Railways: Trans-Pennine Rail Line

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Thursday 10th December 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I add my thanks to the noble Lord for securing this debate. We welcome improvements to rail services, particularly where they will have the biggest impact. The subject of the debate is about not simply the pausing of the electrification of the trans-Pennine line but about its impact on the economic development of the north of England. If I have guessed correctly in which of his many areas of responsibility the Minister is speaking today—and perhaps I have not—it is interesting that the government spokesperson for this debate is from the Department for Transport rather than from a department one might more normally associate with responsibility for overall economic development.

I do not know, if I am right, whether this means that when the decision was announced by the Secretary of State for Transport to pause the electrification of the trans-Pennine line, the Secretary of State was also responsible for making an assessment of the potential impact of the decision on the economic development of the north of England, or whether likewise when he was announcing that the pause had ended and then subsequently going along with the recommendations from Sir Peter Hendy—which put back the intended date of completion of the electrification of the route—the Secretary of State for Transport was also responsible for an assessment then of the impact of the delay on the economic development of the north of England. Certainly, the report from Sir Peter Hendy called for by the Secretary of State on the replanning of Network Rail’s investment programme did not address this point, and neither does he appear to have been asked to take it into account.

The usual very helpful briefing pack for this debate from the House of Lords Library does not appear to contain very much about any such assessment of the impact of either the pausing, unpausing or subsequent delay in the timescale of this electrification scheme. That could be an oversight. Alternatively, it could mean that such an economic development assessment does not exist, or at least not in the public arena.

I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us when he responds if in reality any proper assessment of the impact of the pausing of the scheme and then subsequent moving back of its completion on the economic development of the north of England has been undertaken, and, if so, who undertook that assessment and what it said. I ask that in the context that, from a purely railway point of view, there have been comments from some sources that the now extended timescale for the electrification of the line could have advantages in that purely electrification of the route within the original timescale within control period 5 would have led to an increase in the costs and complexity of subsequent intended and projected capacity and speed upgrades, and that if the electrification and track improvements to provide faster and more frequent journeys were instead to be undertaken together—as it appears may now be the case—that would also considerably enhance the benefit-cost ratio of the scheme. Perhaps the Minister could comment on that point in his response.

If that point has any validity, it highlights the problem, to put it politely, of Ministers announcing schemes for electrification of rail routes and pushing for early completion dates in the run-up to an election, without thinking through the consequences. Of course, once the election is out of the way, it is politically easier to repent at leisure over completion dates when the impracticality, and perhaps also the lack of sense, of the original timescale and apparent limited extent of the project has to be admitted, as has happened in this instance with the trans-Pennine route. In this case, though, the Government knew before the election—but remained silent—that their projects did not stack up. Network Rail has said that in mid-March 2015, it informed the Department for Transport that decisions might need to be made in the coming months about the deferral of certain schemes.

We have recently had the announcement on the setting-up of a national infrastructure commission to advise on major infrastructure projects. Will the Minister say whether the intended role of the commission is such that, had it been in existence at the time, it would have been asked to advise beforehand on the Government’s pre-election announcements on improved transport links related to the northern powerhouse concept? If so, the national infrastructure commission holds out the prospect for the future of announcements of significant transport infrastructure improvements made prior to an election not subsequently having to be hastily and significantly revised and amended immediately after the election. Perhaps the Minister could comment on the intended role of the NIC in this regard.

The briefing pack includes a copy of a letter dated 30 September 2015 from the Secretary of State to Louise Ellman MP, the chair of the House of Commons Transport Committee. The Secretary of State states that he has asked Network Rail to “unpause” the electrification of the Trans-Pennine route. Perhaps the Minister could say whether “unpause” means the same as “proceed with immediately”. The Secretary of State then goes on in his letter to Louise Ellman to say that,

“Network Rail will work with the Department for Transport and Rail North to develop a new plan for electrification of the TransPennine line between Stalybridge and Leeds and on to York and Selby to focus on delivering key passenger benefits as quickly as possible. This is an improvement on the previous plan which only changed the power supply of the trains”.

That point relates to the point I raised a few moments ago about the scope of the original decision. On that point, on the extent of the proposed electrification, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in March 2015—interestingly, again, close to the election—that electrification would be extended from Selby to Hull, with funding from the private sector. Will the Minister confirm that that is still on track, and indicate when this work will be completed and what level of funding will be required from the private sector?

The letter from the Secretary of State goes on to talk about faster journey times and significantly more capacity between Manchester, Leeds and York. Faster journey times and capacity increases are not, of course, simply about electrification. They are also about track capacity and line speeds. Does the new plan involve providing additional tracks on parts of the route, so that, for example, fast trains can be segregated from stopping services and freight trains—and, if so, to what extent and where? What will be the maximum line speed on the newly electrified line once the work has been completed? By what extent will the freight capacity of the route be increased following electrification and the increase in line capacity? These are all issues that will impact on the economic development of the north of England, which is the subject of this debate.

The report from Sir Peter Hendy states that Network Rail has sought to balance the level of expenditure required to manage the core business and the extent to which it can deliver the full enhancement programme within the available funding. The report goes on to say that Network Rail has concluded that the core business can be managed within the borrowing limit that has been set for control period 5, but that the principal change to achieve this will be a reduction in renewals activity, which Network Rail considers can be managed safely and will not create a backlog that cannot be caught up in subsequent control periods. Are the Government happy to see renewals activity reduced as part of the replanning of their investment programme, including electrification schemes? Presumably, the present renewals programme has been drawn up on the basis of what needs to be done and when.

A further consequence of the replanning of the investment programme is that Network Rail will have to divest itself of assets, including property assets, to provide required levels of funding. As Sir Peter Hendy’s report says, selling assets to fund enhancements has implications for the future funding of the railway, as less income from property means that more will have to come from elsewhere. That could, of course, include higher fares for passengers and freight. Reducing Network Rail’s future income looks like a decidedly questionable move, based on short-term considerations rather than long-term thinking.

The electrification of the trans-Pennine route will not now be completed until 2022. It will be delivered not within control period 5—as originally intended—but across control periods 5 and 6. Will the Minister say when, during 2022, it will now be completed? Will the Minister also say what the cost of the delayed electrification of the trans-Pennine route will now be compared with the previous estimated cost, which I believe was in the region of £240 million, but I accept that I could be seriously wrong on that? What part of any increased cost is due to the pausing of the scheme and subsequent delay in its completion? When will the electrification of the route now actually commence?

What impact will there be on rail services on the trans-Pennine route as a result of the necessary infrastructure work being undertaken during the period from now until the completion of the electrification project some time in 2022? If it will result in an adverse impact on services, both passenger and freight, over that period of time, to what extent will that be the case, and what impact will that have on the economic development of the north of England over the next seven years, which is what this debate is about?

I hope that some lessons have been learned from the pausing, unpausing and delaying of the trans-Pennine electrification scheme, not least the problems of playing election politics with major railway infrastructure projects. As the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee said last month:

“The 2014-2019 rail investment programme could not have been delivered within the budget which the department, Network Rail and the Office of Rail and Road agreed”.

It added:

“Over promising what can be delivered leads to inevitable delays and cost overruns; and simply delaying projects further as a budget management mechanism is not good financial planning”.