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Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Sentamu
Main Page: Lord Sentamu (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sentamu's debates with the Cabinet Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am not quite sure I know how to follow that last remark. I have put my name to this amendment for the reasons so eloquently given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Like him, I carefully read the considered and lengthy response of the noble Lord, Lord True, to the equivalent debate in Committee. The noble Lord set out to make our flesh creep about the consequences of this amendment. I shall deal with three of his arguments, one of which has already been dealt with today.
First, the noble Lord said that, if this amendment were passed, the chance of zombie Parliaments would remain high. As we have already heard, the last Parliament was a zombie Parliament to the extent that the Fixed-Term Parliament Act requires a two-thirds majority. Without that, it would not have been. The noble Lord, Lord Howard, said, “Ah yes, but there will be other circumstances in which such a zombie Parliament could obtain”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has explained the first next step if a Prime Minister were unable to win a majority. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, is asking us to entertain as plausible the possibility that, if nobody could form a Government, Parliament would decide that it wished to continue in existence without there being a credible Government. This is completely implausible to me. I cannot foresee circumstances in which such a situation would obtain for more than a very short period—a day or two at most. The noble Lord did not set such circumstances out. I do not believe that this amendment makes zombie Parliaments more likely.
Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord True, said that the amendment is “dangerously silent” on the status and practice of the conventions associated with confidence. Of course it is silent on the convention because conventions are not law. In the case of a Motion of no confidence having been passed, it seems blindingly obvious that, at that very minute, there would be a vote under the Act, as it would then be, to call an election. I cannot see circumstances in which that would not happen. The fact that conventions are not mentioned in this Bill is impossible and largely irrelevant.
Thirdly—and most extraordinarily—the noble Lord, Lord True, argued that this amendment, if passed, would deny or “overturn” the votes of millions. What on earth does that possibly mean? When millions vote, they do so in the expectation that there will be a full term of Parliament. During the course of a Parliament, they may or may not at any particular time wish that there were another election. As it happens, today, I suspect that most people would be rather glad to have an election, but that is not the way the constitution works. Parliament is elected for a period. If that period is to be truncated, the authority for truncating it rests with Parliament. The people have no say in whether to have an early election under our constitution, and the Government are certainly not proposing that, so the argument that, somehow, the amendment would frustrate the votes of millions is completely misplaced.
It comes down to a simple question: where should the ultimate source of power in our constitution rest? This was the question which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, posed. We contend that it should be with Parliament and not the Executive. We contend that the steady accretion of power to No. 10—which, to a limited extent, has been further added to by the decision of the Prime Minister to set up a prime ministerial department— is not good for democracy. The amendment is one small way of reversing that trend.
My Lords, I apologise that I was not present during Committee.
When I was a student, a young person doing A-levels in Uganda, there was a question: “How are the people of the United Kingdom governed?” The book said, “The people of the United Kingdom are governed by the Queen in Parliament under God”, and went on, “and the sovereign is Parliament.” If Parliament is the ultimate authority, to deny it the possibility of agreeing to the Dissolution of Parliament seems bizarre. If it is not, who has the ultimate authority? The noble Lord, Lord Howard, said that the Government could be paralysed and could not govern, but governance can happen only if those in the Executive are accountable and transparent to Parliament. If they are not, we are creating a body of people who think they are not answerable for their decisions to Parliament—that they are the ones who give it legitimacy. They may find themselves paralysed because, for whatever reason, they cannot obtain a majority. We heard that lady in Bristol when the election was announced in 2017. She said, “Not another election!” People are fed up with ad hoc solutions that often do not help.
I support the noble Lord, the Convenor of my group, who has provided a simple solution. If the Government cannot obtain a simple majority for Parliament to be dissolved, so be it. As for the calling of elections regardless because you are not getting your legislation through, well, if Parliament is objecting and it is sovereign, it requires a bit of humility to say, “We did not get it this time; maybe next year.” I plead for this simple amendment, which would resolve all the problems that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, talked about—of the power of the sovereign and the power of the courts. Of course, the courts will intervene if something illegal has been done. Do noble Lords remember the Brexit question, when there was a desire that it should be done through the royal prerogative, the old King Henry VIII powers? The court said, “No. The act to enter into these negotiations was an Act of Parliament, and if you want to do away with it, it is Parliament that must consent for that to be done.” That was when the courts intervened, by the way.
I, for one, support this simple way to resolve the problem that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act created, but we surely cannot go back to the power of the Prime Minister as if Prime Ministers are not accountable to Parliament: they are.
My Lords, first, I apologise that I was not able to speak in Committee. I did, however, read the very interesting debate, and I am extremely sorry to say that I find myself at odds with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I think he and I wholeheartedly share a concern about the creeping, stealthy growth in the size of the state and of the Executive. I have spoken on this before and I will always stand up with him to oppose it.
Also, I fear that I am taking on my former boss, my noble friend Lord Lansley, on this matter. Listening to them, I feel, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said, that they are making some very beguiling arguments. As we have just heard, what is being suggested in the amendment sounds very simple. We could be in The Jungle Book, facing Kaa and his big eyes: it is a simple, big thought that we can just introduce this amendment and all will be well.
My Lords, I must also apologise for not being here in Committee, although I have followed your Lordships’ arguments with great interest.
One point is abundantly clear to me: the idea of not using the royal prerogative to call for an election is, at its very best, curious. The concept that a Government should limp on without the confidence of the Commons, when that Government no longer have the wish, or possibly the ability, to conduct the affairs of the nation, can do only harm to the well-being of this country. I have listened to a lot of erudite and hypothetical—indeed very hypothetical—arguments today. We cannot get away from the fact that, if a Government feel that they no longer wish to govern, then it is not only pointless to keep them in place but potentially very damaging.
In line with what my noble friend Lord Bridges said, restricting people from voting is anti-democratic. There should be no impediment to the freedom to allow the electorate to express their opinion at any time at the ballot box. Allowing the courts to interfere with that and to have a say may have unknown effects and cause serious harm, as the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, and others have pointed out. After all, the courts can produce some very weird results.
My only other thought, standing here among so many noble and learned Lords, is that I wonder what the collective noun for lawyers is. Do your Lordships think it is “a bear pit” of lawyers?
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, asks whether the sun has risen. Yes, it is still up there, but for those who lived in the Mexican desert during the testing of the atomic bomb, the sky was so full of light that nearby farmers woke up and started working, but three hours later the light had gone. Of course, at the usual time of 6 am, the sun rose. They said, “We saw the sun rise twice”, but it had not. Physical things may help us, but also they may not.
For myself, I find phrases such as
“A court or tribunal may not question”
very difficult. Putting that in statute sets a bad precedent. The courts are restrained in the way that they approach many things; they would never simply say out of hand, “We are not going to look at this”. That is why my friend Sir William MacPherson, when someone did not want the election to take place in 1992, looked at that and then dismissed it. Now there is the idea that he should not have done so. I have always had great admiration for the British Parliament and for the Civil Service and the way that it works, which is just really lovely—some of your Lordships who were born here and live here may not appreciate it, but I do—but this measure worries me.
I was in the judiciary when we questioned Mr Amin for expelling Uganda citizens who happened to be Asian. There were two kinds: those who were Ugandan Asian citizens and Asians living in Uganda who were British. We questioned whether he had the right to do this. He did not like it. What did he do? He passed a decree that no court in the land could question the expulsion of Asians. That caused me a lot of problems. This measure sounds almost like that.
There should be no Act of any sort which is not subject to the possibility of challenge in the courts, because they are the custodians of the rule of law. We cannot say by statute, “You should not challenge this particular prerogative”; if it is not done according to the rule of law, they should be able to look at it. I have a lot of confidence in judges, lawyers and the people, because they are the guardians of the rule of law. If they do not guard that, the likes of Mr Amin will have a field day. I support the intention the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that the clause should be deleted.
My Lords, very briefly, I would like to respectfully adopt the arguments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and others, including the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, and my noble friend Lord Faulks, in this matter.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, I think, that he could not see the courts getting involved in a Dissolution case, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said similarly. But, as my noble friend Lord Faulks has said, very many people, including many lawyers, could not see the courts getting involved in a Prorogation matter because, until the Supreme Court and Miller, that was considered to have been unarguably a political matter. But in a paradigm example of judicial activism, the Supreme Court in Miller did get involved, despite the unanimous decision—which some people find curious—of a strong divisional court below. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred later to the rule of law. My point is that, until the Supreme Court and Miller, as held by the divisional court, Prorogation was considered to be a political matter.