My Lords, since it was created just over a year ago, the National Crime Agency has been operational across the UK, but its work in Northern Ireland has been greatly restricted because the Northern Ireland Assembly did not agree that NCA officers could use police powers and operate on matters that are devolved.
This means that our response to a national security threat—serious and organised crime—has been weakened. The specialist resources that the National Crime Agency has developed on child sexual exploitation, cybercrime and economic crime have not been available in Northern Ireland. The numbers of civil recovery cases are down and the National Crime Agency has been doing far less than SOCA did before it. The Police Service of Northern Ireland has had to stretch further to fill the gap.
Serious and organised crime groups do not operate in isolated pockets in each region. They do not respect borders or force boundaries. The Police Service of Northern Ireland estimates that there are between 140 and 160 organised crime groups active in Northern Ireland—an estimated 800 active criminals. Nearly a third of these groups are assessed as having international links. Another third are linked to crime elsewhere in the UK or in the Republic of Ireland.
The order that we are debating today changes matters. It enables the National Crime Agency to operate with full powers in Northern Ireland, including under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The NCA will be able to work with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, providing expertise, denying criminals assets and ensuring that the people of the United Kingdom are all afforded the same protection by the National Crime Agency.
The order ensures that the National Crime Agency will operate in Northern Ireland with the clear, transparent and significant accountability that the Northern Ireland political parties have sought. It is worth setting some of this out in detail here. The order will ensure the primacy of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. A National Crime Agency officer will not be able to use constable powers without the prior agreement of the chief constable of the PSNI. This process will ensure that NCA officers must have regard to community impact assessments.
The use of covert techniques will also require the prior agreement of the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The director-general will be answerable to the Northern Ireland Policing Board and will be required to attend meetings of the board and provide it with information. The board will monitor the exercise of NCA functions in Northern Ireland.
Reflecting the arrangements already in place for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Police Ombudsman will have a role in overseeing the activities of NCA officers in Northern Ireland and investigating complaints against them.
The director-general will also be responsible for ensuing that all NCA officers working in Northern Ireland have read and understand the Police Service of Northern Ireland code of ethics. Wherever practicable, the code will be reflected in the disciplinary procedures applicable to NCA officers in relation to their exercise of functions in Northern Ireland.
The order will also allow the NCA the ability to recover criminal assets in relation to offences that are devolved, together with the ability to request the recovery of assets held overseas in civil recovery cases.
This is a comprehensive package of measures which enables the NCA to operate effectively in Northern Ireland, while meeting concerns about accountability, by putting the agency on a very similar footing to the PSNI. I commend the order to the Committee.
Let me say, first, that we agree that the extension of the NCA’s power to Northern Ireland is a big step forward. I have one or two questions on the Explanatory Memorandum, but I raise them in the context of our agreement that we should be going down the road that is provided for in the order. I suspect that at least some, if not all, my questions will be because I have not fully understood the impact or significance—or lack of significance—of some things contained within the order.
My first question comes under that category of how significant or otherwise the order is. Paragraph 4.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum—I refer to the sentence starting with the last word on the second page—states:
“The effect of the extension of section 48(7) of the 2013 Act, and article 8(8) of the Order, is that these changes are deemed to always have had effect and so are retrospective”.
I am afraid that I have not been able to form a view in my own mind on what, in practical terms, is the effect of a change apparently being made retrospectively. Does that in reality have any impact on anybody or anything? How significant or otherwise is the reference to its being retrospective?
In paragraph 4.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum, the last sentence refers to the fact that,
“These provisions are not yet in force in Great Britain, and the effect of the extension of the provisions to Northern Ireland is that the provisions will be commenced by way of commencement order under the 2013 Act at a later date”.
If I have understood that correctly, the obvious question is: when is the later date? Are we talking about some time ahead or not?
Paragraph 7.1 is on the policy background to the issues that arose when we were discussing the 2013 Act, because the Northern Ireland Assembly would not pass a legislative consent Motion in respect of the provisions relating to the operation of the NCA in Northern Ireland. I just ask for confirmation—I think that this is what all the information in front of me implies anyway—that there are now no problems with any of the parties in Northern Ireland on that issue. Are they all at one with the road that we are going down as far as this order is concerned?
Paragraph 7.3 in the Explanatory Memorandum—once again, I am afraid that this comes into the category of my not understanding how significant or otherwise this is, and whether it means anything or does not really mean anything at all—refers to the fact that:
“The Order also makes modifications to the way ‘relevant NCA provisions’ will be exercised in Northern Ireland”.
I simply ask again: what are those modifications in practical terms? Do they mean anything of any substance, or are we talking about minor details?
Paragraph 7.4 then sets out some of the requirements. The first is:
“The requirement for the Secretary of State to consult strategic partners in Northern Ireland before setting strategic priorities for the NCA in Northern Ireland”.
Is it considered likely that those strategic priorities will be very similar for the NCA in the United Kingdom as a whole, or is it envisaged that there will almost definitely be strategic priorities that are very much related to Northern Ireland and not to anywhere else—and, if so, what kind of strategic priorities might they be if they are going to be significantly different from elsewhere in the United Kingdom?
Paragraph 7.4 of the Explanatory Memorandum refers to,
“The requirement for the Director General of the NCA to consult strategic partners in Northern Ireland when preparing an annual plan … including the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland … and obtain the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before issuing any annual plan”.
So we have a scenario where, in setting the strategic priorities, it is for the Secretary of State to consult strategic partners, but the actual issuing of any plan seems to need the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. Why is it that the strategic priorities and the preparation of the annual plan require consultation, but the issuing of any plan—which, presumably, is about implementing the strategic priorities—requires the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland? Is it potentially a blockage if, apparently, you cannot issue the plan unless you have the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland? Why is one part of it consultation, and why when it comes to the issuing of the plan is consent required? What is the significance of that?
Paragraph 7.5 states that the provisions are to include:
“A duty on a member of the PSNI or any other person operating in Northern Ireland charged with the duty of investigating organised crime or serious crime to co-operate with NCA officers in the discharge of NCA functions”.
Will there be any facility for the NCA to be able to second PSNI officers to assist them with their work in Northern Ireland, or will it always be done on the basis of co-operation rather than secondment?
My next question again probably comes under the category of not understanding the order fully. In paragraph 7.5, the fifth bullet point states:
“Those powers can only be exercised where a Northern Ireland general authorisation is in place and the powers are exercised in accordance with that authorisation”.
Is this order the general authorisation, or is the general authorisation something else that somebody has to give? If so, who is the person who has to give it? As I say, my question probably arises from not having fully understood what the order is saying.
Paragraph 7.5 goes on to say that the powers can be exercised also where,
“a general authorisation and an operational authorisation are in place and the powers are exercised in accordance with the operational authorisation”.
What can a National Crime Agency officer with powers and privileges of a constable not do in Northern Ireland that they could do in Great Britain with similar powers? Is there any distinction, or is the order simply giving them the same powers in Northern Ireland as they would have in the rest of Great Britain?
Paragraph 7.9—it is a fairly long paragraph, but I am referring to the seventh bullet point onwards, which is over the page—states:
“Paragraph 9 provides that the Director General must attend a meeting of the Northern Ireland Policing Board if given a reasonable period of notice … Paragraph 11 provides for inspections by the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland. Those inspections must relate to NCA officers exercising NCA functions in Northern Ireland … Paragraph 14 provides that the Secretary of State must consult the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before asking HMIC to carry out an inspection that relates specifically to NCA activity in Northern Ireland”.
Have I read that correctly? Can two inspectors, the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland and HMIC, both carry out inspections of NCA activity and functions in Northern Ireland and, if so, why? If I have read it correctly—and I may have misunderstood it—why do we need both of them capable of carrying out inspections? If that is the case, is it not a bit of overkill?
Finally, under the heading “Impact”, paragraph 10.2 states:
“NCA officers in Northern Ireland are currently engaged in activity that does not require them to exercise the powers and privileges of a Northern Ireland constable”.
How many NCA officers are already engaged in activity in Northern Ireland and how many is it anticipated there will be once the powers in the order come into force?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his questions on the order. I will try to take them in the order in which they were asked.
The noble Lord asked first about the retrospective nature of the order and what the effect of that is. The retrospective effect is to reverse the effect of the Perry case in the Supreme Court, which prevented the pursuing of assets outside the UK belonging to those living outside the UK. The provision took effect in Great Britain when the Crime and Courts Act 2013 came into effect and is not new to, or specific to, Northern Ireland. It allows the NCA to pursue assets outside Northern Ireland, even in relation to ongoing existing investigations.
The noble Lord also asked about paragraph 4.7 and the later date regarding the timing of the provisions being in force in Great Britain. We are commencing the remaining provisions in the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, for Great Britain on 1 June 2015; for Northern Ireland we expect commencement in late 2015 and no date has yet been agreed.
The noble Lord also asked about the Northern Ireland Assembly’s consent. Consent to this order was given on 3 February, as was required by the Crime and Courts Act, with Sinn Fein voting against the action to give consent.
The noble Lord asked whether the strategic priorities would be different in Northern Ireland and about the annual plan, which obviously needs consent. The strategic priorities are the same across the UK and are kept under review; the annual plan is specific to Northern Ireland and contains much more detail. It will have an impact on the PSNI and therefore needs agreement.
The noble Lord also asked about Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland and the HMIC seemingly having the same role. In fact, they have different functions. HMIC considers policing; the Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice will consider other aspects of activity.
The noble Lord also asked about PSNI co-operation and general authorisation. The PSNI works closely with the NCA and may second officers if appropriate; this is an operational decision. The general authorisation is agreed with the Northern Ireland Department of Justice and sets out any specific agreements that are necessary.
I may not have answered all the noble Lord’s questions. I am just about to answer another one. What can an NCA officer not do in Northern Ireland that he can do in the rest of Great Britain? He may only exercise the powers and privileges of a constable in Northern Ireland if the prior agreement of the chief constable is obtained. The requirements set out in Schedule 1 to the order need to be met. If they are met, then an NCA officer’s exercise of powers will be the same as in the rest of the UK.
I hope that answers most, if not all, the noble Lord’s questions.
I think that the Minister has effectively answered all of them, apart from the one on how many NCA officers there are currently engaged and how many it is anticipated there will be when the provisions of the order come in. Apart from that, I think that the noble Baroness has answered all my questions.
I am very pleased to hear it. I have not got the exact figures; I am not sure we know the exact figures at this stage. I will certainly write to the noble Lord on that.
My Lords, it is a fundamental principle of our justice system that any person prosecuted by the Crown has the right to a properly conducted defence. The criminal legal aid scheme provides that legal aid will be granted to those who cannot afford to pay. This may include apparently wealthy individuals who have been prevented by the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 from making use of their assets to pay for a legal defence.
Prior to the enactment of POCA, many defendants who were likely to have their assets confiscated if convicted would recklessly dissipate assets through lavish spending on their defence in an attempt to secure an acquittal at any cost and reduce the amount available for confiscation if convicted. POCA introduced provisions to prevent this occurring by prohibiting the use of assets “restrained” or frozen to pay for defence costs because they may be needed to satisfy a future confiscation order. As a consequence, some apparently wealthy individuals, including some individuals suspected of involvement in serious and organised crime such as drug smuggling and large scale fraud, rely on legal aid to pay for their defence.
In recent years, a system of means testing for legal aid has been introduced for all Crown Court defendants. Those who can afford to pay some or all of their legal aid costs are required to do so. While anyone charged with a criminal offence and facing imprisonment or loss of livelihood is entitled to legal aid, I think that most noble Lords would agree that, if the defendant can pay some or all of their legal bill, they should.
The effect of the POCA provisions that prevent defendants from using restrained assets to pay their defence costs means that some wealthy individuals are not only granted legal aid but are also unable to pay any contribution towards it. This leads to a public perception of unfairness in respect of the legal aid scheme. Members of the public may wonder why such an individual should get a taxpayer-funded defence without making any contribution when less well-off defendants still have to contribute to the cost of their defence. After all, as we are asking people on modest incomes to pay something towards their defence costs, it seems only fair and reasonable that we ask millionaires to do so as well.
These regulations, and related regulations to be laid in a negative resolution instrument by the Ministry of Justice, introduce a new system that will help ensure that individuals who are required to make a contribution to the cost of their defence are made to do so. This will be accomplished by keeping such a defendant’s assets under restraint until they have either paid off their outstanding legal aid payments in full or the court discharges the restraint order.
To ensure that the new policy does not have a negative impact on either victims or the rest of the criminal justice system, the Legal Aid Agency will seek to recover legal aid payments from capital assets that remain after the confiscation process has been completed. This instrument allows for the extension of a restraint order beyond the payment of a confiscation order when a capital contribution order is issued before the end of the confiscation process. The person subject to the order will then be required to pay legal aid contributions from the remaining restrained capital after the confiscation order has been paid in full.
Not every restrained assets case will fall within the new regime. The defendant may have no assets remaining after any compensation owed to the victims and moneys owing under the confiscation order have been paid in full. The Government’s view is, however, that where a defendant has assets left after their ill-gotten gains have been confiscated and their victims compensated, it is right that such assets be used to repay the costs of their criminal defence. These regulations will help to ensure that that happens.
The regulations allow for the payment of legal aid contributions from restrained assets, but it may not always be considered necessary to continue with restraint in order to get a capital contribution order satisfied, in which case the court will be asked to lift the restraint order after the confiscation process has been completed. The capital contribution order will be issued against the remaining unrestrained assets. This is something that will be considered on a case-by-case basis after discussions between the prosecutor and the Legal Aid Agency.
As a result of these changes and the associated memorandum of understanding, a closer working relationship between the prosecutors and the Legal Aid Agency will be developed, ensuring that the process for recovering legal aid costs is smoother, regardless of whether a restraint order is extended past the confiscation order.
These changes are intended to come into force on 1 June. It is anticipated that these types of cases accrue about £2 million of legal aid costs a year and these changes will help the Legal Aid Agency to recover as much of these costs from offenders as is possible. I beg to move.
I have just a couple of points. Obviously, we support the intentions behind these regulations and what they seek to achieve.
Could I just ask about paragraph 4.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum? Once again, I am not sure exactly what to make of it. It says:
“The enabling powers for the regulations (found in sections 46 and 47 of the CCA)”—
that is, the Crime and Courts Act—
“are not yet in force. It is our intention to commence sections 46 and 47 before the regulations are made, but after they have been laid in draft and debated by both Houses of Parliament”.
Does that mean that we will end up with a situation where the relevant sections have been commenced but there are no regulations in existence, or am I misinterpreting what is indicated in paragraph 4.3? It would be helpful if the noble Baroness could clarify what exactly it means in practical terms.
I have just one other point. I think the noble Baroness said that the changes would probably be expected to recover another £2 million that is not being recovered at the moment. Is that expected to be from a significant number of people, or is the argument—and obviously the reason for these regulations—that it is a fairly limited number of people who are withholding, able to withhold or not paying quite significant sums of money? The Minister has given the figure for the money that should be and is not being clawed back at the moment, but are we talking about a relatively limited number of Mr and Mrs Bigs in this world who are withholding or able not to pay the contribution towards the legal aid, or does it cover a large number of people in that position who will make up the £2 million total that it is hoped will be retrieved under these regulations?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his questions. On his first question on commencement, the answer is quite technical. Would he be happy for me to write to him?
I say this seriously, even though it may sound a facetious comment. Could the noble Baroness persuade whoever writes the letter to write it in language that even I might be able to understand? That would be very helpful.
I totally support the noble Lord on his wish to receive letters in plain English. I shall put in that request.
On the number of people and the amount that I mentioned, the amount is an estimate of money accruable to legal costs after confiscation and living expenses. The numbers are not known, but the noble Lord will be pleased to hear that we do not have massive numbers of people undertaking this type of criminal activity, so I cannot imagine that the numbers are huge. I will correct that comment if I am wrong, but I would not have thought that it would constitute a significant number of people at all.
I shall write to the noble Lord on the first question, in plain English.
My Lords, these orders give effect to four codes of practice that provide guidance on the use of various powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—POCA. The amendments to the codes of practice are necessary purely as a consequence of amendments to POCA previously approved by this House. It is therefore important to note that we are not debating the powers themselves, but rather the content of the codes which give guidance on the use of those powers.
The codes provide an important safeguard and ensure that the powers in POCA are used in a targeted, consistent and effective way, thus providing vital reassurance to the public that the powers are being used appropriately. POCA stipulates that the Secretary of State must prepare and publish a draft of any new or revised code, consider any representations made and modify the draft as appropriate. I can assure the Committee that proper consultation has been undertaken on all the codes that I will refer to today.
The first of these codes, on cash searches, governs the use of powers to search for cash suspected to be the proceeds of, or intended for use in, crime. The second order gives effect to a new code of practice governing the use of search and seizure powers to prevent the dissipation of property that may be used to satisfy a future confiscation order made under POCA. The code also governs the use of the power to detain such property. The third order before the Committee gives effect to a revised code of practice providing guidance on the use of the powers of investigation by law enforcement officers under POCA.
POCA has been amended so that the Crown Court, rather than the High Court will deal with investigation powers relating to a detained cash investigation. Civil recovery investigation powers have been extended to cover persons as well as property, and provide for requests for evidence to be made overseas. The revised code addresses those changes. The Attorney-General put forward similar amendments to the code he made in relation to the investigation powers available to prosecutors in civil recovery cases.
The amended codes before noble Lords build on previous codes issued under POCA. They closely follow those issued more widely to police officers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The codes provide an important safeguard and ensure that the powers are used in a targeted, consistent and effective way, thus providing vital reassurance to the public that the powers in POCA are being used appropriately. The orders before the Committee will bring all the relevant codes of practice into effect, ensuring that effective and up-to-date guidance and safeguards are in place and enabling full commencement of the POCA amendments that I have described.
Once commenced, the new powers will give officers important new tools for the recovery of criminally obtained assets. This is a key pledge of our serious and organised crime strategy and this Government’s commitment to tackling all levels of crime. We are working towards a common commencement date for these new powers across Great Britain of 1 June 2015. Commencement of the powers in Northern Ireland will be slightly delayed, as we have only recently secured legislative consent for the Assembly to fully extend the NCA’s powers to Northern Ireland. However, we expect these new powers to commence in Northern Ireland before the end of the year.
The use of these powers will rightfully be guided by the codes of practice. They are an important safeguard to ensure the targeted, proportionate and effective use of these powers, balanced against the rights of individuals and communities. I therefore ask the Committee to approve these orders. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the Minister has reminded us, we are not here to discuss the original legislation but the codes of practice. However, the question is just how successful will the codes of practice be in achieving the goal that is set out in the legislation. These draft codes of practice have been set out to guide law enforcement officers and accredited investigators in the exercise of their functions when conducting investigations under the relevant parts of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Indeed, the codes go through many facets of the investigation of proceeds of crime, including search and seizure warrants, monitoring orders, interview conditions and obtaining evidence from abroad.
My Lords, the statutory instrument before us brings into effect a number of changes to the Extradition Act 2003. This order has two significant purposes. First, it makes several consequential amendments that are needed to bring into force the new appeals filter, which was agreed by Parliament during the passage of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Secondly, it adds to the list of territories designated under Part 2 of the Act, and amends some existing designations.
I shall briefly explain in a little more detail why these changes are being brought at this juncture and the effect that they will have on our extradition arrangements. Under the 2003 Act, UK extradition partners are designated under either Part 1 or Part 2. The territories designated under Part 1 are EU member states and Gibraltar, which operate the European arrest warrant. Territories are designated under Part 2 on the basis that they are parties to the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, parties to the Commonwealth scheme on extradition or have signed a bilateral extradition treaty with the UK.
Since 2004, from time to time, further territories have been designated for the purposes of Part 2 of the 2003 Act, for example, where territories have joined the European convention, where particular bilateral treaties have taken effect or where experience of extradition cases has shown that designations are required. It was only right, therefore, that in his review of extradition arrangements in 2010, Sir Scott Baker recommended that the Government periodically review Part 2 designations and their evidential requirements. The Government, in response to Sir Scott Baker’s report, undertook to conduct such a review and this order now draws on the findings of the first part of a two-part internal review of designations.
Specifically, in acting on the conclusions of the first part of this review, the Philippines is now being designated as a result of the negotiation and ratification of a bilateral extradition treaty. The existing designation for Serbia and Montenegro is being amended to reflect the fact that they are now separate countries. Kosovo is being specifically designated to reflect its status as a separate territory. The Dutch and Danish overseas territories are being designated because they are parties to the 1957 convention and we, therefore, have a legal obligation towards them. In addition, the British Overseas Territories are being designated following a court ruling that the existing arrangements which were put in place when the 2003 Act came into force did not apply in relation to requests from a British Overseas Territory to the UK. This order will resolve that anomaly.
The order also removes any requirement to provide prima facie evidence for the Dutch and Danish overseas territories, Monaco and San Marino when they make an extradition request to the United Kingdom. This reflects the fact that they are parties to the 1957 convention and our obligations therein. The order removes Monaco and San Marino from the list of territories that are afforded a longer than normal period in which to provide a full extradition request to the judge where a person has been arrested under a provisional warrant. The normal period of 45 days from arrest will now apply to those territories, again to reflect that they are parties to the 1957 convention. The order adds Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha to the list of those territories afforded 65 days to provide the relevant documents. This is because these territories are accessible only by sea and, as such, more time is required to send the original papers.
The second part of our internal review of designations will focus on UK extradition relations under the non-binding Commonwealth scheme for extradition. It will consider matters such as human rights and whether there has been a disproportionately long period of time since any request has been received from a territory, and the effect that that should have on its designation. If it is found to be appropriate to either designate or undesignate a territory or territories, both Houses will be afforded the opportunity to debate this by way of an order before Parliament.
Turning to the other purposes of this order, the Baker review recommended introducing an appeals filter to appeals against extradition under the 2003 Act. This was introduced by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The provisions before us will make amendments to the 2003 Act that are consequential on the operation of the appeals filter. The filter represents one of the major reforms to our extradition arrangements, and will apply to extraditions in both Part 1 and Part 2 cases, and to appeals made both by the subject of the request and by the requesting state.
At present, once extradition has been ordered, the person may appeal directly to the High Court. The Baker review found that very few appeals to the High Court succeed. The appeals filter, once it has been commenced, will make it clear that an appeal lies only with the leave of the High Court and should help avoid unmeritorious appeals clogging up the court.
Before the appeals filter can be commenced, a number of minor consequential amendments are required to be made to the 2003 Act. These technical changes will be made by this order in the interests of clarity and to ensure that the appeals filter operates effectively from the moment it comes into force.
I urge noble Lords to support these changes in the interests of efficiency and of ensuring that our extradition arrangements are clear and effective. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the Minister has said, the Extradition Act 2003 provides for two distinct sets of procedures to apply to incoming extradition requests. Part 2 of that Act provides a system that includes ministerial involvement, unlike Part 1 of the 2003 Act. Part 2 is applied to territories that are not EU member states with which the United Kingdom has extradition relations. As the Minister has said, the Baker review of the UK’s extradition arrangements recommended that those territories designated under Part 2 of the Act should be intermittently reviewed, and this order now draws on the findings of the first part of a two-part internal review of designations.
I raise two or three pretty minor points. The Minister referred to the second part of the internal review, which, as I understand it, has still to take place. Can she estimate when it is likely to be completed? Paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum says that that second part of the review,
“will also consider whether there has been a disproportionately long period of time since any request has been received from a territory, and what effect that should have on its designation for the purposes of the 2003 Act”.
Are any of the territories specifically referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum likely to come into this category of the,
“disproportionately long period of time since any request has been received”,
or are we talking about different territories, so that none of the territories specifically referred to in this EM would come into the category being looked at under the second part of the internal review?
The Minister also referred to the change in the number of days addressed in paragraph 7.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum, where it says that,
“in provisional arrest cases involving Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, the period in which the full papers must be provided to the judge is 65 days (rather than the normal 45 days)”.
I have not entirely understood why this situation arises. How many such cases are there each year from these territories? If the present requirement is 45 days, though I am not sure that it is, what are the actual difficulties that have been encountered? Have they meant that we have no alternative but to apply the 65-day period, since obviously the three territories have not only just become accessible by sea? Some would say that that situation may have existed for some time. As I say, I accept that my question may show that I have not fully understood the purpose for, or the reason behind, the change.
The Minister will be aware of what the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments had to say about the relationship between the coming into force of Article 3 of the Act and the commencement of Section 160 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The department commented that it would make the relationship more explicit in the final version of the Explanatory Memorandum when the order was made. Should the Explanatory Memorandum I have in front of me make the relationship more explicit, or is that an Explanatory Memorandum that is still to come?
I hope the noble Lord will forgive me; I missed his last question because I was seeking clarification on something. If he would like to repeat it, that would be very helpful, or I could write to him.
I simply asked about the issue that was raised in the 23rd report of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments of the intended relationship between the coming into force of Article 3 of the Extradition Act and the commencement of Section 160 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which are all covered in the order and in the Explanatory Memorandum. In responding to that issue, the Home Office said that the department would make the relationship more explicit in the final version of the Explanatory Memorandum when the order is made. I was not entirely clear whether the Explanatory Memorandum that I have in front of me is the one in which the relationship should be made more explicit, or whether another Explanatory Memorandum will be provided that will make it explicit and meet the observation made by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
I thank the noble Lord very much for repeating that. To answer the last question first, there will be another one.
The noble Lord asked about territories that had been identified for which a disproportionate period of time may have elapsed. None has yet been identified. He asked about St Helena and Tristan da Cunha. He is absolutely right that there has always been sea around them. There was hundreds of years ago and there still is; that has not changed. In fact, I am sure that I read somewhere about a bridge being built to St Helena. We are approaching this with a sense of reasonableness in terms of delay. There have been no cases from St Helena between 2003 and 2015, but I suppose that a reasonableness test may be applied to getting documents to us or to them.
The noble Lord asked about the date of the second part of the internal review. We are expecting that in the first Session of the new Parliament. I think that answers all his questions.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not aware of my noble friends’ abilities at singing or dancing, so I do not know whether I would want to put them at the Dispatch Box in front of your Lordships.
One organisation that has done a lot to allow and promote busking is London Underground. The House may not be aware that my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe was largely responsible for that when he was in charge of London Underground. He can indeed be described as the buskers’ friend. I would like to follow up on one point, because I was not quite clear what the Minister’s response was to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, when he said that the statutory guidance was not as clear as it might be. I think that he asked for an assurance that it would be looked at again if it was shown not to be adequate, and he referred to the situation in Canterbury. What was the Minister’s response to that? Did she say that the statutory guidance would be reconsidered if it proved inadequate, as the noble Lord suggested that it was?
My Lords, we have no plans to issue guidance in relation to how the two existing Acts are applied to buskers. I am sure that the guidance would be looked at if a problem were found. The task force wants to develop a voluntary code of practice, and that will be very helpful both to buskers and to local authorities, not just in London but around the country.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the Government recognise the importance of respecting human rights and are committed to preserving the rights of individuals in their homes and businesses not to undergo unnecessary intrusion. The Government have consistently made very clear their intention that public authorities should have fewer powers to enter people’s homes and that the privacy and rights of home owners and businesses should be protected and strengthened wherever possible. It is essential that powers of entry, as with any enforcement power, achieve the right balance between the need to enforce the law and ensure public protection, and providing sufficient safeguards and rights for the individual.
Powers of entry are statutory powers for a person to enter land or other premises for a specific purpose. Such powers are important tools that facilitate the protection of the public from harm, enable the effective investigation of offences and allow for the necessary enforcement of regulations. It is sometimes necessary to enter premises. However, we recognise that doing so can place burdens on businesses and individuals, and we have therefore sought to correct this.
The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 introduced a number of measures to rationalise the more than 1,200 powers of entry that were available in statute. The Act required Ministers who have responsibility for powers of entry to, for the first time, examine those powers together, consider whether they were still necessary and proportionate and, crucially, consider whether they contained sufficient safeguards. Reports laid before Parliament in November last year proposed significant reform. The Act also provided for the introduction of a code of practice containing guidance about powers of entry and associated powers.
Following the review of existing powers of entry, this order provides for such a code of practice to come into force on 6 April this year. The order also describes those who will be covered by the term “relevant person” for the purposes of entry to premises. Subject to certain exceptions, this will mean that, in future, any person exercising a power of entry will be obliged to have regard to the new code. The two exceptions to the definition of “relevant person” are that, first, the person concerned is exercising a devolved power of entry and, secondly, that the exercise of the particular power of entry is subject to a separate statutory code of practice.
The relevant code of practice to which this order relates was first published last December. It provides guidance and sets out considerations that apply before, during and after the exercise of powers of entry—for example, that an occupier needs to be provided with written notice at least 48 hours before entry and that reasonable efforts should be made to obtain the informed consent of the occupier.
Of course, many of the considerations set out in the code already exist in statute in relation to certain powers of entry. It is therefore important that the code of practice does not override existing provisions and introduce unwelcome complication. The purpose of the code is simply to provide for a minimum level of safeguards to be applied broadly across powers of entry and to increase the consistency and transparency with which they are exercised. Where particular safeguards already exist in statute, the code will not alter or replace them.
Under the recent review, we proposed significant reform to existing powers of entry under statute. This code seeks to build on that reform and ensure that all entry to premises is exercised in a more proportionate and less intrusive manner, while upholding effective enforcement where necessary. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the purpose of and background to this order. The Explanatory Memorandum indicates that the Secretary of State has been obliged to prepare a code of practice containing guidance about the exercise of powers of entry under, I believe, Section 47 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
Why does it appear to have taken a quite considerable period of time to produce the code? The public consultation took place over some six weeks at the beginning of 2013, and it does not appear that the Government were exactly overwhelmed with responses, since there were apparently just 28. What has been happening since the beginning of March last year? Could the Minister also say who was consulted on the code? The 2012 Act places a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult various people in the course of preparing the code of practice and in relation to the description of “relevant persons”.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his contribution and hope that I can satisfy him on some if not all of the questions that he asked.
The review of all existing powers of entry identified more than 1,200 such powers. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why it took so long. I suppose the answer is, in part, that there were more than 1,200 separate powers, exercised in a very broad range of circumstances, and the review was therefore quite a considerable and complex task. It was really the first time that the Government considered these powers of entry as a whole rather than in parts. Although it took a while, I hope the noble Lord is satisfied about why it did. The important thing is that the review was carried out.
I certainly do not wish to pursue this point in great detail, but the consultation on the draft code of practice finished at the beginning of 2013, so presumably the draft code of practice reflected the 1,237 separate powers and how they could be brought together into a draft code of practice to produce greater conformity and consistency. What I cannot understand is why, the consultation on the draft code of practice having ended early in 2013, it has now taken so long for us to be considering the code of practice in its final form.
My Lords, I appreciate the point that the noble Lord makes. The consultation was completed in 2013, but the issue is complex. I assume that the Government had to consider the complexity of the matter as a whole. The noble Lord still does not look satisfied, so perhaps I should put it in writing in due course.
The noble Lord also asked who was consulted. We consulted widely with organisations responsible for exercising powers of entry as well as with the businesses and individuals who are subject to the powers. We believe the new code of practice will provide the much needed consistency and transparency that he talked about and will ensure that members of the public know what to expect when powers of entry are exercised without unduly restricting the ability of enforcement bodies to take necessary action.
I now have from the Box behind me another point about why it took so long to produce the code. It was in order to meet the concerns of other government departments. It was necessary to complete the review of existing powers before bringing forward the code of practice and take into account their concerns on the wording of the code. I will lay that out in writing to the noble Lord.
The code was subject to public consultation and was available on the Home Office website. Home owners at the time were able to access it. The review and the code were separate projects—that might also be helpful to the noble Lord. The review was about which existing powers should be revoked, have safeguards added or be rewritten, while the code is about what safeguards should apply to the exercise of powers of entry that remain on the statute book. I hope that helps to clarify the noble Lord’s concerns there.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why it will be five years before an internal review takes place. Section 49 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 places an obligation on the Secretary of State to keep the code under review. This obligation will bite from the point the code comes into force. I hope that explains that point.
The noble Lord also asked whether organisations say that the code will make them less effective than they are now. None of the organisations that responded to the consultation stated that the code will be less effective than the current arrangements. I hope that gives the noble Lord comfort.
The noble Lord also asked when changes proposed by the review will take effect. It is for the department to make the legislative changes that have been proposed in review reports. Timetables will take into account the wider policy context in which a particular power operates; for example, it might be appropriate to make changes to powers of entry alongside other planned reforms. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 provides statutory tools to repeal, add further safeguards to or consolidate powers of entry, and I am aware of a number of changes having been introduced.
I am sure that I have not answered everything that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked, but I hope that gives him some satisfaction. With that, I commend the order to the Committee.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this order concerns the important government commitment to reduce the number of organisations that can access communications data. Noble Lords will be aware of the significance of this subject and of the provisions on the retention of communications data currently being considered by this House in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill.
As noble Lords will know, communications data are the who, where, when and how of a communication but not its content. It is a crucial tool for fighting crime, protecting children and combating terrorism. Access to communications data is governed by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, known as RIPA. RIPA contains robust safeguards, including tests of necessity and proportionality. In July last year, in response to an adverse judgment of the European Court of Justice on the EU data retention directive, Parliament passed the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, or DRIPA. This Act ensured that important capabilities were not undermined, while increasing safeguards.
While that legislation concerned data retention, the Prime Minister also announced a number of safeguards concerning access to communications data. One of those safeguards was a commitment to reduce the number of organisations with access to that data. This order fulfils that important commitment. A further safeguard in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act will ensure that data retained under that Act can be accessed only via RIPA or through a court order or warrant. This order therefore replicates a power to access communications data that already exists in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
I will now turn to the substance of the order. As I have said, it reduces the number of organisations that can access communications data. This is a crucial safeguard. I know that this Committee will agree that only those authorities that can make the strongest possible case should be allowed access. Following a recommendation from the Joint Committee on the draft communications data Bill, the Home Office conducted an exercise to ascertain whether some authorities should lose their powers to access communications data. This order removes powers from the following 13 authorities identified in that exercise: the Charity Commission; the Civil Nuclear Constabulary; the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Northern Ireland; the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills; the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; the Department of the Environment, Northern Ireland; the Environment Agency; the Food Standards Agency; the Pensions Regulator; the Port of Dover Police; the Port of Liverpool Police; the Royal Mail; and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency.
Some noble Lords may consider that we should have gone further and taken away powers from more authorities. The Government considered the business cases for all the authorities with communications data powers. I can assure noble Lords that there are very good reasons why the authorities that have retained their powers have been allowed to do so. When deciding which authorities should retain access, the Government considered a number of issues, including the statutory responsibilities of the authorities with access, the seriousness of the offences they investigate and the number of requests that they made. Although identifying authorities to lose powers was not easy, the authorities identified in this order were not able to demonstrate that their continued access was strictly necessary.
It is worth noting that there is also a substantial amount of transparency on this issue. The most recent report by the Interception of Communications Commissioner listed all the authorities with access to communications data and the purposes for which they can access those data, as well as the number of requests that they made in the calendar year. I hope that the approach the Government have taken and the transparency available will assure noble Lords that the Government are taking the right action concerning which authorities should have investigatory powers. This brings me on to the other provision in this order.
The order also amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) Order 2010 to add a new purpose for which communications data may be acquired for the purposes of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. This new purpose is specifically designed to replace powers that are currently available in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The order specifies that only two public authorities will be able to use this purpose to access communications data: the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. The measure will ensure that all their requests for communications data are subject to the safeguards in RIPA. These two authorities are currently able to access communications data under RIPA for the purpose of the prevention or detection of crime. They are also able to access communications data under the Financial Services and Markets Act when investigating civil abuse of our financial system.
Noble Lords will understand, particularly in the light of experiences over the past few years, how serious and damaging the impact of abuse of our financial system can be. Communications data are capable of showing who contacted who and at what time. This power is fundamental in, for example, proving that insider dealing has taken place. So to be clear: this new purpose replaces powers that have been available in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 but ensures that they are subject to the robust safeguards in RIPA.
I know that the Committee will appreciate why we are bringing forward the provisions in this order. Equally, I know that the Committee will want to feel confident that we will keep under review whether the right authorities have the right powers. I can assure the Committee that we will. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 provided for David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to undertake a review of investigatory powers and report by 1 May 2015. DRIPA also contains a sunset clause of December 2016. Therefore, legislation on communications data will be needed in the next Parliament. We look forward to the findings of the review and to using those findings to inform future legislation.
In closing, the order fulfils the important government commitment to reduce the number of organisations with access to communications data. It also ensures that all requests for communications data by the financial regulators are subject to the safeguards in RIPA. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the background and purpose of the order which, as she said, removes some public authorities from the list of bodies allowed to access communications data under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and increases the grounds under that Act on which the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority can access data to include non-criminal enforcement of financial services regulation.
However, why are the Government bringing forward the order now? The Explanatory Memorandum refers to the draft communications data Bill, as did the Minister, and a Joint Committee report published more than two years ago. The Explanatory Memorandum also states that while that Bill was being considered there was substantial consultation with the authorities from which this order removes powers, as well as with the Treasury in relation to the change affecting the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. All this appears to have been some time ago, and it is only now that the order is being brought forward, yet there have been other developments since the Joint Committee report on the consultations to which I have referred. As the Explanatory Memorandum itself says in paragraph 12—to which the Minister has already made reference—the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act of last July,
“requires the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to carry out a review of investigatory powers, including communications data”.
That review should be completed by 1 May, in just over three months’ time. In addition, the Intelligence and Security Committee is determining how we can properly balance both security and liberty in online communications.
Why then have the Government decided to bring this already delayed order in now rather than wait for the pending reports and views on issues relating to communications data from the independent reviewer and the ISC? Is bringing this order forward now rather a case of jumping the gun in the light of developments in recent months, bearing in mind that this order appears to have been somewhat delayed? It would be helpful if the Minister could say why the Government deem it appropriate for the 13 organisations listed to lose access to communications data. One of them has undergone a fundamental change in ownership since the Government first started considering this issue. What were the criteria against which the decision that they should lose access to communications data was reached?
On the consultation that took place some time ago, which is referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum, can the Minister confirm what I think she said in her opening comments that all the 13 authorities concerned had agreed to the removal of their powers to access communications data? Will she also say whether the relevant Ministers did likewise in respect of the authorities that came under their departments? Were any authorities originally on the list subsequently taken off the list of 13 we now have? Were any organisations that were not originally on the list subsequently added it?
During a debate in this House in July last year, reference was made to the Food Standards Agency, which is included in the list of 13 organisations and, in particular, to the egg inspectorate of the Food Standards Agency using RIPA. We were told that in the past few years people have gone to prison for multimillion-pound frauds restamping eggs. In that debate, we were told that billions of eggs were being brought in from France unstamped and processed in a factory in the Midlands. The egg inspectorate had to know about this, and there was a tip-off. The point being made in that debate was that any idea of the egg inspectorate not being able to use RIPA would seriously weaken the efforts of those who are there to protect us from the kind of activity I have just described. Will the Minister comment on that in the light of the fact that the Food Standards Agency is listed as one of the organisations losing access to communications data under RIPA?
We are not opposing the order, but I should be grateful if the Government respond in some detail—if not today, then subsequently—to the questions I have asked and the points that I have made.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for the questions he has raised. I am very grateful that he will allow me to write to him in due course, given that I have not had a Box behind me for most of the debate.
On why the order is required now and why we cannot do everything together, DRIPA has a sunset clause and everything will have to be reviewed in the next Parliament. In addition, the independent reviewer David Anderson QC will report his findings on 1 May 2015. There is no doubt about it: the Government and subsequent Governments will need to review the whole thing in the round anyway, and the sunset clause in 2016 will underline that need to review the whole issue.
The noble Lord also asked why we specifically chose the 13 organisations to lose power and whether they were satisfied with that loss. I understand that some concern was expressed by the Royal Mail. I do not know of any concern expressed by any other organisation. The primary reason they were chosen was they had made little if any use of the powers, and therefore were taken off the list. It is also important to note that the Joint Committee found it difficult to say which organisation should lose its powers.
As I understand it, the Joint Committee basically said that organisations should be looked at. That has been done and the 13 have emerged. It would certainly be helpful to know the criteria that we use to decide which ones should be on the list.
I hope that I have explained that. It was the case that either little use or no use had been made of the powers. I assume that, as time goes on, organisations may be added to the list or be taken off it, depending on events. The noble Lord asked a specific question about the egg inspectorate. As I understand it, the inspectorate does not have powers to access communications data. I hope that that helps.
Is the Minister saying that it does not have powers at present—not that it will not have them but that it does not have them at present?
It has never had them, I understand. I will have to write to the noble Lord because I know that I have not answered all his questions, but I hope that he will be satisfied with that.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank the Minister for her explanation of the reasons for and purpose of the order. The order amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to add immigration officers to the officers to whom the code of practice governing the exercise of the powers concerned will apply. The order also defines “senior officer” in relation to an immigration officer.
As the Minister has said, the order addresses an oversight at the time of the passing of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. We accept the need to rectify situation.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his brief comments. With that, I commend the order to the Committee.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeOnce again, I thank the Minister for her explanation of the background to, and purpose of this order, which we support. The order, as the noble Lady has said, brings into force a revised code of practice that is intended to make clear what constitutes reasonable grounds for suspicion when police officers decide to exercise their statutory powers of stop and search. It also indicates that, if these powers are not exercised lawfully, performance or disciplinary procedures could be instituted.
As the Minister said, and as the Explanatory Memorandum also states, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary found that 27% of the stop-and- search records that they examined did not contain reasonable grounds to search people. The inspectorate attributed this to poor levels of understanding among officers about what constitutes reasonable grounds and poor supervision.
On the point that has just been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in relation to culture as much as anything, the Explanatory Memorandum indicates that a review is taking place of the national training on stop and search through the College of Policing. Perhaps the noble Baroness could indicate when it is expected that the review will be completed. The Explanatory Memorandum also states that,
“the College of Policing will consider introducing a requirement that stop and search training should be subject to assessment and refreshed on a rolling basis”,
with failure to pass meaning that,
“officers could not use the powers in the course of their duties”.
Can the Minister indicate when a decision is likely on whether to introduce this requirement referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum?
Perhaps I may also raise a few points on the consultation that took place on the revisions to the code of practice. Were any significant issues raised by the campaigning and community support groups and organisations referred to that responded not adopted and, if so, what were they? If I read it correctly, the Explanatory Memorandum indicates that responses were received from six police forces and one police and crime commissioner. In view of the importance of appropriate use of the stop-and-search powers for good police and community relations, that would seem, on the face of it, to be a low level of response from the police. Perhaps the Minister could comment on that in her reply and say whether the Metropolitan Police was one of the forces that responded.
The Explanatory Memorandum sets out in paragraph 12 the success criteria for the changes. One of the criteria is:
“Reduction in the use of stop and search and improvements in police and community relations”.
Is there a target for the reduction in the use of stop and search? The Explanatory Memorandum states that the implementation and impact of the changes in the code of practice will be monitored “on an ongoing basis”. When is it likely that information on the progress being made will first appear in the public domain?
Having asked all those questions, I repeat that we support the order.
I thank my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for their very constructive comments on this order. My noble friend Lord Paddick makes an excellent point about not just amending the legislation but changing the culture in which the police operate and the importance of training in embedding the new attitudes and approach to stop and search. I assure both him and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the College of Policing is making very good progress in its review of national training. The Government expect the college to publish a first draft of stop-and-search standards in February. I hope that that is helpful.
There were a number of other questions on which I hope that it will be okay to write to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in due course. I thank both noble Lords and commend the statutory instrument to the Committee.
My Lords, I am happy to be involved with this debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, who not only asked me my first Question but has engaged me in my first debate. When researching this subject, I noticed that he has an almost Wilberforcian determination to bring the issue forward.
As noble Lords have outlined, the Government’s policy is to allow asylum seekers to apply for permission to work only if they have not received a decision on their claim after 12 months because of reasons outside their control. This is fair and reasonable. In the Government’s view, it is vital that we maintain a distinction between economic migration and asylum. Many noble Lords have raised the issue of the crossover where people awaiting asylum can work. The policy in place is specifically designed to mitigate this risk and to protect labour markets by restricting employment, when permission is granted, to occupations on the shortage occupations list published by the Home Office.
As many noble Lords have said, the desirability of the United Kingdom as a destination for economic migrants is not in doubt—this is a great place to live. The Government have been successful at reducing non-EEA migration, but EEA migration remains high as those who benefit from EU free movement come here to look for work. Widening access to the labour market by relaxing our policy on the right for asylum seekers would send the wrong signals and damage the significant progress that this Government have made in controlling migration.
My noble friend Lord Roberts referred to the attitude of other EU countries to asylum seekers. I have looked into this. It is true that if you arrive in Greece you can work straightaway. However, you cannot avail yourself of some of the asylum support and accommodation that we provide in this country, and life could be made far more difficult for you ultimately. He also referred to Sweden, which is a very good case in point. In Sweden you have to have a personal identification number in order to work. However, in order to work as a migrant you have to learn Swedish and do extensive volunteering work, which in itself takes up time.
The issue of whether it takes too long to consider asylum claims has been raised. The Home Office is addressing the issue. In 2012-13, 78% of asylum claims received a decision within six months. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that all asylum claims must be carefully considered and that this takes time and resources.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, mentioned the backlog, as did the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I have some figures about the number of additional staff being drafted in. I understand that 160 new decision-making executive officers are in place to deal with this, as are 90 administration officers. Nearly 80% of claims are dealt with within six months. However, it is important that the Government do all that they can to deter unfounded claims, not least because such claims must still be decided and this slows down consideration of genuine claims at the expense of people who really need our protection.
Perhaps I can go through some of the other points made by noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Roberts talked about the judgment this year that asylum support needs to be reviewed. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also mentioned it. The judge did not say that the current rate was too low; he said that the methodology for making decisions was flawed. We are, therefore, reviewing that and a report on the outcomes will be produced on 9 August.
My noble friend Lord Roberts also asked whether Azure cards could be offered in Lidl and Aldi. My noble friend kindly gave me the heads-up on the issue yesterday and I have approached my noble friend Lord Taylor, the Minister, to ask whether this could be looked into.
My noble friend Lord Roberts talked about medication, which is, in fact, fully covered by the NHS. I am pleased to report that asylum seekers awaiting a decision can have full access to the NHS, including help with getting to health facilities. He also brought up the issue of the standard of housing. I have to say that it is varied but I can absolutely assure him that any accommodation provided must be fully equipped and appointed with all necessary items.
Several noble Lords raised the issue of self-esteem and the inability to work during the stressful time awaiting an asylum decision. It is absolutely the case that people awaiting decisions on asylum claims can volunteer. They are also not necessarily poor, although I accept that, in giving up their homes and livelihoods in their countries of origin, they may well be poor—but not necessarily. They are able to volunteer. This goes back to the point about not muddying the difference between an asylum claim and seeking a work permit. My noble friend Lord Attlee made the point about volunteering and the UK being such a great place in which to live—hence the number of applications that we receive. My noble friend also made the good distinction between the genuine asylum seeker and those seeking work.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, talked about the culture of disbelief. We cannot accept that there is such a culture. All claims are considered on their merits, the evidence and the law. The noble Lord might be pleased to know that on average we grant asylum in 30% of initial decisions.
I have covered the issue of the backlog. The number of undecided cases predating 2012 is decreasing and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, might be pleased to know that we have made a decision in all pre-2011 cases. However, I will look into some of the questions and statistics that he asked me about and, if I have not covered everything, we will ensure that those questions are addressed.
Several noble Lords commented on our decision about reviewing the point at which we would allow asylum seekers to seek employment. We have not reviewed that issue, which lies entirely within the 2003 reception conditions directive. We make a distinction between people seeking asylum and those coming here to seek work.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee made several points, including on asylum seekers not being allowed to work—I referred to volunteering in that regard—and on integration and community cohesion. I acknowledge that an asylum seeker might feel isolated, but we are an incredibly integrated community, particularly in the capital, London, and, indeed, elsewhere in the country. We pride ourselves on that integration and on our tolerance and much work goes on to promote that. My noble friend also said that we need to have good systems. I hope that some of the figures that I have mentioned reassure her. Indeed, almost 80% of the claims are heard within six months.
I hope that I have answered all the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. However, I note that he is about to rise to tell me which ones I have not answered.
I took it from an earlier comment that the noble Baroness made that she would check to see whether all the questions that I raised had been answered and, if that was not the case, would write to me soon. That is perfectly acceptable from my point of view. However, I was particularly interested in the figure in the briefing that we received—as far as I know, these are Home Office figures—on the 19,685 applications received since April 2006, and the issue of how many of those the Government are attributing to delays arising from the actions of asylum seekers and how many are due to the actions of the Government.
I do not have those figures before me but I will certainly provide them to the noble Lord. However, given that 11 minutes have passed, I conclude by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate.