to make a contribution, such as the most recent special adviser to join your Lordships’ House, my noble friend Lady Helic, who I am sure all noble Lords will feel has been a very welcome addition to our ranks.
My Lords, given that there are now many more people who favour the total abolition of your Lordships’ House than support its retention on an appointments basis, do the Government recognise just what a dangerous game they are playing by resisting all serious democratic reform? Do the Government also recognise that the previous Government succeeded in getting a Bill through Second Reading in the House of Commons with a very large majority? Does the Leader of the House think that the Prime Minister, who says that he regrets the lack of progress of that Bill, has the guts now to reintroduce it?
The noble Lord and I had exchanges on this matter only recently just before the Recess, when I reminded him that the Bill to which he refers did not succeed in leaving the House of Commons. In our manifesto, we made it clear that that is not a priority for this Parliament. We see it as a priority to address the size of the House, and that is where we will focus our energies
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, do you want me to take control of this and answer the questions? It sounds like the House is calling for the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, first and then I am sure we will want to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Tyler.
The noble Lord is persistent in pursuing his point about what action noble Lords from the Liberal Democrat Benches might take in light of the recent election result, but I am certainly not going to respond on their behalf to his request. What is really important is that we are all mindful of the result of the last election in the way we do our work in this House.
My Lords, does the Leader recall that the coalition Government of which she was a very distinguished member introduced a Bill to sort out this little problem back in July 2012? It had a majority in the other House of 338 at Second Reading and the support of a majority in each of the three main parties. Indeed, it would have progressed to the statute book had it not been for some silly party games of the Labour leadership with Conservative Back-Benchers. This problem would have been resolved by now.
But the Bill did not succeed in making its way out of the House of Commons. The manifesto that we stood on at the last election said that we would not seek to introduce comprehensive reform at this time, and it was on that manifesto that we won the general election.
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for reasons that will become apparent in a moment. I have three issues to which I want to refer briefly.
First, as others said last week and have said today, the idea that these proposals affect the other place alone has been blown to smithereens. It is clearly extremely relevant to the powers and responsibilities of your Lordships’ House that these proposals are examined very carefully. The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has referred to the proposed changes to Standing Orders and, in particular, Standing Order 83O. I do not know quite why the zero is there—oh, it is an “O”, and obviously very important. For brevity’s sake, I am not going to read them, as there is a whole page of them, but they are headed, “Consideration of certified motions or amendments relating to Lords Amendments or other messages”.
What is here is clearly an opportunity for a subset of the House of Commons to veto what the House of Lords has said, which goes to the very heart of this issue. It is taking a part of the Westminster Parliament and saying that it has a veto over the whole of that Parliament. The relationship between our two Houses is clearly of supreme importance, as others have said, and this alters the supremacy of the Westminster Parliament. It is as important as that. Even more topically, if one devolved subset of our system of governance is given that opportunity, what are Holyrood, Cardiff and Stormont going to say? They will want it too—and why should they not? It alters the whole delicate balance of power and responsibility within the United Kingdom.
The case for a Joint Committee is absolutely clear. If I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, the other place can take absolutely no notice whatever of our Constitution Committee—it does not have a comparable Constitution Committee, as he well knows. Perhaps it should have one. By the time that our Constitution Committee has come up with some recommendations, the danger is that the changes to the Standing Orders in the other place will already have been passed.
That brings me to my second point. This is a classic case of the dangers of piecemeal and ad hoc attempts to deal with apparent anomalies in our constitution. Removing one anomaly produces another. Any Member who still thinks, after listening today, that this can be resolved in isolation would do well to read the Hansard report of our brief debate last Thursday and the debate in the other place last Wednesday. I particularly draw the attention of noble Lords to the comments of the former Attorney-General, Dominic Grieve, who said:
“Ultimately, every decision that is taken by an Assembly or Parliament in the United Kingdom has a knock-on effect elsewhere, outside the area of its jurisdiction”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/7/15; col. 1002.]
Surely, such a wealth of practical experience exceeds what is available to the Leader of the Commons on his own—hence, I believe that a Joint Committee would be entirely appropriate.
There is a head of steam now to go beyond this immediate problem and think about the wider context, so I hope the Leader of the House will persuade her colleagues to look again at the case for a comprehensive constitutional convention, supported now on all sides of your Lordships’ House and widely supported in the other place, as well as being the subject of a Private Member’s Bill in the name of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed.
The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, is right: just having a constitutional convention is not in itself going to solve this problem, as was clear from the convention in Scotland, which is occasionally quoted as if that were the model. We should be clear that you have to start out with a remit that is agreed, so that all those involved know where they are trying to go. That was not the case in Scotland, as evidenced by the fact that two parties did not want to be involved in the constitutional convention precisely because at that stage, they could not agree to the common remit.
There is clearly a major opportunity, as well as a problem, arising from these proposals. I hope that in the short term there is a Joint Committee of the two Houses—such committees have an enviable reputation for getting to the bottom of things and sorting them out in a way that individually, the two Houses have found difficult—but I believe that in the longer term, this now leads to the need for a constitutional convention.
My Lords, when I sought to intervene, a little too late, on the prompt conclusion of the proposal to the House from the noble Lord, Lord Butler, I wanted to ask him one question. He is proposing a Joint Committee. Recently, we have had an election and seen the arrival of a substantial number of Scottish National Party MPs who previously observed the principle of a self-denying ordinance, but have made it clear that they do not think this quite applies in the same way any more. I wanted to intervene in order to ask: while this Standing Joint Committee is taking place, what will cover any problems arising from legislation in the mean time? We have had some very interesting—
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pretty pathetic self-regulated House that cannot even allocate appropriate time to such an important issue as this. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that there is every difference in the world between giving English MPs a voice and giving them a veto. That was, of course, what the McKay commission, to which I gave evidence, identified at the very outset. I simply do not understand why this Government have ignored the advice of the McKay commission.
I endorse absolutely the suggestion that this is an appropriate issue for a Joint Committee of both Houses because it clearly affects the process by which all of us examine legislation at both ends of the building. That would be the traditional way forward, and I hope that the Leader of the House will give us an assurance that that will be looked at seriously.
In the mean time, I suggest that this issue has much wider implications for our constitution. I have constantly heard from the other side of the House suggestions that we have been far too ad hoc and piecemeal when looking at issues of this sort. Surely this is the time for the Government to commit themselves to a convention. But we must have some agreement about the purpose of a convention because the Scottish convention, at the outset, already had a clear remit, with agreement from all participants. That is one of the reasons why the Scottish nationalists and Conservatives did not agree to that convention. We should, at the outset, have agreement on what we should be doing.
There are considerable constitutional implications to the proposed veto, to which my noble and learned friend, with his experience of Scottish devolution, will refer in a moment. This is not a minor issue for one end of this building.