Tuesday 4th March 2014

(10 years, 2 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Triesman Portrait Lord Triesman (Lab)
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My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Foreign Secretary’s Statement, and I appreciate the early sight that we had of it. I will say immediately that I think it is a very serious and very valuable Statement. We wholly subscribe to two of the concluding points, and to much else as well, but I will start with the two concluding points:

“The UK’s national interest lies in a free, democratic, unified, stable and peaceful Ukraine able to make its own decisions about its future”,

and,

“we also have a direct national interest in the maintenance of international law”.

That is 100% common ground among us all.

Today we need, as I suspect we will need over the coming weeks and months, careful judgments and very careful words. The dangers of the position in which we find ourselves are plain to see, just as they were when we discussed this matter on 24 February. It is difficult to think of a greater threat to European security in the recent history of the continent. This incursion by Russia into the sovereign territory of a neighbour, far beyond the bases in Ukraine for which it has lease arrangements, breaks a raft of international laws and obligations. The Statement repeats them: it is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the Russia-Ukraine bilateral agreement of 1997 on military bases. It breaks all the agreements guaranteeing Ukrainian territorial integrity.

The diplomatic efforts by the Foreign Secretary and his visit to the Ukraine are to be applauded. The visit to Paris tomorrow is also important for carrying the process forward. It is helpful that Secretary Kerry has been so directly involved, as is the EU generally, and of significance that Chancellor Merkel has taken a leading role. Efforts at NATO are also of the first importance. Security co-operation is now becoming a non-credible option as far as NATO and Russia are concerned.

Plainly, Russia should step back. I think we all fear that it will not. It has no justification for its actions. The justifications it purports to provide—a letter from a fleeing and discredited President and the ever more extravagant denigration of the people and the interim Government of Ukraine, using fanciful and, on occasions, grotesque language—are raucous and synthetic. It is language that I suspect is constructed largely for a Russian domestic audience, designed to arouse popular memories of what was indeed a terrible period of Nazi invasion of Soviet territory and the unspeakable loss of lives at the hands of the Nazis. But it is not a credible description of the present and it runs the manifest risk that all such exercises do: that a belligerent state gradually comes to believe its own rhetoric. If Russia continues its current line of approach, it must be viewed as a threat to the south-east of Ukraine as a whole. Precisely this trajectory was discussed in your Lordships’ House last week.

First, this should not be allowed to drift, by accident or design, into armed conflict. The restraint of the Ukrainian people, state and forces is exceptional and commendable. I am sure that that will be felt right across the United Kingdom. It has been statesmanlike. As a result, there is no excuse for Russia to move from its current level of aggression to out-and-out violence. What we all need now is a process of de-escalation. All efforts at diplomacy must be made and the multinational institutions must step up to the mark—and quickly. It is clear that diplomacy has had little traction so far. However, appeals not to isolate Mr Putin have followed and, perhaps predictably, they have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, nobody can be put off from making the effort.

I say the efforts have been unsuccessful. Chancellor Merkel found herself talking to a leader living, as she put it, in a parallel universe. Despite Germany’s dependence on Russian gas, the chancellor appears to have pulled no punches in what she said and I applaud that. Mr Kerry encountered a policy mindset that reminded him of the 19th century in its attitudes of large states to smaller ones—I confess that I have reached back to study Bismarck to try to find parallel language. Beyond dispute is that discussions setting out what President Obama called the consequences of continued military intervention fell on deaf ears. President Putin disregarded them, as he did proposals for an internationally mediated process to ensure the rights of Russian speakers in the Crimea and a formal special status to protect them. Indeed, President Putin talked to President Obama having already secured a unanimous vote in the Duma for military intervention. The only conclusion it is safe to draw is that this is about retrenching the Ukraine inside Russia’s sphere of influence rather than anything else. It goes further than securing Sevastopol, which was not in any case under threat. The hurt that may be felt by a diminished global status is the target Mr Putin seeks to address. The risks of the consequences do not appear to be that great to him, and that should cause us concern.

What is needed now is a process of stabilisation. Russian leaders must be able to calibrate—and do so on the basis of clear statements from all the rest of us—the balance of diplomatic and economic risks they face; that is, what have been described as the consequences. Ukrainian leaders must also and clearly opt for inclusiveness. The rights of populations within the country, including those speaking Russian, must be protected and those peoples need to know they are protected. I welcome the assurances that the Foreign Secretary received about the status of Russian language legislation. That should be a very helpful step. That is a basis for both the Ukraine and Russia moving forward in some form of dialogue as soon as possible. A role in defusing the crisis must be seized with both hands. Did the Foreign Secretary raise other issues with the Ukrainians that might go in the same direction during the course of his talks this week?

As my right honourable friend Douglas Alexander said in another place, Russia needs to be clear and to understand the consequences of its actions. His main point was that the rest of us need to understand the consequences of inaction. What will the United Kingdom say at the emergency session of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on Thursday? I assume that is going ahead and that we will attend it. What was said by the Foreign Secretary at yesterday’s EU Foreign Affairs Council? Is a process taking place of building from words about what the consequences may be to taking action? Are Her Majesty’s Government able to clarify what they advocate as the “costs” and “consequences”? Again, I make no apology for repeating this point. When dealing with a state leader like President Putin, it is critical that he understands precisely what everybody intends so that there can be no mistakes about what follows.

Is it right to say that all diplomatic and economic options are on the table for this Thursday? I have deliberately not included the word “military”, because I do not believe that anybody is looking in that direction; we are talking about diplomatic and economic options. Are those options on the table? If not, the Russian appetite for future military action will, in my view, have been whetted and we can expect to see more of it, to the detriment of the peoples of the region.

We are pulling out of the preparations for Sochi, and I am sure that that is right. Are the Government minded to pull out of the Sochi conference and to say so now? Is Russia now a legitimate member of the G8? Has it the status, does it meet the requirements, to take part in international bodies of that kind?

The financial support for Ukraine is obviously a matter of the first importance. We know that it needs $35 billion over the next 24 months to avoid a default. I think that the £10 million contribution from the United Kingdom is unquestionably helpful, but far more is needed and the IMF itself needs to take an important role. That role will be taken against a background, as the Statement says—again, I am glad that this is in the Statement—of dealing with poor institutions and ongoing corruption, but these are probably moments in which people will be more attentive to what is required of them than they might have been at some other points in their history when they saw less threat. The solvency issue is fundamental to any long-term prospects. If the country hollows out and falters, the prospect of ever reaching stability must be to that extent diminished.

I conclude by saying that all the direct contact that the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and many of the other international diplomats have had must have been of help, and its continuation must be of help. There must be value in the formation of a contact group. It at least will set agendas, schedule meetings and try to ensure that people are around the table rather than simply working out where they can parade their troops next in somebody else’s territory.

This is difficult, and it is a time for the House and those of all parties who regard the United Kingdom’s interest as paramount to draw together.