Foreign Affairs

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, it is a rare privilege for us to have the Foreign Secretary wind up a debate on foreign policy in this House. Such are the quirks of politics, I suppose.

I shall concentrate on one topic, and that is economic sanctions. The sanctions regime has emerged as one of the most important tools of British foreign policy. Despite, or perhaps because of their long and tangled history, their rationale remains deeply mysterious. Are they tools of war avoidance or an extension of war by other means? It is a hybrid tool, at best. This ambiguity is fatal to any peacekeeping or peacemaking purposes they may have, because they insert a warlike mentality into what should be efforts at peace—hence the utmost clarity is needed in defining their purpose and assessing their results.

Since 2014, the number of individuals designated under the UK sanctions regime has grown from 230 to 2,000. The Foreign Secretary added another 50 a fortnight ago. Their stated purpose is, as has been said, to “degrade Russia’s war-making capacity” and deplete Putin’s armoury. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen predicted that the

“Russian economy will be devastated”

by sanctions, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Two years on, Russia’s economy is a long way from being devastated; indeed, it has proven far more resilient than many believed possible. The IMF now predicts that Russian GDP will expand by 2.2% this year, much faster than is predicted for the UK.

There are two main reasons for this. The first is trade diversification. Far from having no place to hide, as Liz Truss, then Foreign Secretary, predicted on 31 January 2022, Mr Putin and his friends have found plenty of places to hide. Moscow has been able to pivot its oil exports towards Asia, now the destination for 80% of Russian crude delivered by sea. Sanctioned goods, including critical components for military equipment, continue to reach Russia via neighbouring countries. Beijing is now Moscow’s main trading partner, and the yuan is one of the main foreign currencies in Russia. That is one reason. The second reason for Russia’s economic resilience is what I would call military Keynesianism. Russia has successfully converted a civilian economy into a war economy. Not only is growth positive, but a higher fraction of GDP is concentrated on war production.

The efficacy of economic sanctions has been repeatedly challenged by experts—not least, I should say, in the report on economic sanctions of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, on which I had the honour to serve. Not only may the efficacy of sanctions be questioned, but they stitch animosity into the fabric of international relations, thus precipitating the break-up of the global trading and payment system which, in turn, makes the world more warlike. There are lots of unintended consequences here, and we need to be very clear about what they are before simply urging more and more sanctions. It would be an important outcome to this debate were the Foreign Secretary to authorise a strategic review of the purpose and track record of sanctions to be made public before international relations are allowed to drift into a permanent warlike state, which may easily topple over into actual war between nuclear powers.

Ukraine

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Thursday 29th February 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Skidelsky]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to bring about a sustainable peace as the war in Ukraine passes its second anniversary.

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and securing a just and lasting peace underpinned by the UN charter is the UK’s foreign policy priority. The quickest path to peace would be for Mr Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. President Zelensky has already demonstrated Ukraine’s commitment to peace in his 10-point peace formula. We must strengthen Ukraine in the fight this year and ensure that Ukraine will win the war. If Mr Putin prolongs it and lays the foundation for Ukraine’s long-term future, we must act and stand with Ukraine.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

I thank the Minister for his Answer, but I am trying to understand the logic of the Government’s position. Is it still the Government’s expectation that Ukraine will win a complete victory in the sense of recovering the territories it has lost since 2014? If so, can the Minister confirm that this remains the Government’s position? If not—most experts now do not think that is a feasible endgame—should the Government not couple support for Ukraine with a public push for a negotiated settlement, such as has been advocated by many countries in the world, while they still have leverage on the table, not least to avoid the unnecessary slaughter of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, on the noble Lord’s final point, we want to stop the slaughter of innocent Ukrainian citizens. The best way to stop that slaughter is for Mr Putin and Russia to stop the war now. There are no two ways about it; we cannot allow it. This is a P5 member which has invaded a sovereign founding member of the United Nations. We back Ukraine, Ukraine’s leadership is important, and the United Kingdom stands firmly behind it.

Situation in Russia and Ukraine Recovery Conference

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble Baroness in her depiction of our relationship with key partners, including the UAE. They are important partners and we have candid and constructive engagement with them, as I have done recently. The circumvention of sanctions has been an issue which has seized many noble Lords—I know the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has repeatedly asked this question—and I assure the noble Baroness that we work directly, bilaterally and collectively to ensure that, in those areas where sanctions are being circumvented, those loopholes are focused upon and can be closed. It is to no one’s benefit if there are indirect ways in which the Russian machinery can be financed.

I will look into what the noble Baroness said about inward investment, et cetera, but in our interactions with the Ukrainian authorities at the most senior level, and in my direct interactions, there has certainly been no reservation along the lines of what she is suggesting. However, if she has further details to share then I will of course look into them.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, made an important point about the importance of thinking about a post-Putin future. I have never thought that Putin either can or deserves to survive this adventure on which he has embarked, but I am interested in what is meant by such phrases as

“withdraw his troops and end this bloodshed now”,

and a remark from the Labour Front Bench about the importance of “winning the war”. What exactly do these things mean? It seems to me that the black box here is Crimea. Is it assumed that winning the war and withdrawing Russian forces means going back to 2014 frontiers and that that is the purpose of winning the war? If that is the case, what legitimacy do the Government expect a post-Putin Government to have in Russia? In other words, if this unjustified invasion ends in the complete defeat and humiliation of Russia, what prospects are there of a stable future for any successor Government in Russia?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I do not believe that I or any member of His Majesty’s Government or His Majesty’s Opposition have ever said that the end objective is instability and the implosion of Russia. I have stated very clearly that that is in no one’s interest. When the Statement says that the war can be ended now, that is exactly what it means. Mr Putin can make that call to the Russian troops and to others, including the mercenary Wagner Group, if they are supporting them. Let him make that statement. A very clear peace plan has been articulated by President Zelensky and we have made it clear that, ultimately, that negotiation begins and ends with Ukraine. As allies and friends of Ukraine, we stand united in ensuring that those objectives are delivered.

There has been a consistent position. It is not often that I can quote His Majesty’s Opposition, but we are very much at one on the end objective, as are the Liberal Democrat Benches. Both sides can speak for themselves, but it is a consistent position. The war can end now if Mr Putin withdraws his troops from the eastern Donbass and Crimea, which was illegally annexed. Ultimately, the return of all sovereign territories includes Crimea. However, that negotiation and peace process is ultimately the responsibility of Ukraine; as a partner and ally of Ukraine, we will be led by its objectives.

Russia: Sanctions

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I will not go into specifics, but the noble Lord will be aware that we work in a very co-ordinated fashion. We work very closely with the Ukrainian Government to ensure that their military requests and priorities are not only understood but that we work in co-ordination to best support them. Indeed, the UK was the first to offer tanks, which resulted in other countries following suit. It is important that we act in a co-ordinated manner.

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, the list of individuals and entities currently sanctioned stands at 3,778 worldwide. It grows every year, but we are never told who is removed from it. Will the Minister give us the assurance that the Government will publish a list of those who have been removed from sanctions since 2001, so that the House is better able to assess the efficacy of the sanctions regime in meeting its objectives?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord will recall that, when we were taking through the sanctions and anti-money laundering legislation, part of that was to ensure a proper and structured review by the Government of those sanctioned. That is part of our legislative process. Providing details of every single individual or organisation would create more work for the Government than necessary, and the cost would be uneconomical. However, within our sanctions policy, when someone or an organisation first has a sanction imposed, there is a way for them to appeal and challenge it. Those sanctions are reviewed on a regular basis.

Ukraine: Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful, as we all are, to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, for initiating this debate and for drawing attention to the real danger of nuclear escalation.

I am in profound disagreement with the Government’s policy on Ukraine—I have said it before in this House and I shall say it again. This disagreement can be stated in one sentence: the Government’s policy is a war policy; I support a peace policy. I shall try to justify that.

The then Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss, stated on 27 April:

“We will keep going further and faster to push Russia out of the whole of Ukraine.”


This policy has been repeatedly restated by government spokesmen. It is supported by the Opposition and echoed by the media.

In calling for peace, I may be an isolated voice in Britain, but not in the world. Everyone outside the NATO world is calling for negotiations and some within it—I draw attention to President Macron in particular. Let me try to be logical. The Government’s policy makes sense on one assumption: that Ukraine, with NATO military support and economic sanctions on Russia, will soon complete the reconquest of Ukraine, including Crimea. In this case, there will be nothing to negotiate; the deed will have been done—it will have been accomplished.

I am not privy to secret military intelligence, but such evidence as I have, plus a dose of common sense, suggests that neither Russia nor Ukraine can achieve their war aims at the present level of hostilities, so the pursuit of victory is bound to bring escalation on both sides. Russia will intensify its air war, and NATO will provide Ukraine with more weapons to shoot down Russian aircraft. At what point such escalation leads to the accidental or deliberate deployment of tactical nuclear weapons is anyone’s guess, but the danger must be there, as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, pointed out. That is why the war should be ended as soon as possible, and that can be done only by negotiations based on a ceasefire.

I utterly reject the premise underlying the Government’s policy that it is up to Ukraine to decide if and when it wants to end the war. President Zelensky’s policy is to get his “land back entirely”. Of course, it is up to Ukraine to decide what to do, but we cannot give Ukraine carte blanche to determine its war policy when we are in fact providing it with the weaponry to continue the war at considerable sacrifice to our own people. The decisions for peace and war, and on what terms to end the war, must be taken by Ukraine and NATO jointly.

I have reached one conclusion which is more compatible with government thinking: that no meaningful negotiations are possible as long as President Putin remains in office and, more importantly, in power. It is not only that his personal prestige is too heavily implicated in an impossible object but that his attempt to achieve it is leading his country to disaster. His invasion of Ukraine has galvanised Ukrainian nationalism, expanded NATO, shifted the balance of power in Europe to its most anti-Russian eastern states, exposed hitherto hidden Russian military and technical weaknesses, subjected Russia to the most sweeping economic sanctions ever imposed, and provoked the emigration of many of the most talented Russian scientists, technicians, thinkers and artists. In sum, he has erected a new monument to imperfect and incompetent statesmanship.

Any settlement of the war which can inspire confidence in the future will require Mr Putin’s departure from the scene. I do not know how this is to come about; it is beyond our control. However, we can offer an incentive: our Government can say that they would be willing to join our partners in serious negotiations to end the war with a new Russian Government. This negotiation would include the future status of Crimea and the dropping of sanctions. It would encourage forces within the Russian state to implement a change of government. This is a tough but constructive policy that I would understand and support; I do not understand the present policy in intellectual terms. It might not succeed, but it is infinitely better than the dangerous bellicosity we seem to be trapped in.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Skidelsky Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords, I find myself in profound disagreement with the Government’s war strategy in Ukraine and, in fact, with almost everything that has been said about Ukraine in this debate. I will try to explain why.

British policy aims for a Russian military defeat, which it will help to bring about by economic sanctions and supplying Ukraine with the necessary means of war. Liz Truss said on 27 April:

“We will keep going further and faster to push Russia out of the whole of Ukraine”.


Simon Jenkins has commented:

“She is clearly revelling in her imagined proxy war on the Russian bear and no one in Whitehall appears able to restrain her.”


I wish her proxy war was only imagined but it is actually happening.

It is an open secret that both France and Germany regard our hawkishness as driving up the price of peace and thus making a ceasefire more elusive. So what is the price of peace? For those whose history lessons begin and end with the Munich agreement of 1938, it is obvious; the price of peace is shameful surrender to the limitless ambitions of an evil and possibly mad dictator. I take a different view. I believe that Putin’s war aims, unlike Hitler’s, are limited and therefore that the fashionable domino theory—that if you give way here, then one after another will fall—is wrong.

I want the war to end before the war aims of our Government are achieved, for two reasons. The first is because the prolongation of the war threatens economic catastrophe. One aspect of that, mass starvation, was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord King, earlier in the debate.

Secondly, there is the consequence of a military disaster. If it happened that Russian conventional forces were actually pushed to defeat, as the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary want, Russia might well counter with tactical nuclear weapons. These have never been deployed; they abolish the distinction between conventional and nuclear war and thus remove a crucial barrier to uncontrolled escalation. To avoid these huge risks, the military position on the ground has to be such—I know this is an uncomfortable thing to say—that both sides can claim some military success. That means that our Government should take a very hard and accurate look at the scale and type of military help we give to Ukraine.

The peace terms discussed in Ankara in late March called for Ukraine’s neutrality, backed by security guarantees and a timeline to address issues such as the status of Donbass and Crimea. The Ukrainians withdrew from them after reports of the massacre at Bucha surfaced on 1 April. This was a horrible war crime, but it does not follow that because a country’s war methods are brutal its ambitions are genocidal or limitless.

Our Government should be urging a resumption of the Ankara process. I believe that a negotiated peace would be possible along lines which safeguard the independence of Ukraine and satisfy some Russian demands. There are three elements. The first is Ukraine’s neutrality for 20 years in return for international, including Russian, guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial borders before the Russian invasion of 24 February. That is, Russia would need to withdraw its troops from the territories that it has conquered after 24 February. Second is UN-supervised elections to determine the future of Donetsk and Luhansk. Third is acceptance of the transfer of Crimea to Russia in return for compensation. No conceivable independent Russian Government will voluntarily give up Ukraine, but Russia must be made to pay for this.

To prepare the ground for this, our Government need to drop talk of bringing the Putin regime to trial as war criminals, and should promise to de-escalate economic sanctions by stages as the peace accord is implemented. As Liddell Hart wisely said:

“Inflict the least possible permanent injury, for the enemy of to-day is … the ally of the future.”