(8 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe first thing I did was to instruct a solicitor to go and see him.
One possible approach would be to consider what is meant by legal professional privilege. It is a privilege of the account that the client gives to the solicitor of the facts on which the client wishes to be advised, and the advice that the solicitor gives in return to that application. A statement of where, for example, the client is at that particular time is not part of either of those. Therefore, that is not, strictly speaking, covered by legal professional privilege at all. This is a way of looking at this matter that is slightly differently from trying to make conditions on legal professional privilege.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeBefore he finishes, may I ask the noble Lord about claims against the Armed Forces? For example, Iraqi claims have been brought forward that rely, to some extent, on the Human Rights Act. What is the impact of his amendment on that?
This applies only to the injury or death of those serving in the military on behalf of the British Crown. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, pointed out to me just before we came in, operations nowadays may not be on behalf of only the British Crown. They may be carried out, for example, in combination with the Americans, the French or some other nation. That is a further complication which did not arise in the case of Smith. The same principles could possibly apply in that situation. However, it does not deal at all with actions against, for example, Iraqis or any other people among whom our Armed Forces might be serving. The jurisdiction applies, in this particular case, to the injury or death of those serving. There would be implications of other kinds, not dealt with in Smith, so far as people who are not members of the Armed Forces are affected by actions of the Armed Forces.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I may be the only person present in the Chamber who was here when Lord Sewel issued these words. Maybe the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Drumadoon, and the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, were there at the same time. As I recall, we were debating these matters late into the night, and at 1 am or 2 am, when we came to Scottish and Welsh matters, there was a blockage. The words that Lord Sewel spoke were a very welcome resolution of a particular problem that had arisen. I recall afterwards that when it was referred to as the Sewel convention we used to rib Lord Sewel that he had unwittingly added his name to something that seemed to have become a great constitutional principle.
I intervene in this debate to refer to the problems in Wales as illustrative of the problems that your Lordships face. We have had three trips to the Supreme Court between the Welsh Assembly and the Wales Office in a very short period of time because we have not had the ability to pass primary legislation until quite recently. Legislative competence is always at our fingertips in Wales. We talk about it all the time. Indeed, the Welsh Labour Government talk about it all the time in holding up the consideration of the current draft Wales Bill. This issue seems to require either a mechanism that resolves the problems or something that is absolutely solid and certain in this particular piece of legislation.
Those who served as my colleagues during the coalition Government in the Wales Office tell me that legislative competence was a weekly discussion and deals were done between the Wales Office and Cardiff in order to solve where the parameters were. Of course we do not have reserve powers devolution in Wales; it is rather different from Scotland. We have been rather envious that Scotland has not so far had to go to the Supreme Court to sort things out in this way. It seems to me, in following my noble friends, that the way it is expressed in the Bill is such that Scottish lawyers will become very wealthy in their trips to the Supreme Court to sort things out. At the moment I am trying to work on a mechanism in Wales that will resolve these difficulties if that cannot be done between Governments in a simple way, not the way that has been arrived at so far. So, go carefully: canny down the brae, as they say, when it comes to consideration of this particular part.
My Lords, some time ago I indicated to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, that I support his approach to this clause. It is vitally important to consider the question of whether it is intended that the clause, whatever its terms, should be subject to decision by a court of law. The situation so far as Wales is concerned—and I think it would be true for the Scottish Parliament—is that in some cases its powers are subject to judicial scrutiny. The Parliament of the United Kingdom is not of that kind. It has never had its principal functions subject to judicial scrutiny. If a term is put into this Bill, which will then become an Act, that determines when the United Kingdom Parliament can act, that will be a complete innovation. It does not matter what the terms are, however precise and well drafted, I cannot see how that could be excluded unless provision is made in the Bill which states that the decision on this point is to be a matter for the United Kingdom Parliament. This I regard as an extremely serious point which the Government have to decide.
It is not a question of agreeing with the Scottish nationalists. The amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seems to be in accordance with what they would like to see; that is, the furthest stretch of the convention, which is called the Sewel convention for various reasons, amounting to what is really a complete ban. That is what I think the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, does, but that does not cut out by itself the idea that a court of law could determine whether the United Kingdom Parliament had acted lawfully in making an Act which could affect Scotland. That is why I strongly support Amendment 12 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey. That concept must be put into this clause at some point in order that the matter be not justiciable.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sorry, the right reverend Prelate. That was a bit of a promotion because we are in the presence of the two Primates. The Motions mark a refusal to accept a decision of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege as the final authority for it. That is what they amount to. It has to be noted, as I have said, that this is the privilege of the elected Chamber, not of the Government.
The amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate—I shall try to get it right this time—is entirely in accordance with the arrangements of this House and with the financial privileges of the House of Commons. Therefore from the point of view of the powers of this House, it is by far the safest of the Motions that have been put forward. In light of what the Leader of the House said in opening, I believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is very open to considering the detail—
My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord not agree that the conventions to which he has referred, going back to the 17th century, were so uncertain that in 1908 the Conservative Party defeated Lloyd George’s People’s Budget in which he sought to give money to the poor people of this country? Does he also not agree that the 1911 Act set out a mechanism whereby the Speaker would certify that a money Bill was a money Bill, and that would remove from us our powers of consideration? Is he not going back to an argument that failed more than 100 years ago?
Not at all. I am stating the present practice, according to Erskine May, in relation to matters of financial privilege. As I said, it is not a matter of the conventions of this House, but of the rights of the other place in this matter. My clear submission to your Lordships is that these amendments challenge the final authority of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege. It is true that the Liberal Democrats—I suppose they were the Liberal Party then, but the succession is probably allowable—found it necessary to take further action to ensure that the practice that had been built up in the 17th century applied in the 20th century and beyond. They put mechanisms in place to prevent financial privileges being in any way transgressed again.