Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Tyler Excerpts

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

I do not accept the canard that by having a threshold an abstention amounts to a no vote. That is utterly misplaced and misconceived. There is no evidence one way or another. It is as likely as not that, were there a threshold, persons who are mildly disposed in favour will be brought out to vote. But if one places oneself in the mind of an ordinary elector who had doubts about the matter in hand, one can ask whether he going to vote or to abstain. If he votes, there is a stone cast deliberately and positively against the proposition. That stone will be part of a pile that he hopes will be sufficient to defeat it. If he does not vote, there is uncertainty as he does not know whether the threshold will be reached.

[Lord Tyler]

My Lords, does the noble Lord accept that in those circumstances an abstention counts as a no vote and so discourages participation in the whole exercise?

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

I readily accept that an abstention can count as a no vote. Whether it would in most cases, with great respect to the noble Lord, I do not think anybody can say. I am quite certain that it is wrong to assume that an abstention is always equivalent to a no vote. That is my proposition. I do not think that I have anything useful to add to the matter, save to say that what is at issue is the credibility of the parliamentary system—credibility that would be greatly damaged if some provision of this nature were not resorted to.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this is an important amendment, which goes to the legitimacy of any change to the voting system. First, I do not believe that the stages in the argument are substantially in dispute. The referendum deals with an important constitutional issue and I have not heard anyone say that we should not have a referendum. There are people who object to referendums but, by and large, if our country is having referendums, this is an issue to have one on because it changes the voting system.

Secondly, this is an unusual Bill in so far as a referendum is concerned because it provides for a compulsory referendum, not an advisory one. By that I mean that if the vote is passed, the consequence is not that Parliament would then produce another Act of Parliament, as it did with the Scotland Act and the Wales Act, but that there is automaticity in that the Minister is required to bring forward an order that would automatically, in the light of the vote, give effect to the change in the voting system.

Thirdly, the effect of the provisions is that if, for example, there was a turnout of 25 per cent in the referendum, which no one regards as an outlandish percentage, you could end up with what is regarded by all as a major constitutional change being produced by 12.5 per cent of the country supporting it.

Fourthly, the reason why a referendum is required is that in constitutional change of this importance—and no one disputes its importance—it should be harder rather than easier than normal to effect such a change.

Fifthly, this is a change that has the support of the Liberal Democrats, while the Labour Party is divided on it and the Conservatives are against it. The effect is that it is almost certain that unlike with, for example, the Scotland Bill, the Wales Bill and the European common market in the early 1970s, Parliament would vote in favour of these changes. That means that, if there is no threshold, you have a situation where, far from it being harder to bring about this constitutional change, it may well be easier than it would have been with a normal Act of Parliament.

The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, said that if you ended up in a situation where the referendum was passed by 12.5 per cent of the electorate, which would be the position, the legitimacy of the change would be considerably in doubt. I agree with that. It would—I quote the noble Lord—“eat like acid” at its legitimacy and put our voting system in play for whoever next forms the Government. There needs to be some protection to ensure that a major constitutional change such as this is not easier to make than through a normal Act of Parliament.

I am aware of the history of this matter, which is coloured by the threshold that was inserted in the 1978 Bill in the House of Commons. At the Committee stage, there was an interesting debate on that, during which George Cunningham, then the Member of Parliament for Islington South and Finsbury, in a very powerful speech persuaded Parliament that it would be wrong to make such a major change without there being a threshold.

[Lord Tyler]

Will the noble and learned Lord explain one point to me? His colleague in the other place, Mr Christopher Bryant, made a powerful speech against any threshold in this Bill, on which the Commons voted by 549 to 31. Why does the noble and learned Lord differ from his colleagues in the other place?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tyler]

If the supplementary vote is so persuasive and so self-evidently the best system, how was it that the noble Lord was unable to persuade his own party over many months that it was the best system? On several occasions, his own party produced proposals for the alternative vote, in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, at the general election and then following the general election. If the noble Lord wants to be persuasive, why does he not start with his own colleagues?