Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 19, at end insert—
“(4A) The Secretary of State may not make regulations designating an international agreement under section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (interception in accordance with overseas requests) where that agreement provides for requests to be made by the competent authorities of a country or territory, or of more than one country or territory, in which a person found guilty of a criminal offence may be sentenced to death for the offence under the general criminal law of the country or territory concerned.(4B) Subsection 4A does not apply if the country or territory has, within the international agreement, given assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed in any case in which or in whose preparation electronic data obtained under this Act has been used.”

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Bill is intended to assist in the fight against serious crime, not least terrorism, by making it possible to conclude agreements with other countries that would provide for electronic data in the possession of a service provider, in that other country to the agreement, to be passed to the UK authorities upon that service provider being served with an overseas production order made by a court in this country. Such arrangements would almost certainly have to be reciprocal, so that the authorities in that other country could make an overseas production order or equivalent in respect of the provision of electronic data by a service provider in this country. The necessity for having these provisions in the Bill is that the current procedure for obtaining such data, which is increasingly used in major crimes or in their planning as the technology rapidly develops, is what is known as mutual legal assistance. Under this process, the application for such data must be through the authorities and a court in the country of the service provider from which that data is being sought. If the application is agreed, there is still the process of actually obtaining the data from the service provider.

In reality, obtaining electronic data under the existing mutual legal assistance arrangements can take many months—apparently up to 12—which is not exactly conducive to fighting effectively serious crime and terrorism, with the length of time taken to obtain that data acting either as a disincentive to seeking it at all or it being obtained so late as to seriously negate its relevance and effectiveness. As I understand it, discussions have already taken place between the United Kingdom and the United States of America about concluding reciprocal arrangements for securing electronic data under the Bill’s provisions on overseas production orders. Indeed, I think the United States has already passed its necessary legislation to enable such arrangements or agreements to be concluded with the UK. We are not in any way opposed to the introduction of these new arrangements in principle but we have two significant areas of concern, one of which is the implications for the UK’s stance on opposition to the death penalty. That is the subject of Amendment 1, which is also in the names of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

An order from this country for an overseas production order applying to a service provider in the USA would, under the Bill, be made in a UK court. The service provider in the USA would, under the terms of the arrangements likely to be concluded, be expected to comply. In fact, as I understand it again, our Government have stated that they will not seek such an order unless they know that the provider would be willing to comply voluntarily.

As understand it again, service providers are likely to be willing to comply because the Bill will provide them with legal protection for releasing such electronic data. Likewise a service provider in this country would, in the normal course of events, be expected to comply with an overseas production order made by a court in another country—such as America, with which it looks as though we are close to concluding an agreement—under the terms of the Bill. I am not sure that there has been an indication from the American authorities that they would seek such an order only if they knew that the relevant service provider over here would comply, so some form of enforcement action could be the result if there was non-compliance.

Our concern in respect of the death penalty, to which this amendment relates, is that in a number of states in the USA it can be handed down as the sentence if a defendant is found guilty of certain serious crimes, including acts of terrorism. In the UK we are opposed to the death penalty—government Ministers have repeatedly stated that—and do not apply it as a sentence. However an overseas production order made by a court in the USA for electronic data from a service provider in this country could result in a situation whereby that electronic data might be significant in or key to enabling a court in America to convict a defendant who could be a citizen of any country, including Britain, of an offence carrying the death penalty as a possible sentence.

There is no issue with an individual being convicted of a serious offence they have committed, not least terrorism, as a result of electronic data obtained from a service provider in the UK and receiving an appropriate sentence, but we have an issue with the provision of such information from this country under the terms of the Bill without an assurance that the death penalty could not be imposed. We cannot as a nation say we are opposed to the death penalty and then sign an agreement with another country, whether the USA or another nation, knowing that a court in that other country could then make an order for a service provider here to provide electronic data which could make the difference between a defendant, perhaps a British citizen, being convicted or not convicted of an offence that led to the death penalty being applied.

This amendment provides that, in any agreement on overseas production orders and the provision of electronic data under the terms of the Bill, assurances must be obtained from the other country concerned that the death penalty will not be applied in respect of any offence for which a defendant has been found guilty and in which the information provided from this country contributed in any way to securing that conviction.

I believe the Government have previously said that there will need to be some form of disputes procedure against an overseas production order made in another country with which we have concluded a reciprocal agreement. However the Government have not been able to say what form that dispute procedure will take, how it will operate or, crucially, on what grounds an overseas production order made in that other country could successfully be challenged. Since the Government have resisted any suggestion of the Bill specifically stating that no reciprocal agreement or arrangement can be made with a country that will not give a cast-iron assurance that any electronic data from this country would not be used to help convict a defendant of an offence for which the death penalty would be applied, it seems extremely unlikely that grounds for a successful objection to an overseas production order under any disputes procedure could be that the data being sought could be used to help secure a conviction that could lead to the death penalty being imposed.

I repeat that the amendment does not preclude a reciprocal agreement being reached with other countries on overseas production orders to secure electronic data in the battle against serious crime, not least terrorism, by improving the prospects of securing convictions and, with them, the prospects of lengthy sentences of imprisonment to reflect the severity of the crime. The amendment seeks to ensure that our policy as a nation of opposing the death penalty is not compromised by service providers here being required by a court in another country with which we have reached an agreement under the terms of the Bill being expected to hand over data when there is no guarantee that that information will not be used to assist in securing a conviction, which could be of a British citizen, for which the death penalty could be applied. We cannot claim that we did not know that that would be the outcome. It will have come about through passing the Bill at the behest of the Government and the Government concluding an international agreement with another country, such as the USA, where the death penalty can still be applied in some states, without securing an assurance as part of that international agreement that the death penalty will not be applied where data secured under the Bill has played a part in securing that conviction. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 3 not moved.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for the Government’s response to my amendment—or rather the amendment I have moved; it is not purely my amendment. The Government’s argument appears to be based on two or three strands. The first is an inference that another country—realistically, we are talking about the USA—might not be willing to conclude an agreement with us under the Bill, including of course a reciprocal agreement, if this amendment is passed with its provisions for prior assurances on non-application of the death penalty. Why, though, should we not have the assurances that this amendment seeks, when we are talking about information from this country? Why should we have to compromise on our stance of opposition to the death penalty by having to hand over electronic data following an order in a court, or made in a court in another country, which could lead to the death penalty being applied if that information helped in securing a conviction in that other country?

I notice that the Government said that such information would not be used in evidence. However, information can be of value in securing a conviction without that evidence in itself being produced in evidence, since it may point people in directions which will lead to other evidence being produced which could assist in securing a conviction. It surely is not opposition to the death penalty—and government Ministers keep telling us that we are opposed to it—if you conclude an agreement that you know could allow the death penalty to be applied thanks to our assistance and co-operation over the provision of data. We need the safeguard that the death penalty will not be applied.

The other point is that orders will be made in that other country that the international agreement we conclude with it will expect to be adhered to and data supplied without any ability of a British court or the Government to say no on the ground that the death penalty could be applied. No assurances have been given that that will not be the case. In the absence of any detail about any disputes procedure and the circumstances in which it would operate, we will not be able to stop information being handed over on the ground that it could allow the death penalty to be applied.

In that regard, we do not know how many overseas production orders will be served on service providers in the UK by other countries with which we reach an agreement and where the death penalty could be applied. It could be a considerable number, and the Government cannot deny that. We could, in fact, be assisting in the application of the death penalty on a not infrequent basis.

As I understand it, the Government have now indicated that they will put down an amendment when the Bill reaches the Commons. It appears that that amendment might provide—I am really not sure—for some kind of review of any agreement reached on overseas production orders with another country, the outcome of which would presumably be available to Parliament before Parliament decides whether or not to ratify the agreement. But Parliament will presumably have to say yes or no to the agreement and will not be able to amend it, and neither will there be any requirement on the Government to accept the findings of any prior review or investigation of an agreement with another country reached under the terms of this Bill and, in particular, on any recommendation that an assurance should be sought on the non-application of the death penalty if it applies in the country concerned.

I really do not think that the assurance given and the statement made about the nature of a possible amendment in the Commons meet the provisions of this amendment, which clearly state that, if we are going to conclude such agreements with other countries on overseas production orders, and if it is a country where the death penalty can apply, firm assurances must be sought that, where information is handed over by service providers in this country, it will not be used to secure a conviction that could lead to the death penalty being imposed. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

6: Clause 3, page 4, line 21, at end insert—
“(8A) “Journalistic data” means electronic data that—(a) was created or acquired for the purposes of journalism, and(b) is stored by or on behalf of a person who created or acquired it for the purposes of journalism.(8B) Where a person (“R”) receives electronic data from another person (“S”) and S intends R to use the data for the purposes of journalism, R is to be taken to have acquired the data for those purposes.(8C) Journalistic data is “confidential journalistic data” if—(a) it is acquired or created by a person or persons in their capacity as a journalist and is held in confidence, or (b) it is communications data of a person acting in their capacity as a journalist, or(c) it is held subject to a restriction on disclosure, or an obligation of secrecy, contained in any enactment (whenever passed or made).”

[Lord Rosser]

The Bill extends the ability of law enforcement agencies through overseas production orders to obtain electronic data held by service providers overseas for the purposes of fighting serious crime, including terrorism. Since the assumption is that an agreement with another country will be reciprocal, the terms of the Bill when implemented will also, in reality, allow law enforcement agencies in that other country with which we have a reciprocal agreement to more easily obtain electronic data held by service providers in this country. But the Bill does not appear to provide adequate safeguards against confidential journalistic material being handed over in a way that results in sources losing their anonymity. We thus appear to have a Bill that potentially compromises the position and values of our free press. If sources of information do not feel that their anonymity will be protected, they are much less likely to provide information to journalists—information that might bring to light corruption, fraud, sexual offences, adverse environmental activity or failings by large organisations or government, for example, that those involved might wish to keep secret.

Clause 12 requires that where an overseas production order is made in respect of confidential journalistic data, it must be made on notice. The agency applying for the overseas production order would have to judge whether the material sought was ordinary or confidential journalistic material, but there is no guarantee under the Bill as it stands that the journalist, or indeed media organisation, will be able to make representations to the court. There is no requirement in the Bill for the journalist or media organisation that acquired the confidential material to be informed. The judge has a discretion to notify the journalist but not a duty. Without a requirement to notify the journalist or media organisation, take representations from them and have regard to what they say, there is no means by which journalists or media organisations can seek to protect their source.

This amendment seeks to address this concern by providing the right of journalists or media organisations to be given notice that an order in respect of confidential material is being sought, and to then be able to make representations to oppose the making of an order involving such journalistic material. It would also provide that the judge must be satisfied that there is a public interest that overwrites the confidentiality of the data sought before an order is made. If the Government have concerns that there might be journalists whom they would not wish to inform of an application for an order, then the advice could be given to the media organisation for whom that journalist worked.

The amendment seeks to ensure the continuation of an important safeguard. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, from these Benches we had an amendment in Committee requiring the court to be,

“satisfied that … data … is not confidential journalistic data”.

We were concerned that the Government had not consulted the NUJ or other organisations; I wonder whether they have had an opportunity for a discussion since then. The News Media Association certainly made its views clear with its concern about what it described as an artificial distinction between “journalistic material” and “confidential journalistic material” and what might flow from that distinction.

New subsection (8C)(b) proposed in Amendment 6 seems to make all data held by a person acting as a journalist “confidential journalistic data”. I see the attraction in that but I wonder whether this is the place to treat material differently from how it is treated elsewhere in UK law—in other words, I wonder about making that provision apply for the purposes of this piece of legislation only, which is a fairly small piece of the jigsaw of legislation that applies to journalism. Can the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, confirm when he winds up whether I have read this correctly: is he eliminating a distinction in this piece of legislation only, and only in the circumstances to which it will apply?

With regard to Amendment 11, we support a requirement to give notice of an application. We had an amendment to that effect in Committee, and we have amendments in the next grouping that are an attempt to respond to the Minister’s comments on the issue then.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is what I am saying, yes.

[Lord Rosser]

The protection of sources in relation to confidential journalistic data is very important to the free press in our country. I pointed out—and, as far as I understand it, this is not being contested by the Government—that there is no requirement in the Bill for the journalist or media organisation which acquired the confidential material to be informed. That seems to be a significant hole in the legislation. Surely in that situation the journalist or media organisation concerned should be able to make representations and to oppose the granting of an order; in other words, their voice should be heard—perhaps, from their point of view, to seek to protect their confidential sources.

I note the Government’s argument that this is already provided for in other legislation. I say only that we are dealing with something here which can relate also—under reciprocal arrangements, presumably—to orders made by a court in another country and not only in relation to orders made by a court in this country. In that situation it is absolutely vital, even if the Government believe that the safeguards are already there, that the ability of a journalist or media organisation to be informed of an application for an order, and the chance to appear and make representations in connection with that order, should be repeated in the Bill. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Asylum Applications

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think I outlined that process just now to my noble friend Lady Berridge. We are expecting to roll it out in 2019. With regard to quality assurance, the audits are going to be carried out by an operational security unit for both the quality of the decision and the application of the policy.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, there have been media reports that a further problem is that staff considering asylum applications are rushed because there is a backlog to deal with, and that in addition staff have targets to meet in respect of the number of decisions they have to make each week on whether to grant or refuse asylum seekers. Is there still a backlog of people waiting for an asylum decision or for an appeal to be heard? If so, how big is that backlog? What targets in reality are staff making asylum decisions expected to meet each day, week or month?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is important that the decisions made are the right ones. I could not comment on decisions being rushed, but I can go back to the department to ask that question. There are certainly a lot of decisions to be made, because people want to come to this country, and I can try to ascertain a figure for the backlog.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of the Bill, and of the thinking behind the Government’s proposals. We too would like to take this opportunity to express our thanks to our security agencies and the police for the work undertaken to protect us from acts of terrorism. We are aware of the significant number of major acts of terrorism—potential and intended—that have been prevented. We also express our thanks to the staff of the emergency services, including hospital staff, who are called into action when incidents—perhaps one should say atrocities—occur. Our thoughts remain with the victims of those atrocities and their families. We accept the need for the Government to update counterterrorism legislation to reflect changing situations and circumstances as well as technological changes and developments.

We expressed our broad support for the Bill in the House of Commons, did not divide on it at Second Reading and supported it at Third Reading. We did, however, table substantial amendments, some of which led to alterations in the Government’s position and government amendments to the Bill, to address concerns we had raised, including those in respect of human rights, which cannot simply be brushed aside.

One feature of the passage of the Bill to date has been the Government laying down amendments of some import just prior to Report stage and Third Reading in the House of Commons. That did not suggest that counterterrorism and security legislation is always being considered and evaluated by the Government in quite the calm and measured way they would like us to believe, but in some areas is being rushed to meet deadlines—even though the events that have weighed most heavily on the Government’s mind in formulating the Bill have not all occurred within the last few weeks or months.

We have no objection to late amendments when the case for their wording and intent is clear. However, it is hardly satisfactory if such amendments are to a Bill that has been through the Commons without there having been time for proper consideration and debate in the other place about the necessity and—equally significantly—appropriateness of the wording of those late amendments. That is the situation we are in with the Bill. A new clause was laid by the Government, with a number of consequential amendments, just prior to Report. It provides for an offence under the Terrorism Act 2000 of entering or remaining in an area outside the United Kingdom that has been designated in regulations made by the Secretary of State. There was an exchange of views in the Commons about where the burden of proof lay in the light of the wording of that new clause, which states:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for entering, or remaining in, the designated area”.


The Minister for Security and Economic Crime stated in the debate, on behalf of the Government, that,

“we have provided for a reasonable excuse defence. Once such a defence has been raised, the burden of proof, to the criminal standard, will rest with the prosecution to disprove the defence”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/18; col. 656.]

The Minister has, in effect, repeated that statement in her opening speech today. However, the wording of the Bill and the Minister’s statement appear to be in conflict. I say that not as a legal authority but as someone whose legal career began and ended with the apparently now steadily diminishing lay magistracy.

Will the Minister indicate why the Bill does not appear to say the same on burden of proof as was said by the Commons Minister when moving the new clause on Report in the Commons and again by the Minister here today? Will she also tell us, assuming that the Commons Minister’s statement is correct on burden of proof under the new clause, whether it will be sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the individual was not in reality engaged in a claimed valid activity for a reasonable excuse defence or whether the prosecution will also have to prove that the individual was also involved in a terrorist or terrorist-related activity, which I thought was something that the prosecution could already seek to prove under the existing law to secure a conviction?

I raise this point in the context of a further statement made on Report by the Minister for Security in the Commons that,

“breaching a travel ban and triggering the offence will provide the police and the Crown Prosecution Service with a further tool to investigate and prosecute those who return to the United Kingdom from designated areas, thereby protecting the public from wider harm”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/18; col. 656.]

Can the police and the Crown Prosecution Service not already investigate an individual returning to the UK from a potential future designated area if they have reasonable doubts as to the true reasons for their being in those areas or countries, or will it, under this Bill, be sufficient for imposing up to 10 years’ imprisonment to show that the individual concerned was not there for a claimed reasonable excuse defence activity or purpose?

The Government appear to have some reservations of their own about this late new clause, which they expect will lead to only a “few people” being prosecuted. In the Commons on Report, the Minister for Security said that,

“I recognise that we have introduced this measure into the Bill late, and I apologise for that. However, we are in the Commons, and the Bill will no doubt go to the other place, and I am happy to discuss further how we can clarify it and safeguard it and make sure that it is not abused as a system, and that the reasonable excuse issue is further explored. I think that is appropriate”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/18; col. 658.]

We will indeed need to look at the process, procedures and criteria against which the Government seek, by affirmative statutory instrument, to designate these areas, and consider the adequacy or otherwise of the safeguards for those with legitimate business in these designated areas, such as aid workers and journalists or those who went there without appreciating what they were getting involved in and came back disillusioned.

In the Commons, the Government were asked by John Woodcock MP if they had,

“an estimate of how many of those 800 Brits who we know went over to Raqqa during the recent conflict could have been prosecuted under this legislation, had it been on the statute book at the time”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/18; col. 658.]

The Minister for Security said that he would write to the Member with a specific number—will the Minister tell us what that figure is? I assume that the figure will also, by definition, be for those who could not be prosecuted under existing legislation. Will the Government also indicate how many designated areas or countries they anticipate there will be under the new clause? It looks as though there will be quite a few, since the Commons Minister, during his opening speech on Report, referred to Turkey, Syria, Iraq, “parts of Africa”, “parts of the Philippines” and,

“areas of conflict where there is a risk of terrorism”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/18; col. 656.]

A further government amendment on Report relates to the seizure of flags or other activities associated with a proscribed organisation, and would give the police the option of seizing such items on suspicion of an offence being committed under the Terrorism Act 2000 without having to make an arrest, subject to that course of action being needed to prevent the evidence for a potential subsequent prosecution being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Such a course of action could still have the effect of raising the temperature at a march or demonstration, even though that is what the provision is designed to avoid, and not least in Northern Ireland. We will need to consider how the proposed course of action might work out in practice.

Further government amendments on Report changed the Bill’s original provisions on the viewing of terrorist material online so that the provision applies to information that is accessed online rather than covering only information that is downloaded first. We will need to consider that issue further since the Bill now provides, instead of the much-criticised three clicks test, for a reasonable excuse defence if the person does not know and has no reason to believe that the information they are accessing is likely to be useful in connection with terrorism or terrorist-related activities. We will need to probe the position of those who might look at such material for legitimate and non-terrorist or terrorist-related intent, such as journalists or academics, or those who look at it inadvertently. The issue of proportionality has to be considered.

A further government amendment on Report increased from five to 10 years, as the Minister said, the maximum penalty for failing to disclose information about acts of terrorism. It would be helpful if the Minister could expand on the reasons that led the Government to believe that the original maximum penalty of five years should be increased to 10 years, apart from it being also the view of Max Hill QC.

Apart from legislation, a further aspect of the Government’s approach to addressing the threat of terrorism is the Prevent programme. It has been in operation for some time now and has been the subject of both positive and negative comments. On the latter point, there is some doubt about whether all sections of the community have confidence in the programme and whether its aims and objectives, which include diverting people from involvement in terrorism and terrorist activity and strengthening community cohesion are always being achieved. Some appear to regard Prevent as primarily an intelligence-gathering exercise.

There is also an issue about the impact on the Prevent programme and its ability to deliver its stated aims and objectives of the cuts in local government services, including those for younger people. As part of the counterterrorism strategy, there should be provision in the Bill for an independent statutory review of the Prevent programme to look at and evaluate the extent to which it is or is not achieving its objectives and the support that it has or does not have across the community, with a view to making changes and improvements to the programme where deemed necessary to enhance our ability to counter the threat and reality of terrorism. Counterterrorism, after all, is not just about creating new offences and fixing maximum penalties.

We will wish to pursue other matters during the passage of the Bill. The European arrest warrant is an important weapon in countering terrorism. Following the attacks in Salisbury and the identification of the two suspects, we have recently obtained a European arrest warrant and either already have or are about to issue an Interpol red notice. Yet the Government opposed an amendment on Report in the Commons that simply required them to adopt the continued participation of the UK in the European arrest warrant in relation to people suspected of terrorist offences as a negotiating objective in the withdrawal negotiations with the European Union.

On Report in the Commons, the Government, in response to the shadow Minister’s concerns in relation to border stops where there is no reasonable suspicion in relation to an individual said that they would look at the situation in Northern Ireland and accountability for the number of stops. That border represents 3% of the passenger numbers for the whole of the UK, but 18% of the stops. There has to be transparency in how the stop power is used—a power to stop, question and detain without reasonable suspicion exercised by officials. We do not want to create a situation that looks like something akin to a hard border on this aspect between the north and south. When do the Government intend to come back with the results of their further consideration on this point? Perhaps the Minister will say.

A further issue raised on Report by the shadow Minister concerned legal professional privacy and the provision in the Bill for an officer not only to watch someone receiving legal advice, which is not new, but to hear that legal advice being given. The shadow Minister suggested that to overcome the government concerns that have led to this provision, there should be a panel of lawyers regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Law Society. The Minister for Security said that he would look at the proposal before the Bill’s introduction into this House. It would be helpful if the Minister could say what the Government’s position now is on this issue.

While we supported the Bill at Third Reading in the Commons, there are a number of outstanding issues that we flagged up on Report, many of which I have referred to, including the need to look in more detail in this House at the significant late amendments tabled by the Government just prior to Report, which could not receive the consideration they should have done in the Commons. We will wish to pursue these points during the passage of the Bill through this House; nevertheless, it would be helpful if the Minister could respond to the specific points and questions I have raised. Surely we all have an interest in ensuring that the Bill is balanced and proportionate, that its provisions are all necessary, and that it strengthens our hand in countering terrorism and terrorist activity while safeguarding human rights.

Brexit: Europol

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 11th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The answer to that is yes—and, for Europol specifically, it means that the UK will keep its liaison bureau in The Hague and will have access to European systems and facilities on the same basis as it does now.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

Can the Government give an assurance that, in the interests of national security, they would not recommend any deal on EU withdrawal to Parliament which did not sustain and protect the current levels of security arrangements and co-operation that are now available to us through our membership of the European Union?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not think anyone would disagree with the noble Lord. Our ongoing security partnership should protect those shared law-enforcement and criminal justice operational capabilities. He and I have debated on the Data Protection Act, on the specific law-enforcement provisions, and, of course, on national security. It is incredibly important that we continue to co-operate, to the benefit of both the EU and the UK.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th September 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment is grouped with Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. We are both interested in how orders are to be enforced. I have to say that I think both amendments are slightly circular. That might mean that they are elliptical—I am not sure. However, we are probing at this stage; I hope that the Minister will take that point.

There are obvious difficulties with enforcement in respect of data held by an entity that is not in the UK and which does not have a base or assets in the UK. We are told in Clause 6(4)(a) that the provisions apply regardless of where the data is stored. I do not know whether “extraterritorially” in the sense of outside the earth, as distinct from in another country, applies here. I simply do not understand how the technology works.

It seems to me that the enforcement will have two aspects: a sanction for non-compliance and ensuring the actual production of the data. So my first question is: will the mechanism for enforcement be in the co-operation arrangement and, generally, how are we to expect the issues that I have raised to be dealt with? I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I shall speak to the amendment in my name, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, has in effect the same objective as the amendment which she has just spoken to and moved. The purpose of our amendment is likewise to find out to what extent and by what means overseas production orders can and will be enforced where there is a bilateral or wider international agreement for an overseas production order made by a court in this country and one made in another country and served on a provider in the UK.

In Committee last Wednesday the Government stated that the reference at Second Reading that,

“UK-based providers will not be compelled to comply with overseas orders”,—[Official Report, 11/7/18; col. 929.]

meant that while,

“UK companies are not compelled by UK law”,

to comply with a production order,

“they may be compelled by the other jurisdiction … depending on the country in question”.—[Official Report, 5/9/18; col. GC 143.]

Bearing in mind that considerable progress appears to have already been made towards concluding a bilateral agreement on overseas production orders with the United States in line with the Bill, will an overseas production order made by our courts in respect of an American-based service provider be enforceable—and, if so, how, by whom and with what sanctions available if there is non-compliance?

Likewise, in the light of the Minister’s comment last Wednesday that UK companies might be compelled by the other jurisdiction to comply with their production order, how will such an order made by an American court in respect of a British-based service provider be enforceable, by whom and with what sanctions available if there is non-compliance? In addition, what do the Government consider would be the basis of appropriate and acceptable enforcement arrangements in both directions for any other countries with whom we might conclude bilateral arrangements in respect of production orders under the Bill?

Last Wednesday in Committee, the Government said that,

“it is reasonable to expect that some form of dispute resolution mechanism would be in place to help determine any differences in the event that there is a dispute over compliance with an order”.—[Official Report, 5/9/18; col. GC 141.]

That statement was, of course, in line with what the Government had said in the Minister’s letter of 20 July following Second Reading. That letter referred to the Government expecting any bilateral agreement to include a mechanism for escalating any dispute over compliance.

But should the letter not have said that the Government “will” require a bilateral agreement to include such processes and procedures, rather than just that they expect that it will? Would the decision of such a dispute resolution mechanism be legally binding? If so, on whom? If not, what would happen if the dispute resolution mechanism failed to resolve the dispute? As I understand it, some service providers have welcomed the Bill because it will provide them with cover when making available electronic data, if done under the Bill’s provisions, from other potential legal proceedings. If that is the case, would that legal protection be provided by the Bill if it was not capable of being legally enforced in one or both directions?

What kind of issues in dispute could be addressed through the suggested dispute resolution procedure mechanism? Who would mediate or arbitrate if such a mechanism was in place? Would there be legal representation? How would the mechanism be activated and by whom? Who would pay the costs? Would the dispute procedure have to reach a conclusion or decision within a fixed maximum timescale? Would the dispute resolution mechanism for any bilateral agreement on production orders with the United States be the same in the United States and the UK, working to the same standard and principles and applying or not applying the same sanctions? If there is to be any enforcement by the courts, through which court would an overseas production order made in this country be enforceable, and through which court would an overseas production order made in the US or another country in respect of a British service provider be enforceable? After at least two years of discussion with the United States on the proposed agreement, the Government must have some specific answers to these questions.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. As they said, overseas production orders will be used where an international co-operation arrangement exists and, as such, orders will be used in an environment where they are readily complied with or where there is confidence that such orders will be complied with.

As I explained when the Bill was read for a second time, the Bill provides an alternative route to accessing evidence to the existing mutual legal assistance channels. However, those channels will still be available. As such, if there is any doubt about compliance, appropriate officers may well opt to seek the evidence required via that existing route to ensure that compliance can be effected through another country’s own domestic sanctions.

Amending this provision to include the means by which an order could be enforced would be a departure from legislation in relation to existing production orders. It goes without saying that non-compliance of an order is a breach of such an order. To answer one of the noble Lord’s questions, the very nature of this being a Crown Court order is that it attracts contempt of court proceedings if there is non-compliance—which will be dealt with by way of court rules.

Failure to comply with an overseas production order made by an English judge will carry the same consequences as failure to comply with a domestic production order—namely, the person will become liable to punishment for contempt of court in the same way as if an order of the Crown Court had been breached. Specifying on the face of the order the means by which contempt proceedings will be brought will not change the legal position.

On the point made by noble Lords about enforcement. I accept that the Bill does not provide an enforcement mechanism in respect of Clause 13(1), which prohibits a person from concealing, destroying, altering or disposing of the data, or disclosing the application to anyone else once they are given notice of the application. This is currently the case with domestic orders made under Schedule 1 to PACE. As I mentioned, these orders can be made only where the relevant international arrangement exists. Orders will be applied for and used in an environment where they are readily complied with and where there is confidence that such orders will be complied with.

In reality, enforcement mechanisms for such requirements are unlikely to be needed—again, this reflects the domestic position. I say this because, where there is a risk that a person on whom an order is served might tip off a subject of interest or destroy evidence, a search warrant is likely to be used or the evidence would not be sought at all. Therefore, where there is a risk of concealing, destroying, disposing of or altering the data, an overseas production order will not be an appropriate method of obtaining that information. As I said, MLA will still be available and, where there is doubt about compliance with an overseas production order, appropriate officers may well opt to seek the evidence required via the MLA route to ensure that the information can be obtained by other means.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the enforcement mechanism would be in the co-operation agreement. We envisage that the co-operation arrangements will require obstacles to compliance to be removed, but the requirement to comply with an order will be a matter for the law of the jurisdiction in which it is made. We have provided for enforcement orders in the Bill via the contempt of court mechanism.

The noble Lord also asked about dispute resolution. Any mechanism for dispute resolution will be subject to negotiation with any country with which we wish to enter into an agreement. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to speculate on the terms of such dispute resolution mechanisms—although I can of course discuss this further with noble Lords ahead of Report. With those explanations, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Perhaps I may ask for clarification. As I understand from what the noble Baroness said— I may well have misunderstood it—if an overseas production order made in this country had to be enforced, it would be on the basis of contempt of court. That would be enforced against a provider in America if we were talking about the agreement with the States. How would contempt of court proceedings against a court decision in this country work in practice in relation to a provider in the United States who did not comply?

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[Lord Rosser]

In the other direction, would an order made in an American court against a British provider that is not complied with lead to contempt proceedings in a United States court, and how would that court enforce it against a British provider?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

While we are waiting, am I right in thinking that in the recent Facebook case it was not that the service provider did not want to provide the information that would be of use to UK law enforcement but that domestic law in America did not allow it to provide that information, and that in the overwhelming majority of cases to which this legislation would apply we anticipate that the service provider would be more than keen to provide the data, provided it can be done lawfully, and that this mechanism provides the lawful means of doing that?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think the noble Lord is probably quite right. It goes back to what I was saying at the beginning of my response. If there were doubts about compliance, or that began to become apparent, MLA would be the process that we would revert to if this was not forthcoming. Ditto, the American side would probably institute the MLA process to ensure compliance.

[Lord Rosser]

On the point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made, does it stand up that the service provider—he spoke about the situation in America, I think—would be protected from any other legal action if it provided the data under a law that it did not have to comply with?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The current Facebook case is a good case in point. There is no requirement for it to provide the information because of its terms, conditions and processes. I am sure that this would ensure that it had to comply with the process, because we are introducing this agreement with the US which places an obligation on CSPs to comply—whereas at this point in time they do not have to.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my Amendments 25, 26, 28 and 35 are also in this group. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has given notice that he intends to oppose Clause 7 standing part of the Bill. I assume that that is to probe the operation of the clause. I am sure he takes the view that I do—that one would not want to accept that these orders can be made without the possibility of variation, revocation or, in the most general sense, appeal.

On Amendment 24, I am ready to be told that it is not necessary to spell out that revocation or variation can be,

“in whole or in part”.

I realise that a part-revocation is probably a variation. We also find the non-disclosure requirements rather troublesome. Amendment 25 seeks to probe the procedure for opposing the non-disclosure requirements. Amendment 26 is part of the same question about how you appeal against them.

Clause 8 provides for non-disclosure of the existence of an order, as distinct from non-disclosure of its contents. There is something rather concerning about not being able to say that an order is in existence. If a data subject asks the internet service provider, it cannot even say, “We will have to refer to the judge”—or can it? I am not sure. The sanction here, presumably, would be contempt of court. I have already referred to whether that is an effective sanction in the case of an overseas or international body. I was reminded of super-injunctions when I read this. They do not have the greatest reputation. Presumably the Minister will remind us that disclosing the existence of an order to a subject could hamper the work of law enforcement or security. All my instincts are that somebody who is affected by an order should know about it. Perhaps the Minister could take this opportunity to explain the operation of it.

Amendment 35 is another probing amendment, about how one appeals, in this case against Clause 13. But my major concerns are around Clause 8. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, I have tabled a Clause 7 stand part debate, which is intended to provide an opportunity for the Government to explain in a bit more detail why this clause is deemed necessary and how and in what circumstances it is intended to operate. In what kinds of circumstances do the Government envisage it being necessary to vary or revoke an overseas production order, and how many times has that happened in respect of domestic production orders, compared to the number of such domestic orders issued? Does the varying or revoking referred to in Clause 7 apply to overseas production orders made in this country or to such orders made in the country with which we have a bilateral agreement and applying to British service providers—or, indeed, does it apply to both? In what circumstances would the Secretary of State, rather than the appropriate officer who applied for the order or any person affected by the order, be likely to seek to vary or revoke an overseas production order?

Will the application to vary or revoke be heard by the judge who made the original order, and what information, or indeed anything else, will be required from an applicant seeking to vary or revoke an overseas production order before court time is granted to hear their application? What will be the test, if any, in terms of the extent or otherwise of a proposed variation being sought before it can be considered or granted? Does the reference in Clause 7 to the requirements in Section 4(2) to (6) continuing to be fulfilled, or being fulfilled, apply to the variation that is being sought or to the original overseas production order as altered by the variation?

Once an overseas production order has been served, the recipient has, I believe, as a standard, seven days to act on it. Presumably that means that an application to vary or revoke by the recipient as a person affected by the order has to be made within those seven days. Is that in fact the case? If it is, is it not a very short period of time, particularly if it is also envisaged that a judge will have to deal with any application to vary or revoke within that seven-day period, or will a judge be able to extend the period already laid down for the electronic data specified in an overseas production order to be produced if an application to vary or revoke has been made?

Finally, what will be the maximum period of time within which applications to vary or revoke must be determined by a judge, and who will be given notice of an application to vary or revoke an overseas production order, and in what circumstances, and thus have the opportunity to support or contest the application?

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The noble Lord asked about the seven days to action an order. The period to comply with the order is seven days, which is a standard timeframe. The respondent would therefore need to apply for a revocation in those seven days if they did not wish to be in breach of that order. We consider the timeframe to be proportionate given the purpose of these orders and the need for information to be produced quickly. With that quite lengthy explanation, I hope that noble Lords will be happy not to press their amendments.

[Lord Rosser]

Could I ask for some clarification? Do the seven days apply at present for domestic orders? In other words, has a view been taken that if seven days is sufficient for a domestic order, it is presumably also sufficient for an order made in this country affecting somebody in the States to apply within seven days? Will it not be a rather more complicated process to apply within a seven-day period, if it is an order made in this country applying to somebody in the States? Does this clause work in the situations of an overseas production order made in this country and orders made in the country with which we have a bilateral agreement applying to British service providers, or does it apply in only one direction?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I understand it, seven days is a standard timeframe. I totally take what the noble Lord says in the sense that we are talking about overseas production orders, but the whole purpose of the Bill is that it is a simpler process in the governing of electronic data. It is a standard period of time that we feel to be proportionate.

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[Lord Rosser]

Would the Minister not agree that somebody in the United States must have a pretty good working knowledge of our legal system to know where to apply if they want to revoke or vary an order within seven days?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I take the noble Lord’s point. I imagine that all of that would be laid out in the agreement, given that it would be set out, but I can certainly have a think about that. Perhaps we can talk about it when we meet.

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Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

29: Clause 9, page 9, line 3, leave out “3” and insert “2”

[Lord Rosser]

I will be very brief. Clause 9(1) states that an overseas production order that is not served within a period of three months is automatically quashed. My Amendment 29 would reduce the three months in the Bill to two months. The purpose of the amendment is to give the Government the opportunity to say why it is felt that as long a period as three months is needed before an order is quashed if it has not been served.

As the Minister said in the previous discussion, the purpose of the Bill is to provide a much faster means of obtaining electronic data than is currently available under the mutual legal assistance process, which can and does take months. Bearing in mind the need for greater speed in respect of serious crime and terrorism offences or investigations, why could it then take as long as three months to serve an overseas production order once it had been made, and for the specific requirements set out in Clause 4(2) to (6) to be met? Why would two months, as suggested in this amendment, be insufficient, and if it is deemed by the Government to be insufficient, in what kind of cases or circumstances would that be the position? I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I have not got a lot to say on this—but I will say it nevertheless. On Amendment 29, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that if there is an order it should be served quickly—although my reaction was, “If it’s so objectionable that the period should be reduced, there shouldn’t be an order at all”. However, in light of his remarks, perhaps I misunderstood the direction in which he is going.

Amendments 36 and 37 are grouped with Amendment 29 and relate to Clause 14, which is about “means of service”. Clause 14(3) refers to service on a person outside the UK by delivering the order or notice, or whatever it is, to that person’s office or place of business. I wonder whether a person could be outside the UK but at the same time have an office in the UK—unless its base is outside. I am not quite sure what those words mean in context.

Amendment 37 relates to Clause 14(3)(a), which says that service can be made by delivery to a place,

“in the United Kingdom where the person carries on business or conducts activities”.

What does “conducts activities” mean if it does not amount to carrying on business? Is this just a bit of belt and braces? If it is, I would not take exception, but I wonder whether the phrase is normally used, because it seems to be part of carrying on business.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

I am a bit confused, but that last point is not something to answer now. It is about whether we are talking about the present or whether, having been at an address in, say, Newcastle at one point, and you have moved to Liverpool, there can be service in Newcastle.

[Lord Rosser]

Bearing in mind that the Minister has said, without making any commitment, that she will reflect further on the amendment, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 29 withdrawn.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Grand Committee

Amendment 4 probes these issues of reciprocity, compliance with human rights principles and what happens in cases where UK law and the law of the other state are at odds, and is intended to ensure transparency. It uses the term “relevant UK law” and Amendment 7 therefore defines what is meant by relevant UK law. We believe that Amendment 8 seeks to achieve the same ends as our amendments but rather less elegantly—but we would say that, wouldn’t we? I beg to move Amendment 3.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, we have tabled Amendment 8 and its objectives are obviously similar to those of the amendments that he has moved and spoken to. At Second Reading, we expressed our concerns over potential difficulties with the implications of the Bill and our amendment seeks to probe this point further.

The Explanatory Notes state that the electronic data in question may include the “content of private communications” being made “available to the state”, and that:

“These intrusions into ECHR rights can be justified as necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder and crime and in the interests of national security and public safety, and are proportionate in light of the requirements that must be met before a judge can make an overseas production order, and the other safeguards set out in the Bill. To the extent that the electronic data made available may include journalistic material, the requirement that an order is made by a judge provides prior judicial oversight for the exercise of the power, and accordingly an Article 10 compliant safeguard”.


We said at Second Reading that those words might not be accepted without question by everyone.

Our amendment is intended to seek further detail and clarification from the Government about the extent of the safeguards on international human rights obligations, the similarity of interpretation of subjective wording in the Bill and the position in respect of the death penalty—not least in the light of the Home Secretary’s recent apparent change, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to, in this Government’s previous position of principle on this issue.

Bilateral agreements with another country or countries will need to be concluded for the provisions of the Bill to be implemented. Presumably, we shall be required to provide the same access arrangements to electronic data in this country as we are seeking from those countries: namely, that an order made in their courts will be capable if necessary of being enforced or implemented here with apparently little or no judicial oversight in this country. What then will be the position if the overseas production order for the electronic data in question was being sought in respect of a case or investigation where the outcome for a defendant—if found guilty—could be the death penalty, as might apply for example in a number of states in the United States, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said? Will we allow the electronic data to be handed over or accessed in such circumstances, as we would apparently be required to do under the terms of the Bill in any bilateral agreement?

At Second Reading, the Government said:

“The agreements will recognise a shared acceptance of the laws in another country with which we are entering into an agreement. It will recognise the other’s rule of law, due process and judicial oversight for obtaining and dealing with information and evidence with regard to serious crime”.—[Official Report, 11/7/18; col. 929.]


What exactly do those words mean in relation to handing over electronic data to another country with which we have a bilateral agreement which could lead to a defendant being found guilty of a crime which carries the death penalty in that other country? Some clarification of those Government words at Second Reading will help.

The Minister wrote in a letter dated 20 July that:

“With regards to death penalty implications, it is the long-standing policy of the UK to oppose the death penalty as a matter of principle. We will ensure that the operation of any agreement, including with the US, is consistent with this position”.


One could argue that those two sentences are open to more than one interpretation. One might argue that you could oppose the death penalty in principle—tell the world that that was your position—but nevertheless still allow electronic data to be handed over under the terms of the bilateral agreement with the other country concerned, even though the crime being prosecuted or investigated was one that, in that other country, carried, or could carry, the death penalty.

Will the Government give an unequivocal statement that under no circumstances under the bilateral or other agreements enabled under the Bill will electronic data be handed over to another country or access to it given to another country if it could contribute to a defendant being found guilty for a crime which carried the death penalty? No such unequivocal assurances appear to have been given at Second Reading and no such unequivocal assurance appears to have been given in the Government’s letter following it.

Amendment 8 also states that:

“The Secretary of State may not make regulations designating an international co-operation agreement unless they have laid before both Houses of Parliament a statement certifying that—


(a) all parties to the agreement adhere to international human rights obligations”.

What is the difficulty in the Government agreeing to this amendment—or to its spirit—unless they envisage circumstances in which all parties to the agreement will not be able to signify their adherence to international human rights obligations?

The amendment refers to,

“freedom of opinion, expression and association”,

but how far does the Bill protect that in relation, for example, to journalistic data, about which certain representations have been made? A later clause provides that an application for an order must be made on notice if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data consists of or includes confidential journalistic data. However, who will draw the distinction when making the application between confidential journalistic data and other journalistic data? How will they know what is confidential and what is not? Why did not the Government decide that any journalistic material should require an order to be made on notice and illuminate this problem?

Clause 12, which concerns this, also excludes material as being created or acquired for the purposes of journalism. If it was created or acquired with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose, that must mean that if at any point in its history information was intended to be used for a criminal purpose, it will not be protected under the Bill as journalistic material. That appears to apply, even if the criminal purpose never transpired and had nothing to do with the material being held by the journalist or how the journalist acquired it. Could not the issue of criminal intent be taken into account by the judge when deciding whether to make an order rather than an issue which loses the material to journalistic classification and with it its procedural protection? Amendment 8 raises that issue.

Amendment 8 also refers to the terms “public interest”, “substantial value” and “terrorist investigation” being interpreted in substantially the same way in the courts in each of the parties to an international co-operation agreement. Once again, we raised the issue at Second Reading when we asked whether any arrangement or agreement with another country would incorporate the same standards and criteria and interpretation of those criteria that would apply in our country before making an order when a court in that other country makes an overseas production order for a British national or company based here to produce stored electronic data or give access to it. If that will be the case—and surely there is a strong possibility of different interpretations of the wording concerned in different countries, or perhaps even within states of America, for example, where we know we have advanced some way towards reaching an agreement—we also asked how we will be able to satisfy ourselves that the other country making such an order was interpreting the criteria in the same way as we would anticipate our courts would do. If we were not so satisfied, what means are available, and to whom, to step in and stop the order being enforced against the named person or company in this country? I do not intend to go into the issue of enforcement or rights of appeal, since this is addressed in later amendments.

The issues I have referred to are those on which we seek some clarification and further explanation from the Government as to exactly what is meant by the wording in the Bill: that is the purpose of Amendment 8, to which I have just referred.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Both noble Lords rightly raised the point of the death penalty in relation to any designated international agreement, through Amendments 3 and 8. It may be useful if I make it clear at the outset that the Bill is about outgoing requests from the UK: it puts into legislation the ability for our law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities to request access to electronic data stored by companies based outside the UK. The Bill is a framework within which international agreements can operate but any such agreement will, of course, be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way, as both noble Lords alluded to, following the procedure set down in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—otherwise known as CRaG. It usually involves laying the agreement in Parliament for 21 sitting days before it can be ratified by the Government.

The negotiation and operation of any international agreement must be compliant with the Government’s guidance on overseas security and justice assistance, which deals with the death penalty and human rights considerations. As part of that rigorous process, a detailed assessment of any human rights risks associated with a particular international agreement must be carried out. As part of reaching an agreement with any country, we can impose restrictions on how the other country can use information sought from a UK service provider. This would be considered as part of the process of developing and entering into a potential agreement and will depend on the risks that are identified during the OSJA assessment process. As I have said, these amendments focus on the extremely important issue of human rights, and the OSJA guidance and assessment process already exists to ensure that human rights considerations are taken into account.

In relation to the death penalty in particular, the Government do not believe that these amendments are the appropriate way to address concerns about it but I recognise the strength of these concerns. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, we are going to discuss this issue in more detail on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

I end on the point about the death penalty, which of course is at the heart of these amendments and first and foremost in this discussion. I am looking forward to further discussions on Report and the meetings that we will have ahead of it. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gives his answer, as I understand it this matter has been under formal discussion with the United States since at least 2016; I think that was indicated previously in Parliament. We seem to be dancing around a bit on the issue of the death penalty. If this matter has been in discussion with the United States since 2016, why has it not been ironed out in that period of two years? I do not think a clear answer has necessarily been given on the question—or at least if it has, I have not understood it—of what our approach will be. Under an overseas production order, are we going to ensure that the information would not be used against a defendant in a case where, if they were found guilty, the death penalty could apply?

Maybe I misinterpreted or misunderstood the wording but, since the Minister talked about enforcement on this, at Second Reading she said on behalf of the Government:

“The Bill is about requests from the UK rather than to the UK, but UK-based providers will not be compelled to comply with overseas orders”.—[Official Report, 11/7/18; col. 929.]


If that is the case—and perhaps the Minister could confirm that they will not be required to comply with overseas orders—presumably there is no issue over enforcement because they will just decide not to comply. Have I misunderstood the significance of what the Minister said at Second Reading in her response?

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. I am not sure that it entirely satisfies us about the potential for misuse of the legislation, but we will reflect on what she said and perhaps discuss it with her before Report.

[Lord Rosser]

If there is any doubt in this matter, as I understand it from the briefing that we had from the House of Lords Library, the UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, giving testimony to the US House of Representatives’ Judiciary Committee in June 2017, said that the UK Government were “in full agreement” with the US Department of Justice that a UK-US bilateral data sharing agreement should limit access to targeted orders for data and not bulk access to data.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord because that underlines my point.

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Moved by

[Lord Rosser]

12: Clause 3, page 3, line 39, leave out subsection (5)

[Lord Rosser]

This amendment is in my name, that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It would delete Clause 3(5), which states:

“Where an application for an overseas production order is made for the purposes of a terrorist investigation other than a terrorist financing investigation, this Act applies as if references to excepted electronic data did not include electronic data that is a personal record which is a confidential personal record”.


Confidential personal records are generally included as excepted data in the Bill, but this subsection provides an exception so that in terrorism cases, confidential personal records can be requested in an order.

A confidential personal record is defined in Clause 3 as a personal record,

“created in circumstances giving rise to an obligation of confidence owed to,”

an individual, whether living or dead,

“and the obligation continues to be owed”,

or the personal record,

“is held subject to a restriction on disclosure, or an obligation of secrecy, contained in an enactment (whenever passed or made)”.

I seek to find out why this subsection is in the Bill, why the Government seek to make this exception or distinction in respect of terrorism investigation and what substantial electronic data information the Government think could be secured in terrorist investigations through Clause 3(5) which would otherwise be impossible to secure.

I and indeed others have already raised the question in an earlier debate of how consistently the parties to a bilateral agreement will interpret the term “terrorist investigation”. If more electronic data can be obtained through determining that an investigation was a terrorism one, and that would be the case for other serious crimes, there could be a temptation to define an investigation as a terrorism one under an overseas production order, purely or largely for that objective. What safeguards will there be to prevent that happening? If the view is taken that the term “terrorist investigation” is being rather loosely interpreted by a party to an international agreement on overseas production orders, how can that decision be challenged? I beg to move.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I should just say that I accept that the terminology is used elsewhere: one of my amendments objects to its use elsewhere. I am still troubled by how it applies here, as I am not sure how one would apply for the revocation, but I will of course go back to look at it.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for her response. I will reflect on what she said about Amendment 12. I was not entirely clear about her response to my question: if a view was taken that the term “terrorism investigation” was being rather loosely interpreted by a party to an international agreement on an overseas production order, how could that decision be challenged? I may have missed her response but, if so, could she repeat it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am not sure that I answered that point, other than to say that we would not want to narrow the scope so that omission would lead to a terrorism investigation being curtailed. Perhaps I could come back to the noble Lord on the other point.

[Lord Rosser]

Yes, I am sure that we can discuss that on another occasion or at the intended meeting. However, I hope that the Minister will take my point that some countries may have a rather looser definition of who or what is a terrorist than we would in this country. Although I appreciate that the Bill is about orders made in this country, nevertheless, before we have that arrangement there has been an agreement the other way, so it is relevant to talk about what other countries might demand or seek from us.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sorry to intervene on the noble Lord, but at the heart of the Bill lies the principle that we would not be dealing with countries with hugely differing levels of legal thresholds or judicial considerations, and all the other things that we have talked about. But yes, perhaps we can talk about that further.

[Lord Rosser]

I understand the point that the noble Baroness has made more than once: that we are unlikely to be signing a deal with North Korea. I fully accept and understand that, but I think that there may be one or two other countries with whom we might sign a deal who may have a slightly different definition of who or what is a terrorist than we might choose to apply. That is important under this, because it gives you access to information that you would not otherwise have.

Again thanking the Minister for her response, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, if I were Whip, I would allow a short break if for no reason other than to go and get a hot water bottle. I am still in summer clothes.

Subsections (2) to (6) of Clause 4 set out the substantive requirements for a judge to consider when making an overseas production order. These include the judge being satisfied that there are: reasonable grounds for believing that a person on whom an order is served operates or is based in a country outside the UK with which the UK has a designated international co-operation agreement; reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed and is being investigated—or proceedings have been instituted—or that the application relates to a terrorism investigation; reasonable grounds for believing that the data sought is likely to have substantial value to the proceedings or investigation; and reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest for the electronic data to be produced.

The amendment would ensure that any additional requirements made by way of regulations under Clause 4(1)(b) are consistent with the requirements under Clause 4(2) to (6). Any further requirements made by way of regulations will be in addition to existing requirements already set out in Clause 4. It follows therefore that any additional requirements cannot contradict the provisions already set out, as these will have to be complied with. There will not be a scenario where only additional requirements as set out in regulations are complied with. In every case, the requirements under Clause 4 must be satisfied before granting an order.

In addition, unless there is express provision in the enabling Act, delegated legislation cannot amend or vary it. Therefore, an additional requirement as set out in regulations under this clause could not have the effect of contradicting or undermining the requirements of the Bill. For example, a regulation which sought to change the type of offence as already set out in Clause 4(3) from an indictable offence to a summary offence could not be adopted under the provisions of the Bill.

Furthermore, the scope of secondary legislation is limited by the scope of the enabling legislation. As the power is to provide for “additional” requirements, it follows that those requirements will be compatible with those already in Bill. The power to provide additional requirements and regulations is subject to the affirmative procedure. Should additional regulations be required, the House will have an opportunity to scrutinise the proposed requirements before they come into law.

The language in Clause 4(1), which the noble Baroness is seeking to amend, clarifies that the additional requirements set out in the regulations may not apply in all cases or in every application for an order. There may be international agreements the terms of which do not warrant additional requirements to be specified in regulations to be made by the Secretary of State. This could be because both the UK and the other country participating or party to the arrangement may choose a wide-ranging agreement that does not place any further restrictions on that which is already proposed in the Bill. The clause therefore reflects the reality that in some cases a judge need only be satisfied of the requirements met in Clause 4(2) to (6) without necessarily having regard to all additional requirements that may have been specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. With those words, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Before the noble Baroness responds, I have a question for the Minister. I have listened hard to what the Minister said. Is the clause in there because the Government think it would be helpful as there might be a need to make additional requirements, or do they actually have a view at this stage on what kind of additional requirements those might be?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

In a sense, this is the same issue that the noble Lord referred to before. Because this is a framework Bill, as I said, a judge may be satisfied that the Bill itself provides enough but the additional requirements—as yet unknown—may be applicable in another agreement, as yet unspecified. It gives that scope where it might be required in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 19 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our Amendments 33 and 34 in this group.

Journalistic data of any kind is not excepted electronic data as set out in Clause 3, despite representations made by media organisations that it should be. Instead, under Clause 12 the application for an overseas production order, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data specified or described in the application consists of or includes journalistic data that is confidential journalistic data, must be made on notice. Confidential journalistic data consists of data created or acquired for the purposes of journalism and in circumstances that give rise to an obligation of confidence that continues or is held subject to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy.

This begs the question: how does the judge make a judgment about whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that confidential journalistic material is involved? Does the judge take the word of the applicant? If the judge determines that confidential journalistic material is involved, how will notice be served on the parties concerned and how will those parties make representations? To probe these issues, Amendment 19 inserts the requirement that:

“The judge must be satisfied that the electronic data specified or described in the application is not confidential journalistic data”.


Clause 13 prohibits the overseas parties from concealing, destroying, altering or disposing of the data, or disclosing the application to anyone else, once they are given notice of the application. What sanction can be imposed for failing to comply? Can it be contempt of court, bearing in mind that at that stage the judge has made no order, only given notice that an application for an order has been made?

Amendment 33 provides that Clause 12(1) should specify that the notice should be served on the data controller and the data subject specifically, as well as anyone else the judge considers necessary. Amendment 34 amends Clause 12(4) to specify that notices should be served on a person R, referred to in Clause 12(3): that is, the person who receives electronic data from another person who intended it to be used for journalistic purposes. I beg to move Amendment 19.

[Lord Rosser]

I referred to the general issue that is the subject of the amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when I spoke to Amendment 8. We share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, subject to what the Minister may have to say in response, about the possible difficulties or issues that might arise.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his points and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his intervention. The effect of Amendment 19 would be to exclude confidential journalistic material from the scope of an application and order. I should first point out that Clause 4 reflects the position in the PACE Act 1984. Journalistic material can already be sought under Schedule 1 to PACE through special procedure, and under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when it is held by a company or person based in the UK. The Bill extends this to circumstances where the data is held by an entity based outside the UK and where a relevant international arrangement is in place.

I do not think that we should introduce in the Bill a difference between material that can be obtained—subject of course to appropriate requirements and safeguards—when it is held in the UK, as opposed to being held by an entity based on the country with which we have entered into an agreement. I should also stress that similar standards are set out in the Bill as already exist in domestic legislation, and that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” is readily used by our court system. Reasonable belief requires more than just a guess or a hunch. It will require the judge, marshalling all the facts before them, to come to an assessment on whether the information sought does or does not contain this type of data. It is not the first time that that standard has been used in legislation, and of course it will not be the last. Where confidential journalistic material is sought, the Bill requires that such applications can only be made on notice. That means that anyone put on notice, which can and may include the journalist whose data might be sought, has the opportunity to make representations to the court as to whether it is appropriate for the data to be obtained.

The effect of Amendment 33 as drafted would be that an application for an overseas production order that included confidential journalistic material had to be made on notice to a data controller and the data subject. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment but I do not agree that it is required, for two reasons. First, the rules of court will set out the process by which a judge can ensure that anyone affected by the order is notified of any given case. Consideration of notice by the judge relating to such a request is left to his or her discretion to allow for the circumstances where notice to a data controller, data subject or anyone else is deemed appropriate by the judge when granting an overseas production order. I think giving the judge discretion to determine which is appropriate in any given case is the right approach.

Secondly—this is a point that I have made before and will make again—we are providing in the Bill the means to serve an order on a company based outside the UK in a country with which we have a relevant agreement, in the same way as is currently the case with a company based in the UK. In those cases the respondent and any other person affected by the order would ordinarily be given notice and therefore the opportunity to make representations, unless under rules of court the judge is satisfied that there are good reasons for not doing so—for example, because of the risk of prejudice to the investigation. We are proposing that the same should apply to overseas production orders.

The intention of Clause 12 is to require an application for an overseas production order to be made on notice where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data sought consists of, or includes, confidential journalistic data. The effect of the clause as drafted is that notice should be served on the respondent—that is, the person who would be required to produce the data if the order is made. In most cases, this would be a service provider rather than the customer on whose behalf the data is stored. However, a requirement to give notice to the respondent under Clause 12(1) does not preclude the judge considering the application from exercising his or her own discretion under rules of court. Under rules of court they may require notice to be given to other persons who may be affected by an order requiring the production of confidential journalistic material, including a person who in his or her professional capacity has acquired that data. It will be a matter for the judge’s discretion, but he or she is likely to insist on notice being given unless the applicant can demonstrate that doing so would prejudice the investigation—for example, where the journalist himself or herself is the subject of the investigation or prosecution.

An example of where it might not be appropriate is where there is a hacking investigation and the journalist might actually be the subject of an inquiry. The judge may decide that putting someone on notice could potentially harm the investigation or risk the dissipation of the material. It is the Government’s intention, however, to ensure that where an application relates to confidential journalistic data, notice can and should be served on journalists and on whoever the judge deems appropriate given the circumstances of the application. The PACE Act 1984, for example, requires service to be made on the respondent only, otherwise notice requirements are set out in court rules.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point about sanctions to comply. It is difficult to construct a proportionate regime to ensure nondisclosure prior to an order being made and, in practice, law enforcement would not apply for an order where there was an unacceptable risk of damaging disclosure. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and I shall consider their comments before Report, if that is amenable to them.

Rendition of UK Citizens

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question.

Last Friday, the Minister wrote to me, on behalf of the Government, on the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill, and said:

“With regards to death penalty implications, it is the long-standing policy of the UK to oppose the death penalty as a matter of principle. We will ensure that the operation of any agreement, including with the United States, is consistent with this position”.


Why, then, are we accepting a request by the United States to share evidence on the two individuals in question under mutual legal assistance, on the basis—to quote the Home Secretary’s letter of 22 June to the US Attorney-General—that,

“I am of the view that there are strong reasons for not requiring a death penalty assurance in this specific case, so no such assurances will be sought”?

Contrary to the content of the Answer to the Urgent Question, why did the Government not come to Parliament a month ago to disclose this complete change of approach and any reasons for it on a matter of basic human rights norms, however heinous the alleged crimes—a change of approach which is also contrary to the Minister’s letter to me of just four days ago?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I reiterate that we oppose the death penalty in all circumstances. The Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill is about outgoing requests. It gives UK law enforcement authorities the power to request electronic data stored abroad where an international arrangement exists for use in UK investigations and court cases. We will ensure that any future international agreement is consistent with our long-standing policy of opposing the death penalty.

Perhaps I may also comment on the change of approach. We have not changed our approach. I refer noble Lords to the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance, which incidentally is long-standing. Part a) says:

“Written assurances should be sought before agreeing to the provision of assistance that anyone found guilty would not face the death penalty”.


Part b) reads:

“Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’ and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance”.

Immigration (Provision of Physical Data) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations form one part of the statutory underpinning of the new EU settlement scheme for resident EU citizens and their family members to obtain UK immigration status. The other parts are the Immigration Rules for the scheme and the associated fees regulations, which were both laid before Parliament on 20 July. Together, these measures will enable the first phase of the implementation of the EU settlement scheme to begin on 28 August.

This will involve the participation on a voluntary basis of employees of 12 NHS trusts, and employees and students of three universities, in the north-west of England. By the way, I had no part in that decision. This phase will enable the Home Office to test the relevant processes and ensure that they work effectively before we begin to open the scheme more widely from later this year.

I trust that the House will welcome the early progress in bringing forward this important scheme, and I thank the 15 institutions that have agreed to take part in the initial phase. It is appropriate that the National Health Service and the higher education sector, which both benefit so greatly from the contribution of EU citizens, should be involved in helping to establish the EU settlement scheme.

On 21 June the Government published a statement of intent on the EU settlement scheme, and I repeated in this House the Oral Statement given by my right honourable friend the Minister of State for Immigration. The statement of intent set out details of how EU citizens and their family members will be able to obtain settled status in the UK. It also set out how the application process will be straightforward and streamlined.

There will be three core criteria that EU citizens will need to meet to be granted status under the EU settlement scheme: proving their identity, showing that they are resident in the UK, and declaring whether they have any criminal convictions. The draft regulations apply the existing powers to take and retain biometrics which apply across the immigration system to the new Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules, which will provide the basis for the Home Office to grant leave to EU citizens and their family members under the EU settlement scheme.

As we set out in the statement of intent, and as we currently require for applications for residence documents under EU law, the draft regulations will enable us to require EU citizens and their family members to provide a facial photograph as part of their application for status under the EU settlement scheme. We need this to help check their identity and to confirm that the passport or identity card they have provided belongs to that person. It will also help us to identify and deter fraudulent applications.

As happens now across the immigration system, the draft regulations will enable us to require non-EU citizen family members applying under the scheme to enrol their fingerprints, where they have not already done so in being issued with a biometric residence card under EU law. We will not be taking fingerprints of EU citizens applying under the scheme.

Recording biometric data and biographical information is important because it enables us to confirm and fix a person’s biographical details to their unique biometric identifiers, and establishes a reliable link between the holder and their status. It also allows us to check against existing records to make sure that the applicant is not known to us or to the police by another identity.

Under the scheme, EU citizens—and non-EU family members who already hold a biometric residence card—will be able to upload a passport-style photograph of themselves as part of the streamlined digital application process. Non-EU family members who do not already hold a biometric residence card will, as now, need to attend one of our application centres to enrol their fingerprints and facial image. Consistent with our approach across the immigration system, non-EU citizen children under the age of five will not be required to enrol fingerprint biometrics. A facial photograph will be required for security and safeguarding reasons, but their fingerprints will not be taken.

Approval of the regulations is an important step in getting the EU settlement scheme up and running, thereby enabling us to provide real certainty to resident EU citizens and their family members, and to their employers, about the basis on which they will be able to remain here permanently. I commend these regulations to the House.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for setting out the purpose and content of this instrument. I also take this opportunity to thank her officials for meeting me yesterday. If I still have not understood precisely what the regulations are about then that is my fault, rather than their inability to explain it to me.

I want to make one or two points, because the meeting with officials yesterday was helpful. As I understand it—I think this is what the Minister was saying—the next stage is to go to a pilot scheme, which will begin from 28 August. As she also said, it covers certain NHS workers and students. What I want to be clear on is, first, how long will that pilot scheme last? Secondly, at the end of that scheme will a further statutory instrument be needed to extend it to other groups? In other words, will there be an opportunity in this House for a proper debate about how the pilot scheme has worked so that the Government will not simply decide, off their own bat, to extend the scheme to other groups on the basis that the Government think that the pilot has been successful? I would like an assurance on that point.

Can the Minister also say whether the intention is to extend the pilot scheme in stages to other groups or, at its conclusion, to extend it across the board? As I understand it, there will be the requirement for a facial photograph and, as I think the Minister said, in respect of non-EU citizen family members a fingerprint requirement as well. Simply to get this on the record, as much as anything, what will happen as far as the individual is concerned if the facial photograph supplied does not meet the requirements of the check against the ID photograph? Will they be told why it is not considered a facial photograph that meets the requirements? Will they be contacted or given help by Home Office officials in a positive way, bearing in mind that, as I recall, the Government have said that the approach with applications of this kind will be not “Why should it be agreed?” but “Why should it not be agreed?”, and that there would therefore be a positive approach from Home Office officials? I would like confirmation that that would apply, for example, where the facial photograph was not deemed to meet the requirements.

I would like to raise one or two other points. The Explanatory Memorandum refers to the consultation outcome and says that account was taken of those discussions. It says:

“The Home Office has not undertaken a full public consultation, but the policy has been discussed with its internal and external stakeholders”.


What points were made in those discussions of which account was taken, and what points were made that the Government did not feel it necessary to take into account? Who were the,

“groups representing EU citizens in the UK”,

with whom this policy was discussed, as referred to in paragraph 10.1 on the “Consultation outcome”?

What will the cost be to the individual of going through this process? I am sticking strictly to the statutory instrument in front of us in relation to the facial photograph and the fingerprints since, subject to what the Minister may say, for a fairly large family it could presumably add up to a not insignificant sum of money. No doubt that is something the Minister will address.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their questions. The first question from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was about an evaluation of the private beta phase, or the pilot phase, which I can confirm will run from 28 August until October. On amendments to extend the scheme any further, we will provide further information in due course about our plans for the phased rollout of the EU settlement scheme later this year so that, in line with the draft withdrawal agreement, it is fully open by 30 March next year. Those plans will absolutely reflect the experience of the pilot phase and the learning that we draw from those who choose to apply under the scheme during that phase.

There will not be a formal report back, but any extension of the scheme will be subject to parliamentary consideration of the required changes to the Immigration Rules for the scheme, further to those for the private beta phase laid on 20 July. We will explain clearly any changes and the reasons for making them at that point.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for giving way. When she mentioned “any extension”, is that any extension beyond the pilot?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Any extension in terms of what the pilot entailed or beyond what was in the pilot? I am not entirely clear about the noble Lord’s question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My point was that there is to be a pilot scheme. Will there be an opportunity for a discussion in this House if it is decided, as presumably it will be, to extend the pilot scheme to other groups, or will the Government just decide that the pilot scheme has been successful and be able to extend it without any debate or discussion in this House? That was the point of my question about whether there will need to be a further statutory instrument.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I understand that any changes at all in the Immigration Rules for the scheme will be laid out, and why they will be laid out. We will need new Immigration Rules to extend the pilot to other groups, which is what I think the noble Lord was asking.

Immigration Detention: Shaw Review

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will repeat a Statement made in the other place by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary.

“With permission Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on immigration detention. As the House knows, our immigration system is made up of many different and interconnected parts. Immigration detention is an important part of that system. It encourages compliance with our Immigration Rules; protects the public from the consequences of illegal migration; and ensures that people who are here illegally or are foreign criminals can be removed from this country when all else fails.

Detention is not a decision that is taken lightly. When we make the decision to detain someone, their welfare is an absolute priority. The Windrush revelations have shown that our immigration system as a whole is not perfect and that some elements need much closer attention, and there are lessons we must learn. That is why I welcome the second independent review by Stephen Shaw into immigration detention, commissioned by this Government, which I am laying before the House today. Copies are available from the Vote Office and on GOV.UK. I am very grateful to Mr Shaw for his comprehensive and thoughtful report. It recognises the progress this Government have made in reforming immigration detention since his last report in 2016, but it also challenges us to go even further.

As the review notes, we have made significant changes to detention in the UK in recent years. Over the past three years, we have reduced the number of places in removal centres by a quarter. We detained 8% fewer people last year than the year before. Last year, 64% of those detained left detention within a month, and 91% left within four; and 95% of people liable for removal at any one time are not in detention at all, but are carefully risk-assessed and managed in the community instead.

In his report, Stephen Shaw commends the ‘energetic way’ in which his 2016 recommendations have been taken forward. He notes that conditions across immigration removal centres have ‘improved’ since his last review three years ago. We now have in place the adults at risk in immigration detention policy to identify vulnerable adults more effectively and make better-balanced decisions about the appropriateness of their detention. We have also strengthened the checks and balances in the system, setting up a team of special detention gatekeepers to ensure decisions to detain are reviewed. We have also created panels to challenge the progress on detainees’ cases and their continuing detention. We have taken steps to improve mental health care in immigration removal centres and we have also changed the rules on bail hearings. Anyone can apply for bail at any time during detention. In January, we further changed the rules so that detainees are automatically referred for a bail hearing once they have been detained for four months. All of this is good work.

However, I agree with Stephen Shaw that these reforms are still bedding in and that there have been cases and processes that we have not always got right. Now I want to pick up the pace of reform and commit today to four priorities going forward.

First, let me be absolutely clear that the Government’s starting point, as always, is that immigration detention is only for those for whom we are confident that other approaches to removal will not work. Encouraging and supporting people to leave voluntarily is of course preferable. I have asked the Home Office to do more to explore alternatives to detention with faith groups, NGOs and within communities. As a first step, I can announce today that we intend to pilot a scheme to manage vulnerable women in the community who would otherwise be detained at Yarl’s Wood. My officials have been working with the UNHCR to develop this pilot, which will mean that rather than receiving support and care in an immigration removal centre, the women will get a programme of support and care in the community instead.

Secondly, the Shaw review recommends how this Government can improve the support available for vulnerable detainees. Mr Shaw describes the adults at risk policy as ‘a work in progress’. We will continue that progress, ensuring that the most vulnerable and complex cases get the attention that they need. We will look again at how we can improve the consideration of Rule 35 reports on possible cases of torture, while avoiding abuses of these processes, and we will pilot an additional bail referral at the two-month point, halving the time in detention before a first bail referral. We will also look at staff training and support to make sure that the people working in our immigration system are well equipped to work with vulnerable detainees, and we will increase the number of Home Office staff in immigration removal centres.

Thirdly, in his report Stephen Shaw also rightly focuses on the need for greater transparency around immigration detention. I will publish more data on immigration detention, and today I have commissioned the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to report each year on whether and how the adults at risk policy is making a difference.

Fourthly and finally, I also want to see a new drive on dignity in detention. I want to see an improvement to the basic provision available to detainees. The practice in some immigration removal centres of having three detainees in rooms designed for two will stop immediately. I have also commissioned an urgent action plan for modernising toilet facilities and we will also pilot the use of Skype, so that detainees can contact their families overseas.

I am aware of the arguments made on time limits for immigration detention. However, as Mr Shaw’s review finds, the debate on this issue currently rests more on slogans than on evidence. That is why I have asked my officials to review how time limits work in other countries and how they relate to any other protections within their detention systems, so that we can all have a better-informed debate and ensure our detention policy is based on what works to tackle illegal migration, but is also one that is humane for those who are detained. Once this review is complete, I will further consider the issue of time limits on immigration detention.

The Shaw review confirms that we are on the right track in our reforms of immigration detention and that we should maintain a steady course. But Stephen Shaw also identifies areas where we could and should do better. My goal is to ensure that our immigration system, including our approach to immigration detention, is fair and humane. This is rightly what the public expect; they want rules which are firmly enforced, but in a way which treats people with the dignity they deserve. The changes that I have announced today will help to make sure this is the case. I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I cannot say that I have read the Shaw report. I was probably in a very similar situation to the Minister, in that I received it only an hour or so ago. Inevitably, that rather restricts what one can say about it. One thing that I have noticed is that, under the acknowledgements at the beginning and in the foreword by Stephen Shaw, there is a date: April 2018. Why is this report being brought to Parliament only in July 2018 and on the last day, effectively the last afternoon, before the Summer Recess? What exactly has been going on since then, if I am correct in thinking that he submitted his report in April 2018, which has prevented the report being published?

The report that we have—this second Stephen Shaw report into immigration detention—does not say that everything is right. It simply says that the situation is better than it was, which is a very different thing. The report is not quite the supportive document that the Statement seems to suggest. Let us look at one or two of the points made in the report.

Last year, it seems that 64% of those detained left detention within a month, and 91% left within four months. It depends on what one’s definition is, but detention was meant to be only for a short period of time, pending removal. Last year it was found that over half of those in immigration detention were released back into the community—a point made by Stephen Shaw in this report. So if more than half in immigration detention were released back into the community, why was their detention needed at all? The Government’s Statement says that,

“immigration detention is only for those for whom we are confident that other approaches to removal will not work”.

We are talking about large numbers of people who are detained and not removed but are released back into the community. A number of people seem to be detained who should not be, which is a point made by Stephen Shaw in this report.

Stephen Shaw comments on the issue of indefinite detention and time limits, saying:

“I have not directly considered the case for a time limit on detention”,


so we do not actually know what his view is on that issue. But he says in his foreword that,

“the number of people held for over six months has actually increased. The time that many people spend in detention remains deeply troubling”.

That is a point that I do not think was highlighted in the Government’s Statement on the report. Why has the number of people held for over six months increased? Do the Government agree with Stephen Shaw that the time that many people spend in detention remains deeply troubling?

Virtually all the population reduction in immigration detention has been on the male side, while the number of women in detention has fallen by a much smaller percentage. Yet there is a high level of vulnerability among women detainees—the very people one would have thought should not have been detained. Can the Minister say why that has happened?

The report deals at some length with the adults at risk policy. It was introduced by the Home Office and does not appear to be working properly in its objective of reducing the numbers of vulnerable people in detention. In his visits to immigration removal centres, Stephen Shaw found many people who he felt should not be there, and he comments in his report that,

“every one of the centre managers told me that they had seen no difference in the number of vulnerable detainees”,

and that in some cases the numbers had gone up. He also calls for,

“a more joined-up approach between the Home Office and its partners across Government”,

which, he says,

“applies particularly to the Ministry of Justice”.

In the section in the report on alternatives to detention, Stephen Shaw draws attention to some of the consequences of the policies restricting access to services that go under the umbrella of the hostile environment, which I believe has now been rebranded as the compliant environment. While he says in his foreword:

“Some of what I say in the pages that follow reflects very well upon the Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, and NHS England”,


he goes on to say that:

“I have found a gap between the laudable intentions of policymakers and actual practice on the ground”.


He also comments that,

“the Home Office’s strategy of expanding capacity by adding extra beds into existing rooms had exacerbated overcrowding and created unacceptable conditions”.

Why has the Home Office’s strategy led to the arising of that situation, upon which Mr Shaw has commented adversely? He repeats again in his report his concern that,

“more needs to be done to ensure that individuals who are at risk are not detained”.

I conclude by raising three questions for the Government in addition to those I have already asked. We are in a situation where the Chief Inspector of Prisons, the all-party parliamentary groups on migration and on refugees, the Bar Council, the British Medical Association and NGOs have all called for an end to indefinite detention. Do I take it from the Statement that the Government are still not prepared to commit to that objective? Perhaps the Minister could confirm that one way or the other.

I think I am also right in saying that the previous review called for an absolute exclusion on pregnant women in detention. But as I understand it, in 2017, 53 pregnant women were detained, almost all of them entirely unnecessarily, and were subsequently released into the community. If pregnant women are still being detained, will the Government commit now to an absolute exclusion of pregnant women and children from immigration detention? There is also currently no proactive screening process so that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence and others who are recognised as vulnerable under the adults at risk policy are identified before they are detained. Will the Government commit to introduce a proactive screening process to achieve this objective?

Finally, now that we have had the follow-up Shaw review, how will the Government ensure that the detention estate continues to be reviewed and assessed? I note that the Statement made reference to the review of the adults at risk policy, but there is more to it than simply that policy, vital and important though it is, so I ask that question once again—bearing in mind that the Shaw review has once again said that the situation is far from what it should be.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement regarding adults at risk and vulnerable people in the detention system. I have always thought that it would take someone very resilient not to become at risk or vulnerable to the effects of detention once detained, however they started that process. That applies even to definite detention, and far more to indefinite detention, when the absence of hope is added to the other conditions experienced. I was grateful to the Minister’s colleague Caroline Nokes, the Immigration Minister, whom I met with the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, the other day, for confirming the Home Office’s aspiration of a humane system. I welcome the direction in which the Government are going on this.

I will mention again a report to which I have referred before in your Lordships’ House—the recent report by the Red Cross on the long-lasting impact on mental health of everyone surveilled after release from detention; in other words, release from physical detention is not the end of the experience.

There is always talk of numbers and percentages, which is helpful, but it is worth remembering that each person detained is an individual. The silver lining to the Windrush experience was that it rather confirmed that; that is certainly how they were seen by the public during the Windrush reports.

A number that I find shocking is the standard number of days to which the Home Office works in dealing with asylum claims. Also, if someone does not go when he is told to leave the country, he is automatically regarded as a flight risk, to the extent that even when he reports to the Home Office he is picked up from there and put into detention.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which this morning announced a new inquiry into immigration detention, because human rights—particularly Article 5 of the convention—are engaged. The committee was planning this inquiry anyway, but the evidence that we heard in an inquiry into the Windrush generation’s experience particularly drew our attention to issues including access to legal advice, the possibility of challenge to detention and accountability.

Policy is always only a part of the story. Implementation and practice are the other very important side of the coin and, of course, that is very much what Stephen Shaw has focused on. He and Mary Bosworth deserve our thanks for all the work that has gone into this report. I have not been able to read this door-stopper yet—it is about half the size of the last door-stopper, but even so—but I will. It seems to me that the reasons for detention given in the Statement rather illustrate that detention is not, as we are so often told, treated as the last resort, although I believe that it should be the very last resort.

I want to pick up a number of points made by the Minister. She mentioned that the team of special detention gatekeepers has been set up—this is part of the recent history—but the gatekeeper process does not seem to have been working as well as planned. The Statement refers to ensuring that decisions to detain are reviewed. What about the initial decision? Should there not be investigations prior to detention to confirm that there are no indicators of vulnerability?

The Statement also refers to immigration bail, described as all being “good work”. Of course, it has been very welcome, but it has not been unfailing. The Minister will recall our exchanges about the problems that detainees have in accessing education. Importantly, it is clear that detainees do not all know that they can apply for bail at any time.

With regard to alternatives to detention, we have heard the organisations that the Home Office is going to work with, but can the Minister assure us that work will go on with other jurisdictions where there are very different practices and that the subject will be not just those whom the Home Office regards as vulnerable but much wider? Mr Shaw comments rather delicately that he is not certain that there has been significant investment in this since the first report.

I must leave time for the Minister to respond—

Cannabis: Medicinal Use

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend will know that international evidence, as well as the limited evidence here, is drawn on. I hope that that answers the questions of both my noble friend and the noble Lord.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Government have said that they have no plans to decriminalise cannabis for recreational use, but according to press reports at the weekend, there was a fall in the number of people prosecuted for possession of cannabis last year, compared with 2015, of 19%, and a 34% fall in the number of cautions for possession of cannabis issued by the police over the same period. In the absence of any credible evidence that the use of cannabis for recreational purposes has recently declined sharply, is chief constables deciding, for whatever reason, not to pursue cases of possession of cannabis to anything like the same level as even two years ago really an operational decision for them, as opposed to a strategic or policy decision that should be taken by elected police and crime commissioners or the Home Secretary?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It is of course up to PCCs to decide the policy priorities for their local areas, and of course those will be different in different areas depending on the prevalence of drug use. The noble Lord is right that the numbers have dropped, but—and I see this, depressingly, in Manchester—the use of synthetic cannabinoids is rife in some cities.