Investment Bank (Amendment of Definition) and Special Administration (Amendment) Regulations 2017

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Tuesday 28th February 2017 Grand Committee

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Baroness Neville-Rolfe) (Con)]

My Lords, the regulations we are looking at today help to ensure that we have an effective system in place to handle the failure of investment banks. Our approach simplifies and speeds up the special administration process and reduces the cost of the administration for clients and for creditors.

It is of course worth recalling that the collapse of Lehman Brothers taught us that our insolvency regime was not capable of dealing effectively with a failure of a large and complex investment bank. Against that background, we introduced the investment bank special administration regime in 2011 with the aim of changing the insolvency rules so that they more adequately protected the interests of clients. The legislation, rightly, includes a provision for review. I pay tribute to Mr Peter Bloxham, an insolvency lawyer who was appointed to lead this and whose final report was laid before Parliament in 2014. The purpose of the regulations is to improve the functioning of the regime by implementing the Bloxham review recommendations and learning from investment bank insolvencies in recent years.

The reforms we are making seek to strengthen the administration process in three ways. First, the regulations make it easier for an administrator to transfer client assets to an alternative firm. This will benefit clients in the event a firm fails by ensuring they have continued access to investment services. The regulations provide an administrator with the power to transfer the whole investment firm to another institution in spite of certain restrictions which can delay or disrupt this, such as the need to obtain client consent from all affected clients before the transfer can take place. Importantly, the regulations include key safeguards to protect clients and their interests. Clients will be able to request the return of their assets following the transfer, while client risk-management arrangements that the firm has in place will be protected.

Secondly, the regulations make the administration process simpler and quicker by strengthening and extending the bar date mechanism. This is a procedure that gives the administrator the power to set deadlines for clients to submit claims for the return of their assets. In the past, some administrators have been unable to close the client estate following the bar date procedure, allowing the administration process to drag on. These regulations therefore introduce a “hard” bar date, a power which enables the administrator to return assets more quickly to clients. I am very grateful to the chair of the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, for the time his committee has dedicated to reviewing the regulations. The committee paid special attention to the bar date mechanism and I always welcome its expertise and engagement on these sorts of provisions.

Thirdly, the regulations provide greater legal certainty for clients and creditors. This addresses a key weakness in the existing regime. One key change is clarification of a client’s right to receive interest on their claims during the administration process. We are taking away the perverse incentive to engage in arbitrage between client and creditor estates that occurred in previous administrations. In addition, the regulations clarify when an administrator needs to go to court to seek a direction on certain matters. Taken together, these reforms improve the speed at which assets can be returned to clients and enable the administration process to operate both more efficiently and effectively.

The changes we are making were broadly supported in consultation with the different parts of the market that would be affected by the failure of an investment bank. We also took advice from the Banking Liaison Panel on specific aspects of the regime, particularly the safeguards in place. I regret that we did not publish a consultation response document. However, in the Explanatory Memorandum and impact assessment accompanying the regulations, we presented a summary of the eight responses we received. I also note that we did not carry forward a duty on firms to co-operate with the administrator. Following discussions with the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments we assessed that existing statutory duties that require firms to provide information and documents to the administrator would be effective. These existing duties will enable clients to access their assets quickly and efficiently without imposing an additional and overlapping duty on firms.

These regulations are an important step forward. They are a reflection of the lessons we have learned from the past failures of investment banks but they are also a reflection of the strong future of our banking and financial system. With the reforms we are proposing today, we will be better able to ensure the financial security of the UK and continue London’s role as a leading financial centre. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this order. As she has already outlined, the purpose of this instrument is two-fold: to correct the definition of “investment bank” and to extend elements of the special administration regime, the SAR, which is the administration procedure for insolvent investment banks. These measures are part of an effort to improve the regulations and processes that govern the financial services sector. We oppose none of the measures the Government are proposing to introduce, but I have a number of points that I hope the Minister can clarify.

Part 2 of the instrument alters the definition of “investment bank” to include alternative investment funds and undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities. It was the intention of the original legislation that such firms be included in the SAR. However, they have fallen out of scope as an unintended consequence of the introduction of other legislation. As has been said, this is merely a correction. In practical terms, it increases the number of banks covered by the legislation from 700 to 1,000. May I be assured that this rise has been taken into account when considering the resources needed to communicate changes to the SAR?

I will focus the bulk of my time on Part 3 of the regulations. After much discussion, the Banking Act 2009 did not include any specific reform of investment bank insolvency. However, it provided an enabling power to pass new regulations that had to be reviewed within two years. Accordingly, the special administration regime was introduced in the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011. Peter Bloxham carried out a review and published recommendations in January 2014. This instrument implements some of those recommendations.

The most substantive change the regulations will introduce is changing the “soft” bar date to a “hard” bar date. Under the current legislation, claimants who fail to claim before the bar date can still receive client assets. The introduction of a “hard” bar date would remove this right. This seem perfectly reasonable. The client asset can be closed more swiftly and at a lower cost. However, the key question I have about this switch is how much longer the process of insolvency will last as a result. If I am not mistaken, the “hard” bar date will not be automatic. The administrator will have to apply to the court. For the court to accept a “hard” bar date, it must be,

“satisfied that the administrator has taken all reasonable measures to identify and contact persons who may be entitled to the return of client assets”.

How long do the Government expect the administrator will need before it can collate all this information?

Furthermore, new Regulation 12D(2)(b) sets out the criteria for when the court can grant an application for a “hard” bar date. The first of these criteria is that there can be,

“no reasonable prospect … that the administrator will receive claims for the return of client assets after that date”.

How can the administrator be sure that there is “no reasonable prospect”? Surely this will require extensive research. Again, will this not result in delay before the administrator is confident it has a strong case for the court? The longer a case of insolvency drags on, the greater the uncertainty, and with uncertainty the prospect of market instability.

The next issue is one my honourable friend in the other place the Member for Stalybridge and Hyde raised, relating to the mechanisms in place before assets are pooled, which could assist in a more efficient and reliable return on client assets. The Economic Secretary to the Treasury in the other place stated in response to my honourable friend’s questions that,

“the FCA has taken a number of steps to improve firms’ record keeping. These reforms have been extensively consulted on with practitioners who have experience in dealing with pooled accounts”.—[Official Report, Commons, Second Delegated Legislation Committee, 7/2/17; col. 8.]

I ask the Minister: what specific steps have been taken by the FCA and has it seen a reduction in the rate of regulatory non-compliance cases it deals with as a result?

I turn to the issues raised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Why have the Government not published the full consultation response to the Bloxham review? I note the Minister’s apology but I hope she can go into a little more detail. I have read the explanation, as has the committee, and I have to say that neither it nor I are convinced by the answers so far. The Government state that:

“The areas raised in the consultation were largely technical in nature”.


Surely this is exactly the place where such technicalities should be debated and scrutinised. I look forward to hearing a more detailed response from the Minister as to why the Government feel it is appropriate to flout their own consultation principles.

My final query for the Minister relates to the procedures used in the event that the administrator’s conduct is challenged. The new sub-paragraph (e) in paragraph 14 states that the FSCS, the financial services compensation scheme:

“may make an application … on the grounds that the administrator is not performing the duties … as quickly or as efficiently as is reasonably practicable”.

I note that the new Section 10A(b) inserted by the order says the administrator must “keep the FSCS informed”, but what does the Minister anticipate that will mean in practice? Surely in order for the FSCS to be confident that the administrator is not fulfilling his statutory duty, he must have detailed knowledge of the workings of the operation. What criteria will be used to judge whether an administrator has failed, and by whom? If the administrator is found to be inappropriate, whose responsibility is it to complete the insolvency? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Bank of England and Financial Services (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2017

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Tuesday 24th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations—and my speaking notes go on to say, “and I thank those who have spoken in this short debate”, but it has been short indeed. As has been identified, this is an uncontroversial statutory instrument, which makes consequential amendments to legislation where references to the Prudential Regulation Authority are made. We understand that these are tidying-up changes and have no intention of opposing this instrument.

I do not wish to keep your Lordships unduly, but it is important to mention what we regard as the wider implications of the primary legislation. The PRA, established by the Financial Services Act 2012—an exercise in which I participated, as I have with every piece of legislation to do with it ever since; that is why I now look so old—will be de-subsidiarised, giving the Bank of England control over microprudential regulation. The board will be replaced by the Prudential Regulation Committee, which will sit on the same statutory footing as the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee.

As your Lordships will recall, our main concern was to ensure that those in positions of power and authority within the banking sector were properly accountable. However, we also queried the Government's rationale for bringing the PRA within the scope of the Bank of England. I would like to make two points. First, I start from the same position as I did at the end of 2015, when what is now the Bank of England and Financial Services Act was going through your Lordships’ House. As I said on the second day of Committee on 11 November 2015:

“I think the Bank will move its emphasis from the Monetary Policy Committee towards the FPC”.


The nature of our economy is changing. The powers of the FPC, including controlling the creation of credit, are absolutely fundamental to how efficiently the money system supports the economy, and hence are fundamental to the economy. Under the system which the 2016 Act abolished there were at least checks and balances.

I went on to say that the PRA was,

“a subsidiary—an independent company … governed by company law—and, therefore, there has to be an arm’s-length relationship between it and the FPC. Under the various terms of the Act, the FPC can create various macroeconomic tools, which it then hands down to the PRA. It hands those down not through some side-channels or influence but, because of that independent legal status, in a very formal way to its subsidiary, and I think that is healthy. I do not believe that in effect moving the PRA closer to the Bank—and, by definition, closer to the FPC—is a good thing. The present separation is working, and I think we should continue it”.—[Official Report, 11/11/15; col. 2005.]

Indeed, one of the benefits of subsidiary status—I should know, having headed a subsidiary company of a large organisation—is that one gets to focus on the business, so that there are clear lines of responsibility. As was brilliantly articulated by my noble friend Lord Eatwell, the 2016 Act muddies these lines of responsibility and, as he said,

“renders the governance structure of the Bank of England opaque”.—[Official Report, 9/11/15; col. 1851.]

The lines of demarcation set out in the Act relating to the PRC seem to add yet another layer of bureaucracy and complication to a new system which for all intents and purposes was functioning as it should. What specific work has been done since the Act came into force last year to ensure the same levels of accountability and transparency, and how will those qualities be visible to the general public?

Presuming that the Government do not take of heed of my advice, the PRA will be abolished and the PRC created. When will this transition take place? The Act states that an order will be introduced by the Treasury to give effect to the Act. Should we expect that order by the end of this Session? I thank the Minister in anticipation for her response. I am in no way saying that we are not impressed by the performance of the Bank of England. Nevertheless, the reasons she gave seemed rather fluffy to justify giving up the clarity that the present subsidiary status provides.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support for the regulations—and, indeed, for his dedication to the scrutiny of the 2016 Act and its subsequent children. He feels that the Act made the governance structure of the Bank of England opaque. I disagree: I welcome the changes, because I believe they make that governance better and clearer. Before the 2016 Act the MPC was a committee, the PRA was a subsidiary and the FPC was a sub-committee of the court, which is, of course, the Bank’s board.

With the changes in the Act, all three are now policy committees established on the same statutory basis, with clear statutory objectives and processes. The noble Lord asked what had happened since the Act came into force to improve accountability and transparency. Since it came into force last year, the National Audit Office has been able to conduct value-for-money reviews at the Bank for the first time, and the MPC’s new practice of publishing its minutes has swiftly become a legal requirement. Once the new PRC is created it will have to report every year on its resources and the independence of its operations, and produce a separate statement of accounts to ensure that the industry levy is limited to funding PRA functions.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My recollection is that the MPC has to report eight times a year, and the FPC, in practice, produces a report at least quarterly. Will the Prudential Regulation Committee produce regular reports of its activity—more regularly than annually?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

The current plan is that it will report every year on its resources and the independence of its operations.

I will respond to the noble Lord’s question on timing. The provisions giving effect to the transfer will come into effect on 1 March this year—very soon—to ensure that the transition is aligned with the Bank’s financial reporting year.

The Bank of England has come a long way since it was established in 1694 to finance the war of the Grand Alliance against France. At that time, it only had 19 officials, including two doorkeepers. Now the Bank of England, including the PRA, has about 3,600 officials and has picked up a few additional responsibilities in the intervening 323 years. These regulations play their own small part in that process. I thank the House again for today’s exchange and commend the regulations to the House.

Savings (Government Contributions) Bill

Debate between Lord Tunnicliffe and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 12th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate today, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for his very kind welcome. I certainly look forward to working with him and other noble Lords in this esoteric and interesting area and bringing light to the issues.

I think we all agree on the importance of people having effective tools to help them save money. As the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, suggested, saving is important and we need the right quiver of incentives—and I welcome his support for Help to Save. I think there is an equal consensus around the need to encourage more people to save. I take the point that there may be more to do to publicise the progress that we have made on defined benefit pensions, described by my noble friend Lady Altmann—who is in a great position to encourage pensions saving and to explain how valuable it can be. However, I do not agree with her conclusion on the lifetime ISA: it has been supported by many, including the ABI, individual members and, indeed, Martin Lewis.

I turn to the link between the lifetime ISA and automatic enrolment, which was first raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. I am well aware of her great expertise on pensions and, indeed, her role in the seminal Turner commission report—I remember well that huge report, which was very authoritative, arriving on my mat when I was responsible for pensions at Tesco, where we really cared a lot about helping people both to have a good pension and to save for their retirement. Those of us who care about pensions can be champions, as the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, said. I share her respect for the work of Business in the Community, as she well knows.

I stress that we are fully committed to supporting people through the pensions system. Automatic enrolment will help 10 million people to be newly saving or saving more by 2018. The lifetime ISA is designed to complement that. It gives young people more choice in how they save for the long term. It is not a replacement for pensions. The Government’s policy towards employers reflects this. Employers have a statutory obligation to contribute towards pensions under automatic enrolment, as well as a direct incentive. Neither is the case with the lifetime ISA. Our impact assessment, based on an OBR-certified costing note, is clear that we do not assume that anybody will opt out of a workplace pension to save into a lifetime ISA—as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, said.

The Help to Buy ISA is similar to the lifetime ISA in that it gives a 25% bonus to support people to buy a first home.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

May I check the logic of that? Is the Minister saying that the OBR has certified that it is a reasonable assumption that nobody will opt out as a result of a lifetime ISA, or merely that it took that as an input assumption in doing its analysis?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

As with all impact assessments, it is an estimate. We looked at the Help to Buy ISA, which is similar to the lifetime ISA in that it gives a 25% bonus to support people to buy a first home. That has not led to a surge in opt-outs. Instead, opt-out rates for automatic enrolment are still much lower than the Government expected, as several noble Lords said; they are currently 9%. The overall programme assumption was, I understand, 28%. We will of course regularly monitor the lifetime ISA going forward to make sure that it is achieving its aim—as the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, suggested, and indeed as we do with all important policy areas. But I am not convinced, to respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that we need a formal annual review.

The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, asked how many people using Help to Save were eligible for automatic enrolment. We set out our expectations of take-up of Help to Save. I am afraid that, as with all forecasts, there is uncertainty, so at this stage we are not able to say how many of these people will also be eligible for automatic enrolment.

Several noble Lords talked about guidance and communication. The Government announced in October 2016 that they plan to replace the three government-sponsored financial guidance providers—the Money Advice Service, the Pensions Advisory Service and Pension Wise—with a new, single financial guidance body, which I welcome. Through creating a single body we intend to make it as easy as possible for consumers to access the help they need to get all their financial questions answered. For example, this could be through helping families to balance their household budget or for individuals considering their options in retirement. Consultation on the precise design of the single guidance body is currently live and closes on 13 February. MAS, TPAS and Pension Wise will continue to provide guidance to consumers until the new body goes live.

The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, raised the issue of pensions tax relief, as did other noble Lords. Our responses to the Treasury’s pensions tax consultation indicated that there was no clear consensus for reform and, therefore, that it was not the right time to undertake fundamental reform to the pensions tax system. But obviously the Government have moved, with the Bill, to encourage younger people to save through the lifetime ISA—and that was a key theme that came out of the consultation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, raised the question of mis-selling risk, which was also a concern of my noble friend Lady Altmann. I agree that it is very important for individuals to have clear information on their products. That is why we will publish factual information about the lifetime ISA on GOV.UK, as well as working with the Money Advice Service and its successor to ensure that they make appropriate and impartial information available. As was said, it is the independent Financial Conduct Authority’s role to regulate account providers, including how they sell a product to consumers. It is currently consulting on the approach and has set out its proposals.

Having said all of that, the communication issue has come up under several different headings. If noble Lords would find it helpful, I will undertake to look through Hansard at the various points that have been made on communication and set out in a letter to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate just what our plans are. That will enable me, for example, to check with the FCA about its current plans and take account of any consultation responses that may already be available. We need to make sure that at the point of sale providers are transparent about risks, including any potential early withdrawal charge and with information on automatic enrolment. That theme came through from almost all noble Lords who spoke. It is a very important area. As has been said, this is a Money Bill, but that does not mean that we cannot set out how we see these things being properly communicated.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, questioned the impact assessment. I understand, from checking with the experts, that it is correct. I was glad that he raised housing because it is an important area. The OBR has noted that the effect of the lifetime ISA on house prices is highly uncertain and its predicted impact is significantly smaller than overall house price movements. As we know, a number of factors can affect house prices, which will be subject to change in future years. For example, we are taking steps to boost housing supply. Following the announcement of £5.3 billion additional investment in housing in the Autumn Statement, we expect to double our annual capital spending on housing during this Parliament. We will publish a housing White Paper shortly, which I hope will address some of the supply issues the noble Lord raised and allow this House to have further exchanges on this incredibly important issue for the future of our economy and our industrial strategy. I believe the lifetime ISA is one way to make sure that first-time buyers have the support they need to get on to the housing ladder.

I will address a number of technical points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. She asked whether the Government would commit to a 50% participation rate for Help to Save. The Government are not setting any specific target around take-up of Help to Save because we want opening an account to be an active decision by those who feel Help to Save is right for them. However, we will continue to work with the account provider and other interested parties to ensure that people are made aware of the scheme and receive the right support and guidance.

The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, talked about eligibility for the under-25s. A person aged under 25 is eligible for working tax credit if they work a minimum of 16 hours a week and have a child or a disability—I am learning a lot from this debate. Our intention is to passport people into eligibility for Help to Save. This is a well-established way of targeting support at people on lower incomes. Importantly, it removes the need for people to complete a further means test to prove that they are eligible, which we know could deter people from opening accounts.