Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2016

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the Government are doing the right thing with this organisation and the House will be grateful to the noble Baroness for having set out in some detail why action is necessary. I have just one question. The noble Baroness rightly said that if an organisation of this kind is proscribed it is possible to seize its funds, but I take it that any organisation that knows it is going to be proscribed would takes its funds out of the jurisdiction, or otherwise distribute them so as to put them beyond reach. Has it been possible in this case, and would it normally be the Government’s practice, to freeze these funds in some way before the announcement of the proscription?

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation of the purpose of the order. The order was, as I understand it, agreed by the Commons yesterday and we hope that it will be agreed in your Lordships’ House this afternoon. We welcome and support the order. As the noble Baroness said, it amends Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by adding the neo-Nazi National Action to the list of proscribed organisations concerned in terrorism. The Minister also set out the provisions of the relevant parts of the 2000 Act, as well as the relevant part of the 2006 Act, which amended Section 3 of the 2000 Act. I do not intend to repeat those provisions.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Temporary Class Drug) (No. 2) Order 2016

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have one concern, which I did not expect to have until I read the Explanatory Memorandum. This is of course the second temporary order in respect of MPA, and the memorandum tells us:

“The Secretary of State has received a recommendation from the ACMD that an order should be made on the basis that this substance is a drug that is being misused”—

we have heard about that—

“and that the misuse is having harmful effects”.

However the Explanatory Memorandum goes on to report the ACMD’s,

“difficulty in finding any significant data relating to harms, seizures and prevalence”,

of MPA since the first order. Can the Minister comment on that? I do not of course advocate the use of any drug, but if the ACMD has not been able to show evidence of harm, is there a danger that by banning this drug we might be pushing people towards harm from another drug that is used instead of it, rather than protecting them from it? It seemed an interesting pairing of comments, if you like, in the Explanatory Memorandum. Since we are talking about temporary orders, and the first temporary order has not apparently provided the opportunity to do what we would have expected it to do, it would be helpful to have a comment on that on record.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose of the order, which we support. As has been said, it replaces the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Temporary Class Drug) (No. 3) Order 2015. That order provided for temporary controls on the drug methiopropamine, known as MPA, which made it an offence to produce, import, export, supply or offer to supply it. The 2015 order expired after 12 months. This order replaces that 2015 order and continues the controls for another 12 months.

As has been said, the Secretary of State has the power to make a temporary class drug order as long as two conditions are met: first, that the drug is not yet classified as a class A, B or C drug, and, secondly, that the Secretary of State has consulted with or received recommendations from the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs and has determined that the drug in question is being or is likely be misused, has harmful effects and should be subject to controls.

MPA is a psychoactive substance similar to methamphetamine. Controls were placed on MPA at the recommendation of the ACMD. The ACMD’s assessment was that MPA was dangerous and had side-effects including anxiety, panic attacks and difficulty breathing, and had apparently been implicated in 22 deaths between 2012 and 2015. The ACMD also reported that MPA had become an injecting drug of choice. Following 12 months of temporary controls, however, the ACMD has reported anecdotal evidence that usage has declined. Police Scotland has reported reduced instances of injection, and the ACMD has pointed out a number of other reasons for believing that its use may be in decline, to which the Minister has already referred and which I do not intend to repeat.

The ACMD has also reported that currently there is insufficient evidence on harms, seizures and prevalence of MPA for it to make a permanent recommendation. That is why it has recommended that the drug, in all its variations, be subject to another 12 months of temporary control to allow it to gather and consider more evidence before it makes a substantive recommendation.

I hardly imagine that the point I wish to make is one that the Minister will be able to answer, but I will raise it nevertheless. We support the order, as I say, but we do not appear to have been provided by the ACMD with any reason why it believes, since sufficient evidence has not come to light in the first 12 months of an order, that sufficient evidence is likely to come to light in the next 12, which this order would cover. I merely put that point to the Minister but I imagine that, quite justifiably, she will say that that is something for the ACMD to comment on. Still, it seems a slight weakness in the letter from the ACMD to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, which contains its recommendation, that it remains rather silent on why it believes that that evidence may become available in the next 12 months, bearing in mind that it has not been available in the 12 months to date.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their comments, wisely asking why the ACMD thinks it can gather evidence in the next 12 months when it could not in the previous 12. In fact it has had only six months to gather evidence. I have gone through some of the harms, side-effects and problems as well as the results of the temporary order in Scotland. The evidence of the harms, to bolster the ACMD advice, will be available shortly, but the reality is that it has had only six months to gather the evidence, which is why it is asking for a further 12.

On the noble Baroness’s point about displacement activity, the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 should deter displacement to other drugs. With those explanations, I beg to move.

Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

That this House regrets that the Government have laid the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 with insufficient explanatory material to allow the House to gain a clear understanding of the instrument’s policy objective or intended implementation; that they have not provided the House with key guidelines needed to direct how provisions are to be interpreted; and that there has been no prior consultation for a significant change in practice for courts and tribunals considering the restriction of freedom of movement. (SI 2016/1052) 14th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to go through in some detail what has led me to table the Motion and why I think an explanation from the Government is required. It relates to the findings in two reports: the 14th and 17th reports of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I am not sure that the Motion can be regarded as a surprise. To put it in context, the Home Office is something of a regular offender when it comes to getting on the wrong side of the committee. In its final report of the previous Session, it included a section on the annual work of the committee. Paragraph 36 stated that as a result of the number of deficient Explanatory Memoranda, a new ground for reporting an instrument had been introduced at the beginning of the 2014-15 Session:

“the explanatory material laid in support provides insufficient information to gain a clear understanding about the instrument’s policy objective and intended implementation”.

The paragraph concluded:

“There are, however, still far too many EMs that use obscure jargon or tell us what the instrument does without giving us sufficient context to judge whether the change is significant or appropriate. The Home Office, Defra, DWP and the Ministry of Justice have been particular offenders in this session”.

The Home Office provided two of the 13 instruments reported for inadequate information last Session: the statement of changes in immigration rules and the Asylum Support (Amendment No. 3) Regulations 2015. The regulations which are the subject of my regret Motion are apparently one of only two instruments reported on the ground of insufficient information so far this year. I am advised by the Committee Office that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee does not report in this way to the House when there are just minor glitches. It is done only, as with these regulations, when the missing material is vital to a proper understanding of the policy.

So what are the issues raised by the committee? First, Schedule 1 sets out for the first time a non-exhaustive list of the “fundamental interests of society” which a court or tribunal must have regard to when considering restricting the right of EU citizens and their families to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states. The committee states:

“We are surprised that so significant a change should be implemented by a negative instrument, and also that it was undertaken without any prior consultation”.

Paragraph 8 of the Government’s Explanatory Memorandum, on consultation, asserts:

“The 2016 Regulations in large part consolidate and clarify the provisions under the 2006 Regulations, modernising the language used and simplifying terms where possible in line with current drafting practice. Therefore, no external consultation has been undertaken”.

That would be a convincing explanation of the need for no external consultation, but for the reality that what it says about the regulations is questionable, and clearly did not convince the Secondary Legislation Committee.

I move on to the other issues raised by the committee. In a letter to the Minister of State for Immigration at the Home Office, the chairman of the committee, on the committee’s behalf, stated that it had,

“significant concern about the open-ended character of some provisions in the Regulations and whether they could be interpreted consistently and objectively”.

In that context, the chairman referred specifically to,

“the decision as to whether the residence of a British citizen and another family member in an EEA state is ‘genuine’ (regulation 9); and ‘preventing social harm’ or ‘protecting public services’ under Schedule 1”.

Paragraph 9 of the Explanatory Memorandum states that the Home Office will be issuing guidance. In his letter to the Minister, the chairman of the committee asked the Minister to,

“tell us how the guidance will support understanding of these and other similarly broad expressions contained in the Regulations”.

The chairman went on to say:

“We would also be grateful if you could send us a copy of the guidance with your response and confirm that it will be available to Parliament without delay so that it can be taken into account should these Regulations be debated”.

There was also a reference in the letter to the fact that, under subparagraph 7(h) of Schedule 1 to the regulations,

“numerous lesser offences can be aggregated”.

The committee chairman added that,

“we would welcome clarification about what sort of offences are intended and how many will qualify a person for removal”.

In his reply, the Minister, Robert Goodwill MP, referring to the use of the word “genuine”, said:

“Guidance will set out how caseworkers should approach the ‘genuine residence’ question and the other conditions of regulation 9. The guidance will be published on Gov.uk on 25 November when the changes to regulation 9 come into force. We will notify the Committee when it is available”.

On the references to the wording in Schedule 1, such as “preventing social harm” and “protecting public services”, the Minister said in his response:

“The Regulations need to be able to relate to a broad and varied array of circumstances in which an individual may pose a threat and so it is inevitable that some of the provisions are somewhat general in nature”.

Under the offences referred to under subparagraph 7(h) of Schedule 1, the Minister said:

“There is … no prescribed list of the offences that will fall under subparagraph 7(h) of Schedule 1, nor is there a threshold to the number of offences that must be committed in order to qualify a person for a decision to be made on the grounds of public policy or public security”.

The Minister went on to say:

“These Regulations will be accompanied by guidance to assist with the interpretation of the provisions. This will provide more detail on the sorts of circumstances which could be considered when making a decision on the grounds of public policy and public security. The guidance will be published on Gov.uk on 1 February when the provisions come into force. We will notify the Committee when it is available”.

Not surprisingly, the committee was unimpressed with the Minister’s response. It said in its 14th report, published on 17 November, that the Home Office guidance to accompany the regulations had not been available to it for its,

“initial scrutiny and nor was a draft”.

It referred to the fact that it had written to the Minister about this and that his reply,

“simply refers us to the guidance which, we note with disappointment, will not be published until the very day the legislation comes into effect”.

The committee went on to say in its report:

“We reiterate our strongly held view that if guidance is intended to direct users on how specific terms should be interpreted or how decisions should be made, it should be laid with the instrument and be available to Parliament throughout the scrutiny process. It would be even better if such definitions were clearly set out on the face of the instrument”.

The committee wrote again to the Minister, Mr Goodwill MP, on 16 November. In its 17th report, published on 8 December—that is, just a few days ago—it said:

“The Minister’s reply of 24 November was again unsatisfactory. He was invited to provide a fuller response which he did in a letter dated 5 December”.

That was the Minister’s third attempt at a letter. The committee continued:

“Although this second response goes some way towards addressing the points we originally raised, it fails to deal with the Committee’s core concern that such open definitions may be inconsistently applied in different parts of the country and result in injustice for individuals”.

The committee’s report goes on to say:

“This instrument exemplifies our more general concern that guidance is being used to supplement secondary legislation with material that should have been included in the legislation itself. In this case, the Home Office has told us that the relevant guidance will not be published until February 2017 when the legislation comes into effect. Our concern about the late availability of the guidance, which we expressed in our 14th Report, has since been aggravated by the publication by the Home Office of guidance in relation to determining the ‘genuineness’ of a marriage (which forms another part of the same instrument) which includes a number of redacted sections which are ‘for Home Office use only’. We question how the courts and individuals can assess their position correctly if a number of the determining factors are kept from them”.

I have a page from the guidance to which the committee is referring. It is page 35 of 44, published for Home Office staff on 25 November 2016. At the top of the page it says:

“Official—sensitive: start of section. The information on this page has been removed as it is for internal Home Office use only”.

Then, right at the foot of that page, the same text appears again. It is no wonder that the committee chose to draw attention to that state of affairs. The report goes on:

“The Minister’s letter of 5 December provides some information about the meaning of ‘protecting public services’ in that he says the expression ‘could be interpreted as benefit fraud or tax evasion, though these examples are not exhaustive’. He fails entirely, however, to address our concern that the term could also be interpreted in a number of less obvious ways, creating a problem for the courts and potential inequality among individual cases. It would, in our view, be more appropriate for such definitions to be fully set out in the Regulations; and, if not, then, as we said in our 14th Report, the relevant guidance should be laid with the Regulations and be available to Parliament throughout the scrutiny process. This is not a new concern, in relation to the Draft Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013, for example, we said, when ‘guidance is so material to the House’s understanding of how the system will operate for individuals, rather than on a theoretical level … proper scrutiny is not possible if the guidance is not published’”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I will certainly take that point back because, if the noble Baroness cannot find it, lesser mortals would really struggle.

In conclusion, the Government believe that the changes made in the 2016 regulations do not fundamentally change the legal position set out in the 2006 regulations and that the measures are proportionate. I hope with those words and with my explanation on the noble Lord’s questions, that he will feel free to withdraw his Motion.

[Lord Rosser]

I want to raise one or two points about what the Minister said. The response we have had from the Government is basically a repetition of what has been said in three letters from the same Minister, one of which I understand followed a meeting with the chairman of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I find it rather puzzling that the Government or the Home Office do not think it rather odd that, if their case is so persuasive and that in effect there has been no real change at all, they have been unable to persuade the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of that fact. Why does the Minister think that is the case? Could it not be that the Home Office has got it wrong and that it has been making changes?

I noticed in her reply at one stage the Minister said, “We have made some changes”. Did the Home Office ever think that maybe it is wrong and that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee is right? If we are at a stage where, after a report like this from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Minister in the department concerned is still prepared to stand at the Dispatch Box when challenged and say, in effect, the scrutiny committee has it wrong and we have it right, it makes you wonder what kind of esteem the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee is held in by the Home Office.

I wonder whether the Home Office is seeking to make any arrangements to offer to meet the committee to talk through this issue of whether there have been significant changes or not, and whether the committee is justified in the really quite serious criticism that it has made. I have not heard anything from the Minister to suggest that the department is willing to offer to discuss this with the committee as a whole.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, as a Member of your Lordships’ House, I believe that the scrutiny committees of both Houses should be taken equally seriously. I will take back the point made by the noble Lord about the Home Office engaging with the committee.

On the date of the guidance, I do not think that I can provide any further information at this point. On the length of the document, as I have said, the list would be quite exhaustive. However, I can provide the noble Lord with further detail in writing on all of these points in due course, if that is acceptable to him.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for her reply and for being willing to respond to the points that I have raised by writing subsequently. I thank her too for her comments about the relationship between the Home Office and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Perhaps I may make it clear that I was not put up here by the committee to say that perhaps there might be a meeting or at least some method of talking things through, so I hope that I have not put my foot in it on behalf of the committee and that its members would welcome such a meeting, just as the Minister would.

Again, I thank the noble Baroness. I have attempted to put across the concerns of the committee, which I have to say that I agree with, and I am grateful to her for her response. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion withdrawn.

Asylum: Sexual Orientation

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 14th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I said that this information is not published but that the Government collect it. There is guidance and there have been improvements in training, so we take this matter very seriously, as I hope I have explained. It is bad enough having to come here from a country where you have been persecuted because of your sexuality without then having to go through another very uncomfortable process, so we continue to monitor the guidance and the training around this very sensitive area.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Minister referred in her last answer to information that was there but not published. Why is it not published?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I think that I have explained twice that it is management information only and that it is not yet sufficiently quality assured to be published. We need published information to be robust.

Immigration: International Students

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 14th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is right to bring up exit checks. The Home Office continues to analyse and assess the element of the exit check data which has been in place since April last year in relation to specific cohorts, in order to understand the extent to which the estimates provided are statistically robust. That level of detail is not yet available but the noble Lord is right to raise this issue.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We do not believe that international students should be included in the Government’s target to reduce migration to tens of thousands. Given that many people may think that over, say, a five-year period the number of international students coming to study in the UK would roughly match the number of such students departing the country in accordance with the terms of their visa, thus having little impact on the net migration figure over that period, can the Government tell us—I fear the answer will be no—the number of international students who came to study in the UK last year? Based on previous experience, how many of those students are likely to overstay their visa, or any authorised extension to stay, and remain in this country after the date by which they should have left? One would assume that the Government know the answer to that question.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I think that that was several questions. However, the National Audit Office reported that in 2009-10, up to 50,000 international students may have come to work, not study, and, before our changes, international student visa extensions were running at more than 100,000 a year, with some serial students renewing their leave repeatedly for many years.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will address a couple of points briefly. First, I will address the difference between Amendments 182 and 187 on the central question of whether it is right to extend pre-charge anonymity to all offences or to sexual offences only. I completely appreciate the logic of the position adopted by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. However, I believe that there is a distinction to be drawn between sexual offences on the one hand and other offences on the other.

I believe that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was right about this. It seems to me that a particular stigma attaches to accusations of sexual offences, which is generally more difficult to rebut where such accusations are made than where an accusation is made of another offence against the person or of offences against property. It is often far more difficult in sexual offence cases to clear conclusively and for ever the name of a suspect who is not charged than it is in the case of other offences. As the noble and learned Baroness pointed out, there is also the interest of the press in sexual offence cases. I suggest that that is why so much publicity has been given to sexual offences, particularly historical offences, in this debate and in your Lordships’ House generally.

A further point is that the nature of the evidence in sexual offences tends to be historical and tends to involve pitting the word of the claimant against the word of the victim. In those circumstances, the no smoke without fire rubric gains currency. I see this as a question of balance in which the balance in the all-offences case mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, comes down against pre-charge anonymity, whereas it comes down in favour of it in respect of sexual offences. It is a case of the robustness and security that we as a society allow to the presumption of innocence.

The second question I wish to address is that of the stage at which anonymity should cease. I entirely take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that the arrest is part of the criminal process and therefore that there is, generally speaking, a public right to know because the liberty of the subject is being taken away at that early stage. However, I cannot get away from the central point that arrest can be effected by a police officer on reasonable suspicion only. That reasonable suspicion frequently arises when the suspect has been given no chance to offer a full explanation which, if he were offered that opportunity, might dispel the suspicion altogether—whereas, to justify a charge, it has to be shown that there is evidence which would, if it were accepted at a trial, lead to a conviction by a court of law. I believe that that distinction is important, and that again the balance is against lifting anonymity at arrest and keeping it therefore at charge.

I then come to the question of witnesses coming forward. I completely appreciate the concern that exists around the House and outside it that witnesses should not be deterred from coming forward. But I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, that in most cases, if evidence from further witnesses is available, it will come forward after charge, so that forbidding pre-charge publicity will delay further evidence rather than prevent it coming to light altogether. There is nevertheless a concern, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Pannick, about the possibility of pre-charge anonymity preventing genuine witnesses—notably other victims—coming forward with allegations that might lead to a suspect being charged when he would otherwise escape justice altogether. That is why the detail of the proviso inserted in the amendment of my noble friend Lord Paddick addresses this point precisely, and it is very different from the amendment that was presented in Committee.

Under this amendment a judge is entitled to say that he is,

“satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to remove or vary a restriction provided for”,

and to,

“direct that the restriction shall be lifted or shall be limited to such extent and on such terms as the judge considers the interests of justice require”.

The amendment further states:

“In considering an application … the judge shall have particular regard to the possibility that further witnesses might volunteer evidence relating to sexual offences allegedly committed by the person”.

I believe that that is the best we can do in striking a balance between encouraging witnesses to come forward and enabling them to know about allegations in appropriate cases, and protecting suspects from unjust publicity that causes the dreadful consequences of which we have all heard.

It is all a question of balance and I appreciate that it is a very difficult balance to strike. But I suggest to your Lordships’ House that the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Paddick strikes that balance accurately and should be supported.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, concluded his comments by saying that it is a matter of balance. I would concur with that view, but the balance concerned depends on which side of the fence you feel you might fall. I do not intend to detain the House for too long, since we have already had a number of Members expressing a desire to hear from the Minister. Nevertheless, I do intend to set out our position.

We do not support either of these amendments. Amendment 182 provides for pre-charge anonymity in all cases, including sexual offences, except where a magistrates’ court decides otherwise. Amendment 187 provides for pre-charge anonymity where a person has been accused of committing a sexual offence unless a judge decides otherwise. I am not a lawyer, and it may well be that my lack of knowledge of the law will be displayed in what I have got to say. But at present, as I understand it, there is an assumption of anonymity before the point of charge, except where the police decide to use their discretion in cases where they believe that disclosure of the identity of the person suspected but not charged is likely, for example, to lead to further evidence coming forward which will enable a stronger case to be made, which will enhance the likelihood of a successful prosecution.

We had a lengthy debate in Committee on the issue of pre-charge anonymity. We on this side acknowledged that a case could be made for going down this road. However, we also referred to the reality that there is evidence—for example, in sexual offence cases, where disclosing the name of the person alleged to have committed such offences has led to other victims coming forward and to a stronger case being able to be made against the accused to secure a successful prosecution. We have evidence that victims of sexual offences are often reluctant to come forward because of feelings that they will not be believed if it is their word alone against that of the alleged perpetrator. This is particularly so where that individual is a well-known and respected—at least, respected at that time—figure. We know too that there are sometimes feelings of shame about such offences, or feelings that such offences have to be tolerated, and a desire not to talk about it. These are feelings that are being expressed now with respect to the rapidly emerging scandal of sexual offences against young people in the football world—people are coming forward now that they know they are not alone.

We know too that the reporting of and convictions for sexual abuse cases are very low. Perhaps we should be spending some time considering why that is the case. We also need to take into account the fact that victims of sexual abuse—innocent people in spades—have had their lives darkened, including when the sexual offences were committed by well-known public figures. Of course, the victims themselves are rarely well-known public figures. During the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, one reason we gave for not changing the law was precisely to avoid giving the impression that there is a presumption of doubt about the credibility of the complainant in sexual offence cases. I am afraid I do not wholeheartedly agree with what I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was saying. Frankly, granting anonymity specifically for those suspected of sexual offences could imply that a person making a complaint in respect of such an offence was not to be believed in the same way as someone making a complaint involving another individual in relation to any other kind of serious offence, such as murder, fraud or, yes, child cruelty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment. While I accept what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said about overcrowding, we need to differentiate between many offences that do not deserve a custodial sentence, and in fact would be more effectively dealt with by a non-custodial sentence, and those that really need long custodial sentences, for the very reasons that the noble and learned Lord has just articulated. These are offences where, particularly in the case of repeat offences, a longer custodial sentence is needed. That is why we will support the noble Baroness should she decide to divide the House.

[Lord Rosser]

I will be brief. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, if, having heard the Government’s reply, my noble friend Lady Royall decides to test the opinion of the House, we too shall be supporting her amendment in the Division Lobby.

I will not go through all her points but my noble friend has referred, as have others, to the issue of repeat offences. She referred to why the maximum sentence is five years at present. She referred to the level of cross-party support that there has been on this issue, and to the relationship of the maximum sentence for this offence with other offences that have a maximum of 10 years. She also made reference to the stalking orders and the Government’s announcement there, which was welcome, but of course it does not address the issue of what the appropriate maximum length of the sentence is. My noble friend also stressed that stalking costs lives in certain circumstances, and causes psychological harm. I think she has made an extremely powerful case. As I said, if she decides, having heard the Government’s response, to test the opinion of the House, we shall be with her in the Division Lobby.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, carries out as a trustee of Paladin to support and give a voice to victims of stalking.

Obviously it would be wrong of me as a Minister to comment on individual cases, particularly on sentences imposed in those cases. However, I want to express my sympathy for the victims of these crimes, which can have significant effects on their lives. It is important to consider the evidence of how sentencers are using the range of penalties available to them today. It is very rare that sentences are given that are near to the current maximum. In 2015 only three people received sentences of over three years for the Section 4A offence, and the average custodial sentence was 14.1 months. The evidence therefore suggests that judges are finding their current sentencing powers for this offence sufficient.

We must also bear in mind that, in addition to this specific stalking offence, this type of offending can be charged under other offences such as assault, criminal damage and grievous bodily harm with intent. When an offender is convicted for one of those offences, they will face a maximum penalty of 10 years for criminal damage or life imprisonment for GBH with intent.

I reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking steps to ensure that stalking is dealt with seriously. As the noble Baroness acknowledged, last Wednesday we announced plans to introduce a new stalking protection order aimed at ensuring that pre-charge options are available to the police to protect victims of stranger-stalking to the same level as victims of domestic violence and abuse. Breaches of these orders will be a criminal offence carrying a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.

Alongside the work of government, the independent Sentencing Council is currently considering sentencing guidelines for intimidatory offences, including the stalking offence covered by the noble Baroness’s amendment. The council aims for its definitive guidelines to come into force in early 2018, following a consultation on the draft guidelines early next year. I encourage the noble Baroness and others to respond to the consultation.

We are also looking at the wider picture of how stalking offences are dealt with and prosecuted. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate are currently carrying out a joint inspection on the effectiveness of the police and CPS response to cases involving stalking and harassment, and to examine the service received by victims.

In setting maximum penalties, we must also consider the penalties available for other, related offences. These include the other offences under Sections 2 and 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act, which can cover similar offending behaviour. We should consider carefully the potential impacts of creating such a large difference between the maximum penalties for the Section 4 and 4A offences, as the amendment proposes. Other relevant offences include assault occasioning actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm, for which the statutory maximum penalty is five years’ imprisonment. To increase the maximum penalty for stalking offences causing fear of violence would mean that the penalty for causing fear of violence would be higher than that for causing the violence itself.

We recognise that it is often the case that raising the maximum penalty appears to be a straightforward solution to a problem. I do not think it is a straightforward solution in this case. It may be necessary in due course but, before moving to raise the maximum, we should give careful consideration to the implications for other related offences and avoid creating anomalies in the criminal law.

However, I recognise the strength of feeling about this issue and the harm that can be caused by the most serious stalking cases. The Government will therefore review the operation of the Section 4A stalking offence and related offences. We will consider the maximum custodial sentences available to the court and, in addition, consider mental health sentences to consider how best to identify and address the underlying issues that are present in the most serious cases. The review will supplement the work being done by the Home Office to prevent stalking by looking at the ultimate sanctions available for those who continue to commit offences. I hope this review will also provide further material for the Sentencing Council to draw on as it produces sentencing guidelines for stalking and related offences. Given this commitment to review the operation of Section 4A, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

We believe that the time for hoping for reviews to come in future is clearly over. Time is late, but I have other case studies, some of which we heard in Committee. There is substantial opinion out there from victims and many parts of the criminal justice system that the treatment that victims get at the moment is just not acceptable and it is time to strengthen the legislation to make it a duty to enforce the code. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

I will be brief, but my name is attached to most of the amendments which we are now addressing. A victims’ rights Bill was introduced in the other place last year by the then shadow Home Office Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and it had all-party support. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said, victims’ rights are largely covered by entitlements in the victims’ code and affected by various other initiatives in recent years. However, the key thing is that the code is not legally enforceable and feedback from victims suggests that it is not applied by the relevant agencies. Maybe that is because they are aware that a failure to provide the service does not make a service provider liable to any legal proceedings. Lack of information and support to victims are the major areas of concern, with victims prioritising the right to information, protection, treatment and support as the highest priorities. These amendments place victims’ rights in a statutory framework and place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and implement a strategy to provide training for all relevant professionals and agencies on the impact of crime on victims. In essence, these amendments lay down what support should be offered to victims, how that support is managed, what training is necessary to put it into place and how complaints can be pursued. These amendments have our support.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will understand that, given the further business to which the House has to attend tonight, I will confine myself to saying that we on these Benches enthusiastically support her amendments.

Sexual Abuse: Harassment of Suspects

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 8th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

We have already made clear from this Dispatch Box our position in respect of pre-charge anonymity in the debates we have had on the issue during the passage of the Policing and Crime Bill. We will continue that debate on Monday. I believe the Minister referred to guidelines being drawn up by the College of Policing. Does the Home Secretary intend to have any input at all into those guidelines? Will she see them before they are published, or is it her view that she has no role at all in relation to the content of those guidelines?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can tell the noble Lord that the College of Policing is developing the new authorised professional practice on media relations, which covers the release of suspects’ names. It has consulted extensively on this. The existing guidance is clear that we expect forces to adhere to this. However, responses are being analysed. The APP is due for publication in the new year and the Government will reflect on it.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 30th November 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

4: Clause 6, leave out Clause 6

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak also to our other amendments in this group: Amendments 12, 14 and 18. First, I acknowledge that the Government have moved, through amendments of their own, to improve the very weak and, frankly, in parts non-existent consultation arrangements provided for in the Bill, where a police and crime commissioner seeks to become the fire and rescue authority. We welcome that there is now a requirement to consult with those representing employees affected by the proposals.

However, the Government have not gone far enough to ensure that consultation is meaningful and that gaps do not exist through which a maverick PCC could seek unjustifiably to restrict or curtail the process—and neither are all the considerations covered that a PCC should be required to address if they wish to become the fire and rescue authority. Accordingly, we have put down Amendments 12, 14 and 18 to government Amendments 11, 13 and 17, and we regard our amendments as being part of a single group.

Government Amendment 11 places a requirement on a police and crime commissioner to,

“publish, in such manner as the commissioner thinks appropriate, the commissioner’s response to the representations made or views expressed in response to those consultations”.

In reality, that means that the commissioner could publish very little about the nature of the representations made and views expressed to him or her under the consultation—perhaps not least by those with strong reservations about the PCC becoming the fire and rescue authority. In being required only to publish a response, the commissioner could be very brief and not actually respond to the specific points and arguments made under the consultation.

Our amendments provide for the commissioner to publish, among other things, copies of each representation made and a summary of views expressed under the consultation on the proposal to become the fire and rescue authority. The amendments also provide for the commissioner to set out why the benefits claimed by becoming the fire and rescue authority cannot be achieved by other forms of collaboration, bearing in mind the emphasis placed in the Bill on improving collaboration between services, which we support.

The government amendments provide that consultation on a proposal from the police and crime commissioner also to be the fire and rescue authority should be carried out in such manner as the relevant police and crime commissioner thinks appropriate. Our amendments seek to be a bit more specific, since there may well be very differing views among police and crime commissioners on what constitutes an appropriate manner in which to consult. Presumably there must be some minimum requirements, and our amendments provide for a period lasting not less than 56 days and a requirement before the start of consultation to produce a draft public proposal, a schedule of public meetings and an invitation to make written submissions.

The government amendments provide for the Secretary of State to publish the independent assessment of a proposal from a PCC to become the fire and rescue authority. Our amendment provides, in addition to what the government amendment says, that it should be published at least one month before an order under Section 4A is made, to make sure that it is published a reasonable period of time before the order is made rather than very close to or even after the order is made.

Of course, I hope that the Government will accept the amendments to which I have referred. However, in the event that that is not their intention, I very much hope that the Government, having heard the points I have made and the concerns that lie behind them, and thus the amendments we have put down, might be prepared to reflect further on this matter and consider whether they could at least come some of the way to addressing some, if not all, of the concerns we have raised by putting down further amendments of their own.

We still have Amendment 4, which seeks to delete the clause that enables a police and crime commissioner to be the fire and rescue authority. I want to make it clear that our opposition to this enabling power in the Bill still stands. I do not wish to detain the House longer than necessary by repeating in detail all the points that we made in Committee and that have led us to our view—but those points still stand. Included among them is the fact that fire and rescue service boundaries are not always in line with PCC areas, and the provision for PCCs to become the fire and rescue authorities assumes that the police organisational structure is, and will be in the future, the most appropriate for the fire and rescue service when already evidence exists that that is not considered to be the case in at least some areas. In our view, the emphasis should be on closer collaboration, which is provided for in the Bill, and not on potentially hostile takeovers.

However, what I want to raise in a bit more detail is the potential impact on fire and rescue service personnel and members of a police force if the PCC becomes the fire and rescue authority and, in particular, the implications if the single-employer model is introduced. I have been told—as opposed to knowing it for a fact myself—that the Staffordshire police and crime commissioner has already prepared a business case, at least in draft, for becoming the fire and rescue authority. As I understand it, that involves adopting the single-employer model and harmonising terms and conditions of service. Apparently, the target date for the takeover of responsibility for the relevant fire and rescue service in this case is April next year—namely, in just over four months’ time. If that is the target date, it immediately raises questions about the consultation process that is likely to be adopted—concerns which I have already sought to express in more generalised terms in what I have said so far.

The terms and conditions of service for firefighters are covered by a national agreement; national bargaining applies. Those terms and conditions are set out in what I believe is referred to as the Grey Book, and they cover not just issues relating to pay and hours but disciplinary arrangements and procedures, as well as pensions. What assurances can the Government give—either now or subsequently in correspondence—that, single-employer model or not, the terms and conditions for firefighters will continue to be determined through the current bargaining procedures and that they will continue to be national terms and conditions, including in a situation where the PCC is also the fire and rescue authority?

When the coalition Government presented their Bill providing for the introduction of police and crime commissioners, the key argument they advanced was that nobody knew who was on the then police authorities, what their responsibilities were or how to contact them. The Government argued that PCCs would be visible, accessible and accountable in a way that did not apply to police authorities. If the intention now is that PCCs who become the fire and rescue authority should be able, if they choose, to move away from national terms and conditions of employment under a single-employer model, that is not a power, role or responsibility which, as I recollect it, the Government cited when making their case for the introduction of PCCs.

I hope that the Minister, as well as giving what I hope will be a helpful response to the three amendments to which I referred earlier, will be able to clarify the position in relation to a PCC who becomes the fire and rescue authority—and, in particular, where they propose to set up a single-employer model, what the position will be in relation to the national conditions of service that currently apply for both firefighters and members of the police force.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I hope I have outlined clearly that the Home Secretary would take a view on this issue and on all representations that have been received when making her decision.

[Lord Rosser]

I, likewise, ask the Minister for some clarification of what she has just said. Am I right in saying that under the single employer model and the harmonising of conditions—if there is to be such—we could end up with different rates of pay, different conditions of service and different disciplinary procedures for firefighters and members of police forces in different PCC areas: that there could no longer be national rates and national conditions of service? That is what I have read into the Minister’s response, because it depends on whether a PCC decides to continue to have conditions of employment determined by the national bargaining body, or whether the police and crime commissioner who has become the fire and rescue authority decides he or she wants to bargain with their own employees in the fire and rescue service and, presumably, the police service, if it is harmonising conditions. Is that a fair interpretation of what the Minister said?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Before Third Reading I will write to the noble Lord and to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, and distribute that response to the House. What I said was the terms and conditions of firefighters and the control staff are negotiated on a UK-wide basis via the National Joint Council, but the NJC has no statutory basis and it is for the PCC-style FRAs to decide whether to remain members. I will write to the noble Lord before Third Reading to outline more detail on what that might look like.

[Lord Rosser]

I take it that the noble Baroness is going to write, and I am very grateful to her for saying that, if necessary, that means we could come back to this issue on Third Reading. I also ask, genuinely for clarification, and I am sorry I did not pick up the Minister’s response on Amendments 12, 14 and 18 first time, but on Amendment 12, which sets out a number of requirements relating to consultation over what documents should be published and why the benefits could not be achieved through other forms of collaboration, did I hear correctly the Minister say that those requirements would be included in guidance? I do not know whether that will be guidance or regulations.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I did say guidance.

[Lord Rosser]

So what I have laid down in Amendment 12 will be included in guidance.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I agreed that the matters that the noble Lord listed would be covered in guidance.

[Lord Rosser]

As I understood it, the Minister did not extend that to the items I covered in Amendments 14 and 18. I am seeking to clarify, not to pursue the argument again, that that statement of what would be covered in guidance relates to what I have in Amendment 12. As I understood what the Minister said, that did not extend to Amendments 14 and 18. I am simply trying to clarify what was said.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I certainly gave that commitment on Amendment 12. I now have all my pages completely out of kilter, but I do not think I gave that commitment on—was it Amendment 14?

[Lord Rosser]

It was Amendments 14 and 18.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Amendment 18 is a matter for the Home Secretary.

[Lord Rosser]

Am I also right—I am genuinely seeking clarification—that what the Minister helpfully said on Amendment 12 did not apply to Amendment 14?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Unfortunately, I cannot find Amendment 14 here, but we have undertaken to work with the Association of PCCs to address in guidance the issues raised by the noble Lord in Amendment 12. Amendment 18 is a matter for the Home Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I would be more than happy if the Minister wishes to write to me to confirm. I am genuinely seeking clarification, rather than trying to reopen the debate.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The issues raised in Amendments 12 and 14 will be addressed in guidance.

[Lord Rosser]

So there is an issue of a period over which consultation shall last. The other matters will be covered in guidance. Is that guidance that will go through this House in the form of regulations, or is this guidance that we will not see until it is published?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think that this may be one area of detail that I could discuss and correspond with the noble Lord over between now and Third Reading. He and I can meet before Third Reading.

[Lord Rosser]

That is a helpful response and I take it in the spirit in which it was said. I hope that the Minister will accept, bearing in mind that she has indicated—I do not want to make things difficult—that it appears to apply to Amendments 12 and 14. To put it bluntly, if that does not prove to be the case we can come back at Third Reading.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Yes, and I hope that it would never be interpreted that I will not follow through on something I say at the Dispatch Box, because I most certainly will meet the noble Lord and discuss the finer detail of the guidance before Third Reading.

[Lord Rosser]

I assure the Minister that she is about the last person that I would ever suggest would appear at the Dispatch Box and make a statement that she did not mean or which was misleading.

In light of what has been said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clinton-Davis (Lab)]

I speak following the very courageous and relevant speech that we have just heard. I do not think that there can be any possible objection to strengthening the law, which is what is proposed. There can be no dispute at all that corrupt relationships between the police and newspapers are highly damaging to both, and they are unacceptable to the public, who must be able to trust both. In a democratic society, which I hope we are, it is absolutely vital that there should be trust in both, and the amendment simply seeks to bolster that position. I can see no objection at all to the purpose of the amendment. I ask anybody here to say what damage it could do to the law. In fact, I think that strengthening the law in this way is absolutely vital, and there should be no question about that.

For many years I practised in the criminal courts. I came across decent police officers who did not bend the truth at all, but I also came across certain police officers who were quite prepared to do exactly that, and in our society that is absolutely unacceptable. I hope that the Minister will appreciate how strongly those of us who have experience in this field feel about this.

I am pretty old now but I still attend this House, although some, including my wife, have some reservations about that. But I was particularly concerned about this issue. Everything which concerns the police is relevant to a democratic society. In my view, it is an absolute necessity as far as this is concerned. There is a gap at the moment, or there may be, that ought to be cured. Many people who have experience in this area recognise that. There should be no question about it.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will not detain the House for too long. As has been said, the amendment would require the Prime Minister to commission an independent inquiry into the operation of the police complaints system in respect of allegations of corrupt relationships between the police and newspaper organisations. It also provides that the inquiry would proceed only once the Attorney-General has determined that the inquiry, if conducted effectively and fairly, would not be likely to prejudice any ongoing relevant criminal investigations or court proceedings cases.

As has already been pointed out, in November 2012 the then Prime Minister reminded the victims of press intrusion that when he set up the Leveson inquiry he had also said that there would be a second stage to investigate wrongdoing in the press and the police, and that the Government remained committed to the inquiry as it was first established. However, real doubts about the Government’s willingness to honour that promise have arisen—hence this amendment. Those doubts have been increased by the Government’s recent decision to consult, including on whether to stick by the promises previously given by the then Prime Minister that there would be a Leveson stage 2.

Police and press relations is a significant area still to be addressed. Briefings by the police in the immediate aftermath of the Hillsborough tragedy had a profound adverse impact on the families who had lost loved ones, and on the thousands who had been at the match and returned home in a state of some trauma, only to read a few days later that the police were blaming them for the deaths of their friends and family. The media were also manipulated in the case of the Shrewsbury 24, and part 1 of the Leveson inquiry found unhealthy links between senior Met police officers and newspaper executives—links which led to resignations. There is also, on occasion, an issue around the nature of relationships between the police and the press at a more local level, where sometimes prior information appears to have been provided about a particular person to be arrested or a particular search carried out.

Honouring a repeated undertaking given by a Government through a Prime Minister, to victims in particular, and with all-party support, is the issue that this amendment seeks to address. If, having heard the Government’s response, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, decides to seek the opinion of the House, we shall be voting in favour of the amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for explaining the purpose behind her amendment. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Blair, who spoke of their own experiences around this issue. As the noble Baroness explained, Amendment 48 would require the Prime Minister to proceed with what is colloquially referred to as the Leveson 2 inquiry into the relationships between the police and the media.

It is of course vital that the police take seriously their role, both in maintaining their own reputation and integrity and in protecting the community that they are meant to serve. However, given the extent of the criminal investigations related to this issue that have taken place since the Leveson inquiry was established—as the noble Lord, Lord Blair, referred to —and given the implementation of the recommendations following part 1, including reforms within the police and the press, the Government must now consider whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry is appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. The Government are therefore seeking the views of the public and interested parties, including those who have been the victims of press abuse, through the public consultation that commenced on 1 November. The consultation seeks views on whether proceeding with part 2 of the Leveson inquiry is still appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. As the last of the relevant criminal cases has recently concluded, the Government believe that it is now time to take stock and seek views on the various options. Submissions received from this consultation will consequently help to inform the Government’s thinking. The consultation closes on 10 January. Given the ongoing consultation, I respectfully suggest to the noble Baroness that this is not an appropriate matter for further legislation.

The Government will reach a view on the way forward having regard to the views expressed in response to the consultation. If we conclude that the inquiry should go ahead in its current or a modified form, the Inquiries Act already provides the mechanism for this, so again this amendment is unnecessary.

Noble Lords will also want to take into consideration the fact that part 1 of the Leveson inquiry cost £5.4 million. We can expect part 2 of the inquiry, should it go ahead with its current terms of reference, to cost a similar amount, so this amendment has very real financial implications, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham said.

My noble friend Lord Deben talked about three issues—the promise, the necessity, and the power of the press and its closeness to the constabulary. In terms of the promise, the Government delivered the cross-party agreement by establishing the Press Recognition Panel by royal charter, and legislating for the incentives in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The time is now right to consult further on these specific areas of part 2 of the inquiry and Section 40, given the time that has elapsed since the Leveson inquiry was set up and the changes that have taken place. It would not be fair to the victims of press intrusion to take a decision based on facts and a situation from five years ago without reflecting on the position today, to make sure that we get the right result and that there are the right protections. We will need to see what comes out of the consultation, as I have said, but ultimately, it is for the Government to take decisions on both matters.

Parliament will clearly need to be involved if the proposed way forward were to repeal Section 40, but we need to wait and see the responses to the consultation. On part 2 of the inquiry, we will of course consult the chair of the inquiry, Sir Brian Leveson, before any decision is made on the future of the process.

In conclusion—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I do not wish to repeat all that has been said, but I would like to raise one or two points. The first refers to the statistics on the use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act in 2015 and 2016 to which the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, has already referred. They show some surprising discrepancies between police force areas on Section 136 cases. For example, Hertfordshire and Merseyside are the two police force areas in which there has been zero use of police cells under Section 136. However, in Lincolnshire, police cells were used under the Section 136 powers on 173 occasions during 2015-16, in the context of a total usage under Section 136 on just 368 occasions. That is a staggeringly high percentage. Equally, one could go through the whole list and point to considerable discrepancies. Surprisingly, although one might have thought that the figure for the Metropolitan Police would be pretty high, the number of occasions in 2015-16 on which people were placed in police cells under the powers in Section 136 was apparently 17, in the context of a total figure of 3,693.

I cannot understand why we have these discrepancies, and I would appreciate it if the Minister commented on that. Is it really about suitable places being available in these areas, or a lack of co-ordination or willpower, or a lack of priority being given to avoiding the need to use police cells? Some response from the Government on that point would be extremely helpful, and extremely interesting.

I want to refer to the letter of 25 November 2016 that the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, to which the latter has already referred. It would be helpful—to me, at least—to have some clarification of what parts of the letter mean. It states:

“It is … our intention that the regulations make clear that certain situations, in and of themselves, do not justify use of a police station, for example, because there is no health based place of safety available at that time. Our expectation, which will be reinforced in the guidance that will support the regulations, is that there should be local plans in place to deal with this and other contingencies”.

What does the reference to,

“local plans in place to deal with this and other contingencies”,

mean? Does that mean that places have to be provided, or something else? The letter continues:

“A police station will only be used as a place of safety if it is considered to be the best and safest way to manage a particular individual in the interests of all concerned”.

But what happens if no health-based place of safety is available at that time? Does the sentence I quoted mean that in that situation, if no such place of safety is available, a police cell can be used? Other references in the letter suggest that that would not be the case, and that, in effect, a police cell could be used only when the individual was considered to be a danger to themselves or to others. Again, it would be very helpful to have some clarification.

I may not have heard the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, properly—I am afraid I am all too good at that—but I thought, and I may be doing her a disservice, that she said that the Government had indicated that they intend to reduce to zero the use of police cells. If so, may I have confirmation of that, because I do not think the letter of 25 November 2016 says that? Of course, the statement:

“A police station will only be used as a place of safety if it is considered to be the best and safest way to manage a particular individual in the interests of all concerned”,

still leaves open the possibility of using a police cell, and would not be consistent with the Government’s intention, if it is their intention, in the long term—one hopes in rather less than the long term—to reduce to zero the use of police cells.

I would like to raise two or three other points related to treating people in a situation of mental health crisis. Clause 80 would reduce the permitted period of detention in any place of safety—not just police cells—from 72 hours to 24 hours. Of course, one could argue that 24 hours is still quite a lengthy period for individuals to be detained prior to an assessment of their mental health, wherever they are detained. The proposals do provide for a further 12-hour extension of that detention period. As has already been pointed out, individuals with urgent mental health needs have just as much right to acute and emergency health care as anyone else. If any other forms of emergency health care were provided within a window of only 24 to 36 hours, it would probably provoke some highly adverse comment. Did the Government consider bringing the time limit down further, to 12 hours, say, with the possibility of extending detention by up to a further 12 hours on the authority of, for example, the registered medical practitioner responsible for the person in question’s examination under the Mental Health Act?

I want also to refer to the position—or lack of it—of independent mental health advocates. As I understand it, subject to other powers in the Mental Health Act, they are available to provide independent advocacy and advice to individuals such as those liable to psychiatric detention, or those who have received community treatment orders. Among other important functions, independent mental health advocates help individuals to obtain information about their detention or treatment, and support them in understanding what is happening to them. But as I understand it, individuals detained under Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act do not have a right to an independent mental health advocate. Surely, detention in any place of safety is a feature of the mental health regime, and one in which independent advocacy, advice and assistance are desirable, if not required. Why is it that individuals convicted of no crime but detained for their own safety can have no access to the independent advocacy and assistance to which they would be entitled during other mental health interventions but not under Sections 135 and 136? A related point is that the PACE codes of practice lay down a requirement to have access to an appropriate adult, but on too many occasions, this does not happen as the code of practice indicates it should.

Finally, for the purposes of the police and criminal evidence arrangements, a police intervention under Sections 135 and 136 is treated as an arrest, and any police involvement in taking a person to a place of safety generates information held by police as to that person’s mental health history, including the recording of a police intervention by way of Sections 135 or 136. The Disclosure and Barring Service provides a system whereby an individual’s criminal record may be checked and, where relevant, disclosed to prospective employers. Ordinary DBS checks result in cautions and convictions being revealed, where permitted, but under enhanced DBS checks, other information held by the police as to their involvement with that individual may be disclosed as well, where the officer responsible reasonably believes it to be relevant and that it ought to be disclosed. Police will hold information as to any arrest they conduct and any involvement they have in taking a person to a place of safety under Section 135 or Section 136. The mere fact of police intervention in response to a person’s mental health crisis is therefore liable to be disclosed. It could therefore have quite significant adverse consequences when it comes to seeking employment.

I understand that since August last year new guidelines have been enforced, requiring constables to disclose as part of such checks only records they reasonably believe to be relevant. There is guidance given relating to Section 135 that indicates that the fact of detention under Sections 135(1) and 136 of the Mental Health Act is unlikely in itself to be sufficient to justify disclosure. Sections 135 and 136 provide the police with powers to remove a person to a place of safety when the person is believed to be suffering from a mental disorder and in need of care or control. Such a detention under the Mental Health Act does not constitute a criminal investigation and should therefore be treated with great caution when considering relevance for disclosure. But, of course, police officers are not mental health professionals. There is nothing to require them to seek the advice of such professionals before making a decision as to the relevance of a person’s mental health.

There is surely a real danger that the police will continue to disclose mental health records. Where a person is processed through the criminal justice system, information relevant to criminal matters may be disclosed as part of an enhanced EBS check. However, the disclosure of an individual’s medical history is an entirely different matter. Will the Government impose a ban on the disclosure of Sections 135 and 136 detentions under criminal records checks? I hope the response to the points I have raised, if not available tonight, might be available subsequently.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, for giving your Lordships’ House a further opportunity to debate the continued use of police stations as places of safety for adults. I think we all agree on the importance of taking someone experiencing a mental health crisis to a place of safety that will best meet their particular needs. We can also agree that, almost always, that should not be a police station, irrespective of the person’s age. But where we have not previously quite agreed is on removing outright the option of using a police station for an adult in those very rare cases where it is the judgment of the police officer on the scene that a police station is the safest place—at least initially—not just for the patient but for the public, health professionals or anyone else at risk from the extreme behaviour of the individual.

Let me make it plain that while the Government’s position is that it would be wrong and potentially very dangerous to ban outright the use of police stations as places of safety for adults, we have no intention of leaving police officers without support in making the judgment that a particular situation is of such severity that this would be the correct response. The regulation-making powers in Clause 79 will be used to set out factors relevant to the decision on whether circumstances merit the use of a police station. We envisage that these will cover a range of issues, such as how dangerous an individual’s behaviour is and how serious a risk of harm to themselves or others they represent. We will also look to include provisions to give the officer the opportunity to consult with mental health professionals if it is safe and practicable to do so.

Equally importantly, if the decision is made to use a police station, we must make sure that the individual receives all the appropriate healthcare and treatment they need while they are there. This, too, will be covered in the planned regulations. The regulations will further provide for a regular review of the individual’s condition so that they can be moved to a more appropriate place of safety if the circumstances change—for example, if their behaviour has moderated and the move is in their best interest and can be achieved without delaying the mental health assessment.

I expect that, once these provisions come into force, we will see a further substantial reduction in the use of police stations as a place of safety for adults. But it would be wrong, in our view, to assume that we can reach a point over the next few years when we can say with absolute certainty that there will never be circumstances where the use of a police station as a place of safety for an adult is an appropriate option because their extreme behaviour cannot safely be managed in an alternative place of safety. That being the case, we do not believe that the proposed new clause is an appropriate way forward. However, I want to reach the position whereby police stations are used as a place of safety only in specific, “exceptional” circumstances —and, when they are used, the person taken there must be given the right medical care.

Lots of points were raised during the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why there were discrepancies in the use of police cells across police forces. There is a range of reasons why this happens. It may include different policies on accepting violent behaviour, but it is also about the fact that, as the noble Lord pointed out, in London, for instance, they are not used as widely as they are in Lincolnshire, which has seen a high rise in the use of police cells. Often that is because Lincolnshire is more rural and there are not so many places of safety available, whereas there are more in London. So there are several reasons why that could be the case.

[Lord Rosser]

Most people regard Dorset as quite rural, but the number of Section 136 detentions in police cells it had was just 10 out of a total of 429 uses of Section 136. Does that not rather knock on the head the argument that it is something to do with how rural an area is?

Asylum Detention Centres: Safety

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, all genuine asylum seekers—LGBT or otherwise—have experienced persecution in the countries from which they have arrived, which is why they are in our country seeking asylum. I stress that detention is used only sparingly: to establish the identity of a person; if there is a reason to believe that a person will fail to comply with conditions; or to effect removal from the UK. But I stress that people genuinely seeking asylum have nothing to fear from seeking asylum in this country. Some of the training has been really improved with regard to the questions asked, particularly of the LGBTI community, because of the sensitivity around their claims.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

In 2010, the coalition pledged to improve the system for LGBT applicants. I think that the then Home Secretary also ordered a review of the LGBT asylum system in 2014. In the light of the findings of this latest report, what has been the outcome of these two commitments in actually improving conditions of detention for LGBT asylum seekers, and what hard evidence is available to prove that those detention conditions have improved?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. An inspection was commissioned by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration back in 2014. It did not indicate any systemic or endemic issues of bullying, violence or victimisation. In fact, it praised the training and the guidance and our work with organisations such as UKLGIG and Stonewall. But the Government do not rest on their laurels. A new detention services order on LGBT was published in April, which provides operational guidance to suppliers and Home Office staff in the immigration detention estate. As I said, Stephen Shaw will be doing a review next year of how his suggested actions have been bedded in.

Mental Health Units: Police Response

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am happy to tell the noble Baroness what I mean by “last possible option”. Something like Taser would be used only when all other methods of restraint are deemed not appropriate or to have failed, and where distance is required between the police and the person who is being extremely violent. That is what I mean by the last option. As to never using it, we can never say that it will not be used because the alternatives—I talked about this with the noble Baroness the other day—are to use more extreme methods of restraint, and we would not want that.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

In the figures in the IPCC investigation, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred, of 191 cases of serious incidents, one in five people were known to have mental health concerns. They were more likely to be restrained and experience multiple uses of force, and were four times more likely to die after force had been used than those not known to be mentally ill. Is not the reality that this year is the third year in a row that the Government have failed to meet their promise that mental health funding in local areas would increase? Is not the reality that until the Government seek to address this problem we will not get at the heart of the issue of the continuing extent to which the police are called out in situations involving people with mental health issues?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I dispute the noble Lord’s assertion about funding because the Government have committed to investing an additional £1 billion into mental health services by 2020 to ensure improved mental health support in the community and for people in accident and emergency, as well as crisis response provision and treatment for both adults and children.