Lord Rotherwick
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(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Rotherwick
My Lords, I support the Minister in his amendments. Although one might be seduced into agreeing with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, there is a balance to be found here. It is interesting to note what has happened when past Governments have overregulated, or put in place harsher regulation than their competitors. One has only to look to the agricultural sector to see what happened to our pig industry and our veal industry: they went abroad. We are not doing our environment any favours. The carbon footprint will just move from our shores to our competitors.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall
My Lords, I add my gratitude to that expressed by various Members of this House for the movement that the noble Earl has made in respect of environmental regulation. But I want to pick up the point that was made by the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, who focused on the word “duty”. My recollection of what the noble Earl said when moving his amendment was that he used the word “duty” in relation to what he anticipated would be the effect of the amendment. Can he either correct me in the impression that I have formed, or when he comes to sum up, explain how the desirability of these environmental matters can actually be enforced by the regulator? To those of us who do not have direct experience of how regulation actually operates, this feels like warm words with not quite enough behind them. I say that without wishing in any way to undervalue the contribution that the Minister has made in going as far as he has.
Lord Rotherwick
Lord Rotherwick
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 10 and to Amendment 11, which seeks to add a new clause after Clause 2. Together these three amendments cover the first point of principle that I wish to address at this stage of the Bill. I have given notice to the Government that I wish to decouple my Amendments 23, 26, 28 and 29, to which I intend to speak later.
First, I again declare my interest as an aircraft owner and pilot. Secondly, I declare an interest as a director of the Light Aircraft Association, the UK body which serves the interests of sports and recreational powered flying in the UK, and as vice-president of the General Aviation Alliance, a body that was formed to co-ordinate the regulatory interests of various UK aviation associations representing pilots, aircraft owners and operators in the general and business aviation—GBA—sector.
I am sorry that I have to return to this important subject at this stage of the Bill. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his time and attention since the Bill was considered in Committee, but I have to say to the House that I am not fully persuaded that the Government have entirely grasped the point that I and the vast community of the GBA pilots, owners and operators are trying to make. I shall be moving three groups of amendments today, all of which address aspects of the Bill and its implications which are of vital concern to the GBA community.
Let me preface my more detailed points in respect of those amendments by saying that this Bill is not what we had hoped for. It is a missed opportunity and it is regrettable. The opportunity to reconsider by way of legislation the strategic and regulatory approach to civil aviation, and the GBA sector in particular, has not arisen for decades. The way has been prepared. There have been reviews and reports and the role and functions of the Secretary of State and the CAA have been examined in depth. All of that work seems destined to gather dust. Is that too harsh a criticism? The legislative opportunity will not arise again for many years, I suspect, and this Bill does not provide the scope for the changes that the GBA sector feels is necessary. The CAA initiatives that led to the strategic and regulatory reviews of 2006 demonstrate that the CAA and the Department of Transport have made progress in their relations with the GBA sector. Those reviews were very much a consultation exercise. But listening is one thing; acting is entirely another.
I shall not detain the House with a summary of those reviews and reports, many of which were touched on in Grand Committee. However, I would mention just one which has only recently been published, the European General Aviation Safety Strategy. That was prepared by a group appointed to consider a request from the European Aviation Safety Agency—EASA—management board in March 2012 to produce a summary of proposed principles and guidelines to inform the future regulation of general aviation—or general and business aviation as we term it—in Europe. In meeting its remit, that group encountered exactly the same problems that I have with the Bill; namely, its restricted scope. That group, however, took a bold step and widened its view.
I commend to my noble friend this broader and bolder approach and I commend to him and to the House the report and its contents and conclusions. The European General Aviation Safety Strategy identifies key rationales that make it necessary and possible to adopt a specific new approach for GBA. The report concludes that this new approach is an urgent necessity in order to ensure a sustainable development for GBA in Europe and avert a dramatic loss of activity as a result of overregulation. The report affirms that GBA is essential to European excellence in aeronautics and contributes to the current strength of major European airlines and aircraft manufacturers. Yet, in this country, the comprehensive new framework that we had hoped for to replace the outdated Civil Aviation Act 1982 has not been presented to us.
I remind my noble friend of the resolution of the European Union Parliament, EC2008/2134, which I commended to him when my previous attempts to construct a suitable legislative basis for the promotion of GBA were found wanting. This resolution calls upon member states to adopt policies promoting growth and sustainability in GBA. My noble friend assured me—at col. GC 143 of Hansard of 27 June 2012—that he would ask for briefing on the resolution. I look forward to him informing the House how it is that the Government intend to respond to that resolution. Has my noble friend been able to hold discussions with the new Minister of State which he gave an undertaking to do at the Committee stage?
My first point of principle is that GBA comprises 96% of UK aviation. My noble friend recognised in Committee the economic and wider importance of the sector. The European report confirms its importance, yet this Bill ignores GBA. It goes no further than the economic regulation of major airports and placing new duties on the CAA in respect of airline passengers and owners of air cargo. Who then is to promote and to protect the interests of GBA? Who will demonstrate to Europe that the UK is open for aviation business in all its forms?
Lord Rotherwick
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for fully addressing my amendments—obviously, nowhere near to my satisfaction. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for his remarks and for recognising that I have taken this a “notch higher”—which would have been a better way for me to put it. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will consider addressing my concerns favourably in future legislation. Indeed, I shall remind him of this moment if we are so lucky as to see future legislation which will help us. I was interested that he acknowledged that general and business aviation is a user of dominant airports. It saddens me to think that there is nothing to protect GBA from being just the poor cousins.
Finally, I thank my noble friend for his sterling efforts in bringing my concerns to the attention of the Minister of State. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rotherwick
“( ) the arrival or departure of pilots and persons to be carried as passengers in general and business aviation aircraft, together with their baggage”.
Lord Rotherwick
My Lords, by decoupling my earlier amendments I appreciate that the Minister may have addressed, in part, some of the remarks I am about to make, through no fault of his own. This group of amendments addresses the second issue of principle and policy I wish to raise with the Minister; he will see that I made this point at an earlier stage in the Bill. It concerns the continued availability and improvement of services for GBA at UK airfields. The GBA community comprises civil aviation operations other than commercial air transport flights operating to a schedule. It represents a multi-billion pound industry in the UK, from executive business jets to flying training, air ambulances, private aircraft operators and pilots.
The Minister helpfully expanded on that generalisation by referring to important GBA services such as search and rescue, mail delivery, life-saving organ transport, law enforcement, aerial survey and environmental protection flights, and the training of future pilots. He also mentioned its growing economic importance for the European manufacturing industry, as stated in Hansard on 29 June 2012 at col. GC144. This recognition of the importance of the sector in the European context was recently enforced by the report to EASA to which I referred earlier.
A 2009 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers reported that only 4% of the 27,000 aircraft registered in the UK were commercial air transport aircraft. As I said before, therefore, we have a Bill before us which ignores 96% of UK registered aircraft and restricts itself to the regulation of those few airports which enjoy a dominant market position. It does not address the needs or interest of the GBA community, or make any attempt to regulate the activities of the majority of airports on which this important sector depends. Sadly, GBA users are increasingly neglected and, at worst, discriminated against, by operators of airports serving predominantly commercial aviation—the sort of airports this Bill is concerned with.
Other threats to the future of GBA arise from the growing pressures on infrastructure, the loss of airfields to development and a regulatory environment which fails to recognise the nature of GBA in formulating policy. If the regulation of airport facilities is framed for the benefit of the air transport user, as it is in this Bill, the inevitable consequences will be creeping marginalisation of other sectors of civil aviation—the GBA. This trend is already evident. I travel wildly as a private pilot—sorry, widely, not wildly; I am glad to say that my flying sometimes is up to scratch—and I find that the provision for GBA in many other countries put ours to shame. The key outstanding issue in respect of a network of airfields is at least considered in the draft aviation policy framework, although access to airfields is as yet unaddressed.
Although I detected an inclination to progress on the part of the Government and the CAA, I tabled amendments in an attempt to speed the process, to protect GBA and to ensure that this important sector can continue to use our major airports. I hope that in his response the Minister will not only acknowledge that there is a problem but set out how the Government intend to respond to it.
I am mindful that when I made a similar point in Grand Committee, the Minister felt that my amendments were deficient because they failed to provide a definition and description of what was meant by general and business aviation. This time I have adopted a different approach and defined GBA in Clauses 66 and 68 as users of airport operation services. I have also added a definition to Schedule 7.
I recognise that my amendments may yet again have been imperfectly formulated by my team to secure the changes for which I argue. That is in part because the Bill is so narrowly constructed as to exclude consideration of the wider issues that are of such concern across Europe. These deficiencies could be easily remedied if the Minister were to accept the principles behind the amendments and work with me and my advisers in GBA to construct something that would secure what we both wish to see—a wish he articulated in addressing my earlier amendments—namely, a vibrant, energetic and successful GBA sector, thriving with the support of the Government and making a full and growing contribution to the UK’s economy. I beg to move.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I recognise that the amendments in this group propose to make further, explicit provisions for general and business aviation in Part 1 of the Bill. I certainly agree with my noble friend that we need a vibrant and successful GBA sector.
In debating my noble friend’s previous amendment, we discussed at length the reasons why it is not appropriate to amend Part 1 of the Bill—which covers the economic regulation of our major airports—to make explicit provisions for general and business aviation. I therefore propose that for the rest of the speech I will address just the specific effect of this group of amendments—although I will read Hansard carefully to digest fully the comments of my noble friend.
Amendments 23 and 26, in Clauses 66 and 68 respectively, look to expand the definition of “airport” and “airport operation services” to cover the arrival and departure of pilots and persons to be carried as passengers in general and business aviation aircraft. The two amendments are ultimately unnecessary. The clauses already cover persons to be carried as passengers—and, as I explained, they already extend to passengers carried by general and business aviation because of Clause 69. Finally, I believe the intention of Amendment 28 is to provide some clarity on what is meant by “user” in its new capacity of referring to users of airport operation services. My noble friend also touched on airfields. The House will recall that I covered that important issue when debating my noble friend’s previous amendment.
I return to the definition of “user”. This is understandably modelled on the definition of “user of air transport service” in Clause 67. However, regrettably, the amendment fails to provide the intended clarity. It clearly sets out the types of user in relation to airport operation services provided for general and business aviation, but does not do so for non-general and non-business aviation. It is unclear why this definition is necessary without the previous group of amendments, which were withdrawn or not moved earlier. If that group of amendments had been agreed, the failure to define “general and business aviation” would have created a risk that these amendments could have the effect of imposing some form of duty to further the interests of all commercial airlines. As noble Lords will recall, the Government are firmly of the view that the new framework should be focused on promoting the interests of passengers and cargo owners.
Noble Lords will be aware from experience that there are circumstances that can arise where airlines’ interests conflict with those of passengers. For example, it may not be in the interests of airlines for the airport to provide adequate refreshment facilities in the terminal building, because airlines can profit from food and drinks purchased on board the aircraft. Therefore, I cannot accept these amendments, which clearly conflict with our policy aim of putting passengers and cargo owners first. That is the policy that the Bill promotes.
As with the previous group of amendments tabled by my noble friend, these amendments are unlikely to deliver the desired benefits. They will confuse the purpose of the Bill and create several unintended consequences. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw Amendment 23.
Lord Rotherwick
I apologise again for wrong-footing the Minister by decoupling this amendment. It obviously caused some confusion in his answer to this rather technical amendment. I will read Hansard carefully and hope that he will be sympathetic if I come back to him for a meeting on this at a later date. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rotherwick
Lord Rotherwick
My Lords, Amendments 63 and 64 address the third and final point of principle I wish to pursue with my noble friend the Minister.
I regret the need to return to the House with concerns over Clause 102. My noble friend the Minister helpfully invited me and my advisers to the meeting he chaired with CAA and Department for Transport officials. We were able to voice the very deep concerns in the GBA community over the nature and scope of the change that this clause would bring about and our concerns over the way in which this new activity would be administered.
The further information I was expecting by Report stage, with regard to making claims for prosecution costs in respect of civil penalties and what would happen to any such amounts, has not been forthcoming, nor has any further information emerged about the process by which the range of offences to be dealt with under the new powers are to be selected. This does nothing to lessen my concerns and I hope that my noble friend will be able to provide that information in his response.
Clause 102 of the Bill amends Schedules 5 and 7 to the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. It adds the CAA to the list of 27 “designated regulators” that may be empowered by order to issue fixed penalty tickets. It adds to the existing list of 45 regulatory provisions contained therein a 46th, which includes Section 61 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. The effect of this is to bring Section 61 of the Civil Aviation Act within the scope of the powers of the Secretary of State under Section 36 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 and allow him to make an order empowering the CAA to issue fixed-penalty notices in the same way that the police do for alleged Road Traffic Act offences.
Section 61 of the Civil Aviation Act is the enabling provision covering the Air Navigation Order. The ANO is a complex document of some 500 pages, detailing thousands of legal requirements for technical and operational matters, such as record-keeping, pilot and aircraft licensing, the rules of the air, aircraft airworthiness and the equipment to be carried on an aircraft.
So we know what Clause 102 will do, but we do not know why. We remain unenlightened as to the justification for this change or the benefits or costs associated with it. We can only infer that the change is proposed because existing sanctions are inadequate and these new sanctions will achieve an improvement in compliance that cannot be secured through existing powers.
In the interests of good government, one would assume that the public good to flow from the exercise of these new powers will bring a benefit to the UK that will exceed the cost of introducing and exercising them. But neither the Department for Transport nor the CAA has made any attempt to quantify the costs or benefits. We are told that they will not do so until after the Bill has passed, the powers have been granted and they have prepared the order implementing the scheme. So perhaps the monetised costs and benefits are outweighed by the public good that will result. The Government’s own published papers say that the main non-monetised benefit,
“is the potential for increased compliance with certain areas of aviation regulation and therefore better protection of passengers and a more level playing field for businesses”.
However, there is no information on the extent of the potential increase in compliance or an identification of the certain areas of regulation.
It is no good for the justification for these powers to be obscured in this way. If there is a reason, it should be made clear so that the House may consider the powers. What compelling reason is there? What improvement in compliance is expected to be achieved? What areas of aviation regulation are failing at present? If we are not persuaded, I may urge noble Lords to support the amendment.
At present, UK aviation, especially GBA, operates in what is described as an open reporting safety culture. The vast majority of pilots, aircraft operators and engineers take their legal responsibilities for flight safety and airworthiness very seriously. There are successful and well supported systems for the voluntary reporting of near misses and general safety occurrences. That takes place in the light of the existing range of prosecution powers, which are used by the CAA where it has evidence to support its case. I understand that in the four years to March 2008 the CAA prosecuted 119 cases of breaches against aviation legislation. This hardly suggests a compliance deficit, given the enormous range of activities. The CAA policy on prosecuting correctly takes account of the fact that the present collaborative approach, where individuals and organisations are free to share information and concerns with the regulator, is more beneficial to safety for the vast majority of people. That valuable safety culture may be undone if the CAA were able automatically to issue fixed penalties. I say that in respect of alleged offences. This may change the relationship between pilots, operators and service providers. If a “no blame” open reporting culture were replaced with prosecution as an administrative commonplace, all the good work built up over decades would be squandered.
The introduction of fixed penalty procedures would also shift the burden of proof. The recipient of a penalty notice would be faced with the alternative of paying up or challenging the ticket in the courts. I am deeply concerned about the financial aspects of this. The penalties imposed under this system will flow to the Treasury. Clause 102 allows the Secretary of State to empower the CAA to recover the costs associated with the fixed penalty ticket system. Therefore, the CAA will be able to launch a new regulatory operation to recover the costs from those it penalises. What incentive does this provide for the CAA to exercise this new function correctly? I was expecting further information on this and it is yet to appear.
We run the risk that our open reporting culture will be fatally damaged, which will work against the interests of increased flight safety. The CAA has adequate penalties and powers of prosecution at its disposal, which it uses wisely and sparingly. No case has been made to the GBA community and no consultation undertaken to back this change. The Bill was consulted on, but inadequately so in respect of the detailed implications and impact that this clause would have on the aviation community. At the very least I would expect my noble friend the Minister, when he winds up on this group of amendments, to provide an assurance that the GBA community will be consulted in detail on the proposed scope and operation of any civil penalty scheme.
I say to my noble friend the Minister that the present arrangements in respect of enforcement of the ANO are working well and with the active consent and participation of the aviation community. We should continue to develop that spirit of co-operation which has achieved so much over the years. My amendment to strike out Section 61 from Clause 102(3) will achieve that. I beg to move.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, while I fully appreciate my noble friend’s concerns in respect of the general and business aviation sector, and the effect on that sector of allowing the CAA to make use of alternative civil sanctions in enforcing offences under an air navigation order, I oppose this amendment because it dilutes the intention of Clause 102.
Noble Lords may recall that my noble friend tabled, and this House debated, an identical amendment in Grand Committee before it was withdrawn, and there is more or less only one way for my noble friend to achieve his objectives. Before turning to the detail of the points made by my noble friend on this amendment, it is important to emphasise the purpose and importance of the clause this amendment seeks to alter.
Clause 102 amends Part 3 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to enable the Secretary of State to make an order conferring on the CAA the power to make use of civil sanctions where it currently relies almost exclusively on criminal prosecutions. We believe that criminal sanctions are disproportionate in relation to some offences, such as minor breaches or offences of an administrative nature, especially when it comes to a normally diligent and conscientious person.
For example, the CAA has an enforcement function in respect of a number of offences using criminal sanctions which entail liability to a summary conviction and a fine. These include failing to return a certificate of registration to the CAA; failing to preserve a log book; failing to keep a personal flying log book; or failing to carry when in flight documents such as the licences of the flight crew of an aircraft or the certificate of registration in force for the aircraft. Another example is where an organisation does not hold an air travel organisers licence when it is required to do so—in other words when it is trading without the necessary licence. Should a person fail to comply with such a requirement, a civil sanction might well be considered to be a more appropriate enforcement action than criminal prosecution.
Providing the CAA with powers to address non-compliance using civil sanctions would help to reduce the risk of a compliance deficit where such offences might on occasion not be prosecuted at all because on the facts a criminal prosecution was considered disproportionate to the breach, excessively time consuming or expensive. However, my noble friend should be aware that the criminal standard of proof still applies. It needs to be more than just an alleged offence.
The purpose of providing the CAA with a range of additional enforcement tools as an alternative to a criminal prosecution is to allow more graduated and flexible enforcement. For example, some of the civil sanctions available under RESA are variable monetary penalties of an amount to be determined by the regulator; compliance notices containing a requirement to take specified steps to ensure an offence does not continue or happen again; and enforcement undertakings where a person may volunteer a resolution by giving an undertaking to take one or more corrective actions.
Clause 102 enables the Secretary of State to confer civil sanctioning powers on the CAA in respect of offences under primary legislation and extends certain powers of the Secretary of State in the Civil Aviation Act 1982 to make criminal offences by secondary legislation. These include the power of the Secretary of State in Section 61 to create criminal offences under an air navigation order. Such orders set the rules, which the CAA largely enforces, that regulate air navigation in the UK. Conferring RESA civil sanctioning powers on the CAA in respect of offences under an air navigation order would require secondary legislation to be laid before Parliament.
Moreover, the instrument would be subject to full consultation and impact assessment, providing an opportunity for all interested parties to make their views known. We fully intend to write to stakeholders, including those in general aviation, informing them of the consultations in ample time to brief their members to involve themselves. We will involve as many individuals and groups as general aviation stakeholders bring to our attention.
The amendment would deprive the CAA of the use of civil sanctions in respect of offences in an air navigation order. This would significantly dilute the intended purpose of Clause 102 to allow the CAA to make use of alternative civil sanctions. My noble friend referred to the complexity of the ANO, but regretfully there are several regulations that are very complicated. I am interested in the ones on road vehicles, and the construction and use regulations are extremely complicated—and, in addition, refer to other European regulations and directives as well.
The inclusion of Section 61 of the 1982 Act is of central importance, as it will enable the Civil Aviation Authority to use civil sanctions in respect of offences in the air navigation order, which is the most significant instrument for the regulation of air navigation in the UK. Concerns have been expressed during the passage of the Bill as to CAA’s use of civil sanctioning powers. RESA contains a number of safeguards to this effect. For example, before making any order, the Minister must be satisfied that the regulator will carry out its activities in a way that is transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases where action is needed. Prior to exercising any civil sanctioning powers, the CAA is required to consult on and publish detailed guidance on its use of civil sanctions and enforcement of particular offences. For these reasons, I hope that my noble friend will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Rotherwick
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his words and reiterate that I tabled these amendments owing to the uncertainty and concerns about Section 61 in Clause 102(3) that were caused in the GBA community. The Minister’s remarks are helpful and I thank him for them and look forward to reading them in Hansard tomorrow. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.