Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] Debate

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Department: Department for Business and Trade

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts
2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026

(5 days, 9 hours ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
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My Lords, for 14 years, I was the most junior opposition Treasury spokesman. A slight problem with that is I was occasionally—in fact, more than occasionally—the most senior opposition Treasury spokesman, largely because there was only one of me. Settling into being a Back-Bencher, I glanced at what was coming ahead and decided I had a duty to participate in this debate and learn. I have looked at the Bill and concluded it is what I am going to call “motherhood”. That is not to belittle it, but part by part by part, it attacks individual problems and proposes solutions. We will be very good at that; we will work at it; and we will, I hope, get a good result.

The only bits that hit my eyes were Clauses 39 and 40 on ring-fencing. The global financial crisis in 2008-09 was right at the beginning of my career as an ill-informed Front-Bencher. I have been through virtually all the Bills—I think only the noble Baroness and I have been there so consistently, although there was of course also the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. We had the global financial crisis in 2008-09, and we really must remember that. It has been mentioned that there will be another one; we do not know what it is, but we should think about how we are prepared for it. I could not agree more with that.

In the 2008-09 financial crisis, the world teetered on the edge of financial chaos. It was solved by a lot of people, but I am particularly proud of Alistair Darling and Gordon Brown for what they did in those weeks when we really did not know what would happen next. After the crisis, we created the Independent Commission on Banking, the Vickers commission, which reported in September 2011 and proposed ring-fencing. I must say that the consensus view on our side was of a good report, a good commission and great people, and the output produced general approval, including from me.

In anticipation of this debate, and looking at ring-fencing as the most significant point that it would touch on, I decided to read a few reports. I read the Ring-fencing and Proprietary Trading Independent Review by Keith Skeoch. It is a fascinating document, which was published in March 2022. The Treasury produced A Smarter Ring-fencing Regime in November 2024 and Safeguarding Stability, Enabling Growth in May 2026. I am afraid I concluded that the ring-fencing regime was doing little good and, in many parts, harm. It has been overtaken in the area of protection by The Bank of England’s Approach to Resolution, of October 2017.

I became fascinated by this resolution stuff—funny things happen to you in old age—and managed to get somebody in the Bank of England, the official who is in charge of resolution, to give me a series of seminars on the telephone. He was a bit suspicious, so he said he had to have his solicitor with him throughout the conversation. I feel I understood it, and I think the claim made in some of these reports is this: all the good that ring-fencing produces is covered by the resolution regime, but the resolution regime, at the end of the day, takes years in preparation, as various banks are persuaded to take particular actions to make them more robust in a crisis. But it actually happens in about 60 hours over a weekend. It is a very elegant process, and they have enormous powers.

I feel that there is a strong case for a relook at ring-fencing, recognising that the resolution regime gives all the protection. We must not lose sight of what we were trying to do. We were trying to avoid the “too large to fail” dilemma. The resolution regime does that. It does not do it for just ring-fenced banks; it does it for all banks. It achieves almost certainly the minimum cost to the public purse—normally, no cost to the public purse. It prevents systemic impacts.

The reason I am making this so short is because the only Bill that goes into the details last about 40 minutes and I did not think this was the time of night to start on it. I simply say that I hope I will be able to find a way, I hope even some support, to produce amendments to the Bill so that we have a proper discussion that looks at whether ring-fencing is still fit for purpose and the extent to which the resolution regime can take over much of its work. The rest of its work, if any, can be distributed within the regime. We can take away the detailed problems that are all over the place in its application, which is a negative to the system, and remove the fact that there are two regulators, which is always a bad thing, especially when one is going to take over at the last minute, as the Bank of England has the power to do in the resolution regime.