Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, we have here a new example of constitution-making. We have now got rid of Henry VIII in this Bill and we have something rather more subtle—not something that that great, mighty ogre could have conceived of for himself.

The new example is:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may, for example”.


Those of your Lordships who were in the House when we discussed the Trade Bill last week will remember another regulation-making power—another blockbuster like this one—only the words used were not “for example” but “among other things”, in relation to regulations under whichever subsection it was. What kind of primary legislation is this? It is really rather alarming. The primary legislation provides:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations”,


do this, that and the other: (a), (b) and (c). Well, fine. The regulations “may” do nine things—there is an amendment to one of them to come later, but this is not relevant to present purposes—specifying just about anything you can think of.

Why do we not say, even in relation to the EU, that the regulation-making power should be defined as widely as it is in Clause 2(2) but not extend further? The reality is that, with these words, in truth there is no limit to the regulation-making power. I find that astonishing, and I suspect that many Members of your Lordships’ House will find that astonishing. So we now have within the terms of the Bill—subject to the Henry VIII point, which is going—in effect an undefined, unconstrained power given to the Secretary of State to make regulations. It will not do.

[Lord Tyler (LD)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge; he has been totally consistent in this field, and I very much sympathise with the point he has just made.

I serve on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and, although I cannot speak on its behalf, I think it would share with me the view that the way in which the Minister has responded to our concerns and corresponded with us has been exemplary. We thank her, I am sure, for that; it is very valuable. However—she probably anticipated a “however”—in our report of 14 February there were two critical paragraphs to which she has not responded in the various exchanges we have had with her. I hope your Lordships’ House will not mind if I read them, because they are extremely important, not just for this Bill but for a whole series of Bills that have been coming before us in recent weeks. The paragraphs refer to some of the correspondence we had with the Minister, and go as follows:

“The Minister repeatedly refers to the need for ‘flexibility’, given that reciprocal healthcare arrangements remain subject to negotiation. She says that there must be flexibility as to the meaning of healthcare, as to the persons who can be funded and as to the persons to whom functions can be delegated. The Minister says, at paragraph 19: ‘This is a forward-looking Bill and so flexibility is key’”.


We then put in our report, in heavy type:

“Powers that are too wide are not the more attractive for being part of a ‘forward-facing’ and ‘forward-looking’ Bill”.


We continued:

“At paragraph 29, the Minister says again that the Bill is a ‘forward-facing Bill’, this time to justify taking powers to go beyond replacing current EU arrangements”.


Again, in heavy type the report continued:

“Given that post-Brexit reciprocal healthcare arrangements are the Bill’s principal target, the powers in clause 2 to make law governing the provision of healthcare by anyone anywhere in the world could have been more effectively circumscribed”.


Those two paragraphs are not just appropriate to this Bill but demonstrate how, on many occasions in recent weeks, we have been effectively offered a skeletal Bill, with very considerable primary legislation made subject to largely unspecified future executive powers. Very often, it would seem, there is good reason, because of urgency or expediency. We are, however, establishing precedents for the post-Brexit situation. At the moment this can be used as an excuse—perhaps only for a few more days before the other place decides that the timescale is ludicrous—but it is not acceptable that we are constantly given legislation for a particular purpose and told that Ministers must have very wide-ranging, unspecified future powers simply for reasons of urgency. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, have said, if we are not very careful we will establish precedents in this way.

I hope that when the Minister responds—having not previously done so in her exchanges with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—she will comment on the particular points that were made in the report’s recommendations.