Afghanistan

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, it has been helpful to have this debate today, and I appreciate that the Minister has provided us with the opportunity to do so. I share the view expressed, and appreciate her contribution to the work that is being done in the region. I express the same appreciation for other Members of your Lordships’ House for the work that they have done as well. Irrespective of agreement or nuances of disagreement that may emerge today, the opportunity for a review at this moment is very welcome. Sometimes detailed discussion and analysis on Afghanistan seem to vanish from the agenda altogether. I think that, given our national commitment to resolving some of the problems of Afghanistan, it is hard to understand that, but it does happen.

First things first. We debate Afghanistan and its region against the background of the combat engagement of our forces. Their courage and heroism deserve both our unstinting praise and the reflection that they are and remain the very best of our nation. They protect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, said, our security interests. That is why they are there. But they are not the only heroes in the story, although, of course, they are placed at the greatest possible risk. Our embassy staff do a remarkable job. The aid workers also do a remarkable job and fill me with pride about the United Kingdom at its best. The same goes for the unsung members of our intelligence services. It is no criticism of any of them at all—none in the slightest—to try to draw up a balance sheet and ask: what are the key issues now? How are they being prosecuted? What has gone right and what has not, and what should we do now?

I want to look at these questions to assess how we stand in the region. I do so, and know how true this is, without the exceptional background resources and latest intelligence appraisals that are always available to Ministers on these occasions. Noble Lords may have to allow for any imprecision or gaps in knowledge on my part. Also, I cannot assess anything other than the work we are doing with our allies. We are not doing this on our own, and the impact of the alliances through NATO and especially the United States establishes particular conditions in which we conduct much of our work, not least in our relationship with Kabul.

My noble friend Lord Parekh was relatively optimistic about some aspects and less so about others. I am not generally speaking a pessimist, but on this occasion I am slightly on the side of pessimism. I wonder whether what we have heard today from the Government really speaks to the full scale of the challenges. That does seem to be an issue. The word “welcome” has been used a number of times, but can we really see in the category of successes an outstanding list of things that we would genuinely welcome as signs of success?

The United Kingdom and the United States are about a year away from a substantial diminution of their military presence in Afghanistan, while others have already left or lowered their numbers. Although we are committed to the longer-term training and mentoring programmes we will not, as the Minister has said, be in the combat roles. Wisely, or more likely perhaps not entirely wisely, we have given our enemies considerable notice, allowing them to repurpose their strategic resources and programmes in the country. It seems all but certain that, whatever the real gains that have been made, Afghanistan will none the less be left with a precarious security problem. As the noble Lord, Lord Bates, said a moment ago, there is likely to be a significant economic downturn, along with political and social institutions in which many Afghans have very little confidence. They believe that, on some grounds, the institutions lack legitimacy. I am not clear on the extent of the risk of civil war being led by disparate warlords, but I suppose that any assessment must say that it is likely. Indeed, there could be a general internal conflict. In such circumstances it is not clear how we, the United States, the wider community or the neighbouring community will prosecute key interests and what options would really be open to us.

The helpful House of Lords Library brief—I congratulate the staff on it—illustrates each of these points. It counterposes the official narrative on security improvements, which is partly justified but not universally accepted as being the most accurate account there could be, with a bleak disbelief about the quality of the emerging Afghan forces. I am bound to say that while we should not gravitate towards any kind of complete pessimism, some recent media, including TV coverage, suggest frightening levels of military incompetence on the part of some of those forces. That is along with the abuse of women and small boys by members of the forces, some of whom appear to have serious drug problems as they prosecute the business of military involvement and command.

The Library brief shows what any economist would regard as an economy that is growing now but that is beyond fragility in the middle term. That is illustrated not simply by the aid requirements. As matters stand, the reliance on different agricultural products at the levels illustrated by my noble friend Lord Parekh leaves little scope for externally tradable goods, except arguably for heroin, and even the internal distribution of agricultural products is inadequate. The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, also talked about the complexity of the politics that lie in the background to all this, and I share his view. The remoteness of political institutions that are far from the reach of many Afghans, the persistent corruption that puts Afghanistan in the bronze medal position in international tables for corruption, and the weakness of the rule of law suggest fertile ground for all kinds of groups to return, not least the Taliban, whether a negotiation moderates its position or not. Drawdown is likely to make the role of institution-building a regional target, but it is hard to see how realistically that is to be achieved. I do not want to be hopeless about the situation, but I do want to understand what we need in order to do it properly.

However, it has to be said that there are things on the positive side, although I have to say that I find it impossible to agree with the Prime Minister’s somewhat effervescent belief that so many things are approaching the sunny uplands. I regret that that is a worrying and somewhat shallow view, because I can see no evidence that everything is going well. It is clear that Afghanistan is marginally safer today. There are fewer civilian casualties and many of them are the victims of the Taliban. The national solidarity programmes have embedded significant aid progress and processes, of which many are cost-efficient and popular. However, the reality is that they have barely marginalised corrupt local officials. Thousands of schools and major irrigation projects have been built, and in this regard I accept the analysis of the international community that President Karzai has performed in a competent way. However, after the drawdown, it is not clear how the incoming forces will occupy the space. My assessment, for what it is worth, is that it is not likely that the Taliban will occupy it or become the hosts of al-Qaeda again in a straightforward way, but that does not mean that other warlords and factional regional groups will not move in. Indeed, cross-border factions are important in this regard.

GDP in Afghanistan has grown but, as we have heard, it is vulnerable to any dip in aid and to the structural features of the economy itself. However, growth there has been—a tenfold growth in 10 years—while life expectancy has gone up by 18 years over the same decade. A great deal has gone right, but as the noble Lord, Lord Bates, was saying, a great many things still look like extremely big challenges. Like my noble friend Lord Parekh, I doubt that we understand the country or the region adequately. Given the frailties, as we pull out it is quite possible that we will abandon all our security interests in that part of south Asia as a whole, not just in Afghanistan. Progress has been made on the status of women and girls, some of it in pursuit of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, which emphasises the healthier prospects for peace in a nation when women are enabled to participate and play an active role. Has the Prime Minister raised this in the trilateral discussions in order to ensure that it is a process that is capable of being continued?

After drawdown, there is a sharp risk that any advances could be thrown into reverse. Gains in schools have been made, but they are not easily sustained either in Afghanistan or in other parts of the region. When we consider the impact of the region on Afghanistan, we necessarily focus on Pakistan. Here, I welcome the work on Pakistan of the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, which has been refreshing in exactly the way many noble Lords have described. However, it should be acknowledged that the problems of dealing with terrorism in the region are complicated. I recognise fully and acknowledge the sacrifices that have been made by Pakistan in combating terrorism, but it is vital to the United Kingdom that Pakistan should none the less change to a greater extent. Parts of it cannot be allowed to remain like a failed state, much less a failed nuclear state, but can those changes be accomplished? It is hard to see real consistency in our approach to this question. We provide military and financial support to a country that also appears to shelter insurgency in difficult parts of its terrain. Of course, it bravely fights any insurgency that is directed at itself, but the hot/cold relationship with Afghanistan leaves a feeling that there is still complicity with some terrorism in Afghanistan.

Any aid to the Haqqani faction, which I can regard only as a major crime family, would be a disgraceful development. The United Nations should list it as a terrorist organisation. Its only realistic role is to destabilise Indian interests at the behest of what I suspect are some factions inside the intelligence community in Pakistan. A proxy war between the subcontinent’s nuclear powers is a dangerous proposition.

We may very well have to work doubly hard to ensure that relationships between all the countries in the region are more successful. I wonder whether we really have developed a comprehensive political strategy and whether we have not relied too much on military force. I still fear that that may be the case. My right honourable friend the shadow Foreign Secretary has consistently advocated stepping up the political strategy, and before each of the major conferences that we have heard mentioned today—Tokyo, Istanbul and Chicago—has asked, as I do today, precisely what our political contribution is and whether we are failing to debate it often enough in our own Parliament. We have learnt a good deal from the Minister today, but the question still has to be asked. In addition, how, in the context of that question, can we ensure that the Pashtuns do not get consistently marginalised in some of the major discussions? That is a regional question.

I conclude with a few quick thoughts, but first by congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, who gave a tremendous analytical overview. I shall not, noble Lords will be relieved to know, try to repeat the points that she made. She gave us a realistic assessment of the characteristics of regional neighbours, the problems of a time limit of six months to make major steps and the questions about Pakistan’s willingness to create strategic stability. As we withdraw, in an orderly fashion, we must not step ahead of Afghanistan’s real capacities or in ignorance of the current levels of corruption and incompetence. We should accept that it would be wilfully naive to believe that the ANSF has avoided some of the systematic corruption that has appeared in almost all other institutions. This was widely understood at the Chicago conference, even if it is thought disobliging on occasions to mention it.

We need to continue to provide security assistance and work to avoid threatened divisions within the Afghan National Army itself. What can our role be there? We need to put emphasis on good governance and do it on a par with security, encouraging political reform. We should not accept that this should always go to the back burner because of the latest political or military exigency. This also means being very choosy about which of the warlords and power brokers in Afghanistan we cosy up to when we try to judge the consequences. How will we approach that? We should ensure that any negotiations with the Taliban are part of a broader process—the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bath and Wells was essentially driving at the same point, not least in welcoming the establishment of the office in Doha—and cover all aspects of the rule of law and the rights of women.

We need to try to keep the broader regional discussions inclusive and make sure as far as we can that we influence them to ensure that India is not excluded, that China engages and continues to engage to a greater extent, and that the complexity of the “-stans” is grasped, while ensuring that Iran, rather than having more influence, has as little influence as we can succeed in achieving, including among the Persian-speakers in Afghanistan. In all this, we need to get our tone right. I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, will take this in the spirit that I intend it, but I always welcome the very measured way in which the Minister deals with these things; there is nothing gushing or rose tinted in enthusiasm about untested capabilities among Afghanistan’s forces or its leaders, the foot soldiers or the operational skills. However, we cannot in other places, particularly in the leadership of the Government, sound as though we are enthusiastic schoolboys, somewhat lacking gravitas as we make a realistic assessment of what is going on. That is not how I believe people will take us seriously.