EU Settlement Scheme

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 23rd October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Earl asks a very good question. There are two issues here. First, they might not realise that they can apply to the scheme. Secondly, they might be in local authority care, but we are cognisant of that. We are working with Liverpool University to ensure that children are communicated with and that they can retrospectively apply if, say, through no fault of their own their parent or carer did not manage to apply in time for June 2021.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

A Government Minister has apparently said that EU citizens living in Britain risk being deported if they fail to apply by the deadline for settled status. It is highly unlikely that all will apply on time, simply because of the large number of EU citizens affected—I think the figure is some 3 million. What do the Government think this threat of deportation of potentially significant numbers of EU citizens will do to strengthen the position of British citizens living in an EU country who wish to remain in that country? I declare a family interest in this issue.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the word “deportation” is crucial here. EEA citizens who do not apply to the EU settlement scheme by the deadline will not be acting unlawfully in the same way that clandestine entrants, arrivals or overstayers do. They will not have knowingly entered the UK in breach of the UK Immigration Acts or overstayed their leave. From 2021, EEA citizens will need to hold either an EUSS leave, a Euro TLR or an immigration status under the new immigration system.

Metropolitan Police: Use of Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 16th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the word “proportionate” is long established in law. The noble Baroness asks whether it is democratic to have a citizen’s voice. Of course it is, but public disorder disrupts the lives of others; we have seen that over the past couple of weeks, when it has been impossible to get around the centre of London. I outlined some of the issues last week but, ultimately, the High Court will test this judicial review.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the police have powers to ban a protest under the Public Order Act 1986 if there is a belief that it may cause,

“serious disruption to the life of the community”,

but, of course, the decision has to be proportionate. Clearly, the view as to what constitutes “serious disruption” is somewhat subjective. In the light of that subjectivity, it is surprising that the Mayor of London was apparently not made aware that the police were going to impose this ban, in view of the responsibility that the mayor has for the Metropolitan Police and the fact that many would regard this as a ban on freedom of speech and the right to peaceful protest, and a potential thin end of the wedge.

When did the Metropolitan Police last impose such a ban under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 and in respect of which protests? Do the police have any guidelines, laid down or approved by any elected representatives, on what constitutes serious disruption to the life of the community? How long does the ban apply for? Is it for a limited period, in perpetuity or for as long as the Metropolitan Police wishes it to apply? Do the Mayor of London or the Home Secretary have any statutory powers to overrule this ban? I understand that legal action in the form of an application for judicial review has been launched over the police decision. Does the Metropolitan Police accept that it will not arrest or charge anybody for breaching the ban, pending the outcome of the judicial review?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right: responses to public order breaches have to be proportionate. He asks what constitutes serious disruption. It might be subjective, but nobody who has gone around London in the past two weeks could argue that this did not cause serious disruption to the city. The proportionality will, of course, be tested through the courts. The noble Lord asked me how long the ban will be in force. We know when it started but I do not know when it will finish.

Sir Richard Henriques Report

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 8th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I would most certainly agree with my noble friend that Sir Richard has performed a notable public service. It is also important that we have an independent body that oversees, independently of both the police and the Government, the conduct of the police, so I would disagree with my noble friend on the second point.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Yesterday, I asked the Government what they meant in their response to an Urgent Question when they said that the Chief Inspector of Constabulary should,

“take account of the findings of the report of the Independent Office for Police Conduct”.

I asked if it meant that the Chief Inspector of Constabulary would take the findings of the IOPC report as read, or whether he would be able to consider, if he so wished, whether some of the report’s conclusions or statements were, in his view, valid or not. In response, the Government said that they meant that the chief inspector would,

“consider the Metropolitan Police Service’s progress in learning from the … recommendations of the IOPC report”.—[Official Report, 7/10/19; cols. 1985-86].

Would it not be helpful if the chief inspector was also able to consider, if he so wished, whether some of the conclusions or statements in the IOPC report were valid or not?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, in drawing up the terms of reference for the inspection, HMICFRS will come to its own conclusions about what the noble Lord has just outlined. I think taking into account the IOPC’s recommendation means taking a view of it in the round.

Visa Applications: Dr Mu-Chun Chiang

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 8th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

On the noble Lord’s last point, about a culture that is far more humane, I would certainly totally subscribe to that, as would the Home Secretary. Regarding the balance between bureaucracy and subjectivity, it was the criticism of subjectivity that led to a much more objective way of determining applications. The noble Lord referred to a coach-load of asylum seekers 18 years ago; I am afraid that neither I nor the Conservative Party can answer for what happened 18 years ago. He also talked about the Home Office giving in before the bitter end; actually, the case was resolved quickly—not that I am in any way trying to defend the fact that it could have been resolved more quickly.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

For a Government who think there is far too much red tape and what they describe as bureaucracy, it is revealing that, when it comes to dealing with work visa applications, rigid application of the very strict rules seems to be the order of the day. The reality is that the decision on Dr Chiang only got changed because there was a lot of adverse publicity about the actions of the Home Office and influential people took up the case. How many other decisions, of a similar kind to Dr Chiang’s, have already been taken and enforced by the Home Office under its now renamed hostile environment policy because the individuals adversely and unfairly affected were not able to get the necessary publicity and support of influential people to get the Home Office ruling changed? Do the Government know the answer to that question? Do they care about it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, we certainly do care. The issue was resolved very quickly, and it is not correct that it only got changed because people intervened. It got changed because new evidence that had been asked for was produced. The fact that we have a 98% grant rate for such applications is evidence of how many people successfully apply.

Operation Midland

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 7th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question. Clearly, false allegations of serious crimes are deplorable, and all those who promote them without evidence should face the appropriate consequences. However, any lessons that are to be learned from what has happened must not lead to any downplaying of the seriousness or prevalence of the rising crimes of child sexual abuse and serious sexual assault, including rape. We cannot go back to a culture of not believing victims.

There are a few specific questions that I wish to ask the Minister. They concern the reference in the Statement to the inspection that the Home Secretary has asked Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Chief Inspector of Fire & Rescue Services to undertake. What exactly is he inspecting that would be different from a normal inspection of a force? Will he be taking the findings of the Henriques report as read or will he be able, if he so chooses, to consider whether some of its findings are valid criticisms or comment? What is meant by him taking into account the findings of the Independent Office for Police Conduct report, which has just been published? Does it mean that he will take its findings as read, or will he be able to consider, if he so wishes, whether some of its conclusions or statements are, in his view, valid or not?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord for those questions. On the point about the impact of false accusations on people who are accused, he is absolutely right: the impact must be devastating, and we have heard many a time in this House of people who are falsely accused. It is important in the context of this case to say that the case of Carl Beech is not a typical one. On the contrary, in the context of sexual offences, it is the under-reporting of the crime to the police that is known to be particularly acute. I think that that is what the noble Lord is driving at. He will know that great progress has been made in encouraging people to report crimes. In responding to the issues raised by this case, it is important that we do not undermine this progress, and that victims continue to feel confident about coming forward and that they will be listened to and taken seriously. We do not want any diminution in that, I agree.

Regarding the HMICFRS investigation, obviously, it is a matter for the inspectorate, and we now need to allow it the space to take its work forward as it sees fit. The purpose of the inspection is to consider the Metropolitan Police Service’s progress in learning from the points made by Sir Richard’s report and the learning recommendations of the IOPC report.

Asylum Seekers: Employment

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 7th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I think I am right in saying that the then Home Secretary said last December that he was reviewing the right for asylum seekers to work, and in June of this year he confirmed that that was the case and that he would update Parliament in due course. I know that the Minister has said on behalf of the Government that this is a complex issue, but it is now quite a long time since the then Home Secretary said that he was looking at the matter. Does that mean that, with a change of Home Secretary, there is now less enthusiasm for doing anything? If that is not the case—let us assume that there is no imminent general election—when do the Government expect to complete this review?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It was the Prime Minister who said that the Home Office was reviewing the matter, and therefore I do not assume that there is a change in the position. I hesitate to say this to the noble Lord, but I am sure that it will be done in due course.

Immigration: Children

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 23rd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank my noble friend for referring to that accusation. I have heard it before: it was raised in your Lordships’ House the other day. It is not a secret service. Officials are working with partners to ensure that effective referral processes are established and that rough sleepers will always be made aware of how information collected on them will be shared and used.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, have the Government not been asked twice about the number of children experiencing the consequences of having no recourse to public funds? I am not quite clear from the Government’s response whether they have that figure but are declining to reveal it or do not know the figure. If the Government do not have the figure, is it because they know they would be embarrassed by the figure’s magnitude if they had to give it out, or are they just not particularly interested?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It is not a question of not being particularly interested. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, there is information sharing between the Home Office and local authorities. I imagine that it is management information, as opposed to publishable figures, but I can confirm that to the noble Lord.

Immigration Detention: Victims of Modern Slavery

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 18th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question from the Shadow Home Secretary in the Commons yesterday. Government Written Answers on 20 December last year and 19 June this year stated that where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual may be a victim of trafficking or modern slavery such individuals shall not be detained, but that there are no central records of such persons. However, the Government indicated yesterday, following a freedom of information request, that, contrary to the interpretation a reasonable person could put on the Written Answers, they did know of 507 individuals who had been detained.

The Government said that the 507 who received a positive reasonable-grounds decision while in detention were then subsequently released within a few days in most cases. But for how long had they already been detained before they received that decision, and why in those 507 cases were trafficking and enslavement signs not picked up and resolved prior to any detention? It does not seem right that victims of trafficking and modern slavery should be locked up as immigration offenders at all. Why was the factual information apparently obtained from the FoI request withheld, presumably knowingly, from the Written Answers in December 2018 and last month? Will the Government explain the justification for, and reasoning behind, the troubling assertion by the Immigration Minister in the Commons yesterday that,

“a Freedom of Information request will elicit different data to that which is available in parliamentary questions”?—[Official Report, Commons, 17/7/19; col. 861.]

How in a democracy can a Government be held to account when they apparently knowingly seek to withhold some available factual information being sought through a parliamentary question?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions. He asked why victims of modern slavery were not detected prior to detention. Quite often, Home Office staff pick up the fact that people are victims of modern slavery. It is not the case that the 507 individuals were detained after getting positive reasonable grounds. As stated clearly in the FoI response, the figure relates to people who had positive reasonable grounds when entering detention or while in it. Further analysis of the figures shows that, of the 507 people in question, 479 received the positive reasonable grounds decision during a detention period. Of those, 328—68%—were released within two days of that decision. In total, 422—88%—were released within a week of the positive reasonable grounds decision. Of the 57 who were detained for eight days or more following the positive reasonable grounds decision, 46—81%—are foreign national offenders.

On the data and the differences in the figures, my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister was absolutely correct to say that there is no central record of those who received a positive conclusive grounds decision and are detained under immigration powers. While the information might be available from the live Home Office case information database, known as CID, it would be for internal management only. For example, some data may be incomplete, and every FOI response is caveated as such.

Immigration Staff: Recruitment

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 18th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I reject my noble friend’s assertions that there is deep corruption within the Home Office. On releasing names, my noble friend will know that the Home Office is legally not allowed to disclose this information. It will not, to ensure that it does not breach statutory and data protection obligations, and that is what I outline to him. Although the names of staff members are known in court, this is not necessarily the same as being in the public domain. The disclosure of names would have to satisfy a high threshold under the GDPR and Section 9 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, which makes it an offence to disclose the facts of an offence in respect of a rehabilitated person.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

In his 2018-19 annual report, the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration states that only half the inspector posts were filled in the last few months of 2018-19; significantly fewer inspection reports were published than in 2017-18; none of the seven published reports in 2018-19 was laid in Parliament by the Government within the eight weeks to which the then Home Secretary had committed in 2014; the Home Office’s focus on managing the fallout of the Windrush scandal and on preparing for Brexit appeared to affect its capacity for other business, including inspections; relationships between the inspectorate and the Home Office were generally poorer in 2018-19 than they had been in 2017-18; and during 2018-19, the chief inspector had just one meeting with the Home Secretary and two with the Immigration Minister. I have heard of an arm’s-length relationship, but that is ridiculous. This is an unacceptable and potentially dangerous state of affairs in a key part of our border control and immigration system. Will the Government accept full responsibility and provide an explanation as to why they have allowed this unsatisfactory state of affairs, highlighted by the chief inspector, to arise and say what they intend to do about it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the noble Lord asked a number of questions, one of which was about border staff. He will know that we have recruited almost all the 900 staff that we undertook to recruit in preparation for Brexit. I will write to him with a longer answer on the inspectorate because I do not have the details at my fingertips today.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 15th July 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of the draft order, which we do not oppose. It amends the Misuse of Drugs Act by narrowing the previous definition of synthetic cannabinoids, as the previous definition has had the effect of requiring compounds that are not of concern to be licensed as class B drugs.

Following the control of the first generation of synthetic cannabinoids in 2009 and of the second generation in 2013, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs first published advice in 2014 on the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids—a group of compounds commonly referred to, as the Minister said, as Spice and Mamba, which mimic the effects of cannabis. The ACMD recommended that these compounds be captured by way of a generic definition as class B drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. It also recommended that the compounds be placed in Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, meaning that they can be legally accessed only with a Home Office licence, which is generally issued for research or industrial purposes.

Following the ACMD’s recommendations, the changes came into effect on 14 December 2016 but, as has already been said, shortly after their implementation the ACMD and the Home Office were told by research bodies that the breadth of the definition meant that it captured a large number of research compounds, many of which were not synthetic cannabinoids. The effect of this was that research institutions had to obtain Schedule 1 licences when they should not have needed to do so.

The ACMD recognised that its advice that led to the 2016 changes had unintended consequences. As a result, it made a further recommendation in December 2017 to the effect that the scope of the generic definition be reduced. Accordingly, this order amends the generic definition of third-generation synthetic cannabinoids by replacing the term “univalent” with a defined number of substituents. This will apparently reduce the number of compounds unintentionally captured by the generic definition, estimated by industry at more than 40,000 substances, while retaining those that have not been found to cause harm. As the Minister said, the revised definition does not alter the position for class A drugs or the licensed medicines previously excluded.

When this order was discussed in the Commons, the Minister said,

“so that while those compounds that have been found to cause harm are captured by it, fewer compounds are unintentionally captured”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/7/19; col. 1263.]

In view of the Commons Minister’s words, how many compounds will still be unintentionally captured by the amended order that we are discussing now, and what level of inconvenience or difficulty will that continue to cause the research community in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector in respect of having to continue, where necessary, to apply for Schedule 1 licences? How cumbersome, time-consuming and time-delaying is the process of applying for Schedule 1 licences, the need for which this order is designed to reduce but apparently not eliminate, in respect of compounds “unintentionally captured” by the 2016 changes? Bearing in mind that the ACMD made its recommendation, which led to the Government making this draft order some 18 months ago, why has it taken as long as it has to reach this stage?

The ACMD’s 2014 recommendations did not come into effect until mid-December 2016. Again, what was the reason for the apparent delay of at least two years? If consultation took place during that lengthy period, did any individuals or organisations raise the problem about the breadth of the definition that the research community raised shortly after mid-December 2016? If not, why did the ACMD—or anyone else—not realise the problem that this order seeks to address before its recommendations were implemented? Did the changes that were brought into effect in mid-December 2016 properly reflect the ACMD’s recommendations of two years or more previously? If not, is that one reason why the problem of the breadth of the definition came to light only after the mid-December 2016 changes came into effect?

This draft order does not seek to address the issue of the use, or rather misuse, of drugs. The UK now has, I believe, the highest recorded level of mortality from drug misuse since records began. I hope that we will soon hear from the Government the different approaches, based on what would most effectively reduce harm, that they intend to consider and adopt in response to a drug situation that appears to be getting worse.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the point that this is regrettable—I agree. It is never a good place to be in, having to amend legislation for this reason. He is right that research was taking far longer because of the application process. That is why we have the order today. He also made the point that psychiatric problems would not be as problematic as they are with synthetic versions. However, I have thought back to several examples that I am aware of, for example, skunk weed, which has caused psychiatric problems. He asked whether I could confirm that Spice is more addictive than non-synthetic cannabis. It is indeed stronger than some other drugs. That is why it is controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act, in line with the expert advice. The SI does not change the control of Spice.

He also made the point that drugs policy should be aimed at reduction. Of course, reduction of the use of drugs is at the heart of what we are trying to achieve, particularly—

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The two probably go hand in hand—the harm of drugs and the use of them are quite parallel to each other—but I take the noble Lord’s point. He made a slightly different point and maybe I just took licence because I could respond in the way that I did. He also talked about the legalisation of cannabis. He knows that the Government do not intend at this point to legalise cannabis. In fact, the statutory instrument is not about the legalisation or otherwise of cannabis but, again, he took the opportunity to bring the issue up.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why it has taken so long to get here, given that the recommendation was made back in December 2017. The initial recommendation from the ACMD in December 2017 acted as interim advice, covering a range of proposed solutions for the Home Office to consider. Officials then liaised with the ACMD on the feasibility of the proposals and the ACMD made short-term recommendations amending the generic definition and longer-term recommendations. Following those recommendations, from spring 2018 the Home Office engaged in a targeted consultation with the research community on the proposals, which confirmed at the end of 2018 that it supported the short-term solution of amending the generic definition. Steps were then taken to make this legislative amendment. The unintentional capture did not come to light until after the introduction of the legislative changes in 2016. After receiving representations from the research community, the Home Office and the ACMD then acted.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how many compounds will still be unintentionally caught by the MDA. The nature of a generic definition is such that it is not possible to specify an exact number of compounds. I will write to him with further detail once I have confirmed that point. We are continuing to work with the ACMD on longer-term solutions. With that—

[Lord Rosser]

I raised another issue. I am not suggesting that we should not pass this order, but how cumbersome and time-consuming is the process of applying for the Schedule 1 licences? Is it some great bureaucratic procedure or not?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think I made that point in response to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It is quite a procedural undertaking; hence it is good that this SI is before us today. My note from the Box just says that it varies from case to case depending on the complexity of the activity being licensed, and that clear guidance is given on the Home Office website on how to make licensing applications. However, there is a broader point: that to get a Schedule 1 licence is quite a serious matter.

[Lord Rosser]

There is one other point—I say this as a complete lay man. It is fairly sobering to find that the ACMD made a recommendation—I understand that it consists of people who know what they are talking about—but we were apparently not able to appreciate that this difficulty would arise, and, because presumably there was some discussion and consultation, nobody outside the ACMD realised that it would arise. Is it not quite a sobering thought that such a mistake could have been made by not only the experienced body that is meant to advise on this but by those who were going to be affected by it? To me, as a lay person, that is quite worrying. Are the Government not worried that a mistake will be made again in some other sphere?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I agree with the noble Lord that any such amendment that we have to make based on SIs that we have put before this House, without the full information before us, is always a concern. However, we are talking about new compounds that need research. We are at the forefront of research and controls but that does not take away from the fact that the noble Lord is right—it is unfortunate when we have to amend secondary legislation like this.

[Lord Rosser]

I am not quite sure from what the Minister says whether the answer to the point I raised is that the problem could not have been envisaged at the time—that it came to light that new substances or compounds suddenly were affected. However, if I am not right in saying that, did the Government inquire of the ACMD why it had not realised that this would be a difficult? Did they get an explanation from it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I will have to write to the noble Lord on that, but I thank him for raising that valid point.

Public Spaces Protection Orders

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 11th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord may be referring to the rough sleeping strategy and how the Home Office uses it. The Home Office is not looking to trick rough sleepers into providing their data to be used for enforcement purposes—a criticism that has been made against us. However, we have been working with local authorities and charities to design an information-sharing protocol that protects the rights of vulnerable individuals but also allows for the effective operation of the RSS.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

What is needed is not just to stop the inappropriate use of PSPOs but for the Government to change their policy and provide cash-strapped local authorities and other agencies with the resources to bring homelessness—which is not a crime—to an end for good, through personal support, assistance into employment and more genuinely low-cost housing, including social housing to rent. Reference has been made to the fact that the Home Office had to update its guidance at the end of 2017. This now states that PSPOs,

“should not be used to target people based solely on the fact that someone is homeless or rough sleeping”.

Why was this not included in the guidelines from day one? What effective check and redress is there, even now, to ensure that PSPOs are not continuing to be used inappropriately against those who are homeless or rough sleeping? The use in the updated guidelines of the word “solely”, which the Minister herself stressed, looks like a significant potential loophole.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord will recognise that the reasons for rough sleeping are many and complex and the sole fact that someone is homeless is not, in itself, a reason to slap them with a PSPO. On housing, we are investing £9 billion in more affordable homes across the country and have delivered over 400,000 such homes since 2010.

Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 4th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

As the Minister said, the College of Policing’s guidelines advise officers not to,

“name those arrested, or suspected of a crime, save in exceptional circumstances where there is a legitimate policing purpose to do so”.

Yesterday, in the debate on the Question in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, two noble Lords referred to the desirability for a judge or a court to have to approve the release by the police of the name of an individual arrested or suspected of a crime but not charged, as opposed to that approval being given, as now, by a chief officer following consultation with the Crown Prosecution Service. I am not quite sure of the Government’s position on this point. Do they believe that the present College of Policing guidelines satisfactorily address the issue of anonymity until charged for those arrested or suspected of any offence, or are they now seriously considering whether the decision to name an individual not yet charged should be judicial, rather than for the police?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Perhaps it would be helpful if I went over what I said yesterday. The College of Policing’s authorised professional practice guidance on relationships with the media makes it clear that suspects’ names should be released to the media prior to charge only in exceptional circumstances if there is a legitimate policing purpose to doing so—for example, where there is a threat to the public or for the prevention and detection of crime. This approach recognises that there is a risk of unfair damage to the reputations of those arrested, particularly if they are never charged. The noble Lord asks whether we support this approach. Yes, we do; as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, we have every evidence that the police are sticking to that guidance.

Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Specified Scottish Authority and Barred Lists) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 26th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

The Minister has certainly answered my questions, for which I am grateful, but I want to pursue one issue—I do so seriously and not frivolously. The secondary legislation committee had asked why, given that the restriction on duplication was introduced in 2012, it was only now being implemented. The answer came back that it was an oversight. My question is simply this: was that because of a breakdown in processes and procedures, or was it just bad luck? Has this been looked into? Is the Home Office taking steps to make sure that such a thing cannot happen again?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

What I do know is that it was originally brought in in 2009. I accept that the noble Lord would like more detail. I think that it is simply an omission, which we often correct in secondary legislation, but if there is anything further to add, I will get the information to him.

Homophobic Attacks

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 26th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Home Secretary, in his Conservative leadership campaign, pledged to put 20,000 more police officers back on the streets—a figure that is very similar to the reduction in the number of police officers since 2010. Previously the Government have sought to argue that the number of police officers does not affect the crime rate, and the Home Secretary, with his campaign pledge, has now managed the feat of going off-message on his own policy line. Does this mean that the Government now accept that the incidence of crime, including ugly homophobic attacks, is influenced by the number of police officers in post and not just by improved police recording, as the Minister has suggested, and that we are all now paying a price for the substantial cuts in police numbers since 2010?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I do not think I have ever shied away from this issue at the Dispatch Box. In fact, I quoted my right honourable friend the Home Secretary in saying that the police had faced unprecedented demands in the last couple of years, particularly from terrorist crimes. He has now pledged over £1 billion to enable the police to recruit an additional 20,000 police officers. I do not think he has ever tried to deny that there have been unprecedented demands on the police.

Immigration and Asylum Applications

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 19th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not agree with the noble Lord that there is systematic failing. He will appreciate that many of these cases are complex and involve human rights considerations. I agree that we should focus on timeliness but the quality of decision-making, which the noble Lord also points out, is absolutely crucial. We have created a UKVI caseworking unit and caseworker lead; I hope that the quality of initial decision-making will improve—I do not doubt it—but I accept that the longer a decision-making or appeals process goes on, the greater the chance of more information coming to light or fresh appeals ensuing.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

In a recent letter to me, the Minister said that, in 2017, 1,936 asylum applications were made on grounds of sexual orientation, with 423 grants of asylum, but 487 appeals were allowed—that is, there were more allowed appeals than the number of applications granted in that same year. I accept that, in some cases, more relevant information is provided by the applicant for the appeal than in the initial application. In what percentage of allowed appeals is that the decisive factor? What are the main reasons for appeals being allowed? Do staff who turned down the initial application get told if there has been a successful appeal and the reasons for it? Have any changes been made to asylum application practices in the light of reasons for allowed appeals, whether in guidance or advice to applicants or questions that should be asked by those assessing an application? I ask these questions since, surely, the Government are trying to maximise the number of correct decisions made on initial applications and minimise the number of allowed appeals. What are the answers to the questions I have posed?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I know that the noble Lord will understand if I do not answer all five questions now. However, I will answer his question on more appeals being allowed than applications being granted as it is a hangover from a question he has asked before. That figure was slightly mystifying at the time. Many of the appeals that are heard are not necessarily from that given year; there may be a lag effect with applications from the previous year—hence, in any given year, more appeals may be allowed than applications granted. I will leave it there but perhaps talk to the noble Lord afterwards about his other questions.

Asylum Seekers

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 10th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the Home Office understands the dangers faced by LGBT people, and our hate crime action plan, launched in 2016, acknowledged them. I know of the two cases that the noble Baroness is talking about, which are very disturbing indeed, so I reject any suggestion that we do not take vulnerabilities, particularly those related to hate crimes meted out on people because of their sexual orientation, very seriously.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

It is my understanding—I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that, in 2017, 1,900 applications were made on the grounds, in whole or in part, of sexual orientation. In that year, there were approximately 1,400 appeals, of which 487—nearly a third—were successful. The number of successful appeals was greater than the number of applications granted. I have two questions. First, of the 487 successful appeals involving sexual orientation, which were the top three countries, in terms of the number to which those who appealed successfully would have been returned had their appeals not been successful? Secondly, of those people whose asylum case applications were, in whole or in part, on sexual orientation grounds, were declined in 2017 and were then returned to their relevant country, how many have subsequently been the subject of persecution or discrimination in their relevant country, because of their sexual orientation? I assume the Government have some idea of the answer to both questions because, if they do not know the answer to the second, how do they know that asylum application declinatures have proved correct?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, when determining asylum claims, the Government will take information from a variety of sources, including the FCO. I cannot answer all the noble Lord’s questions just now, but I can say that of the top five countries for sexual orientation-based asylum claims by volume, the largest by far was Pakistan.

Overseas Students: TOEIC Tests

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 30th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to an Urgent Question in another place.

In his first appearance in that capacity in the Commons about a year ago, the Home Secretary gave an assurance that he would investigate the Test of English for International Communication scandal. Why are we still awaiting a decision when about 34,000 student visas have been cancelled? The delay cannot be laid at the door of the NAO, as the Answer to the UQ appears to suggest. Is the Home Secretary aware of the damage, distress and loss caused to international students wrongly accused of cheating in their English language test, some of whom have had to end their studies and some of whom have been wrongly deported?

Is the Secretary of State continuing to rely on evidence from Educational Testing Services as to the alleged scale of cheating—evidence which has been discredited by both expert opinion and, repeatedly, in the courts? What was the financial settlement reached by the Home Office and ETS after its licence was revoked? ETS thinks that just about everyone who sat the test either cheated or had questionable results, a figure that was as unbelievable as ETS itself appears to be. How many appeals have been heard against revocation, refusal or curtailment of student visas on TOEIC grounds, and how many have been won by the applicants?

Finally, what lessons has the Home Office learned from this debacle about English language tests and its hostile environment policy, which is obviously still in play? If I cannot have full answers to these questions today, I should be grateful for a written response.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord and welcome him back to his place on the Front Bench. He asked several questions, the first being “Why the delay?” This is an issue of widespread fraud—setting up and using these test centres and colleges— that took place over several years. He will know that, under this Government and indeed under the coalition Government, we have now closed more than 900 such colleges since 2011.

On those who may be wrongly accused, the noble Lord will recall the report by Professor Peter French, which concluded that the number of false matches was likely to be very small and that the system would give people the benefit of the doubt, so the number of people wrongly accused was likely to be extremely low. The courts have always said, even when finding against the Home Office on individual facts of case, that sufficient evidence should be there to make an accusation of fraud, but it is up to the individual then to rebut it. However, we recognise the concerns; we do not refute the concerns raised by a Member of the other place. That is why the Home Secretary has now asked for further advice and why the NAO is also investigating, and the Home Secretary will respond when he has sight of both that advice and the NAO’s findings.

The noble Lord asked whether a settlement was reached. It was. For reasons of commercial confidentiality, I cannot discuss that, but I will see whether I can find out more for him.

The noble Lord also talked about the hostile environment. This is not about being hostile to people who want to work or study in this country. To use a study visa in order to work is to try to game the system, which is exactly what was going on here and why we closed down so many of those colleges.

Religious Hate Speech

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 5th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the noble Lord asked me a hypothetical question in an unspecified situation. The CPS and the police agreed definition of hate crime is used for the purposes of identifying and flagging only. The definition is: any criminal offence which is perceived to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person’s actual or perceived disability, race, religion, sexual orientation or transgender identity. When flagged as a hate crime, the police will be satisfied that an offence has been committed and will then investigate evidence in support of the appropriate charge, as well as the aggravated element of hostility. It would not be appropriate for me, as I have just said, to confirm whether this is an example which would constitute a hate crime. That would be an operational decision both of the police and the CPS based on the specific circumstances.

On the Austrian situation, the judgment does not raise any issues which require any further consideration by this Government at this time.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I was hoping that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, was going to tell us that, like Mr Farage, he now found UKIP so awful that he, too, was leaving its ranks. Section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986, which was added, I understand, by this House during the passage of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, states:

“Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents”.


In the light of those references to “insult or abuse”, do the Government intend to reconsider the appropriateness of those two words in Section 29J in the current climate, which seem to conflict to some degree with the objective of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and its protection for individuals from hatred and the fear of violence and harassment?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, we need to be careful to balance the two issues. I know why the noble Lord picked “insult” and “abuse” because they sound quite strong words, but insult and abuse and hatred are quite different things. I take the noble Lord’s point: on the face of it, they seem quite strong words.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 3rd December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the government amendments in this group make a number of changes in response to the debates in both Houses regarding the ports powers under Schedule 3 to the Bill and Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. They also respond to the reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee, and to representations from the Law Society and others.

During the course of the previous debates, there has been much focus on the important topic of a detainee’s right to consult a solicitor in private, and on the exceptional power that would allow an officer to overhear that consultation to mitigate concerns that the detainee might pass on a message to a third party. While this power was not without safeguards—for example, it could only be authorised by an assistant chief constable where the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that allowing the detainee to exercise his or her right to consult a solicitor privately will have certain serious consequences—the Government have heard the concerns raised and are prepared to take a different approach.

Amendments 37 to 39, 41 and 42, would replace that power and instead allow an officer, in the situation that I have just described, to require the detainee to choose a different solicitor. The detainee will then be reminded of the right to free legal counsel from an approved duty solicitor who has met the standards and competence of the Law Society’s criminal litigation accreditation scheme. This approach, which will apply to both Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 ports powers, will mitigate the concerns regarding the detainee’s first-choice solicitor but will still allow the detainee to receive private legal counsel—in all likelihood, with a trusted solicitor from the duty solicitor scheme. It mirrors the provisions in PACE Code H with regard to the detention of terrorist suspects as proposed by the Law Society in its evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons, and aligns with the proposals of the shadow Security Minister and noble Lords in this House.

The new power will also be subject to important safeguards. For example, it can only be directed by a superintendent and only where the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that allowing the detainee to exercise his or her right to consult a solicitor privately will have certain serious consequences: for example, interference with evidence or gathering of information; injury to another person; alerting others that they are suspected of an indictable offence; or hindering the recovery of a property obtained by an indictable offence.

Amendments 35, 36 and 40 concern the points raised in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, regarding the information provided to a detainee about their right to access a solicitor. During that debate, I drew the House’s attention to the draft Schedule 3 code of practice which, like its equivalent for Schedule 7, is clear that a person who has been detained under either power must be provided with a “notice of detention” that clarifies their rights and obligations. The examining officer must also explain these rights and obligations to the detainee before continuing with the examination. Furthermore, at each periodic review of the detention, the examining officer must remind the detainee of any rights that they have not yet exercised.

While the Government are satisfied that all the safeguards that the noble Baroness asked for are already in place through the codes of practice, Amendments 35, 36 and 40 will make it explicit in the primary legislation that a detainee has to be made aware of his or her right to access a lawyer at the moment of detention. We are in complete agreement that any person who is detained under these ports powers should be informed of their rights before any further questioning takes place.

Amendments 43 and 44 will address concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee with respect to the scope of the regulation-making power in what is now paragraph 60 of Schedule 3. This power would allow the Secretary of State to specify additional persons who may be supplied with information acquired by an examining officer. The power mirrors an equivalent in Schedule 14 to the Terrorism Act 2000 relating to information acquired through a Schedule 7 examination. These regulation-making powers are an important means of future-proofing the mechanisms to share information with government bodies and operational partners. Currently this information can be shared, if needed, with the Secretary of State, HMRC, a constable or the National Crime Agency.

We recognise the concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the powers as drafted could allow sensitive information to be passed to any organisations, including those in the private sector. That is not our intention. The Government are clear that such information should be held and managed responsibly and should not be made available to any person or organisation. Amendments 43 and 44 would ensure that the Secretary of State, in relation to either power, could specify a person to be supplied with this information only if the person exercised a public function, whether or not in the United Kingdom.

I hope that noble Lords are reassured that the Government have listened to a number of concerns raised during the debates and have acted to improve this legislation. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The shadow Security Minister in the Commons, it has been said, proposed that a list should be drawn up of lawyers properly regulated through the Law Society and the Solicitors Regulation Authority, who would be available to give legal advice and thus overcome the Government’s concern that a person detained under the hostile activity ports powers might seek the service of a rogue solicitor to give legal advice but, in reality, use that person to pass on information to a third party with potentially damaging consequences.

The Government in the Commons said they would consider this proposition and, as the Minister has just said, they have now tabled an amendment that takes out the reference in the Bill to consulting a solicitor,

“in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer”,

and instead provides for a senior officer to be able to require a detainee to consult a different solicitor of the detainee’s choosing. In her letter of 27 November setting out the Government’s amendment, the Minister has said that in practice a different solicitor of the detainee’s choosing is likely to be the duty solicitor. Can she say what will happen if the further different solicitor of the detainee’s choosing is also deemed unacceptable? Will, in effect, the detainee be told either that they choose the duty solicitor or they will not have a solicitor to consult? It would be helpful if this point could be clarified in respect of persons detained under the port and border control powers.

We support the amendments and recognise that the Government have endeavoured to address the concerns expressed in the Commons by the shadow Minister, as well as the similar concerns expressed by noble Lords in this House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Baroness for those questions. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what happens if the detainee chooses another solicitor, who is then of concern. I am trying to read the writing here. If concerns still exist, the superintendent is within his or her right to direct that the detainee should choose a different solicitor, and that applies not just to the first-choice solicitor. The point about confidential material—

[Lord Rosser]

I appreciate the difficulty with reading writing. I cannot read my own, let alone somebody else’s. Does it mean that if the detainee chooses an unacceptable second solicitor, they will then be told, “It’s the duty solicitor or you don’t have a solicitor at all”?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

From what I understand, a panel of approved solicitors is available to detainees—I am sure that the Box will fly over with a piece of paper if I am wrong about that. However, if, for whatever reason, the first solicitor from the panel is given to the detainee—

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do agree with the noble Lord; that is absolutely brilliant. But I have just received another piece of information: if the detainee is still not satisfied, they can consult a solicitor by phone, so that is a third arm of the options for detainees. Between us, we have got there.

As for who approves the access to confidential material, it would be the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

[Lord Rosser]

The reason for my asking the question is that, as I understand it, sub-paragraph (2)(b) of Amendment 41 states that the right of the detainee,

“may instead be exercised by consulting a different solicitor of the detainee’s choosing”.

I have nothing at all against duty solicitors and hold them in high regard. However, if the detainee then chooses another solicitor who is unacceptable—presumably not one of the duty solicitors—we are fairly clear that the detainee will then be told to use the duty solicitor or have no solicitor at all.

Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be given the opportunity to debate the updates to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules in the House this afternoon. Before I address the updates to the rules, I will briefly cover the background to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, as well as some key statistics.

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which I will refer to as the tribunal from now on, was established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The tribunal replaced the Interception of Communications Tribunal, the Security Service Tribunal, the Intelligence Services Tribunal and the complaints provision of Part III of the Police Act 1997, which concerned police interference with property. The tribunal investigates and determines complaints which allege that public authorities have used covert techniques unlawfully. It also investigates complaints against security and intelligence agencies for conduct which breaches human rights. There are presently 10 members of the tribunal, and the president is the right honourable Lord Justice Singh.

I will now address the updates to the tribunal rules. Under Section 68 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the tribunal is entitled to determine its own procedures. These proceedings are documented in the rules I am presenting here today. The rules have not changed since the tribunal was established 18 years ago. Therefore, it is now necessary that they be updated to better reflect current tribunal practice.

First, to improve the efficiency of decision-making in the tribunal, we have amended the rules to allow further functions of the tribunal to be exercised by a single member of the tribunal.

Secondly, to strengthen the power of the tribunal, we have added an explicit process for when a respondent refuses to consent to disclosure, but the tribunal considers disclosure is required.

Thirdly, the rules have been updated to make clear that the tribunal will hold open hearings, as far as is possible. For the first time, this puts in writing the tribunal’s commitment to transparency, where appropriate.

Fourthly, to assist complainants and respondents to the tribunal, we have provided details of the function of counsel to the tribunal, including by listing the functions the tribunal may require counsel to the tribunal to perform.

Finally, we have amended the rules to set out the process for the making and determination of applications to the tribunal for leave to appeal in specific circumstances, as well as determining in which court the appeal should be heard. This is in preparation for the new right of appeal, which is coming into force as a result of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The introduction of an appeals route will allow for greater levels of reassurance that justice has been done, as well as greater levels of transparency.

In bringing forward those updates to the tribunal rules, it was important that we consulted extensively on the proposed changes. We did that through a six-week public consultation in November 2017. Three substantive responses were received, within which 17 amendments were proposed. Officials considered the amendments carefully with colleagues across government, and five amendments were accepted and incorporated into the rules.

The updates to the rules make the work of the tribunal more transparent and efficient, as well as ensuring that the legislation accurately reflects how tribunal process and proceedings have evolved over time. I commend the rules to the House.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We are not opposed to this statutory instrument, which updates the rules that govern procedures in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, including those for a new right of appeal. The tribunal investigates and determines complaints that allege that public authorities have used covert techniques unlawfully and have infringed the right to privacy, as well as complaints against the security and intelligence agencies for conduct that breaches a wider range of human rights.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 introduced a right of appeal, which will be on a point of law, from decisions and determinations of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Leave to appeal will be granted only where the appeal raises an important issue of principle or practice, or for another compelling reason. Have there been any cases in which leave to appeal would have been granted had there been an appeals procedure, or is the appeals procedure being added because it is felt that it ought to be available rather than because there is evidence that its not being available has denied a right that ought to be there? How many cases is it anticipated might be appealed per year? How many determinations and decisions are made by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal each year, and is that number going up or down?

The tribunal rules are also being updated by this statutory instrument to provide, among other things, that further specified functions may be exercised by a single member of the tribunal. As a result of the public consultation, to which three substantive responses were received, 17 amendments were proposed, of which the Home Office accepted five. Those are listed in paragraph 10.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum. I am aware that the question was asked and answered when the rules were considered in the Commons, but it would nevertheless be helpful if the Minister could clarify for the record in our Hansard the reasons for not accepting the 12 amendments that have not been incorporated.

Could the Minister also give the reasons why it is proposed in the rules that further functions should be able to be exercised by a single member of the tribunal, and why in particular the listed functions in paragraph 7.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum? Did that proposed change arise from a proposition from the tribunal itself? If so, what reasons were advanced for going down that road, and did the tribunal ask for any other functions to be exercised by a single member to which the Government have not agreed?

Immigration (Health Charge) (Amendment) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

We do not share management information data because it is purely that—management information. As I understand it, we are seeking to resolve this issue with Coram Children’s Legal Centre, and when we do I will be happy to write to the noble Lord with the outcome.

I hope that noble Lords are satisfied with my response, although I suspect they are not, and that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for her response. I did not get the impression that she was particularly excited about some of the things that are presumably in the brief in front of her when she responded to the numerous questions that have been asked. Nevertheless, she always—and I mean this—seeks to respond to the questions raised. We are grateful for that—and I mean that too.

I also thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. It seems quite a long time ago that I moved the amendment. I do not intend to make another lengthy speech or go through all the points. I was certainly struck by the view of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that it is a bargain. Whether he believes that it is a bargain for young children, which is one of the issues mentioned in my amendment, I do not know. Obviously, from the way he said it, I assume that he does, but I and some other noble Lords fundamentally disagree with his view. On that score, though, I respect his opinion and the arguments that he made.

During this discussion and in the response we have had from the Minister on behalf of the Government, great stress was laid on estimated costs and how the charge has been looked at against estimated costs. Very little was said about looking at the income of some of the people who will have to pay those costs. It is all being looked at from a cost point of view; it has quite obviously not been looked at from the point of view of the impact on the total incomes of those who will have to pay the charge, not least of those in low-income families.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I apologise for intervening on the noble Lord. I said that I would write to noble Lords with an illustrative example of a nurse, if that helps.

[Lord Rosser]

I appreciate that the Minister said that she would write. I would be very grateful indeed if, when she writes, she will address this issue of the impact of the charges on the incomes of those who will have to pay it, particularly those on low incomes and with families with children.

There is another example of the way that the Government look at the issue. When reference was made to the impact on nurses, the answer was: “You solve it by increasing pay”. Yes, there has been a small increase in nurses’ pay, but there have not been very big increases over the past eight years. The charge is being doubled but I do not think that nurses’ pay is being doubled. I do not think that nurses will necessarily feel that the relatively small increase they have just had—they have not had much over the past few years—will be any real compensation for having to pay, for one specific item, a doubled charge. One does not get the impression that the Government have looked at this from the point of view of the impact on incomes, particularly for those among the less well off.

I think I heard a comment—I will withdraw my remarks if I am incorrect—which almost seemed to say that when low-income families are faced with this additional charge, it is up to them to arrange their finances accordingly. That was the thrust of the argument and how it came across to me. That is another indication that this has not been looked at from the point of view of the impact, particularly on people on low incomes and with children.

I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she will write. I hope she will perhaps reflect further on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend Lady Lister about the child rights impact assessment. I hope she will address that issue in her response on behalf of the Government. I know that she will give examples, but I also hope that she will reflect further on looking at the fee-waiver rules on destitution. “Destitution” implies that one must be in a pretty desperate state before receiving any assistance. The figures on the numbers of those getting the waiver appear to bear that out. No doubt the Minister will give examples in her reply—without indicating who she is talking about or anything like that—of the kinds of situations and income levels to which those fee-waiver rules have been applied up to now. At least then we could get a feel for the issue.

The answer given on why there had been no public consultation rather took my breath away. Apparently, it was because there was a manifesto commitment to £600. That seems an extraordinary reason for saying that there will be no opportunity for people to comment on what the Government are doing in the sense of how it will apply and its impact. I would have thought that any Government would want to put something like that out for consultation to get responses from people on the impact of such a doubling of charges.

I was very surprised to find that we have a Government who believe that they should not do any further consultation on the impact of something—not the principle of whether they will do it—and on how they might mitigate that because of a figure in a manifesto that they intend not to keep but to put at a lower level than is in the manifesto, which I am not complaining about. However, if the argument is that people voted for an increase in the charge to £600—it is difficult to believe that votes in the general election were determined solely by that—then they have not got what they voted for because the charge is less than that. Again, I am not complaining about that. I find it extraordinary that that was used as a reason for not consulting and giving people an opportunity to comment on the impact on certain people of doubling the charges.

I raised the issue of the child rights impact assessment. As I said, I hope the Minister will address that in her response. I will bring my comments to a conclusion. We opposed this matter in the Commons, where the order was agreed to in a vote. I tabled my amendment today to emphasise our continuing serious concerns about the impact of this increase in the immigration health charge but it is not my intention to press it to a vote.

Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner for North Yorkshire (Fire and Rescue Authority) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 21st November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, we agree with the terms of the regret Motion. I do not wish to make any specific comments about the police and crime commissioner concerned since I know nothing about the police and crime commissioner in that area. Suffice it to say that my information too, not surprisingly, is that the North Yorkshire police and crime panel has rejected proposals for the commissioner to take on responsibility for both the fire service and the police—or at least what at that time were proposals—and that the panel had urged the commissioner to reconsider what she was seeking in favour of a model that would retain the current fire authority and give the commissioner a voting place at the table. Likewise, as has already been said most eloquently, the local authorities and the fire and rescue authority expressed a clear preference for the representation model. Indeed, the information that I have received—to put it diplomatically—is that the police and crime panel has a difference of view with the police and crime commissioner over the running of her office in relation to issues of bullying and a hostile environment.

I make no comment on the rights or wrongs of it because I personally know nothing about it. I was told that the police and crime panel intended to write to the Home Office to highlight its concerns. I do not know whether it has done so or whether the Home Office has received any such letter. Clearly there is not a very happy relationship between the police and crime commissioner and the police and crime panel in North Yorkshire. One would have thought that, to get to the bottom of it, the Secretary of State would have wanted to know rather more than perhaps he does about working relationships between the two organisations, since that surely must be a consideration in whether you are going to extend the power and authority of the police and crime commissioner. Maybe the Minister will tell us that the Home Secretary has already done that, and that he is satisfied that the police and crime commissioner is in the right and that the police and crime panel has got the wrong end of the stick; I will wait and see what the Minister has to say on that.

I refer to the independent assessment on which the judgment was made that the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness have been met, and indeed of public safety. On economy, in the section headed “Our Overall Assessment”, the report says:

“Our overall view on economy is that it has received little attention in the LBC”—


the local business case—

“and there is an absence of quantified benefits in relation to any reduced costs of inputs”.

Later in the paragraph, having referred to other issues, it goes on to say:

“On that basis we are unable to reach an objective conclusion on whether the proposal will meet the specific criterion of increased economy”.


Then, looking at the issue of efficiency, the independent assessment says:

“As we noted above nearly all of the savings in the LBC arise from efficiency savings”.


I am not reading out the full paragraph, but it states that:

“The only savings which can be attributed directly to the Governance model are those arising from changes in the structure of the OPCC and the FRA”—


the office of the police and crime commissioner and the fire and rescue authority—

“i.e. those savings referred to as Direct Governance Benefit”,

in the local business plan.

As has already been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, the report goes on to say that:

“This leads to a net cost reduction of £36K p.a. from 2019/20 or a total of £204K, net of implementation costs, over the 10 year period of the LBC”.


As has already been said, the independent assessment says:

“However, the savings directly attributable to the change are modest”.


That is probably one of the understatements of the year, if you are talking about savings as low as that; and it is based on the figures that have been put forward by the police and crime commissioner and the assumptions being made proving to be correct.

Turning to effectiveness, the report says:

“Proving a direct link between the governance model”—


which is what the police and crime commissioner wants—

“and effectiveness is a subjective process”.

It ends—it is debatable whether you think this is an endorsement—by saying:

“On balance our view is that the proposed change in governance has the potential”—


I emphasise “potential”—

“to have a positive impact on effectiveness”.

In other words, the independent assessment could not produce the evidence that the change would have a positive impact on effectiveness; it would have only the potential to have a positive impact on effectiveness.

In the next paragraph—I am not reading out the whole paragraph—the assessment says:

“Having reached that conclusion we would add that there is no overwhelming case for change and that most of the proposed changes could be achieved under the other three options, subject to the willingness of all the stakeholders to work together”.


The assessors were also asked to comment, I think, on the issue of public safety, and their comment was,

“this is a very subjective area to assess”.

They concluded by saying:

“On that basis we have concluded that there is no increased risk to public safety due to the proposed change in governance”—


that is a relief—

“and that there may be benefits in the future”.

If that is a ringing endorsement of the PCC’s plan, I think the Secretary of State has got it all wrong, because, as I understand it, it is on the basis of that independent assessment that he has agreed the proposal. Subject to what the Minister may say in response, he does not seem to have taken much account of working relationships—for example, the PCC’s relationship with her police and crime panel, and perhaps with other people as well, including her own staff.

In concluding, I simply say that if the independent assessment is deemed sufficient to meet the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, it is very unlikely that any future proposal from a PCC to take over a fire and rescue authority will ever be anything other than approved by this Secretary of State.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, who secured it. As noble Lords will know, the Policing and Crime Act 2017 helps to make collaboration far more commonplace than it was hitherto. It placed a new duty on the police, fire and rescue and emergency ambulance services to keep collaboration opportunities under review and, where it is in the interest of their efficiency and effectiveness, to put those opportunities into practice. Let us not forget the rationale for a broad and non-prescriptive duty. It is for those with clear, local accountability to accelerate local emergency service collaboration.

As noble Lords will be aware, the Act also enables PCCs to take responsibility for the governance of fire and rescue services to drive that greater collaboration between policing and fire, which is what we are discussing this evening. Sir Ken Knight’s 2013 review of the fire and rescue service concluded that PCCs,

“could clarify accountability arrangements and ensure more direct visibility to the electorate”.

His findings were clear. The patchiness of collaboration across the country—I can attest to that myself—will not begin to change consistently without more joined-up and accountable leadership.

The directly accountable leadership of PCCs can play a critical role in securing better commissioning and delivery of emergency services at a local level. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for the work that he is doing to this end, and of course to Greater Manchester and the excellent work done in that area.

I have visited the police authority and seen the current PCC in action and I can certainly attest to the more visible model that PCCs represent. They are directly elected by the communities they serve, and it is the public who hold PCCs to account in the most powerful way—at the ballot box. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, questioned the visibility of the PCC but, even though I was on a police authority, I am not sure I could name every member. However, everyone in Greater Manchester knows the PCC.

Last month marked a year since the first police, fire and crime commissioner was established in Essex. Roger Hirst set out a raft measures—

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I apologise to the noble Lord if I am conflating or confusing combined authorities with the PCC role. He certainly was very vociferous on the role of scrutiny in terms of the combined authority.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, asked about the Government’s view on police and fire mergers in terms of the wider role; he referred to justice. I shall go back and ask what future plans are, because I confess that at this point I do not have up-to-date information on that.

Noble Lords asked about claims of bullying and whether the Home Office had received any representation. I confirm that the PCP in North Yorkshire has written to the Policing and Fire Minister regarding those allegations of bullying and harassment levelled at the PCC from members of her own staff. I also confirm that broader questions regarding the scrutiny role of PCPs have surfaced. PCC Mulligan has apologised for the impact that her behaviour may have had on the complainant and is already addressing many of the areas that the panel identified in its recent report.

[Lord Rosser]

I am talking about this in general terms. Is the ability of a PCC to work with those around her—for example, the police and crime panel and her own staff—a factor that is taken into account in considering whether she or he should also have responsibility for the fire and rescue service?

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 21st November 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the review of drugs. As he said, the Home Secretary announced on 2 October a major, independently led review of drug misuse. While the review will obviously not cover prescription drugs, it will look at a wide range of issues, including the system of support and enforcement around drug misuse, to inform our thinking about what more can be done to tackle drug harms. It will make sure that we know as much as possible about who drug users are, what they are taking and how often, so that law enforcement agencies and the police are able effectively to target and prevent the drug-related causes of violent crime. We will shortly set out the terms of reference and the name of the reviewer, which I cannot give at this point. The review will inform our thinking and help shape what more we can do to tackle drugs and drug harms.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the drugs are prescribed before people come into prisons or while they are there. I do not have that answer now, but whether the drugs are used before prison or while in prison, it is a problem in the prison estate. I will provide him with a breakdown of where we think the prescribing occurs.

The noble Lord asked whether the Government had asked the ACMD or vice versa. The Government can ask the ACMD for its advice, but the ACMD can also ask the Government to instigate an assessment of drug scheduling. On the additional cost, the financial implications are set out in the impact assessment. The cost in year 1 to pharmacies is estimated to be about £97,000 and the cost to the CPS £172,000. There is an additional dispensing cost to the NHS which is estimated at present value to be £53.7 million over 10 years. That has obvious implications for GPs. Officials will meet the necessary bodies to outline the effect on GPs’ practices of the rescheduling of both drugs.

[Lord Rosser]

The issue was not that I was not aware of the costs on GPs, pharmacies and the NHS, because they are spelled out in great detail in the document, even telling us what is the average pay per hour, working out that it would require five minutes for people to find out how to operate the new system and working out the cost of five minutes at £20 or £30 per hour—whatever the figure is. My point is that there is no reference to the cost of the order on the police, the criminal justice service, the probation service or the Prison Service—people can be sent to prison for up to two years. It just says that the cost will be subsumed into the overall cost of dealing with controlled drugs. I find it odd that the Government can set out the calculations in enormous detail of what it will cost pharmacies, GPs and the NHS but remain utterly silent on what the cost will be to the criminal justice system.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I outlined the projected costs to the CPS in year one, but the noble Lord asks a reasonable question and I will try to get him an answer. As he says, the number of organisations affected is stated in the impact assessment.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about the exemption from the 1971 regulations. If I may, I shall write to him. Oh, it was the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser]

My point was that small businesses appear to have been exempt from the 1973 regulations in relation to the provision of a safe or appropriate cabinet. I shall stand corrected if I have got it wrong, but I understand that that was not what the advisory committee recommended. Why has the advisory committee’s recommendation been ignored in this case and what are the implications of not applying the 1973 regulations in relation to storage in safes and cabinets?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Again, that is a reasonable point—and I now have the answer. We accepted the ACMD advice in principle, subject to consultation.

[Lord Rosser]

But am I nevertheless correct in saying that the ACMD did not say that the 1973 regulations should not apply? I am well aware that there is consultation; the document says that small businesses were dead against the regulations being applied, which may not be a surprise. I am asking about the implications of not applying those 1973 regulations, bearing in mind that, as I understand it, the ACMD did not say that they should not apply?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I go back to the consultation. Following the provisions of this option will mean that, although the drugs will be subject to auditing requirements, there will be no requirement to store them in controlled drugs safes—as the noble Lord said. Apparently, a significant number of respondents did not think that organisations could accommodate the drugs in existing safes, and expressed concern that this would result in substantial additional costs associated with buying and installing such safes.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the noble Baroness for her promise to write to me, but these regulations about storage were drawn up with a purpose, to prevent something happening. It is now being said that they will not apply, although, as I understand it, that is not what the ACMD recommended. What is the downside of not applying the regulations, which were presumably made with a purpose? Clearly, the people most against them being applied were the small businesses that would be affected. Can I be told what the downside of not applying them is? Why was the recommendation of the ACMD not followed? I understand that there was consultation, I understand that there were groups which were against that, but perhaps they had a vested interest.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think that the issue is slightly more complex than it appears at face value. If the noble Lord will oblige me, I will write to him on this point but on that note, I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, in moving this Motion I thank all noble Lords who have participated in debate on the Bill, in particular the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Of course we can never do anything without our fabulous Bill team, who have been on hand to explain some quite complex and technical matters. I always think that your Lordships’ House improves a Bill as it passes to the other place, and I hope that it will agree when it has time to consider it. Thank you.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I too take this opportunity to add to what the Minister has said. Despite the reality that the Bill has not exactly held this House in rapt attention, judging by the number of people who decided to participate in our debates, I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Manzoor, and the Bill team for their help and their willingness to meet to discuss the important issues that have been raised during the passage of the Bill. I also thank the members of our team who have provided such invaluable and vital support to me and to my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark.

Police: Serious and Violent Crime

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 15th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

This is the second Question on policing today and it is the Home Office that has a responsibility for assessing how much funding police forces need. In the light of the 11% to 25% range—in real percentage terms—in funding reductions experienced by police forces between 2010-11 and 2018-19, rising violent crime, fewer arrests, high numbers of crimes not being investigated, less neighbourhood policing, fewer police officers and declining public satisfaction, is it still the Government’s assessment that police forces have sufficient funding in the current financial year to meet the legitimate demand for police services? Is the answer yes or no?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The Government’s assessment at this point in time—I refer again to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and my honourable friend the Policing Minister—is that the police have had huge increases in demand. The pattern of crime is changing, as the noble Lord pointed out. Knife crime is a particular issue in London and county lines are spreading the problem across forces. I know that the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister recognise this and are looking to work on the funding picture.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Perhaps I may add one further question to those raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It relates to the urgency procedure. The noble Baroness has already asked who makes the decision on what is or is not urgent, but can we also have some feel, presumably based on the experience of the agencies concerned, of how frequently they expect to use this procedure?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the kind of situation in which we can expect the urgency provisions to be used possibly goes to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about how frequently they are used. It is difficult for me to talk about the average frequency in any week, year or other given timescale, but clearly there is a spike nature to some of these events. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will accept that I cannot give a definitive answer to his question. However, basically the provisions will be used to disrupt a live threat—for example, where a hostile agent tries to leave the UK with information detailing live UK intelligence agency operations, capabilities and employees. Stopping an agent with this material and being able to access it immediately will give the police a greater chance of determining whether other hostile operatives are in possession of the material and which UK intelligence officers or agents are potentially at risk of exposure. In the aftermath of something like the Salisbury event, Schedule 3 powers would provide the police with additional tools to stop and question persons with potential links to a hostile state or its actors who might have knowledge of or involvement in the attack. In such a scenario, it would be critical to analyse their devices and material at speed in order to understand the extent to which they were engaged in hostile activity.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about the timeframe. Obviously, the urgency procedures would be used only where there was an immediate risk of death or significant injury or of a hostile act being carried out. In such a case, the police must be able to act with immediate effect. However, on the question of whether we could have done it the other way round, with a prior authorisation procedure being put in place, the answer is that that would still take some days. I hope that that answers the question.

The point was made that the timeframe for the urgency process—that is, within 24 hours—makes it very difficult to make representations to the commissioner. I was asked whether that is enough time or whether it should be longer. The timescales for the urgency process aim to strike a balance between giving the property owner enough time to make representations and ensure that the police are not able to use the property without judicial authorisation with the decision having to be taken by the commissioner within three days, and, by the same token, conceding that it is likely the property owner will want a decision to be taken as quickly as possible to prevent the police using their property without a decision by the commissioner. The draft Schedule 3 code of practice, which is available online, makes it clear that the examining officer must provide a notice that will explain to the property owner that they are invited to make representations to the commissioner, including contact details and the associated timescales.

Did the noble Baroness ask me what happens if the property owner cannot be contacted?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

She did, and I have the answer here—as if by magic. Paragraph 63 of the draft Schedule 3 code of practice is clear that, where the examining officer retains a person’s property beyond the period of examination, the officer should ask the person how they would prefer to be contacted regarding the status or return of their property. The officer will typically seek to acquire the phone number, email address or postal address of the examinee. However, under the urgency process, the examining officer would attempt to use the details provided by the examinee to make contact and to provide the information. This would typically include attempting to call the person a number of times, as well as sending them information by recorded post and email. If the person is at the known UK address then the officer from the local force could be tasked to attend the address to deliver the relevant information in person. Obviously, however, it would not be reasonably practicable for the police to take this approach on every occasion or where the person is abroad. It would not be reasonably practicable for the examining officer to make contact with the person where they have provided false contact details. I hope that satisfies the noble Baroness.

[Lord Rosser]

I appreciate that the Government cannot stand at the Dispatch Box and announce that this will be used X number of times a week, a month or a year—of course I understand that. But is the provision there because of previous experience that there is a gap in the arrangements, for which we have had to pay a price because we have not been able to enact the procedure, or is it there because there is a feeling that there might arise a need for such a procedure in the future?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

There are several answers to that. Obviously, the Terrorism Act 2000 needs updating. The Salisbury attack showed us the need to update our laws in this regard, and clearly the way that technology and other things have moved on creates a gap in our abilities because they have not been provided for in previous legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank noble Lords for their points on this amendment. I start by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that the IPC has been consulted throughout the drafting of the code.

The interactions between noble Lords probably go to the root of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The section on screening outlined in the Schedule 3 code, which mirrors the existing guidance for the equivalent CT powers, is there to provide ports officers with clarity on the distinction between questions that can be asked by police officers in the ordinary course of their duties with a view to deciding whether to examine someone and questions that are permissible only once a Schedule 3 examination has commenced; that is, those questions designed to elicit information to enable an officer to determine whether the person is or has been concerned in hostile activity.

We have all come across police officers as we go about our daily lives and are used to seeing them on local streets and in tourist hotspots or protecting our national infrastructure. Wherever officers are on the ground, it is reasonable to expect them to interact with the public. It is not only a reasonable expectation but a vital aspect of front-line policing.

Such interactions will vary and depend on the specific purposes. They may range from polite conversation between an officer and a member of the public to a situation where an officer wants to query why a person is acting in a certain way or why they are present in a certain place. In such circumstances, police officers do not rely on specific powers of questioning; rather, they are simply engaging members of the public during their ordinary duties, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, pointed out. It is no different when officers are stationed at UK ports.

It would be unusual if officers did not interact with the public in this way. It would be even more unusual if front-line officers were not able to use those interactions to determine whether any further action was needed. It is unfortunate that, in trying to clarify this distinction between what would constitute questioning or interaction during ordinary police duties and questioning that can take place only once a Schedule 3 examination has commenced, the language and intention of the code have somehow been misunderstood.

Let me be clear: what is referred to as “screening” in the draft code is not a prescribed process or procedure that ports officers must adopt before selecting a person for examination. It is a clarification of what questions can be asked, if appropriate, prior to selection for examination, as against the questions that can be asked only during an examination.

It is quite possible that a ports officer will speak to members of the public at a UK port in the course of their duties with no intention of selecting them for an examination of any kind. Of course, the person’s behaviour might lead the officer to consider use of a police power, but Amendment 63A could have the unfortunate implication that, in other contexts and absent specific statutory powers, officers are unable to talk to the public or request to see their documents in the ordinary course of their duties to determine whether they need to take the further step of invoking their legal powers. It would define such questioning as being part of the Schedule 3 examination itself, rather than something that takes place before an examination. All that said, even though I do not agree with the amendment, we will consider whether further clarity is needed in the code before formally laying it before Parliament for a debate and approval by both Houses. I hope that, with that assurance, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that response and all other noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate. I am grateful to the Minister for saying, if I understood her correctly, that there will be further reflection on this issue. I accept that she has not, on behalf of the Government, accepted the amendment. I do not know whether it is the listing of potential questions that is the cause of the difficulty. If it is, one solution might simply be to make reference to the fact that there may be a screening process, without laying down specifically what the questions are that may or may not be asked as part of it, since most of the debate seems to have centred on listing the specific questions. These, of course, were lifted straight from the code of practice.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, put it correctly. Rather than prescribe a list of questions, I am seeking to get clarity within the code in due course.

[Lord Rosser]

I take it from that that the Minister will be coming back to let us know the outcome. On that basis, I thank the Minister for her response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Rosser]

I will be very brief indeed. We will listen with interest to what the Government have to say in response to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, but—obviously, subject to what the Government say—it seems to us to have considerable merit.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge: the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is indeed wise and elegant in his words. As the noble Lord has explained, this group of amendments deals with the definition of “hostile act” in Schedule 3.

It is important to emphasise that the design of any new power should be specific to the threat it is seeking to mitigate. The scope of this power has been designed to do just that; namely, to mitigate the known threats from hostile state activity. The danger of these amendments, therefore, is that they will limit the scope of the power, thereby limiting the range of threats that it has been designed to combat.

For the benefit of the Committee, the ports powers under Schedule 3 will be used by examining officers at UK ports or the border area,

“for the purpose of determining whether the person appears to be a person who is, or has been, engaged in hostile activity”.

A person is engaged in hostile activity if they are,

“concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of a hostile act that is or may be … carried out for, or on behalf of, a State other than the United Kingdom, or … otherwise in the interests of a State other than the United Kingdom”.

Under this schedule, a hostile act is defined as an act that,

“threatens national security … threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or … is an act of serious crime”.

By replacing “hostile act” with “serious crime”, these amendments would significantly narrow the range of hostile activity that these powers are designed to counter. It would undoubtedly limit the ability of our ports officers to detect, disrupt and deter hostile actors. Serious crime is defined in the Bill as being an offence which could reasonably be expected to result in,

“imprisonment for a term of 3 years or more, or … the conduct involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose”.

Some of the activities which I believe noble Lords would expect to be captured through these new powers would not fall within the scope of the truncated definition of hostile activity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, explained earlier, some offences under the Official Secrets Act 1989 attract a maximum penalty of only two years’ imprisonment and may not involve the use of violence, result in financial gain or involve a large number of people acting in pursuit of a common purpose. Consequently, an examining officer would not be able to exercise Schedule 3 powers for the purpose of detecting, disrupting or deterring this type of hostile activity even if the activity threatens national security or could be prosecuted for offences under the Official Secrets Act. This is simply not acceptable.

There may even be occasions when we have intelligence to suggest that a person linked to hostile state activity is travelling to the UK for a hostile purpose but the intelligence we have is incomplete and the nature of the hostile purpose cannot be determined; therefore, we cannot assess whether the purpose is linked to a serious crime. In this circumstance, it would be very important to have a power to stop and examine them at the port to establish the nature of the hostile act.

As noble Lords will know, following the appalling acts in Salisbury, the Government are undertaking a review of legislation to combat hostile state activity. Hostile activity, by its very nature, is often covert and undertaken by foreign intelligence officers or their agents seeking to acquire sensitive information to gain an advantage over the United Kingdom and undermine our national security. On occasions this activity may not be considered criminal under the law as it stands; for example, if a foreign intelligence officer intended to travel to the UK to maintain or build a relationship with employees contracted to work on UK defence projects with the aim of acquiring sensitive information, this may not be a crime but it would be imperative to detect and disrupt this activity at the earliest opportunity, before irreversible damage to our national security occurred.

It is entirely plausible that a hostile actor should want to visit the UK in order to collect classified documents from an agent who had committed acts of espionage on their behalf. It is not a crime for the hostile actor to receive these documents and leave the country but, although the individual has not committed a crime, a Schedule 3 examination would enable an examining officer to make a determination as to whether they have been engaged in a hostile act. An examination would also allow the examining officer to remove the classified documents from the hostile actor, preventing the disclosure of potentially damaging information.

Even though the purpose of a Schedule 3 examination is to make a determination as to whether the actor has been engaged in a hostile act, exercise of the power may provide a number of secondary benefits. In instances such as the example I have just talked about, it would provide the first leads into an investigation to detect who the agent is—if we did not already know—and prevent the documents from ever being disclosed. These investigations may or may not lead to future prosecutions. It is therefore right to give the police the power to investigate hostile state activity, even at a preliminary stage before we have reasonable suspicion that a foreign intelligence officer has committed an offence. I know that noble Lords do not really think that the police should not have the power to stop someone who is from, or acting on behalf of, a foreign intelligence service as they enter or leave the United Kingdom.

If we were to accept these amendments, traditional behaviours undertaken by hostile states which have the potential to have such a detrimental effect would fall out of scope of the power and we would not be able to detect, disrupt or deter them. I put it to noble Lords that such activity should not go unchallenged. The definition of “hostile act” is necessarily broad to ensure that the powers capture the full range of activities which hostile actors engage in. We recognise the concerns that have been raised and I reassure the Committee that these were considered in the drafting of Schedule 3. This is why we have explicitly restricted the definition to an act that is carried out for, or on behalf of, or otherwise in the interests of, a state other than the United Kingdom.

I also recognise the concerns about the term,

“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

As has been pointed out, there may be instances where an act undertaken by a hostile state actor threatens that economic well-being yet does not threaten our national security; it is also true for acts of serious crime. Economic well-being, like national security, is a term already used in UK legislation. The intention of this limb of the definition is to ensure that these powers can be used to mitigate hostile acts which could damage the country’s critical infrastructure or disrupt energy supplies to the UK. For example, if an employee in the banking sector of the City of London discovered a serious vulnerability in computer networks and shared this information with a hostile state, it would drastically undermine confidence in the City of London and cost the UK economy millions, if not billions.

I hope that with these explanations, the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was not clear whether the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was using this amendment to seek more information, but we wonder about the operational practicality of its first paragraph. It suggests that if the commissioner is informed of a particular stop, they would have some power or role to respond. More important are the points implicit in what the noble Lord said about keeping records or data. In another context, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, used the term “meticulous” about keeping records in Northern Ireland, and reference was made to using them as the basis for review of practice. That is very important and although we have hesitations about the amendment’s first paragraph, what has prompted it is important.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed out, Amendment 67ZA would require an examining officer to notify the IPC each time a person is examined under Schedule 3 and require the commissioner to publish an annual report on the use of the powers in the Northern Ireland border area. In relation to the second part of the amendment, as the noble Lord stated, Part 6 of Schedule 3 already requires the commissioner to review the use of the powers and make an annual report.

The police will make a record of every examination conducted under Schedule 3, as they already do with Schedule 7. I reassure noble Lords that the commissioner will be afforded full access to these records on request, and to information on how the powers have been exercised. It would place an unnecessary burden on the examining officer to have to notify the commissioner each and every time a person has been examined.

Regarding concerns about how these powers will be exercised at the border in Northern Ireland, media and political commentary over the summer sought, wrongly, to conflate the introduction of this legislation with the discussions on the Irish border in the context of Brexit and concerns over the possibility of more stringent measures. The Security Minister wrote to the shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 4 October to address these concerns. I circulated a copy of that letter after Second Reading, so I will not repeat his response in full here. However, I want to reiterate that it is simply not the case that these powers will be used as an immigration control or to interfere with the right to travel within the CTA. Their application to the border area mirrors that of the analogous counterterrorism powers in Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, which have been in operation for 18 years. In that time, we have not seen a blanket or large-scale use of these powers in the border area. In fact, the number of examinations in Northern Ireland as a whole during 2017-18 amounted to 6% of the UK total.

The Schedule 3 powers must be used only to determine a person’s involvement in hostile activity. The location and extent of their use will be informed by the threat from hostile activity and any decision to use them will be on a case-by-case basis. While the commissioner’s annual report will not provide a location breakdown of where the powers are exercised, for clear national security reasons, he will review police exercise of the powers, including their use in Northern Ireland.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the Bill regularises stops that are already taking place under Schedule 7. The answer is no. Schedule 3 powers will be used only to determine whether a person is engaged in hostile activity. We have already discussed the definition of hostile activity. Its broad scope is to mitigate a range of threats. Schedule 7 is about persons engaging in terrorism.

I hope that I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that response and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her contribution to this brief debate. The point I was seeking to clarify is that, as I understand it, the Government have maintained that sometimes the powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 were being used to stop people who, it might be argued, are involved in hostile activity. The point that I was trying to confirm is whether the Government feel that they are simply regularising what happened under another Act, or whether we are talking about a new group of people who may be stopped and detained. I gather from what the Minister said that we are, and that we are not talking about people who, rightly or wrongly, may have been stopped and detained under the Terrorism Act on the basis that it was counterterrorism.

I assume that the Minister is once again going to say that she is unable to respond, but are we expecting any significant increase in the number of people being stopped and detained? She said that they will be people who are not being stopped and detained at present under other powers when perhaps those powers should not have been used, and that these will be new people. Is that the situation? Is it likely to be an extensive number? She said that it would be very difficult for the commissioner to be advised every time somebody was stopped, which suggests that there will be significant numbers of people.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Mercifully for the UK public, the number of people involved in hostile state activity is low. The commissioner will have access to all the reports. We are expecting far fewer stops than under Schedule 7. I think I expressed that, but in a different way. We do not expect a plethora of new cases. The IPC can have access to all the records, but he does not have to be informed every time. He will have all the information he needs.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that response. I want to reflect on what has been said. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Stop and Search Powers

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question, which was prompted by media reports that the police want changes in the “reasonable suspicion” requirement before using stop and search powers. The vast majority of those stopped turn out to be innocent, and the Prime Minister, while Home Secretary, was concerned that it eroded the trust that ethnic minorities have in the police and in Britain as a fair society. The reality is that intelligence-led stop and search does work, but random stop and search does not work.

I note what was said in the Answer so will simply ask: have any discussions taken place between the Home Office and senior police representatives, including the national police lead for stop and search, at which the issue has been raised of changing or amending the requirement of “reasonable grounds for suspicion” before police use their stop and search powers?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Regarding conversations, the British Transport Police hosted a police and public consultation forum on 2 November. It was a policing seminar on stop and search where debates were had on the effectiveness of stop and search on emerging knife crime and violence. As part of the seminar, the possibility of removing the requirement for reasonable grounds was debated within the group, but it was not put forward by senior officers and was only part of an informal discussion with stakeholders. The Home Office was not in attendance, and the NPCC issued a corrective statement to editors.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I will listen to what the Minister says in response to the amendment, but from what I have heard so far, the case for it appears somewhat compelling.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is never nice to stand up and feel defeated on a matter. I shall outline the various points on proscription. As noble Lords will know, the effect of proscription is that the organisation is added to Schedule 2 to the 2000 Act, and that a number of offences bite in relation to membership and support for it. In practice, the Home Secretary is responsible for proscriptions relating to international and domestic terrorist groups, and the Northern Ireland Secretary for Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups.

Under Section 4 of the 2000 Act, either a proscribed organisation itself, or a person affected by its proscription, may apply to the Secretary of State for it to be deproscribed. Section 5 establishes the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission to consider appeals against refusal of an application under Section 4, and there is a route of appeal on a point of law from the commission to the Court of Appeal.

Amendment 59 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review every proscribed organisation on an annual basis, to determine whether it continues to meet the legal test for proscription. The Secretary of State would, further, be required to decide whether each organisation should remain proscribed or should be deproscribed, and to publish that decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has explained, his amendment reflects recommendations he made in his former role as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—a role which he performed with great eminence and authority, and in which he made a great contribution. I do not think that he will agree with me just because I have said that.

The noble Lord will, of course, be familiar with the Government’s long-standing policy on removing terrorist organisations from Schedule 2 to the 2000 Act, from the responses of successive Home Secretaries to his reports as independent reviewer. However, for the wider benefit of your Lordships, I will, if I may, spend a short while setting this out. The Government continue to exercise the proscription power in a proportionate manner, in accordance with the law. We recognise that proscription interferes with individuals’ rights—in particular the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights: freedom of expression and freedom of association. That is why the power is exercised only where necessary.

We should recall that organisations are proscribed for a reason—because they are concerned in terrorism. Our first priority is to protect the public and support our international partners in the fight against terrorism, and the power to disrupt a proscribed organisation by preventing it from operating or gaining support in the UK is an important one in this struggle. Where the Home Secretary has decided on advice, including from operational partners, that this test is met, with the serious consequences that flow from that, we consider it appropriate to continue to take a cautious approach when considering removing terrorist groups from the list.

While we take extremely seriously our responsibility to protect the public and to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the UK, it is not the Government’s position that once a group has been proscribed that should simply be indefinite, without the prospect of ever being removed from the list. To this end, Parliament provided a clear route for any proscribed organisation, or any person affected by an organisation’s proscription, to submit an application to the Home Secretary for the organisation to be deproscribed. Indeed, three groups have been deproscribed following such applications.

This, I believe, is the most appropriate and balanced way to deal with the question of deproscription. It ensures that any person who believes that any proscription is inappropriate has a clear route to challenge that proscription, so that groups which are not concerned in terrorism and no longer pose a risk to the public can be deproscribed. But it also avoids placing the public at risk, or causing alarm, through precipitate decisions to lift restrictions on organisations with a significant terrorist pedigree but which may have, for example, become less visibly active in recent times. It is an enduring feature of the terrorist threat that both individuals and organisations with a terrorist mindset can disengage and then re-engage in terrorist activity, potentially without warning. Such individuals and groups will continue to pose a threat, and to be properly characterised as terrorist, during both their fallow and active periods, and it would not be responsible for the Government to remove the prohibitions and stigma that apply to proscribed organisations unless we are truly certain that they have changed and no longer pose a threat.

The Government are committed to ensuring that the right groups are proscribed and that the public are protected. But we are not persuaded that introducing regular formal reviews of past proscription decisions would in practice prevent any injustice, particularly given the existence of a review system on application, whereas such a system of formal reviews could lead to perverse outcomes and would have a significant operational impact in terms of diverting investigative and intelligence resource from current threats to public safety in order to carry out the reviews.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank all three noble Lords for their points on the European arrest warrant and our future law enforcement, internal security and criminal justice relationship with the European Union following our exit from it. The Prime Minister has repeatedly made clear that the UK is unconditionally committed to maintaining Europe’s security now and after our withdrawal from the EU. We are proposing a comprehensive security relationship which preserves that mutually important operational capability that enables UK and EU operational partners to work together to combat fast-evolving security threats, including in respect of terrorism and hostile state activity.

In July, the Government published a White Paper on our future relationship with the EU. It sets out how we are seeking a relationship that provides for mechanisms for rapid and secure data exchange, practical measures to support cross-border operational co-operation, and continued UK co-operation with EU law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. We continue to value our co-operation and information sharing on issues such as extradition, and believe that a pragmatic solution is in the interests of EU member states and the UK. Our primary objective is to keep our citizens safe.

While I welcome this opportunity to reiterate the Government’s commitment to maintaining a strong security partnership with the EU after exit, the nature of the future relationship is a matter for negotiations. As such, it would not be appropriate or necessary to include in primary legislation any measure that pre-emptively binds the Government’s hands by setting our negotiating objectives. That point was accepted when this matter was voted on in the House of Commons in September, and was accepted by both Houses when the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill was enacted.

We are clear that we want a security partnership that maintains co-operation in these areas but negotiating objectives are just that, and not a matter for this or any other Bill. Parliament will agree the final form of the withdrawal agreement when legislation to give effect to it is brought forward in due course. Therefore, at this stage, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for her reply and other noble Lords for their participation in this brief debate. From what has been said in response, I am not entirely clear whether that meant that it was part of our negotiating position that we would continue to participate in the European arrest warrant, or whether the Government are accepting that, under whatever deal is done, it will not be possible to continue to participate, for some of the reasons that have already been voiced in this evening’s debate. I do not know whether the Minister is able to help me on that and say whether it is our negotiating position to try to remain within the European arrest warrant system or whether the Government accept that we cannot, and the hope is that something comparable can be the subject of negotiation.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I said to the Committee that that aspect of security co-operation was absolutely vital, and therefore some sort of security agreement was being worked on at the time. I cannot pre-empt what that will look like, but all the co-operation we enjoy now should continue, although, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, it may not be in the form of a European arrest warrant, given that no other non-EU states have been able to avail themselves of it. But it should certainly align closely with what we have now.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that clarification. This short debate has been useful; one thing it has shown—by the way, I do not suggest that it has only just come to light—is that the future of the European arrest warrant is in doubt at present, which is potentially quite serious from our nation’s point of view. Let us hope that that does not come to pass. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Brexit: Arrangements for EU Citizens

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 5th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question in the other place. Last week the Immigration Minister told the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee that in the event of a no-deal Brexit:

“If somebody has not been here prior to the end of March next year, then employers will have to make sure that they go through adequately rigorous checks to evidence somebody’s right to work”.


First, was that statement correct in all respects: that employers after 29 March 2019 will have to differentiate between resident EU citizens already here and those arriving after our departure from the EU? Secondly, if the Immigration Minister’s statement was correct, what form will these “rigorous checks” after 29 March take that employers will have to make sure that EU citizens not already here prior to that date will have to go through to evidence their right to work? How will these rigorous checks differ from what employers have to do at present when EU citizens seek work here under the existing EU free movement of labour provisions? Finally, when will sadly lacking publicly available written guidance on this specific issue be provided?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. Regarding employer checks, he will know that employers already need to carry out right-to-work checks on EU citizens, and that will not change. It is clear that employers will carry out right-to-work checks on EU citizens as they already do, and they will not be expected to differentiate between a resident EU citizen and those arriving after March 2019. However, in addition, I understand that employers have been given toolkits to enable them to carry out their duties in the right way.

Knife Crime

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 5th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I join the right reverend Prelate in his sympathy for the families—it must be devastating for every family that has lost someone to such a dreadful crime. The right reverend Prelate may remember that in October the Home Secretary announced further measures, including a commitment to consult on a new legal duty to underpin a public health approach to tackling serious violence, bringing all relevant partners together and making this a top priority. It will be supported by a youth endowment fund— £200 million over 10 years from 2020—to divert young people from crime and violence. He is absolutely right to suggest a multiagency approach.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, we all deplore the level of knife crime and its impact on the many people who are affected. We all support the London mayor’s call for a long-term approach. Nevertheless, since 2010 the Government have maintained that the level of crime is not influenced by reductions in the number of police officers and in neighbourhood policing. The Met Police Commissioner said last week that forces were stretched. In the light of the increase in violent crime, the increase in reported crime, falling clear-up rates and the increase in the number of crimes that do not even get properly investigated, will the Government confirm that it is still their view that the number of police officers, which has fallen considerably since 2010, has no impact on the incidence and level of crime?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord would agree that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and the policing Minister have acknowledged the increasing calls on police time and resources, particularly over the past two years, but our analysis points to a range of factors driving serious violence, most notably in the drugs market. The Government, therefore, understand that police demand is changing and becoming much more complex. Noble Lords will know—I have said it before—that the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service has visited police forces across England and Wales and that was why the funding settlement of more than £460 million in 2018-19 was arrived at. Early intervention is, however, crucial in this area, particularly for young people.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. My name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy are also attached to this amendment. As has been said, it reflects a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I simply comment that circumstances can change and therefore ask whether it is unreasonable that an individual covered by the enhanced notification requirements should be able to seek a review of the necessity and proportionality of those requirements, as recommended by the JCHR.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, as noble Lords have said, Clause 12 strengthens the notification requirements under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 which apply to individuals convicted of terrorism offences, or offences with a terrorism connection, to enable the police to better manage the risk posed by such individuals. It does so by increasing the amount of information that registered terrorist offenders must notify to the police, in many respects bringing the requirements into line with those already in place for registered sex offenders.

The length of time that a terrorist offender is subject to the notification requirements varies depending on the length of sentence they receive, up to a maximum of 30 years for a person sentenced to 10 years’ or more imprisonment. The notification requirements are not onerous and do not place restrictions on an offender’s activities, but they do provide a proportionate means for the police to monitor the ongoing risk posed by a person who has been convicted of a terrorism offence and, where appropriate, to take action to mitigate any increased risk that they might pose.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained that her amendment is motivated by a concern that it is not appropriate for a convicted terrorist to be subject to the requirements for this length of time without the ongoing necessity and proportionality of this being reviewed. I understand the sentiment behind her amendment but I disagree. As I have said, the notification requirements are not disproportionately onerous, and they flow as a direct consequence of a conviction for a terrorism offence—a category of offence which is of a particular level of seriousness. The notification measures provide a real benefit to the police in providing a quite light-touch but effective means of monitoring the ongoing risk posed by such a person over an extended period of time.

There is benefit in this, as individuals who are of a sufficiently terrorist mindset that they have been convicted of a terrorism offence, particularly one serious enough to merit a lengthy sentence of 10 or more years, can retain that mindset and can disengage and then re-engage over such an extended period of time. As such, the notification requirements in their current duration are, I suggest, clearly both necessary and proportionate.

The noble Baroness has suggested that, to ensure proportionality, we should follow the approach taken for registered sex offenders, which, following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of R (F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, includes a review scheme along the lines that she has proposed. However, it is crucial to note that the Supreme Court ruled only that a review scheme was necessary in order to comply with Article 8 of the ECHR for registered sex offenders who are subject to the requirements indefinitely.

Of course, the terrorism notification requirements can apply only for a finite period. The Supreme Court did not find that the sex offender notification scheme, as it applied to individuals subject to the requirements for a finite period, was incompatible with Article 8. As a result, for registered sex offenders subject to the notification requirements for a fixed period, there is no review scheme. Furthermore, and in any event, we should also note that the Court of Appeal found in the case of Irfan that terrorism offending is in a different category to sex offending in terms of ongoing risk. Notwithstanding the particularly serious nature of sex offending, terrorism offences have, in the words of the Court of Appeal,

“unique features which compound concern. A single act can cause untold damage, including loss of life, to a large number of people, by someone motivated by extreme political or religious fanaticism”.

A failed or foiled plot can also still serve to inspire many. If anything calls for a precautionary approach, it is terrorism. I hope that, in the light of this explanation, the noble Baroness feels that she can withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark are attached to these three amendments. All that needs to be said has already been said and I just wish to indicate my support for the views that have been expressed. I hope that the Government will either accept these amendments or, alternatively, accept the spirit of what has been said, go away and come back with their own proposals on Report.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. On the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about reflecting on what the Committee said, I should make the point that the Government do reflect on what is said—that is the importance of the legislative process—and that, as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, said, we always have to balance these matters.

I shall deal with the amendments and explain why, for the moment, the Government do not support them.

Clause 13 confers on the police the power to enter and search the home address of a registered terrorist offender under the authority of a warrant issued by a justice for the purpose of assessing the risk that the offender poses. We have already debated the underlying purpose of the terrorism notification requirements and their importance in helping the police to manage the risk posed by those convicted of serious terrorism offences, so I will not go over that ground again.

However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, these amendments would have a number of effects. Amendment 39 would narrow the purpose for which the power of entry and search may be operated and confine it to assessing whether the offender is in breach of the notification requirements rather than, as is currently drafted, to assess the risk that they pose.

Amendment 40 would introduce a requirement for the grant of a warrant so that the justice must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the registered offender is in breach of his or her notification requirements. Amendment 41 would provide, in addition to the current requirement, that the justice must be satisfied that it is “necessary” for the officer to enter and search the premises for the purpose of assessing the risk posed by the offender. The justice must also be satisfied that entry and search is “proportionate” to that purpose.

It may assist your Lordships if I begin by setting out the purpose of this power and why it is needed in its current form. The purpose of the power is to assess the risk posed by the offender. The police consider that home visits are an important tool in managing and risk-assessing registered terrorist offenders during their time, subject to the notification regime. This power allows them to ascertain whether the offender does in fact reside at the address they have notified to the police and to check their compliance with other aspects of the notification regime. This is, of course, the purpose that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, envisages in Amendment 39.

However, home visits are also helpful as they allow a broader assessment of risk to be made beyond monitoring compliance with the notification obligations. They allow the police to identify any other factors that might contribute to the overall risk an offender poses to themselves or their community and their risk of reoffending. This might include their general living conditions, as well as any signs of mental health decline or drug or alcohol misuse. They can also allow the police to identify any potential risk that the offender may cease to comply with the notification requirements and, in particular, that they may abscond from their registered address.

It is not an inappropriate purpose for the police to wish to keep in touch with a registered terrorist offender. That actually strikes me as quite responsible, given that the police are charged with protecting us all from such serious offenders. Amendment 39 would mean that the new power could not be used for that purpose, so the police may become aware of an increase in risk and potentially harmful activity only at a later stage when the opportunity to take mitigated action may have been missed.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Ignoring what I just said—I am not sure how that happened—I hope that, with the explanation I have given, the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for her response and thank other noble Lords who participated in this brief debate. Can she confirm that the reason for changing seizure provisions so that seizure can be dealt with by having a person reporting for summons is not meant to be taken as meaning that, where clothing or flags are seized under these provisions, in reality the matter would not be pursued through the courts?

I probably have not made myself clear. There will now be a procedure where clothing, or a flag in particular, could be seized in circumstances where the person could be reported for summons. I asked whether in reality that procedure meant that, once the flag had been seized, the chances were that the matter would not be pursued any further through the courts or whether it was still likely that matters would be pursued through the courts.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Generally, the seizure would be with a view to prosecution, yes.

[Lord Rosser]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification, and in thanking her once again for her response, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Border Force: Heathrow Airport

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the figure that the Minister gave of 95%, I think, covers all terminals at Heathrow and the whole day. The biggest problem of delay is at terminals 4 and 5 during the peak summer months and at specific periods of the day. The figure then is nothing like 95%. Can the Government now give us relevant figures on the percentage of non-EEA passengers arriving at Heathrow terminals 4 and 5 in the peak summer months during the periods when those terminals are at their busiest who experience delays exceeding the service level agreement, which I think is the information that my noble friend Lord Blunkett would like?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The reason I have not given the noble Lord those figures is because I cannot give them. We are certainly looking through the aviation strategy to provide improvements and looking at the service level agreements that we have made.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is what I am saying, yes.

[Lord Rosser]

The protection of sources in relation to confidential journalistic data is very important to the free press in our country. I pointed out—and, as far as I understand it, this is not being contested by the Government—that there is no requirement in the Bill for the journalist or media organisation which acquired the confidential material to be informed. That seems to be a significant hole in the legislation. Surely in that situation the journalist or media organisation concerned should be able to make representations and to oppose the granting of an order; in other words, their voice should be heard—perhaps, from their point of view, to seek to protect their confidential sources.

I note the Government’s argument that this is already provided for in other legislation. I say only that we are dealing with something here which can relate also—under reciprocal arrangements, presumably—to orders made by a court in another country and not only in relation to orders made by a court in this country. In that situation it is absolutely vital, even if the Government believe that the safeguards are already there, that the ability of a journalist or media organisation to be informed of an application for an order, and the chance to appear and make representations in connection with that order, should be repeated in the Bill. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Asylum Applications

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think I outlined that process just now to my noble friend Lady Berridge. We are expecting to roll it out in 2019. With regard to quality assurance, the audits are going to be carried out by an operational security unit for both the quality of the decision and the application of the policy.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, there have been media reports that a further problem is that staff considering asylum applications are rushed because there is a backlog to deal with, and that in addition staff have targets to meet in respect of the number of decisions they have to make each week on whether to grant or refuse asylum seekers. Is there still a backlog of people waiting for an asylum decision or for an appeal to be heard? If so, how big is that backlog? What targets in reality are staff making asylum decisions expected to meet each day, week or month?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is important that the decisions made are the right ones. I could not comment on decisions being rushed, but I can go back to the department to ask that question. There are certainly a lot of decisions to be made, because people want to come to this country, and I can try to ascertain a figure for the backlog.

Brexit: Europol

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 11th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The answer to that is yes—and, for Europol specifically, it means that the UK will keep its liaison bureau in The Hague and will have access to European systems and facilities on the same basis as it does now.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Can the Government give an assurance that, in the interests of national security, they would not recommend any deal on EU withdrawal to Parliament which did not sustain and protect the current levels of security arrangements and co-operation that are now available to us through our membership of the European Union?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not think anyone would disagree with the noble Lord. Our ongoing security partnership should protect those shared law-enforcement and criminal justice operational capabilities. He and I have debated on the Data Protection Act, on the specific law-enforcement provisions, and, of course, on national security. It is incredibly important that we continue to co-operate, to the benefit of both the EU and the UK.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th September 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I shall speak to the amendment in my name, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, has in effect the same objective as the amendment which she has just spoken to and moved. The purpose of our amendment is likewise to find out to what extent and by what means overseas production orders can and will be enforced where there is a bilateral or wider international agreement for an overseas production order made by a court in this country and one made in another country and served on a provider in the UK.

In Committee last Wednesday the Government stated that the reference at Second Reading that,

“UK-based providers will not be compelled to comply with overseas orders”,—[Official Report, 11/7/18; col. 929.]

meant that while,

“UK companies are not compelled by UK law”,

to comply with a production order,

“they may be compelled by the other jurisdiction … depending on the country in question”.—[Official Report, 5/9/18; col. GC 143.]

Bearing in mind that considerable progress appears to have already been made towards concluding a bilateral agreement on overseas production orders with the United States in line with the Bill, will an overseas production order made by our courts in respect of an American-based service provider be enforceable—and, if so, how, by whom and with what sanctions available if there is non-compliance?

Likewise, in the light of the Minister’s comment last Wednesday that UK companies might be compelled by the other jurisdiction to comply with their production order, how will such an order made by an American court in respect of a British-based service provider be enforceable, by whom and with what sanctions available if there is non-compliance? In addition, what do the Government consider would be the basis of appropriate and acceptable enforcement arrangements in both directions for any other countries with whom we might conclude bilateral arrangements in respect of production orders under the Bill?

Last Wednesday in Committee, the Government said that,

“it is reasonable to expect that some form of dispute resolution mechanism would be in place to help determine any differences in the event that there is a dispute over compliance with an order”.—[Official Report, 5/9/18; col. GC 141.]

That statement was, of course, in line with what the Government had said in the Minister’s letter of 20 July following Second Reading. That letter referred to the Government expecting any bilateral agreement to include a mechanism for escalating any dispute over compliance.

But should the letter not have said that the Government “will” require a bilateral agreement to include such processes and procedures, rather than just that they expect that it will? Would the decision of such a dispute resolution mechanism be legally binding? If so, on whom? If not, what would happen if the dispute resolution mechanism failed to resolve the dispute? As I understand it, some service providers have welcomed the Bill because it will provide them with cover when making available electronic data, if done under the Bill’s provisions, from other potential legal proceedings. If that is the case, would that legal protection be provided by the Bill if it was not capable of being legally enforced in one or both directions?

What kind of issues in dispute could be addressed through the suggested dispute resolution procedure mechanism? Who would mediate or arbitrate if such a mechanism was in place? Would there be legal representation? How would the mechanism be activated and by whom? Who would pay the costs? Would the dispute procedure have to reach a conclusion or decision within a fixed maximum timescale? Would the dispute resolution mechanism for any bilateral agreement on production orders with the United States be the same in the United States and the UK, working to the same standard and principles and applying or not applying the same sanctions? If there is to be any enforcement by the courts, through which court would an overseas production order made in this country be enforceable, and through which court would an overseas production order made in the US or another country in respect of a British service provider be enforceable? After at least two years of discussion with the United States on the proposed agreement, the Government must have some specific answers to these questions.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. As they said, overseas production orders will be used where an international co-operation arrangement exists and, as such, orders will be used in an environment where they are readily complied with or where there is confidence that such orders will be complied with.

As I explained when the Bill was read for a second time, the Bill provides an alternative route to accessing evidence to the existing mutual legal assistance channels. However, those channels will still be available. As such, if there is any doubt about compliance, appropriate officers may well opt to seek the evidence required via that existing route to ensure that compliance can be effected through another country’s own domestic sanctions.

Amending this provision to include the means by which an order could be enforced would be a departure from legislation in relation to existing production orders. It goes without saying that non-compliance of an order is a breach of such an order. To answer one of the noble Lord’s questions, the very nature of this being a Crown Court order is that it attracts contempt of court proceedings if there is non-compliance—which will be dealt with by way of court rules.

Failure to comply with an overseas production order made by an English judge will carry the same consequences as failure to comply with a domestic production order—namely, the person will become liable to punishment for contempt of court in the same way as if an order of the Crown Court had been breached. Specifying on the face of the order the means by which contempt proceedings will be brought will not change the legal position.

On the point made by noble Lords about enforcement. I accept that the Bill does not provide an enforcement mechanism in respect of Clause 13(1), which prohibits a person from concealing, destroying, altering or disposing of the data, or disclosing the application to anyone else once they are given notice of the application. This is currently the case with domestic orders made under Schedule 1 to PACE. As I mentioned, these orders can be made only where the relevant international arrangement exists. Orders will be applied for and used in an environment where they are readily complied with and where there is confidence that such orders will be complied with.

In reality, enforcement mechanisms for such requirements are unlikely to be needed—again, this reflects the domestic position. I say this because, where there is a risk that a person on whom an order is served might tip off a subject of interest or destroy evidence, a search warrant is likely to be used or the evidence would not be sought at all. Therefore, where there is a risk of concealing, destroying, disposing of or altering the data, an overseas production order will not be an appropriate method of obtaining that information. As I said, MLA will still be available and, where there is doubt about compliance with an overseas production order, appropriate officers may well opt to seek the evidence required via the MLA route to ensure that the information can be obtained by other means.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the enforcement mechanism would be in the co-operation agreement. We envisage that the co-operation arrangements will require obstacles to compliance to be removed, but the requirement to comply with an order will be a matter for the law of the jurisdiction in which it is made. We have provided for enforcement orders in the Bill via the contempt of court mechanism.

The noble Lord also asked about dispute resolution. Any mechanism for dispute resolution will be subject to negotiation with any country with which we wish to enter into an agreement. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to speculate on the terms of such dispute resolution mechanisms—although I can of course discuss this further with noble Lords ahead of Report. With those explanations, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Perhaps I may ask for clarification. As I understand from what the noble Baroness said— I may well have misunderstood it—if an overseas production order made in this country had to be enforced, it would be on the basis of contempt of court. That would be enforced against a provider in America if we were talking about the agreement with the States. How would contempt of court proceedings against a court decision in this country work in practice in relation to a provider in the United States who did not comply?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

While we are waiting, am I right in thinking that in the recent Facebook case it was not that the service provider did not want to provide the information that would be of use to UK law enforcement but that domestic law in America did not allow it to provide that information, and that in the overwhelming majority of cases to which this legislation would apply we anticipate that the service provider would be more than keen to provide the data, provided it can be done lawfully, and that this mechanism provides the lawful means of doing that?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think the noble Lord is probably quite right. It goes back to what I was saying at the beginning of my response. If there were doubts about compliance, or that began to become apparent, MLA would be the process that we would revert to if this was not forthcoming. Ditto, the American side would probably institute the MLA process to ensure compliance.

[Lord Rosser]

On the point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made, does it stand up that the service provider—he spoke about the situation in America, I think—would be protected from any other legal action if it provided the data under a law that it did not have to comply with?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The current Facebook case is a good case in point. There is no requirement for it to provide the information because of its terms, conditions and processes. I am sure that this would ensure that it had to comply with the process, because we are introducing this agreement with the US which places an obligation on CSPs to comply—whereas at this point in time they do not have to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

Could I ask for some clarification? Do the seven days apply at present for domestic orders? In other words, has a view been taken that if seven days is sufficient for a domestic order, it is presumably also sufficient for an order made in this country affecting somebody in the States to apply within seven days? Will it not be a rather more complicated process to apply within a seven-day period, if it is an order made in this country applying to somebody in the States? Does this clause work in the situations of an overseas production order made in this country and orders made in the country with which we have a bilateral agreement applying to British service providers, or does it apply in only one direction?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I understand it, seven days is a standard timeframe. I totally take what the noble Lord says in the sense that we are talking about overseas production orders, but the whole purpose of the Bill is that it is a simpler process in the governing of electronic data. It is a standard period of time that we feel to be proportionate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

Would the Minister not agree that somebody in the United States must have a pretty good working knowledge of our legal system to know where to apply if they want to revoke or vary an order within seven days?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I take the noble Lord’s point. I imagine that all of that would be laid out in the agreement, given that it would be set out, but I can certainly have a think about that. Perhaps we can talk about it when we meet.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, we have tabled Amendment 8 and its objectives are obviously similar to those of the amendments that he has moved and spoken to. At Second Reading, we expressed our concerns over potential difficulties with the implications of the Bill and our amendment seeks to probe this point further.

The Explanatory Notes state that the electronic data in question may include the “content of private communications” being made “available to the state”, and that:

“These intrusions into ECHR rights can be justified as necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder and crime and in the interests of national security and public safety, and are proportionate in light of the requirements that must be met before a judge can make an overseas production order, and the other safeguards set out in the Bill. To the extent that the electronic data made available may include journalistic material, the requirement that an order is made by a judge provides prior judicial oversight for the exercise of the power, and accordingly an Article 10 compliant safeguard”.


We said at Second Reading that those words might not be accepted without question by everyone.

Our amendment is intended to seek further detail and clarification from the Government about the extent of the safeguards on international human rights obligations, the similarity of interpretation of subjective wording in the Bill and the position in respect of the death penalty—not least in the light of the Home Secretary’s recent apparent change, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to, in this Government’s previous position of principle on this issue.

Bilateral agreements with another country or countries will need to be concluded for the provisions of the Bill to be implemented. Presumably, we shall be required to provide the same access arrangements to electronic data in this country as we are seeking from those countries: namely, that an order made in their courts will be capable if necessary of being enforced or implemented here with apparently little or no judicial oversight in this country. What then will be the position if the overseas production order for the electronic data in question was being sought in respect of a case or investigation where the outcome for a defendant—if found guilty—could be the death penalty, as might apply for example in a number of states in the United States, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said? Will we allow the electronic data to be handed over or accessed in such circumstances, as we would apparently be required to do under the terms of the Bill in any bilateral agreement?

At Second Reading, the Government said:

“The agreements will recognise a shared acceptance of the laws in another country with which we are entering into an agreement. It will recognise the other’s rule of law, due process and judicial oversight for obtaining and dealing with information and evidence with regard to serious crime”.—[Official Report, 11/7/18; col. 929.]


What exactly do those words mean in relation to handing over electronic data to another country with which we have a bilateral agreement which could lead to a defendant being found guilty of a crime which carries the death penalty in that other country? Some clarification of those Government words at Second Reading will help.

The Minister wrote in a letter dated 20 July that:

“With regards to death penalty implications, it is the long-standing policy of the UK to oppose the death penalty as a matter of principle. We will ensure that the operation of any agreement, including with the US, is consistent with this position”.


One could argue that those two sentences are open to more than one interpretation. One might argue that you could oppose the death penalty in principle—tell the world that that was your position—but nevertheless still allow electronic data to be handed over under the terms of the bilateral agreement with the other country concerned, even though the crime being prosecuted or investigated was one that, in that other country, carried, or could carry, the death penalty.

Will the Government give an unequivocal statement that under no circumstances under the bilateral or other agreements enabled under the Bill will electronic data be handed over to another country or access to it given to another country if it could contribute to a defendant being found guilty for a crime which carried the death penalty? No such unequivocal assurances appear to have been given at Second Reading and no such unequivocal assurance appears to have been given in the Government’s letter following it.

Amendment 8 also states that:

“The Secretary of State may not make regulations designating an international co-operation agreement unless they have laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that—


(a) all parties to the agreement adhere to international human rights obligations”.

What is the difficulty in the Government agreeing to this amendment—or to its spirit—unless they envisage circumstances in which all parties to the agreement will not be able to signify their adherence to international human rights obligations?

The amendment refers to,

“freedom of opinion, expression and association”,

but how far does the Bill protect that in relation, for example, to journalistic data, about which certain representations have been made? A later clause provides that an application for an order must be made on notice if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data consists of or includes confidential journalistic data. However, who will draw the distinction when making the application between confidential journalistic data and other journalistic data? How will they know what is confidential and what is not? Why did not the Government decide that any journalistic material should require an order to be made on notice and illuminate this problem?

Clause 12, which concerns this, also excludes material as being created or acquired for the purposes of journalism. If it was created or acquired with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose, that must mean that if at any point in its history information was intended to be used for a criminal purpose, it will not be protected under the Bill as journalistic material. That appears to apply, even if the criminal purpose never transpired and had nothing to do with the material being held by the journalist or how the journalist acquired it. Could not the issue of criminal intent be taken into account by the judge when deciding whether to make an order rather than an issue which loses the material to journalistic classification and with it its procedural protection? Amendment 8 raises that issue.

Amendment 8 also refers to the terms “public interest”, “substantial value” and “terrorist investigation” being interpreted in substantially the same way in the courts in each of the parties to an international co-operation agreement. Once again, we raised the issue at Second Reading when we asked whether any arrangement or agreement with another country would incorporate the same standards and criteria and interpretation of those criteria that would apply in our country before making an order when a court in that other country makes an overseas production order for a British national or company based here to produce stored electronic data or give access to it. If that will be the case—and surely there is a strong possibility of different interpretations of the wording concerned in different countries, or perhaps even within states of America, for example, where we know we have advanced some way towards reaching an agreement—we also asked how we will be able to satisfy ourselves that the other country making such an order was interpreting the criteria in the same way as we would anticipate our courts would do. If we were not so satisfied, what means are available, and to whom, to step in and stop the order being enforced against the named person or company in this country? I do not intend to go into the issue of enforcement or rights of appeal, since this is addressed in later amendments.

The issues I have referred to are those on which we seek some clarification and further explanation from the Government as to exactly what is meant by the wording in the Bill: that is the purpose of Amendment 8, to which I have just referred.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Both noble Lords rightly raised the point of the death penalty in relation to any designated international agreement, through Amendments 3 and 8. It may be useful if I make it clear at the outset that the Bill is about outgoing requests from the UK: it puts into legislation the ability for our law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities to request access to electronic data stored by companies based outside the UK. The Bill is a framework within which international agreements can operate but any such agreement will, of course, be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way, as both noble Lords alluded to, following the procedure set down in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—otherwise known as CRaG. It usually involves laying the agreement in Parliament for 21 sitting days before it can be ratified by the Government.

The negotiation and operation of any international agreement must be compliant with the Government’s guidance on overseas security and justice assistance, which deals with the death penalty and human rights considerations. As part of that rigorous process, a detailed assessment of any human rights risks associated with a particular international agreement must be carried out. As part of reaching an agreement with any country, we can impose restrictions on how the other country can use information sought from a UK service provider. This would be considered as part of the process of developing and entering into a potential agreement and will depend on the risks that are identified during the OSJA assessment process. As I have said, these amendments focus on the extremely important issue of human rights, and the OSJA guidance and assessment process already exists to ensure that human rights considerations are taken into account.

In relation to the death penalty in particular, the Government do not believe that these amendments are the appropriate way to address concerns about it but I recognise the strength of these concerns. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, we are going to discuss this issue in more detail on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

If there is any doubt in this matter, as I understand it from the briefing that we had from the House of Lords Library, the UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, giving testimony to the US House of Representatives’ Judiciary Committee in June 2017, said that the UK Government were “in full agreement” with the US Department of Justice that a UK-US bilateral data sharing agreement should limit access to targeted orders for data and not bulk access to data.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord because that underlines my point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am not sure that I answered that point, other than to say that we would not want to narrow the scope so that omission would lead to a terrorism investigation being curtailed. Perhaps I could come back to the noble Lord on the other point.

[Lord Rosser]

Yes, I am sure that we can discuss that on another occasion or at the intended meeting. However, I hope that the Minister will take my point that some countries may have a rather looser definition of who or what is a terrorist than we would in this country. Although I appreciate that the Bill is about orders made in this country, nevertheless, before we have that arrangement there has been an agreement the other way, so it is relevant to talk about what other countries might demand or seek from us.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sorry to intervene on the noble Lord, but at the heart of the Bill lies the principle that we would not be dealing with countries with hugely differing levels of legal thresholds or judicial considerations, and all the other things that we have talked about. But yes, perhaps we can talk about that further.

[Lord Rosser]

I understand the point that the noble Baroness has made more than once: that we are unlikely to be signing a deal with North Korea. I fully accept and understand that, but I think that there may be one or two other countries with whom we might sign a deal who may have a slightly different definition of who or what is a terrorist than we might choose to apply. That is important under this, because it gives you access to information that you would not otherwise have.

Again thanking the Minister for her response, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, if I were Whip, I would allow a short break if for no reason other than to go and get a hot water bottle. I am still in summer clothes.

Subsections (2) to (6) of Clause 4 set out the substantive requirements for a judge to consider when making an overseas production order. These include the judge being satisfied that there are: reasonable grounds for believing that a person on whom an order is served operates or is based in a country outside the UK with which the UK has a designated international co-operation agreement; reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed and is being investigated—or proceedings have been instituted—or that the application relates to a terrorism investigation; reasonable grounds for believing that the data sought is likely to have substantial value to the proceedings or investigation; and reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest for the electronic data to be produced.

The amendment would ensure that any additional requirements made by way of regulations under Clause 4(1)(b) are consistent with the requirements under Clause 4(2) to (6). Any further requirements made by way of regulations will be in addition to existing requirements already set out in Clause 4. It follows therefore that any additional requirements cannot contradict the provisions already set out, as these will have to be complied with. There will not be a scenario where only additional requirements as set out in regulations are complied with. In every case, the requirements under Clause 4 must be satisfied before granting an order.

In addition, unless there is express provision in the enabling Act, delegated legislation cannot amend or vary it. Therefore, an additional requirement as set out in regulations under this clause could not have the effect of contradicting or undermining the requirements of the Bill. For example, a regulation which sought to change the type of offence as already set out in Clause 4(3) from an indictable offence to a summary offence could not be adopted under the provisions of the Bill.

Furthermore, the scope of secondary legislation is limited by the scope of the enabling legislation. As the power is to provide for “additional” requirements, it follows that those requirements will be compatible with those already in Bill. The power to provide additional requirements and regulations is subject to the affirmative procedure. Should additional regulations be required, the House will have an opportunity to scrutinise the proposed requirements before they come into law.

The language in Clause 4(1), which the noble Baroness is seeking to amend, clarifies that the additional requirements set out in the regulations may not apply in all cases or in every application for an order. There may be international agreements the terms of which do not warrant additional requirements to be specified in regulations to be made by the Secretary of State. This could be because both the UK and the other country participating or party to the arrangement may choose a wide-ranging agreement that does not place any further restrictions on that which is already proposed in the Bill. The clause therefore reflects the reality that in some cases a judge need only be satisfied of the requirements met in Clause 4(2) to (6) without necessarily having regard to all additional requirements that may have been specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. With those words, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Before the noble Baroness responds, I have a question for the Minister. I have listened hard to what the Minister said. Is the clause in there because the Government think it would be helpful as there might be a need to make additional requirements, or do they actually have a view at this stage on what kind of additional requirements those might be?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

In a sense, this is the same issue that the noble Lord referred to before. Because this is a framework Bill, as I said, a judge may be satisfied that the Bill itself provides enough but the additional requirements—as yet unknown—may be applicable in another agreement, as yet unspecified. It gives that scope where it might be required in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I referred to the general issue that is the subject of the amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when I spoke to Amendment 8. We share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, subject to what the Minister may have to say in response, about the possible difficulties or issues that might arise.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his points and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his intervention. The effect of Amendment 19 would be to exclude confidential journalistic material from the scope of an application and order. I should first point out that Clause 4 reflects the position in the PACE Act 1984. Journalistic material can already be sought under Schedule 1 to PACE through special procedure, and under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when it is held by a company or person based in the UK. The Bill extends this to circumstances where the data is held by an entity based outside the UK and where a relevant international arrangement is in place.

I do not think that we should introduce in the Bill a difference between material that can be obtained—subject of course to appropriate requirements and safeguards—when it is held in the UK, as opposed to being held by an entity based on the country with which we have entered into an agreement. I should also stress that similar standards are set out in the Bill as already exist in domestic legislation, and that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” is readily used by our court system. Reasonable belief requires more than just a guess or a hunch. It will require the judge, marshalling all the facts before them, to come to an assessment on whether the information sought does or does not contain this type of data. It is not the first time that that standard has been used in legislation, and of course it will not be the last. Where confidential journalistic material is sought, the Bill requires that such applications can only be made on notice. That means that anyone put on notice, which can and may include the journalist whose data might be sought, has the opportunity to make representations to the court as to whether it is appropriate for the data to be obtained.

The effect of Amendment 33 as drafted would be that an application for an overseas production order that included confidential journalistic material had to be made on notice to a data controller and the data subject. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment but I do not agree that it is required, for two reasons. First, the rules of court will set out the process by which a judge can ensure that anyone affected by the order is notified of any given case. Consideration of notice by the judge relating to such a request is left to his or her discretion to allow for the circumstances where notice to a data controller, data subject or anyone else is deemed appropriate by the judge when granting an overseas production order. I think giving the judge discretion to determine which is appropriate in any given case is the right approach.

Secondly—this is a point that I have made before and will make again—we are providing in the Bill the means to serve an order on a company based outside the UK in a country with which we have a relevant agreement, in the same way as is currently the case with a company based in the UK. In those cases the respondent and any other person affected by the order would ordinarily be given notice and therefore the opportunity to make representations, unless under rules of court the judge is satisfied that there are good reasons for not doing so—for example, because of the risk of prejudice to the investigation. We are proposing that the same should apply to overseas production orders.

The intention of Clause 12 is to require an application for an overseas production order to be made on notice where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data sought consists of, or includes, confidential journalistic data. The effect of the clause as drafted is that notice should be served on the respondent—that is, the person who would be required to produce the data if the order is made. In most cases, this would be a service provider rather than the customer on whose behalf the data is stored. However, a requirement to give notice to the respondent under Clause 12(1) does not preclude the judge considering the application from exercising his or her own discretion under rules of court. Under rules of court they may require notice to be given to other persons who may be affected by an order requiring the production of confidential journalistic material, including a person who in his or her professional capacity has acquired that data. It will be a matter for the judge’s discretion, but he or she is likely to insist on notice being given unless the applicant can demonstrate that doing so would prejudice the investigation—for example, where the journalist himself or herself is the subject of the investigation or prosecution.

An example of where it might not be appropriate is where there is a hacking investigation and the journalist might actually be the subject of an inquiry. The judge may decide that putting someone on notice could potentially harm the investigation or risk the dissipation of the material. It is the Government’s intention, however, to ensure that where an application relates to confidential journalistic data, notice can and should be served on journalists and on whoever the judge deems appropriate given the circumstances of the application. The PACE Act 1984, for example, requires service to be made on the respondent only, otherwise notice requirements are set out in court rules.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point about sanctions to comply. It is difficult to construct a proportionate regime to ensure nondisclosure prior to an order being made and, in practice, law enforcement would not apply for an order where there was an unacceptable risk of damaging disclosure. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and I shall consider their comments before Report, if that is amenable to them.

Immigration Detention: Shaw Review

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will repeat a Statement made in the other place by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary.

“With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on immigration detention. As the House knows, our immigration system is made up of many different and interconnected parts. Immigration detention is an important part of that system. It encourages compliance with our Immigration Rules; protects the public from the consequences of illegal migration; and ensures that people who are here illegally or are foreign criminals can be removed from this country when all else fails.

Detention is not a decision that is taken lightly. When we make the decision to detain someone, their welfare is an absolute priority. The Windrush revelations have shown that our immigration system as a whole is not perfect and that some elements need much closer attention, and there are lessons we must learn. That is why I welcome the second independent review by Stephen Shaw into immigration detention, commissioned by this Government, which I am laying before the House today. Copies are available from the Vote Office and on GOV.UK. I am very grateful to Mr Shaw for his comprehensive and thoughtful report. It recognises the progress this Government have made in reforming immigration detention since his last report in 2016, but it also challenges us to go even further.

As the review notes, we have made significant changes to detention in the UK in recent years. Over the past three years, we have reduced the number of places in removal centres by a quarter. We detained 8% fewer people last year than the year before. Last year, 64% of those detained left detention within a month, and 91% left within four; and 95% of people liable for removal at any one time are not in detention at all, but are carefully risk-assessed and managed in the community instead.

In his report, Stephen Shaw commends the ‘energetic way’ in which his 2016 recommendations have been taken forward. He notes that conditions across immigration removal centres have ‘improved’ since his last review three years ago. We now have in place the adults at risk in immigration detention policy to identify vulnerable adults more effectively and make better-balanced decisions about the appropriateness of their detention. We have also strengthened the checks and balances in the system, setting up a team of special detention gatekeepers to ensure decisions to detain are reviewed. We have also created panels to challenge the progress on detainees’ cases and their continuing detention. We have taken steps to improve mental health care in immigration removal centres and we have also changed the rules on bail hearings. Anyone can apply for bail at any time during detention. In January, we further changed the rules so that detainees are automatically referred for a bail hearing once they have been detained for four months. All of this is good work.

However, I agree with Stephen Shaw that these reforms are still bedding in and that there have been cases and processes that we have not always got right. Now I want to pick up the pace of reform and commit today to four priorities going forward.

First, let me be absolutely clear that the Government’s starting point, as always, is that immigration detention is only for those for whom we are confident that other approaches to removal will not work. Encouraging and supporting people to leave voluntarily is of course preferable. I have asked the Home Office to do more to explore alternatives to detention with faith groups, NGOs and within communities. As a first step, I can announce today that we intend to pilot a scheme to manage vulnerable women in the community who would otherwise be detained at Yarl’s Wood. My officials have been working with the UNHCR to develop this pilot, which will mean that rather than receiving support and care in an immigration removal centre, the women will get a programme of support and care in the community instead.

Secondly, the Shaw review recommends how this Government can improve the support available for vulnerable detainees. Mr Shaw describes the adults at risk policy as ‘a work in progress’. We will continue that progress, ensuring that the most vulnerable and complex cases get the attention that they need. We will look again at how we can improve the consideration of Rule 35 reports on possible cases of torture, while avoiding abuses of these processes, and we will pilot an additional bail referral at the two-month point, halving the time in detention before a first bail referral. We will also look at staff training and support to make sure that the people working in our immigration system are well equipped to work with vulnerable detainees, and we will increase the number of Home Office staff in immigration removal centres.

Thirdly, in his report Stephen Shaw also rightly focuses on the need for greater transparency around immigration detention. I will publish more data on immigration detention, and today I have commissioned the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to report each year on whether and how the adults at risk policy is making a difference.

Fourthly and finally, I also want to see a new drive on dignity in detention. I want to see an improvement to the basic provision available to detainees. The practice in some immigration removal centres of having three detainees in rooms designed for two will stop immediately. I have also commissioned an urgent action plan for modernising toilet facilities and we will also pilot the use of Skype, so that detainees can contact their families overseas.

I am aware of the arguments made on time limits for immigration detention. However, as Mr Shaw’s review finds, the debate on this issue currently rests more on slogans than on evidence. That is why I have asked my officials to review how time limits work in other countries and how they relate to any other protections within their detention systems, so that we can all have a better-informed debate and ensure our detention policy is based on what works to tackle illegal migration, but is also one that is humane for those who are detained. Once this review is complete, I will further consider the issue of time limits on immigration detention.

The Shaw review confirms that we are on the right track in our reforms of immigration detention and that we should maintain a steady course. But Stephen Shaw also identifies areas where we could and should do better. My goal is to ensure that our immigration system, including our approach to immigration detention, is fair and humane. This is rightly what the public expect; they want rules which are firmly enforced, but in a way which treats people with the dignity they deserve. The changes that I have announced today will help to make sure this is the case. I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I cannot say that I have read the Shaw report. I was probably in a very similar situation to the Minister, in that I received it only an hour or so ago. Inevitably, that rather restricts what one can say about it. One thing that I have noticed is that, under the acknowledgements at the beginning and in the foreword by Stephen Shaw, there is a date: April 2018. Why is this report being brought to Parliament only in July 2018 and on the last day, effectively the last afternoon, before the Summer Recess? What exactly has been going on since then, if I am correct in thinking that he submitted his report in April 2018, which has prevented the report being published?

The report that we have—this second Stephen Shaw report into immigration detention—does not say that everything is right. It simply says that the situation is better than it was, which is a very different thing. The report is not quite the supportive document that the Statement seems to suggest. Let us look at one or two of the points made in the report.

Last year, it seems that 64% of those detained left detention within a month, and 91% left within four months. It depends on what one’s definition is, but detention was meant to be only for a short period of time, pending removal. Last year it was found that over half of those in immigration detention were released back into the community—a point made by Stephen Shaw in this report. So if more than half in immigration detention were released back into the community, why was their detention needed at all? The Government’s Statement says that,

“immigration detention is only for those for whom we are confident that other approaches to removal will not work”.

We are talking about large numbers of people who are detained and not removed but are released back into the community. A number of people seem to be detained who should not be, which is a point made by Stephen Shaw in this report.

Stephen Shaw comments on the issue of indefinite detention and time limits, saying:

“I have not directly considered the case for a time limit on detention”,


so we do not actually know what his view is on that issue. But he says in his foreword that,

“the number of people held for over six months has actually increased. The time that many people spend in detention remains deeply troubling”.

That is a point that I do not think was highlighted in the Government’s Statement on the report. Why has the number of people held for over six months increased? Do the Government agree with Stephen Shaw that the time that many people spend in detention remains deeply troubling?

Virtually all the population reduction in immigration detention has been on the male side, while the number of women in detention has fallen by a much smaller percentage. Yet there is a high level of vulnerability among women detainees—the very people one would have thought should not have been detained. Can the Minister say why that has happened?

The report deals at some length with the adults at risk policy. It was introduced by the Home Office and does not appear to be working properly in its objective of reducing the numbers of vulnerable people in detention. In his visits to immigration removal centres, Stephen Shaw found many people who he felt should not be there, and he comments in his report that,

“every one of the centre managers told me that they had seen no difference in the number of vulnerable detainees”,

and that in some cases the numbers had gone up. He also calls for,

“a more joined-up approach between the Home Office and its partners across Government”,

which, he says,

“applies particularly to the Ministry of Justice”.

In the section in the report on alternatives to detention, Stephen Shaw draws attention to some of the consequences of the policies restricting access to services that go under the umbrella of the hostile environment, which I believe has now been rebranded as the compliant environment. While he says in his foreword:

“Some of what I say in the pages that follow reflects very well upon the Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, and NHS England”,


he goes on to say that:

“I have found a gap between the laudable intentions of policymakers and actual practice on the ground”.


He also comments that,

“the Home Office’s strategy of expanding capacity by adding extra beds into existing rooms had exacerbated overcrowding and created unacceptable conditions”.

Why has the Home Office’s strategy led to the arising of that situation, upon which Mr Shaw has commented adversely? He repeats again in his report his concern that,

“more needs to be done to ensure that individuals who are at risk are not detained”.

I conclude by raising three questions for the Government in addition to those I have already asked. We are in a situation where the Chief Inspector of Prisons, the all-party parliamentary groups on migration and on refugees, the Bar Council, the British Medical Association and NGOs have all called for an end to indefinite detention. Do I take it from the Statement that the Government are still not prepared to commit to that objective? Perhaps the Minister could confirm that one way or the other.

I think I am also right in saying that the previous review called for an absolute exclusion on pregnant women in detention. But as I understand it, in 2017, 53 pregnant women were detained, almost all of them entirely unnecessarily, and were subsequently released into the community. If pregnant women are still being detained, will the Government commit now to an absolute exclusion of pregnant women and children from immigration detention? There is also currently no proactive screening process so that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and others who are recognised as vulnerable under the adults at risk policy are identified before they are detained. Will the Government commit to introduce a proactive screening process to achieve this objective?

Finally, now that we have had the follow-up Shaw review, how will the Government ensure that the detention estate continues to be reviewed and assessed? I note that the Statement made reference to the review of the adults at risk policy, but there is more to it than simply that policy, vital and important though it is, so I ask that question once again—bearing in mind that the Shaw review has once again said that the situation is far from what it should be.

Immigration (Provision of Physical Data) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations form one part of the statutory underpinning of the new EU settlement scheme for resident EU citizens and their family members to obtain UK immigration status. The other parts are the Immigration Rules for the scheme and the associated fees regulations, which were both laid before Parliament on 20 July. Together, these measures will enable the first phase of the implementation of the EU settlement scheme to begin on 28 August.

This will involve the participation on a voluntary basis of employees of 12 NHS trusts, and employees and students of three universities, in the north-west of England. By the way, I had no part in that decision. This phase will enable the Home Office to test the relevant processes and ensure that they work effectively before we begin to open the scheme more widely from later this year.

I trust that the House will welcome the early progress in bringing forward this important scheme, and I thank the 15 institutions that have agreed to take part in the initial phase. It is appropriate that the National Health Service and the higher education sector, which both benefit so greatly from the contribution of EU citizens, should be involved in helping to establish the EU settlement scheme.

On 21 June the Government published a statement of intent on the EU settlement scheme, and I repeated in this House the Oral Statement given by my right honourable friend the Minister of State for Immigration. The statement of intent set out details of how EU citizens and their family members will be able to obtain settled status in the UK. It also set out how the application process will be straightforward and streamlined.

There will be three core criteria that EU citizens will need to meet to be granted status under the EU settlement scheme: proving their identity, showing that they are resident in the UK, and declaring whether they have any criminal convictions. The draft regulations apply the existing powers to take and retain biometrics which apply across the immigration system to the new Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules, which will provide the basis for the Home Office to grant leave to EU citizens and their family members under the EU settlement scheme.

As we set out in the statement of intent, and as we currently require for applications for residence documents under EU law, the draft regulations will enable us to require EU citizens and their family members to provide a facial photograph as part of their application for status under the EU settlement scheme. We need this to help check their identity and to confirm that the passport or identity card they have provided belongs to that person. It will also help us to identify and deter fraudulent applications.

As happens now across the immigration system, the draft regulations will enable us to require non-EU citizen family members applying under the scheme to enrol their fingerprints, where they have not already done so in being issued with a biometric residence card under EU law. We will not be taking fingerprints of EU citizens applying under the scheme.

Recording biometric data and biographical information is important because it enables us to confirm and fix a person’s biographical details to their unique biometric identifiers, and establishes a reliable link between the holder and their status. It also allows us to check against existing records to make sure that the applicant is not known to us or to the police by another identity.

Under the scheme, EU citizens—and non-EU family members who already hold a biometric residence card—will be able to upload a passport-style photograph of themselves as part of the streamlined digital application process. Non-EU family members who do not already hold a biometric residence card will, as now, need to attend one of our application centres to enrol their fingerprints and facial image. Consistent with our approach across the immigration system, non-EU citizen children under the age of five will not be required to enrol fingerprint biometrics. A facial photograph will be required for security and safeguarding reasons, but their fingerprints will not be taken.

Approval of the regulations is an important step in getting the EU settlement scheme up and running, thereby enabling us to provide real certainty to resident EU citizens and their family members, and to their employers, about the basis on which they will be able to remain here permanently. I commend these regulations to the House.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for setting out the purpose and content of this instrument. I also take this opportunity to thank her officials for meeting me yesterday. If I still have not understood precisely what the regulations are about then that is my fault, rather than their inability to explain it to me.

I want to make one or two points, because the meeting with officials yesterday was helpful. As I understand it—I think this is what the Minister was saying—the next stage is to go to a pilot scheme, which will begin from 28 August. As she also said, it covers certain NHS workers and students. What I want to be clear on is, first, how long will that pilot scheme last? Secondly, at the end of that scheme will a further statutory instrument be needed to extend it to other groups? In other words, will there be an opportunity in this House for a proper debate about how the pilot scheme has worked so that the Government will not simply decide, off their own bat, to extend the scheme to other groups on the basis that the Government think that the pilot has been successful? I would like an assurance on that point.

Can the Minister also say whether the intention is to extend the pilot scheme in stages to other groups or, at its conclusion, to extend it across the board? As I understand it, there will be the requirement for a facial photograph and, as I think the Minister said, in respect of non-EU citizen family members a fingerprint requirement as well. Simply to get this on the record, as much as anything, what will happen as far as the individual is concerned if the facial photograph supplied does not meet the requirements of the check against the ID photograph? Will they be told why it is not considered a facial photograph that meets the requirements? Will they be contacted or given help by Home Office officials in a positive way, bearing in mind that, as I recall, the Government have said that the approach with applications of this kind will be not “Why should it be agreed?” but “Why should it not be agreed?”, and that there would therefore be a positive approach from Home Office officials? I would like confirmation that that would apply, for example, where the facial photograph was not deemed to meet the requirements.

I would like to raise one or two other points. The Explanatory Memorandum refers to the consultation outcome and says that account was taken of those discussions. It says:

“The Home Office has not undertaken a full public consultation, but the policy has been discussed with its internal and external stakeholders”.


What points were made in those discussions of which account was taken, and what points were made that the Government did not feel it necessary to take into account? Who were the,

“groups representing EU citizens in the UK”,

with whom this policy was discussed, as referred to in paragraph 10.1 on the “Consultation outcome”?

What will the cost be to the individual of going through this process? I am sticking strictly to the statutory instrument in front of us in relation to the facial photograph and the fingerprints since, subject to what the Minister may say, for a fairly large family it could presumably add up to a not insignificant sum of money. No doubt that is something the Minister will address.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their questions. The first question from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was about an evaluation of the private beta phase, or the pilot phase, which I can confirm will run from 28 August until October. On amendments to extend the scheme any further, we will provide further information in due course about our plans for the phased rollout of the EU settlement scheme later this year so that, in line with the draft withdrawal agreement, it is fully open by 30 March next year. Those plans will absolutely reflect the experience of the pilot phase and the learning that we draw from those who choose to apply under the scheme during that phase.

There will not be a formal report back, but any extension of the scheme will be subject to parliamentary consideration of the required changes to the Immigration Rules for the scheme, further to those for the private beta phase laid on 20 July. We will explain clearly any changes and the reasons for making them at that point.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for giving way. When she mentioned “any extension”, is that any extension beyond the pilot?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Any extension in terms of what the pilot entailed or beyond what was in the pilot? I am not entirely clear about the noble Lord’s question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My point was that there is to be a pilot scheme. Will there be an opportunity for a discussion in this House if it is decided, as presumably it will be, to extend the pilot scheme to other groups, or will the Government just decide that the pilot scheme has been successful and be able to extend it without any debate or discussion in this House? That was the point of my question about whether there will need to be a further statutory instrument.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I understand that any changes at all in the Immigration Rules for the scheme will be laid out, and why they will be laid out. We will need new Immigration Rules to extend the pilot to other groups, which is what I think the noble Lord was asking.

Rendition of UK Citizens

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question.

Last Friday, the Minister wrote to me, on behalf of the Government, on the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill, and said:

“With regards to death penalty implications, it is the long-standing policy of the UK to oppose the death penalty as a matter of principle. We will ensure that the operation of any agreement, including with the United States, is consistent with this position”.


Why, then, are we accepting a request by the United States to share evidence on the two individuals in question under mutual legal assistance, on the basis—to quote the Home Secretary’s letter of 22 June to the US Attorney-General—that,

“I am of the view that there are strong reasons for not requiring a death penalty assurance in this specific case, so no such assurances will be sought”?

Contrary to the content of the Answer to the Urgent Question, why did the Government not come to Parliament a month ago to disclose this complete change of approach and any reasons for it on a matter of basic human rights norms, however heinous the alleged crimes—a change of approach which is also contrary to the Minister’s letter to me of just four days ago?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I reiterate that we oppose the death penalty in all circumstances. The Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill is about outgoing requests. It gives UK law enforcement authorities the power to request electronic data stored abroad where an international arrangement exists for use in UK investigations and court cases. We will ensure that any future international agreement is consistent with our long-standing policy of opposing the death penalty.

Perhaps I may also comment on the change of approach. We have not changed our approach. I refer noble Lords to the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance, which incidentally is long-standing. Part a) says:

“Written assurances should be sought before agreeing to the provision of assistance that anyone found guilty would not face the death penalty”.


Part b) reads:

“Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’ and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance”.

Cannabis: Medicinal Use

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend will know that international evidence, as well as the limited evidence here, is drawn on. I hope that that answers the questions of both my noble friend and the noble Lord.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Government have said that they have no plans to decriminalise cannabis for recreational use, but according to press reports at the weekend, there was a fall in the number of people prosecuted for possession of cannabis last year, compared with 2015, of 19%, and a 34% fall in the number of cautions for possession of cannabis issued by the police over the same period. In the absence of any credible evidence that the use of cannabis for recreational purposes has recently declined sharply, is chief constables deciding, for whatever reason, not to pursue cases of possession of cannabis to anything like the same level as even two years ago really an operational decision for them, as opposed to a strategic or policy decision that should be taken by elected police and crime commissioners or the Home Secretary?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It is of course up to PCCs to decide the policy priorities for their local areas, and of course those will be different in different areas depending on the prevalence of drug use. The noble Lord is right that the numbers have dropped, but—and I see this, depressingly, in Manchester—the use of synthetic cannabinoids is rife in some cities.

Operation Conifer: Funding

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 12th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I most certainly acknowledge my noble friend’s point—that for many people this is a very unsatisfactory outcome. In terms of further things that the Home Secretary might be able to do, it is for the PCC to instigate an inquiry, should he wish to do so. He has stated to me in correspondence that he does not want to, for several reasons, but the option is open. The court case to which my noble friend refers will of course determine in due course.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I am sure that Members of the House are still somewhat baffled by the answers that have been given about why the Home Secretary has, as the Minister indicated, made his decision about an investigation by the inspectorate. However, I will move on from that and simply ask: is it not the case that Operation Conifer was more of a national investigation than simply a Wiltshire Police matter, and is not the logical extension of that that the Home Office should also be prepared to provide funding for an independent inquiry into the conduct of Operation Conifer, which in reality was simply delegated to Wiltshire Police?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Operation Conifer was led by Wiltshire Police, so it was led by a local police force and was not a national operation. In terms of the funding for it, the Home Office has already provided £1.1 million of special grant. If special grants are applied for, the Home Office will consider them.

Registration of Marriage Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Friday 29th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I shall just add, in light of what the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, has just said, that my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester is seeking assurances on this point, as I understand it, and I sincerely hope that those assurances can be given.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I hope that I can now give those assurances. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, because he distinguished very much between the argument for another day, which is about same-sex marriages in churches, and the very important point of children of same-sex parents on the register: it is not called the register, of course, but we will probably continue to call it the register.

As the noble Lord pointed out, the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 made provision for couples of the same sex to enter into a marriage. However, under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, the provisions to solemnise marriages of same-sex couples do not apply to marriages taking place in the Church of England. As with all other religious ceremonies, there is no compulsion on an individual to solemnise a marriage where the reason is that it concerns the marriage of a same-sex couple.

The provisions in the Bill do not seek to make any changes to marriage preliminaries, or to how or where marriages can be solemnised; it simply seeks to change how marriages are registered, moving from a paper-based system of registration to an electronic register. The electronic system of registering marriages will apply to all marriages, irrespective of whether the couple are of the opposite sex or of the same sex.

I have just received a note containing the answer to the point made by my noble friend about the move to a schedule system not creating differences between the registration process for opposite-sex and same-sex couples. To clarify, by the names of the parents it will say “Mother/Father/Parent” for both parents. That will apply to children of opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples and whatever we have to come.

Immigration (Guidance on Detention of Vulnerable Persons) Regulations and the Detention Centre (Amendment) Rules 2018

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for securing this debate. I want to say at the outset that I appreciate his insight into this issue of immigration detention and the concern that he has consistently shown for the welfare of detainees. I also thank other noble Lords from all sides of the House for their contributions.

We put significant effort into encouraging individuals to comply with the Immigration Rules and to support those with no right to remain to leave the UK voluntarily. Unfortunately, a minority of individuals refuse to comply, and detention can be a necessary and proportionate tool for enforcing their return.

As I have said, detention is used sparingly, and we operate a strong presumption in favour of not detaining. At any one time, of those people with no lawful basis of stay in the UK and who are liable to removal, 95% are managed in the community and not in detention. The number of individuals whom we detain has decreased. In the year ending March 2018, there was an 8% reduction in the number of people entering detention compared with the previous year.

For every individual detained, there must be a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable timescale. As part of the decision to detain, there should be an assessment as to the likely duration of detention. In addition, alternatives to detention will have been considered, or will have failed, in each case.

The majority of people are held for short periods. Ninety-one per cent of those leaving detention in the year ending March 2018 were detained for less than four months and 64% for 28 days or less.

As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned, the welfare of vulnerable people in immigration detention is of the utmost importance to the Home Office. Where it is necessary to detain people to remove them, a number of safeguards are in place. One of these is the adults at risk in immigration detention policy, referred to by the noble Lord. Others include the presence of healthcare staff in all immigration removal centres and residential short-term holding facilities; a comprehensive suite of published guidance and operating procedures to govern conditions in centres and support the well-being of detainees; regular reviews of detention by senior officers to ensure that detention remains appropriate; and independent judicial oversight of immigration detention.

The adults at risk policy, implemented in September 2016, provides a vital safeguard. It was a key part of our response to Stephen Shaw’s review of the welfare of vulnerable people in immigration detention commissioned by the Prime Minister when she was Home Secretary. Under this policy, vulnerable people are detained, or their detention continued, only when the immigration considerations in their case outweigh the evidence of vulnerability—the balance that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about. Detention decisions are made on the basis of all available evidence. Cases are reviewed at regular intervals and whenever new evidence comes to light in respect of removability and vulnerability.

That brings me to the new definition of torture in the context of immigration detention. I do not think that anyone would dispute that victims of torture—and, indeed, all those identified as vulnerable—should be considered to be particularly at risk of harm in immigration detention. But it is not, and has never been, government policy that such individuals should never be detained. There is no absolute exclusion from detention for any category of person. However, for individuals considered to be at risk, the policy strengthens the presumption against detention. It carefully balances an individual’s vulnerability considerations against the immigration considerations so that detention is considered in individual cases only when immigration considerations outweigh the risk identified.

The way in which torture is defined in the context of immigration detention has a long history. We currently use the EO definition established in case law in 2013. This is a broad definition which led to some cases being inappropriately considered as torture, thereby diverting attention from the most vulnerable. As a result, the Home Office brought into force the United Nations Convention against Torture definition of torture, with the introduction of the adults at risk in immigration detention policy in 2016. Following a judicial review of the policy, and as an interim relief measure, the High Court ordered the Home Office to revert to the EO definition, and we did so in December 2016. The court subsequently declared the UNCAT definition to be unlawful when used for the purposes of immigration detention. However, it declared that the adults at risk policy was inherently sound and lawful.

In addition, the court further stated that the EO definition was deficient for the purposes of immigration detention. The judge set out his carefully considered view of what a rational definition should look like in this context, taking into account the impact of acts of harm on those in detention. He came to this view having heard a wealth of expert evidence, including that provided by experts associated with the litigants, Medical Justice. We have used the judge’s clearly expressed view as the basis for the definition set out in the statutory instruments laid before Parliament on 27 March 2018. In answer to the question “Why can’t we withdraw the SIs?”, we cannot withdraw them and revert to the old definition of torture as laid out in EO as that was judged to be deficient for the purposes of immigration detention. It was too broad and led to some cases being inappropriately considered, diverting attention from the most vulnerable, as I have said.

The court also said that the broad safeguarding provisions were not effective and the guidance needed to be amended. The statutory instrument bringing into force the revised statutory guidance meets this requirement.

Noble Lords have said that the Home Office should have waited for Stephen Shaw’s follow-up report to be published before making any amendments to the definition of torture. Let me be clear: the changes we are making are to implement the court’s judgment in full, with the reasonable timescales it set out. Until Mr Shaw’s report has been formally published, I cannot discuss its contents. However, I can say that officials kept Mr Shaw’s team informed of the work they were doing to implement this new definition while they engage with the NGOs on this issue.

[Lord Rosser]

In the light of the Minister’s comment that officials had informed Stephen Shaw of what they were doing, is she saying, or seeking to imply, that in fact his re-review has given the Government’s proposals in these statutory instruments a clean bill of health? If that is what it has done, why not publish it now?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I will get on to when it will be published. I am simply saying that officials kept the team informed of the work they were doing to implement the new definition while they were engaging with NGOs. We will carefully consider all of Stephen Shaw’s recommendations, as we did last time, and take them into account when we review detention centre rules, including the operation of the rule 35 reporting mechanism later this year. We will publish his report with a full government response before the House rises in July, in answer to noble Lords’ questions.

As I said, the current imperative is to ensure that, in the light of the court’s very clearly expressed view, we implement a lawful and effective definition of torture for the purpose of the adults at risk policy. There is no reason to delay this. It is separate to, and not dependent on, Mr Shaw’s report.

It has been suggested that the new definition of torture in the context of immigration detention is too complex to be applied by caseworkers and doctors. I do not accept this. It fully reflects the guidance handed down by the High Court. The court, in turn, had the benefit of a large amount of expert and clinical evidence, much of which was submitted by the litigants, Medical Justice. So there is no reason to believe that caseworkers and doctors will find the definition of torture set out in the statutory instruments too complex.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked whether the consultation with NGOs was sufficient. There was no legal obligation to run a consultation, but officials willingly engaged with them on the definition of torture and on caseworker guidance and training.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked—

Airports: Border Force

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 26th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can certainly take that back, because I do not know the direct answer. That comment was made to me some weeks ago, but I shall take it back to the department and get a suitable reply for the noble Baroness.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the lengthening and continuing delays at Heathrow for arriving passengers to clear immigration and passport control are at the very least causing reputational damage to the airport and the airlines affected. This has financial consequences for them as well as for our economy. Since the Government have not met—and are apparently still not meeting—all their service level targets on waiting times for passengers arriving at Heathrow, what level of compensation will be provided by the Government to the operator of Heathrow and the airlines involved? If no compensation is going to be provided by the Government, why not, bearing in mind that in other areas of activity, firms providing services for the Government would be liable to penalties for failing to deliver on their service level targets?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I am not sure. I do not know the answer to whether there are actual financial penalties in terms of compensation from the Government for failing to meet service level standards. What I can say is that over 95% of passengers arriving at Heathrow are, in fact, dealt with through those service level agreements.

Home Office: Immigration

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 18th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Baroness for that question. In and of itself, the fact that doctors and nurses have been taken out of the cap will improve the bureaucratic processes and help decisions to be made more quickly. As to those doctors and nurses who are not in the occupation shortage list, the sponsor still has to go through the resident labour market test. I expect this to go more smoothly and to free up the numbers within the cap for other occupations.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

In response to a question from my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford about tier 2 visas and recruiting medical professionals from overseas, the Government said:

“It is appropriate to take doctors only from countries that have their own very effective medical systems. To take them from third-world and developing countries is not acceptable”.—[Official Report, 12/6/18; col. 1575.]


That reply indicates there must be a government list of some sort of both third-world and developing countries from which it is deemed not acceptable to take doctors. There will be interest in which nations are included in the list of developing countries, in particular, from which it is considered not acceptable by the Government to take doctors; and, not least, how many and which countries from the Indian subcontinent are on that government list. Can the Minister make sure that the government list in question—in whatever form it exists and to which reference on this issue was made by the Government last week—is made available to Members of this House?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can answer the question about doctors from India because we issue a huge number of visas to them. As to recruitment from third-world countries—I did not answer the question from my noble friend Lord Cormack—rather than guess at it I shall get back to the noble Lord on those countries, although I suspect that there is not such a list.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2017

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 21st December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their comments. I think they will absolutely understand that the information I have given at the Dispatch Box is the information I can give, and that obviously, for national security reasons, I cannot go into further detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the deproscription mechanism, to which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also alluded. Two other groups have been deproscribed under the Terrorism Act since 2000. On deproscribing, under the legislation, any group must be considered for deproscription following the receipt of a valid application—which we received for the deproscription of the HIG. In addition, on proscribing, the noble Lord asked about the various criteria. I would also not like to say under which specific criteria these groups were proscribed; suffice it to say that the Home Secretary takes the various criteria into account, and that one may significantly outweigh another in her determination. Therefore, I hope the noble Lord will understand that I am not being particularly forthcoming at the Dispatch Box.

Finally, the activity of deproscribed groups, just as that of proscribed groups, is kept under review, as noble Lords would expect. If the test for proscription is met in the future and it is appropriate for the Home Secretary to exercise her discretion in favour of proscription, she will lay an order to reproscribe the group, and the order will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also talked about the loss of human rights when proscription is enacted. He is absolutely right. That is why, in the round, proscription should be a proportionate response, given the restrictions it places on people’s human rights.

[Lord Rosser]

I do not want the noble Baroness to regard this as a challenge to what she has just said; I am merely asking for confirmation. Is it really regarded as a security issue to give any indication of which of the five factors set out in the Explanatory Memorandum weighed with the Home Secretary in her decision? I ask that in the context of the noble Baroness’s opening statement, when she referred to supporting international partners in the fight against terrorism, which is one of the five factors. One could take it as a pretty good hint that that was a factor, but that would then be inconsistent with the noble Baroness’s statement that she cannot say which of the factors weighed in the mind of the Home Secretary on this issue.

Randox and Trimega Laboratories

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 27th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the response to the Urgent Question in the other place. Perhaps she can explain, when she comes to respond, why the Police Minister chose originally to make his announcement in a Written Statement on 21 November, and why it has taken an Urgent Question to get an Oral Statement from him. One would have thought that what we are hearing about was sufficiently serious to justify the Minister in the Commons coming to the Dispatch Box without being summoned there through an Urgent Question.

Regrettably, the 2010 Government abolished the Forensic Science Service. Perhaps this is one of the chickens coming home to roost as a result. Randox Testing Services, one of the companies involved, has been quoted as saying:

“We are now well advanced in developing a foolproof testing system which would enhance the security of our operations in the future, to provide the necessary level of confidence”.


Surely a fool-proof testing system being in place would have been part of the terms of its contract to do this work. Will the Minister confirm that that really is not the case, as the statement from the company seems to imply?

Randox has also said that it will be paying the cost of retesting. What about the cost of the police investigations that have been taking place for some time, of the local authority investigations referred to in the Statement and of the costs of obtaining legal advice? Who is going to be paying these? Is it the company, the police, local authorities or the individuals affected? The Police Minister’s Written Statement of 21 November said, in relation to the other company, Trimega—which is now part of Randox:

“The number of Trimega’s customers affected … is unknown. It may never be possible to identify them all, due to poor record-keeping practices”.


Is Trimega in breach of its contract, as a result of having poor record-keeping practices? If so, what are the potential penalties?

Finally, the information that has been given indicates that most drug tests from the current company, Randox Testing Services, between 2013 and 2017 are being treated as potentially unreliable. Will Parliament be told of the extent to which such drug tests—and those done by Trimega in the years before 2013—are found to have been unreliable and the precise impact this has had on individuals? That is the least that the Police Minister now owes Parliament.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions. He is absolutely right: it is indeed a very serious matter and the Government do not take it lightly. He will have noticed that the WMS of 21 November was a fulsome Statement and there is now an investigation going on which will take some time. He questioned the abolition of the FSS. The alleged manipulation predates the closure of the FSS, which was never involved in family cases—that was Trimega. He talked about Trimega being part of Randox. I must make it clear that at this point Trimega was not part of Randox. Trimega closed and Randox set up: yes, the two individuals were employed at Randox, but Trimega was not part of it.

The noble Lord also asked whether the numbers would ever be known. They may never be known accurately, but we think that approximately 10,000 tests were affected. The nature of what allegedly went on here means that we can never make this fool-proof because, as the regulator herself said, no reasonable set of quality standards could be guaranteed to prevent determined manipulation by skilled but corrupt personnel.

Hamas

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 31st October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, our policy on Hamas is very clear. The group must renounce violence, recognise Israel and accept previously signed agreements. We now expect to see credible movement towards these conditions, which remain the benchmark against which its intentions should be judged. We call on those in the region with influence over Hamas to encourage the group to take these steps.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not wish to pursue the specific issue raised in the Question but to raise a more general point. What reviews have the Government undertaken to establish exactly what impact proscribing an organisation actually has, as opposed to what it is intended to have, on the unacceptable activities of those who were in membership of that organisation as opposed to the impact of proscription on the organisation itself?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, what I can say about the impact of proscription is that those groups are illegal entities in this country. They are not allowed to promote their policies or to progress some of the things that they want—for example, the destruction of Israel.

Daphne Caruana Galizia

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 24th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very important point. The UK supports freedom of expression as both a fundamental right in itself and as an essential element of a full range of human rights. The freedom of expression is required to allow innovation to thrive and ideas to develop. People must be allowed to discuss and debate issues freely without fear of repression or discrimination.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I refer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, about British detectives travelling to Malta—we certainly welcome his enthusiasm for Europol. I ask this as a serious question: unless there is some evidence that the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia—shocking though it is—was also connected either directly or indirectly to corruption or other criminal activity in this country, do we any longer have detectives available to go to Malta following cuts in police numbers? We have now seen here a dramatic increase in hate crime and violent crime. The director-general of MI5 has said that the terrorist threat is operating,

“at a scale and pace we’ve not seen before”,

and police forces here are now no longer in a position even to start investigating some reported crimes. Do we really have detectives available to go elsewhere?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, in the aftermath of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the Home Office authorised the deployment of 63 police officers to support local police forces in the British Overseas Territories of the BVI and Anguilla, so we certainly have the capacity should it be requested. As for police funding and police numbers, police funding has been flat since 2015 and the police carry reserves of over £1 billion to be deployed as they see fit. There is also the point made by HMIC that there is scope for further efficiencies within the police, so that should be borne in mind.

Banks: Immigration Act 2016

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 23rd October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Compliance with the Immigration Act produces a benefit for society, as many immigrants contribute very well to the economy. I count myself as an immigrant; noble Lords can make a judgment about that.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, regarding the Immigration Act 2014, whose provisions I take it are actually in force, can the Government identify how many individuals have been identified as being in the United Kingdom without permission only through checks by banks and building societies under that Act? Can the Government say how many individuals have been wrongly denied opening an account and for how long, on average, because of these checks?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is quite difficult to answer the question of how many people might have been denied access to a bank account under the Immigration Act 2014 because people who are here illegally are part of a changing picture. I do not have to hand information on people who have been wrongly denied access to a bank account, but I can get back to the noble Lord on that topic.

Operation Conifer

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 11th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I take what my noble friend says, but it is very important to understand that part of an investigation of this sort also looks towards whether there are any contemporary child safeguarding issues around the living. If members of the public bring complaints and allegations forward to the police, it is right that the police investigate them, particularly if there are any ongoing or current misdemeanours to be looked into in addition.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, my understanding, which may well be incorrect, is that Wiltshire Police undertook this investigation in effect as the lead for a number of police forces, as the Operation Conifer investigation was not confined to alleged matters or to people in Wiltshire. In the light of the concerns expressed in some quarters about the investigation, and in the light of the response the Minister has given to the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, can she clarify this point? Which elected person, if any, had the statutory power—if they so chose to use it—to challenge how the Operation Conifer investigation was being conducted or even to stop it? Did the Home Secretary have that power? Did the Wiltshire police and crime commissioner have that power? Did some other elected figure have that power—or did no elected figure have that power?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The elected power who would have the authority to undertake any of the issues that the noble Lord is talking about would be the PCC. It would be up to him whether to call for an investigation and it would be for him to, perhaps, refer matters to the IPCC. He is the elected power.

Immigration: International Students

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 10th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I hesitate to intervene in the sense that, frankly, I could not do a more effective demolition job on the Government’s policy than the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, did. But I still do not think that we have heard from the Minister why the Government apparently see the overriding need to keep international students in the net migration figures, bearing in mind that the evidence shows that their removal would not make any significant difference to those figures. Is she able to explain to us why the Government are not prepared to stand up now and say that they are about to change their policy? From the response that she gave, which appeared to be a glowing one on the number of students coming into the country, can I take it that the universities are still quite happy that international students are retained within the net migration figures?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

What the noble Lord said about high compliance lends credence to the fact that our reforms are working in this area. We wish to continue to attract international students to study in the UK and we absolutely recognise the cultural and financial contribution that they make to this country. That is why we have commissioned the study that I referred the noble Baroness to, and why we do not limit the number of genuine international students who come here to study and from whom UK businesses can recruit.

Psychoactive Substances Act 2016

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 6th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Again, I wish I had been present for the debates that took place. I certainly take on board what the noble Lord said. I have not got an answer for him today, but I will look into the question that he asked.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Government’s 2017 drugs strategy states on page 4:

“While use of new psychoactive substances among the general population is low … they continue to appear rapidly on the market, and use among certain groups is problematic, particularly among the homeless population and in prisons”.


What exactly is “problematic” meant to convey in this context that could not have been conveyed in more specific, clearer language? If the problem is among the homeless and in prisons, would a solution not be more social housing and affordable housing to rent and buy in the first instance, and a review of the lessons that should be learned from an excessive reduction in the number of prison officers over the past seven years in the second instance?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I guess that “problematic” means causing a problem to society. It is a particular problem with homeless people because such drugs are very cheap—ditto in prisons—and some psychoactive substances are not easy to detect, particularly spice. I forget the end of what the noble Lord said. Ah! It was about prison officers. Certainly, from some of the documentaries we have seen on television, it needs to become harder to get drugs into prison and there are more and more ingenious methods of secreting them into prison.

Prevent Strategy

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 6th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank my noble friend for that question. On Islamophobia, the Government are absolutely clear that hatred and intolerance on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity have absolutely no place in our society. Our hate crime action plan sets out our commitment to defeating all forms of hatred. Generally, the Government’s counterextremism strategy defines extremism as,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.

This applies to all forms of extremism, including the far and extreme right wing.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Of course, the Prevent strategy to counteract extremism and acts likely to incite extremism applies across the board and to the whole community. Recently, some of our national media have carried a news story about alleged cultural impositions on a Christian child in the care of Muslim foster parents— a story that was subsequently revealed, following court proceedings, to be inaccurate in significant aspects, as well as being accompanied by a contentious mocked-up photograph. The way the story was presented and headlined was hardly designed to lower the temperature as far as attitudes about extremism are concerned. How exactly does the Prevent strategy apply to misleading reporting of such stories in our national media?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is extremely unhelpful and can be divisive when such stories hit the media. With regard to how that might fit into Prevent, the Prevent programme is fundamentally about supporting vulnerable individuals and safeguarding them from being drawn into terrorism. It is safeguarding in a similar way to how we would safeguard people from drug abuse or physical and sexual abuse. I will not comment on individual cases, but that would be the clear distinction between the two.

Immigration Act 2016

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 19th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question.

I have previously asked—without success—for the Government to provide the figures on the number of further unaccompanied children that local authorities have said they have the capacity to take in the current financial year, 2017-18, under Section 67 of the Immigration Act 2016, on the basis that government funding at the current level per child will be continued for further unaccompanied children coming here under the Dubs amendment in the current financial year. If I am again to be unsuccessful in getting an answer to that question, is it because, in the Government’s view, that question is now irrelevant because it appears in the response to the UQ that the Government have now put a cap of 480 on the number of children who can come here under the Dubs amendment? This is surely the same figure applicable at the time of the PNQ on 27 April 2017, in the light of the addition of the further 130 children as a result of a government administrative error, when the Government also said,

“we have not closed the Dubs scheme”.—[Official Report, 27/4/17; col. 1444.]

Surely, in the light of the response to the UQ, which appears to apply a cap of 480, that claim made on 27 April no longer stands up, and if I am right in saying that, frankly, that is a disgrace.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, regarding the cap, the specified number was set out in legislation. It was initially 350, which was based on the consultation we carried out with local authorities. I have apologised before at this Dispatch Box—I apologise again—in that there was an administrative error and the figure then rose to 480. That figure is based on the number of children that local authorities can accommodate. It is right that we have not closed the Dubs scheme, which remains open. There are numbers to be filled and therefore the Dubs scheme is not closed.

Immigration Centre Detainees: Pay

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 4th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is important to recognise that immigration detainees have lawfully had their right to work in the UK, if indeed they ever had one, curtailed by virtue of an immigration decision or by the decision to detain them. Therefore, their position regarding pay rights is not the same as for people who are not subject to immigration detention.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, a freedom of information request to the Home Office in 2014 apparently found that in May that year hundreds of detainees had been paid £45,438 for 44,832 hours of work. If that work were not done by detainees in the immigration centre “volunteering”, as the Government seem to describe it, presumably it would have to be done in total or in part by paid staff of Serco or whoever is running the centre. If the figures I have cited for one month are correct, that suggests that the saving from using detainees at £1 per hour, compared to paying employed staff on the minimum wage, would be in the region of £300,000 a month. Who gets the benefit of this apparently considerable financial saving each month? Is it the Government or the firm running the immigration centre who reap that financial benefit?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is important to recognise that the work undertaken is entirely voluntary. It is not to supplement the work of the contractors. Contractually, the IRC providers must make a minimum number of opportunities available for detainees to participate voluntarily in this paid activity. As I explained to the noble Baroness, detainees’ position regarding pay rights is not the same as for those who are not in detention.

Police: Senior Posts

Debate between Lord Rosser and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 29th June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, ahead of the election, we consulted police leaders on direct entry to chief constable rank, and the proposal on direct entry to the broader chief officer ranks featured in the Conservative manifesto. I found the meeting that I had with the noble Lords extremely useful. One thing that we all agreed on was the importance of leadership, with the skills and training required for senior police officers. Current legislation already allows direct entry at the ranks of assistant and deputy chief constable and of commander to deputy commissioner of the Met Police if a person has completed the police national assessment centre and the strategic command course. It is essential that people have not only the leadership but the skills going in.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Blair, got an answer to the specific question that he asked, but that is not always unusual. He has quite rightly drawn attention to the universal praise expressed for our police for their response to recent terrorist attacks. However, such praise does not help pay the ever-increasing daily bills which face our brave police officers in their everyday lives. Bearing in mind that the Government had no difficulty at extremely short notice in finding that an additional £1 billion was available to bolster their own political position in Parliament, can the Minister tell us what the Government’s policy is this morning on bolstering police pay between now and 2019, and the extent to which it differs from that laid down in 2015 by the then Chancellor, George Osborne?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, this country has seen some unprecedented events during the past three months in terms of the terrorist attacks and the terrible incident at Grenfell Tower. The police and emergency services not only have stepped up to the plate but have been under a lot of pressure in that time, both mental and physical. In the light of the recent attacks, we are engaging with the police about the demands that they face, to ensure that they continue to have the resources that they need to keep us safe.