Intellectual Assets: Crime
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Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, I think that the whole House will endorse the view that an economy such as ours depends crucially for its advance and future prosperity on its capacity to innovate and the intellectual capital on which that depends. Therefore, a central part of the Government’s strategy is very much concern not just with national security but with developing, with the private sector, a secure cyberplatform on which investment in this country from both domestic companies and companies abroad can be based.
Lord Rosser
Bearing in mind the increasing threat posed by the type of crime raised in this Question and the importance of developing still further links and levels of co-operation with other countries on this issue, can the Minister give a categorical assurance that the Government’s intention to merge the Serious Organised Crime Agency with the new national crime agency will not result in any diminution of personnel and resources directed at fighting crime of this kind? Furthermore, will the Government’s recently announced review of intellectual property and its value to the UK economy also address the threat posed by intellectual property crime?
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, of course many sorts of crime are involved. The original Question was clearly about espionage but there is also theft, to which the noble Lord referred—that is, crime of a more straightforward kind—and both those aspects of our intellectual underpinning in this country need to be addressed. I can give the assurance that there will be no change in the status of SOCA, which will remain central—and I mean central—to crime-fighting in this country, so there will be no diminution in our efforts on that front. As those on the Benches opposite may know, we will produce a strategy for cybercrime by the end of the year. Therefore, I can give that assurance, and we agree with those on the Benches opposite that this is a matter of high national importance.
Immigration: Deportation
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Baroness Neville-Jones
The noble Baroness raises some of the absolutely pertinent issues which our further review needs to take into account. I cannot comment precisely on the contract of the company that will be employed in addition to G4S but I think it fair to say that the Government feel they need to look at all aspects of the services provided. They need to start with the contract and go right through to what happens on the aircraft.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, what checks will the Government be making to ensure that the new private security firm involved in deportations carries them out in accordance with the laid-down practices and procedures, including, in particular, the use of force?
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, as the House may know, there are several control and monitoring systems in place. Contrary, perhaps, to some of the prevalent views, they are in fact very active. The Chief Inspector of Prisons has oversight of all the detention facilities, which includes the escorts, and he conducts inspection visits on an unannounced basis. The independent monitoring board is based at Heathrow. After the last Question that I was asked on this subject I inquired how active that independent monitoring board was, and I was told that it is very active. It has produced critical comment on some of the practices it has observed, although not in this area, and it has said specifically that it does not think that there is a systemic problem, which I know is one of the anxieties in the House. Furthermore, detainees themselves have the right to make complaints. Those go to the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and he reviews them. There are many controls trying to ensure that there is both a good system and proper practice.
Identity Documents Bill
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The Earl of Erroll
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 1 and 4 because, as I said on Second Reading, when we discussed this matter at length, it seemed a shame to throw out the one good bit of the scheme along with the bad bit. The bad bit comprises the national identity register, whereas having another bit of plastic with which to identify yourself is not a huge concern. As I said then—I may as well put this on record again—I should be very happy to see us have a plastic passport, as you might call it, comprising the photograph page of the passport with an identical chip in it. We are told that retaining this provision temporarily as a travel document for use in Europe would give rise to huge expense as whole sections of the national identity register would have to be preserved. I do not believe that that would be the case; I think the pudding is being over-egged here in order to make the case all one way.
I support Amendment 4 in preference to Amendment 2 because the latter seems to be rather all-embracing whereas Amendment 4 is concerned merely with the information that is relevant to a passport. That information would have to be retained for a passport anyway and would probably be sufficient to prove the authenticity of the card. I have not checked with my expert but I imagine that the card is very secure and that if you are in possession of the Government’s public key you can authenticate the card without having to have any of this background information off a database, and you can tell whether the card has been cloned or tampered with in any way. Therefore, I think we should do exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Brett, suggested and retain the card as a travel document. Perhaps in due course we could also have a convenient European travel card to go along with it, but we should retain the minimum of information that is required, if any.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I support both the amendments in my noble friend’s name in this group and the related Amendment 4, to which I am one of the signatories. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, for also being a signatory to Amendment 4. On Second Reading, we heard the noble Earl’s views on the sense and convenience of continuing to use ID cards as travel documents in Europe, and he has re-emphasised those points today. We on these Benches share that view and the annoyance and frustration of those cardholders who, under the Bill, would be prevented from continuing to use their cards in this way. The amendments before us would enable existing ID cards to continue to be used as travel documents in Europe.
On Second Reading, having asserted that maintaining full-life validity of the existing ID cards would probably cost an extra £60 million to £80 million, which she considered to be unacceptably high, the Minister inferred that the alternative proposition of a refund of £30 to existing holders of the ID cards was unacceptable not because it was too much but because it was so trifling, since it was,
“rather less than probably most people pay for a monthly subscription to Sky”.—[Official Report, 18/10/2010; col. 742.]
That was an interesting phrase from the Minister, suggesting that Rupert Murdoch and his interests are never far from this Government’s thoughts.
ID cards were sold as documents that, among other things, would be valid as travel documents in Europe for 10 years. Those who bought the cards, planning to rely on them for future travel, will now have to spend additional money on obtaining a passport, or renewing it when it expires. Of the 12,000 to 13,000 individuals who bought ID cards, some did so because they only travel in Europe and never further afield, others because their passports were about to expire. Some bought ID cards because they were far more affordable than a full British passport. All these individuals have a right to feel cheated. They were sold a product—in this case, an identity card and its associated benefits—only to find, not that the terms of use are likely to be changed by the Government, but that the value and purpose of the document will be completely nullified without compensation. On the point of fairness, the Government's stance cannot be right. As the Minister, Mr Damian Green, eloquently put it in his impact assessment, there would be a reputational issue for the Government,
“in dealing with people who purchased a now-useless card in good faith”.
The Government's argument appears to be that because they said prior to the general election that they would scrap the ID card system, everyone should have known that, and it is their own fault if they bought one. However, the individuals concerned bought one from the Government.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Are we not now getting on to Amendment 3? The noble Lord seems to be talking entirely about compensation.
Lord Rosser
I am not talking entirely about compensation: I am talking about the issue of scrapping the card and not continuing at all. The amendment deals with it continuing as a travel document in Europe. The individuals concerned bought a card from the Government: not from a Labour Government or a Conservative Government, but from the Government. To those individuals, it is still the Government who are now withdrawing them. Until now, we have not had a culture in which it is acceptable for an arrangement entered into with the Government by an individual for a service in return for a payment to be totally withdrawn shortly afterwards, but for the payment made by the individual to be retained on the grounds that it is rather less than most people pay for a monthly subscription to Sky.
The Minister said at Second Reading that we must have a sense of proportion about this. She should address that comment to herself. Accepting these amendments would be one way for the Government to show a sense of proportion. Perhaps the Minister will tell us whether the same approach as that being shown to individuals with ID cards is being adopted for contractors who have been working for the Government on developing and running the ID card scheme. Have they, too, been told that they should have known that the scheme would no longer continue if there was a change in the political colour of the Government at the election and that, knowing this, they should not have entered into any contracts; and accordingly that no further payments are being made to them and the terms of any contracts are null and void, with no compensation payable? I do not think so. For this Government, there appears to be one rule for their dealings with those who can fight their corner, such as the large contractors and their owners and shareholders, and another rule for their dealings with individual citizens who do not have the resources or muscle to stand up to what some would regard as sharp practice.
The impact assessment refers to the cost of termination of contracts with contractors, and the cost of the refund process. If there are to be no refunds—which is why we are tabling an amendment suggesting that the cards should continue as travel documents in Europe—what refund process is being referred to in the impact assessment? How much would it cost? How much compensation has been paid for termination of contracts?
Using an ID card as a form of travel document is not an unfamiliar phenomenon in Europe, as my noble friend Lord Brett explained. The identity cards of Germany, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Sweden are all recognised by all EU members as valid for intra-EU travel. The argument that border agencies would be flummoxed by individuals using our ID cards for travel is not very convincing. Neither, incidentally, do there appear to have been problems with recognition of the limited number of identity cards issued here so far. As my noble friend Lord Brett explained, this is a facilitating amendment to enable the continued use of ID cards for travel purposes. We support the amendment. It is sensible—as is Amendment 4, to which the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is a signatory. If the national identity register is to be destroyed, it makes sense to transfer data relevant to passports and international travel to the passport database and to the Identity and Passport Service. After all, the IPS is used to handling such information. Practically, such a transfer would not be hard to achieve. Transfer would require the permission of those individuals whose data are held, but these would not be difficult to obtain where, as is likely in most cases, the individual is willing to agree. That is because, on data transfer, the appropriate section of the Data Protection Act 1998 states:
“Personal data shall be obtained for only one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes”.
We do not see that what we are suggesting with this amendment falls foul of that criterion.
The Earl of Erroll
The biometric data held on identity cards are different from those held on passports, so that is not quite right.
Lord Rosser
If that is the case, I take the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. I think what he is saying is that he does not think it is relevant to the particular issue of the ID card continuing as a travel document, rather than that it is not relevant at all. If so, I accept what the noble Earl says.
The Government are clearly not too sure of the wisdom of their position, as the Minister implied at Second Reading when she said that she did not consider that there was a need to do this “as things stand”. But I hope that, in the light of that, the Minister will reflect hard on the amendment, which seeks to ensure that the identity card can continue to be used as a document for travel in Europe. The disregard now being shown for those who bought ID cards on the basis that they would be valid for a range of purposes, including travel in Europe, for 10 years, is unworthy of any democratic government. This group of amendments seeks to redress the situation by providing that the existing ID cards should remain valid as travel documents in Europe for 10 years and that existing ID card data should, subject to the agreement of the individual, be transferred to the passport database if the information on the national identity register is to be destroyed. The Government ought to be prepared to agree to these amendments and I hope that, on reflection, the Minister will indicate that that is now her position.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, the amendment does not contain all that accompanying detail. It is not easy, therefore, to interpret what the noble Lord actually thinks should be transferred. If he wants to make that clearer, perhaps that might help, but, as things stand, these amendments have not been thought through. That is a pity because there is the germ of a good idea here. The idea of a passport card is not new, and Members of this House may be aware that—
Lord Rosser
I have a question in the light of what the Minister has said. If it were possible to produce something with which she agreed that achieved the objective to, as Amendment 1 said,
“remain valid as a travel document in Europe until their expiry date”,
by the moving of data on to the passport database, is that something that she would agree to?
Baroness Neville-Jones
I cannot give advance assent to a proposition that I have not seen in writing, so I cannot concede that point to the noble Lord.
Might I continue? It is the case that transport cards are issued by a number of countries for use with other countries where there is a bilateral or multilateral agreement, and there is a set of standards issued by ICAO that were adopted under a non-binding conclusion by the EU in 2005. It may be that the previous Administration chose not to invest in passport cards; they could have done so then. That might have been because of the work and the level of investment on ID cards themselves.
Another possibility at that stage would have been consideration of the use of vignettes. The ability to store the equivalent of a vignette in the passport card is under development, and we will wait to see how that progresses. At this stage, though, given that none of that base was laid by the previous Administration, we do not think it is possible or cost-effective to invest in passport cards as a priority.
My final point is again on costs. I appreciate that the amendments aim in effect to pass the data currently on the NIR to the passport database. As I have indicated, there is no existing provision, nor is it appropriate, for the IPS to establish a new database. The amendment also fails to recognise that it will be necessary to deal with lost or stolen cards that would have to be replaced. Once this thing is working, you cannot just say, “Well, if you lose your card, that’s too bad”; it has to be a living system.
Issuing replacement cards would require an infrastructure to be in place. Given what was said at Second Reading, I asked the IPS to estimate how much that would cost each year. The results are as follows: to maintain the infrastructure and pay service charges to the contractors would cost about £4 million; to replace lost or stolen cards would cost an estimated £500,000; and to maintain basic customer support facilities and appropriate levels of staffing would be another £500,000. Those are all per annum figures. About £5 million over one year—which, in the lifetime of these cards, means 10 years—gives a total of £50 million. I have tried to cover the issues raised by the Opposition. There are others—such as transgendered people having only one card, as they currently do with the passport, and the question, which we will come to, of refunds and consumer protection—which I shall go into in due course. However, even with the amendment, there is a catalogue of problems. Instead, I recommend that the amendment be withdrawn.
Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, sitting between the Cross Benches and my noble friend’s Liberal Democrats, I have to confess that the difference between myself and them is that whereas they could not understand the Bill as it was originally written, I cannot understand it now that it has been rewritten by them. I grew up on childhood problems which involved Mr Black, Mr Brown, Mr Green and Mr White who lived in houses that were—but not necessarily respectively—green, white, brown and black. Then you were given a certain amount of information and you had to decide who was living in the right house. All I can say is that the Minister now constitutes my road to sanity because if she can explain what the original Bill meant and why this measure does not improve it, at least I shall sleep at night.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, are interesting. Those are the points that I understood. Other points were made which—through my own ignorance, not their failure to explain them—I could not fully understand. I am extremely grateful that I am not left with the hapless task of having to respond to them. No doubt when we have heard the Minister’s response, we will find out the validity or otherwise of the points that have been made. For people such as myself who are not lawyers and who do not profess to understand some fairly obscure wording, will the Minister please give the reasons why she is not accepting the amendments in a layman’s terms, not a lawyer’s? If she is accepting them, presumably there is no problem in that regard.
The Countess of Mar
My Lords, may I return to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights? It says, in relation to Clauses 4, 5 and 6:
“The practical use of these offences could engage the right to private life and we call on the Government to provide Parliament with a more detailed justification of why these offences are necessary and an explanation of what conduct is criminalised by these offences that is not already caught by existing legislation”.
I hope that the Minister will respond to that point as well.
The Earl of Erroll
Absolutely. It is important to have an external view of these things that will report directly to Parliament, because it is our duty to protect the rights of citizens against the Executive.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I want to speak to my noble friend Lord Brett’s amendment as well as to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, which seem to raise a different issue. Primarily, though, I shall address my comments to the issue of identity fraud, which is raised in my noble friend’s amendment.
I think that it was on Second Reading that my noble friend Lord Bach pointed out that ID fraud is one of the UK’s fastest growing crimes, with nearly 2 million people a year falling victim to it and it costing the country some £2.7 billion. A huge proportion of people are affected; more than nine out of 10 people in the UK consider themselves to be at risk from identity fraud.
Minimising the paper trail of one’s identity details is an important part of facing up to the threat of fraud, and ID cards helped to do that, as the evidence that was presented in another place by the representative from the Manchester Airport group and the comments made today by my noble friend Lord Brett have indicated. The ID card scheme, of course, did not provide a panacea when it came to addressing identity fraud. The cards offered some help in that area, and we feel it is important that that is acknowledged, but with regard to, for example, identity fraud committed online, the ID card did not offer added security.
My noble friend’s amendment calls on the Government to produce a report on the lessons learnt for tackling identity fraud from the ID card scheme and its cancellation. It is interesting to refer back to the evidence given by the representative from the Manchester Airport Group to the committee in another place. I draw attention once again to points that he made. He said that the benefit that they got from the system was that they were absolutely sure that the person who was standing in the pass office was the right person. He was asked by committee members whether it might have been possible to achieve some of the benefits by other means—which is also important in relation to the amendment—for example, by using passports. He said that, yes, that was something that they would like to hold on to, but added:
“At the moment we are not getting very positive indications that that would be possible, but we will keep pushing”.
Later, he was asked whether he was saying that some of the innovative ideas in the identity card scheme could be replicated using the passport database or something similar. He said:
“I believe that if there is a will to do that, yes, we can. At the moment we are not actually feeling that will, but I believe that it is possible”.—[Official Report, Commons, Identity Documents Bill Committee, 29/6/10; cols. 29-30.]
Those observations suggest that there would be real benefit in having a report on the impact on combating identity fraud of the repeal—as that is the intention—of the Identity Cards Act 2006. The comments made in that evidence certainly suggested that the scheme had benefits, but that some of them might be achieved in other ways if it was scrapped. It is a case of looking not just at what may have been lost but at whether the benefits which were worth keeping, particularly relating to identity fraud, could continue to be achieved by other means. Reference was made in the evidence to the use of the passport database.
At page 7, paragraph 15 the impact assessment states:
“For Government and business, the benefits were expected to derive from simpler, quicker business processes and reduced cost of identity related fraud. However, the realisation of benefits depends very strongly upon high take-up rates for the card, because these are the key to engaging public and private sector organisations in offering card-based services”.
The point has been made that there was not a very high take-up; the system had only just come in. However, in the Government’s impact assessment there is a clear recognition that the identity card scheme could produce benefits for government and business by reducing the cost of identity-related fraud. Once again, that would seem to be an argument for the Minister to accept the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Brett, which simply calls for a report on the impact of the repeal of the Act on combating identity fraud.
The noble Baroness told the House on Second Reading that an action plan was being developed by the National Fraud Authority and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, following their strategic threat assessment of the harm impact of identity crime, and that that was being overseen by the Home Office. If there is an exercise or if an action plan is already in the process of being drawn up, it is surely not irrelevant to look at the impact of the repeal of the Identity Cards Act 2006 on combating identity fraud and the lessons learnt from the operation of the scheme. Once again, I say, particularly given some of the evidence presented in the other place and the statement in the Government's impact assessment, that there would have been benefits in relation to identity fraud—albeit that of course I accept that the document said that that would relate to a high take-up of the cards.
Can the Minister tell us any more about the action plan—obviously, not the details of what is in it but the progress being made, what it might involve and when we might hear more about it? I also take this opportunity to ask whether, as part of the action plan, the Government are following the rollout of the new generation of identity documentation in Germany, which will include the radio frequency identity chip—which, as I understand it, will facilitate secure online transactions. At least, that is the theory; whether it does in practice is presumably something that still must be seen. Does the Minister think that anything can be learnt from that new technology to address the very serious problem, which everybody recognises, of identity fraud?
I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept these amendments. My comments are mainly related to the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Brett, as clearly everyone has an interest in devoting the maximum resources and the maximum amount of information gained from operating other relevant schemes to trying to combat identity fraud.
Cyberattacks: EU Committee Report
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I am the final warm-up act before the much referred to and much awaited speech by the Minister. I wish to add my thanks to those already expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, for the work that he and his sub-committee have undertaken in producing such an informative report into a subject of ever increasing importance and concern. Those concerns have been reflected by every Member of your Lordships' House who has spoken with authority in this debate. I also congratulate my noble friends Lord Reid of Cardowan and Lord Browne of Ladyton on their, as anticipated, impressive and thought-provoking speeches, which gave us the benefit of their considerable and real expertise and knowledge in this field.
The noble Lord, Lord Jopling, in his helpful and informative opening speech, drew attention to the key findings in the report, including the issue of the part that the European Union can usefully play in protecting Europe against large-scale cyberattacks. It was certainly of some comfort to read that the committee did not feel that this was an area where our Government, in relation to our own country, were being complacent. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, said, the witnesses from whom the committee took both oral and written evidence generally thought that the United Kingdom had sophisticated defences compared to most other states.
To quote from the report, the European Network and Information Security Agency, referring to mechanisms for dealing with internet incidents, had stated that,
“the UK, along with a limited number of other Member States, is considered a leader in this area with developed practices that set benchmarks for others to adopt”.
Continued vigilance and development will be necessary to ensure that that continues to remain the case.
There has, of course, been a change of Government since the report was concluded. While we have read their written response, I hope that we will hear more from the Minister when she responds about the views of the new Government on the report and the serious issues it raises, and the extent to which the Government do or do not agree with the stance adopted by the previous Administration in their evidence to the sub-committee. In their reply of 6 July 2010 to the report, the Government state:
“While we are in agreement that cyber security is a significant and increasing facet of national security, the present Government is in the process of reviewing whether there are things we can do better or differently to achieve the same national security goal; that this is likely to extend to the European Union”.
It would be helpful if the Minister could explain what that statement means in practical terms. When did the review start? Who is undertaking the review? When will the review be complete? Will its findings be made public? What “things”—that is the word that the Government use—are being looked at to see if they can be done better or differently to achieve what is referred to as the “same national security goal”? Finally on that paragraph, what exactly is it that is,
“likely to extend to the European Union”?
A number of UK organisations and bodies with independent expertise are referred to in the report and in the Government’s response. Will the Minister confirm that these bodies will survive the forthcoming cull?
In their response, the Government say that they will remain actively involved in the discussions under way at the European level on the role for the European Union and that they support the committee’s recommendation that this should be focused on the promotion of best practice and on reducing the gap between the most advanced and the less advanced member states. As has been said on more than one occasion today, cyber does not recognise national or European Union boundaries but is also a global threat. We need our international partnerships and alliances, since we have common interests with other responsible nations in sharing information on threats and vulnerabilities.
The Government recognise that the prevention of cyberattacks has an important international dimension. They state:
“In developing a new cyber security strategy, the Government is putting significant resource into having a strong and proactive role in this”.
What are the objectives of this new cybersecurity strategy that it is felt may not currently be being addressed or need updating? Is it part of the “process of reviewing” referred to in the third paragraph of the Government’s response, to which I referred earlier?
The importance of this debate and the importance and relevance of the committee’s report has been further enhanced in the light of the speech the other day, to which the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, referred, by the director of GCHQ on cybersecurity. He said, as did the committee in its report, that this was not solely a national security or defence issue but went to the heart of our economic well-being and national interest. The committee’s report, as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, highlighted, gives examples of cyberattacks that have occurred which seek to strike at the heart of a country’s ability to function. The GCHQ director added further weight to this point in relation to our own country when he said that the threat of cyberattacks to disrupt seriously critical national infrastructure,
“is a real and credible one”.
He also said that:
“There are over 20,000 malicious emails on Government networks each month, 1,000 of which are deliberately targeting them ... that we have seen the use of cyber techniques by one nation on another to bring diplomatic or economic pressure to bear ... we have seen the theft of intellectual property on a massive scale, some of it not just sensitive to the commercial enterprises in question but of national security concern too ... and that the risks in all these areas are growing along with the enormous growth of the Internet. At the moment it’s expanding by about 60% a year”.
This includes growth stimulated by the Government as they seek to get services online, not least in response to an increasing public expectation that services will be available in this way. The expectation is that within the next few years, online tax and benefit payment systems could be processing over £100 billion-worth of payments at a time when the increasing cost of e-crime to the economy runs into billions of pounds and organised groups attack not just commercial targets but also online tax systems across Europe.
The GCHQ director commented that cyberspace is contested every day, every hour, every minute, every second, and that he could vouch for that from the displays in his own operations centre of minute-by-minute cyberattempts to penetrate systems around the world. He went on to say that:
“Ministers are looking, in the context of the Strategic Defence and Security Review and the Spending Review, at what capabilities the United Kingdom needs to develop further”,
and added that:
“Clearly they will also be deciding how they trade off against other spending priorities”.
Perhaps the Minister could answer the question that the director in effect posed—namely, how high a priority compared with other spending priorities does this Government give to providing the necessary resources to ensure that this country continues to be protected effectively from cyberattacks?
I conclude by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, and his committee on a thorough, thoughtful and informative report which has rightly raised the profile of this important and, indeed, worrying issue.