Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Juxtaposed Controls) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2021

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd June 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

This order corrects errors in the earlier 2021 order of the same name, which we discussed in the House on 2 March. That earlier order extended the current immigration enactments, relating principally to detention at ports powers, including the power to use reasonable force, applicable already to the Channel Tunnel route, to the juxtaposed controls at the ports of Calais and Dunkirk. However, the earlier order set out the required modifications to the UK Borders Act 2007 as a stand-alone article rather than a provision to be inserted in a previous order from 2003, which is needed to modify relevant immigration enactments to ensure that the juxtaposed controls in Calais and Dunkirk operate correctly.

This order we are now debating rectifies the situation and incorporates two additional minor changes. I thank the Minister for her letter of 20 May 2021 explaining the background to, and necessity for, this further order. Can the Minister spell out the actual consequences to date of the earlier order being defective in its drafting? Have powers been used for which it now turns out there has been no proper statutory authority, or has it meant simply that the introduction of the powers in the original order has been delayed? If the new powers on reasonable force have been available at Calais and Dunkirk, on how many occasions have they been used since they came in?

In her letter, the Minister said that

“the department has reviewed its internal processes and has taken proactive steps to prevent such errors from occurring in future”.

Does that mean that the error that did occur was as a result of a deficient process or failure to adhere to a process, rather than being a straightforward mistake or oversight?

In our debate on the earlier order on 2 March, the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, said that she found herself

“perplexed that the legislation governing borders and border control is spread across such a great many statutory instruments … It is just the sort of legislation that frustrates parliamentarians—and others, presumably—because it relies on so many statutory instruments, orders and regulations, rather than the primary piece of legislation, to introduce the rules.”—[Official Report, 2/3/21; col. 1101.]

I doubt that the noble Baroness would have imagined that her point would be substantiated so powerfully and so quickly by the very fact of our being back just three and a half months later to debate yet another order rectifying an error in the original order of March.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the original order, which this order amends, said:

“Impacts will be monitored through regular collection and analysis of … force data as well as the existing internal review system.”


What exactly are the impacts that will be monitored, and how will the Government assess the impact of this change, in respect of the use of reasonable force, on national security? How many people have been refused entry to the UK coming through French northern Channel ports in the first three months of this year compared with the first three months of last year? Is it expected that this further order, amending the original order, will have any impact on the number of people entering the UK without authority through the northern French ports and any impact on the quantity of goods entering this country that should not be doing so?

What does a power to use “reasonable force” mean in practice? Where Border Force officers on Channel crossing routes already have the powers, on how many occasions per week or per month on average do they have to use these powers? Are Border Force officers who can use reasonable force also armed officers or are they ever armed officers?

Will enabling Border Force officers to use “reasonable force” at the northern French ports mean that fewer officers will need to be deployed or will the change provided for in this order have no impact on staffing levels? Have concerns been raised by the French authorities that our Border Force officers at the northern French ports not having sufficient powers in relation to “reasonable force” increases the workload and the responsibilities of the French authorities?

There are a number of issues affecting our borders and Border Force personnel that the Government have yet to get a grip on, a couple of which I want to raise briefly. Kent County Council has been warning the Home Secretary for some time of its inability to cope with the number of unaccompanied children arriving into its care. Where are the safe routes to replace both Dubs and Dublin III? The removal of safe routes, without replacement, will simply encourage more vulnerable people to seek to enter the UK by irregular routes. While the Government are correcting mistakes today, could they also give us an update on safe routes for unaccompanied children in Europe?

The Government have gone back on an election commitment by cutting their international aid provision. That will do nothing to solve the refugee crisis which leads to people being forced to leave their own homes and seek refuge elsewhere, including by arriving at our own borders. While the Government are looking again at the powers needed at our own borders, will they also take heed of the warnings, including from many Members on their own Benches, of the impact that our aid policy has around the world?

I trust the Government will address the points and questions that I and other noble Lords have raised in their response. One would like to think that this order and the original order will improve national security in a meaningful, necessary and measurable way, and that the orders are not just about either ensuring uniformity across juxtaposed control locations for the sake of it or the Government pursuing other policies which are likely to make the need to used “reasonable force” more likely than ever.