Ukraine

Lord Risby Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Risby (Con)]

My Lords, I warmly thank the noble Viscount for introducing this debate.

For a number of years I have been chairman of the British Ukrainian Society, so I have been to the country many times. It has had, at times, an extremely difficult history. I will share what recently happened here in London to commemorate one of the most grotesque happenings in European history, the Holodomor—the famine induced by Stalin that caused the deaths of millions of Ukrainians. We had a very moving ceremony outside Westminster Abbey, with hundreds of Ukrainians present. I was delighted that just two weeks ago our Foreign Secretary came to the Palace of Westminster to open a photographic exhibition showing the horrors of the Holodomor and all that it has meant, ingrained as it is in the collective memory of the people of Ukraine. In 1991, Ukraine became independent. The orange revolution drew extraordinary attention to the country, but there were the invasions of the eastern part of Ukraine and Crimea in 2014.

As far as the reality of Crimea is concerned, I had a young Tartar working for me. The fabric of life in Crimea has been utterly turned upside down, with human rights violations on a grand scale and the abolition of the Tartar people’s parliament. In eastern Ukraine, in the Donbass, which has effectively been dominated by Russian and pro-Russian mercenaries, there has been death and destruction, the shooting down of a passenger plane and cyberactivity in disinformation on a massive scale, all costing the Ukrainian economy hugely.

I will read a little note from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly report on human rights, which says,

“governance in rebel-occupied territories continues to disregard human rights and liberties. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes ‘cases of summary executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment’”,

of individuals and attacks on those following the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It is appalling.

I will dwell in particular on the recent events in the Sea of Azov, which have happened despite the agreements about that area between Russia and Ukraine. The truth is that the Kerch Bridge linking Russia and Crimea was in practice constructed to impede larger vessels trying to reach the port of Mariupol, a hugely important commercial centre for Ukraine. Preposterously, President Putin accused President Poroshenko of Ukraine of manufacturing these events. Such is the disbelief, it is hard to imagine such nonsense. Russia’s navy intercepted the Ukrainian vessels and arrested the Ukrainian crew, 24 of whom were detained for illegally crossing a so-called maritime border that had been agreed before. Vessels en route to Mariupol today are being deliberately held back, with all the consequences. At the end of August, I was in Odessa. I saw the highly provocative activity of Russian vessels in the Black Sea. I would be grateful to the Minister if he could comment on the current role of Royal Navy vessels that have been operating in the Black Sea.

All this begs the question of how we react. I know that Britain has admirably led the discussions within NATO about putting more troops, beyond advisers, into Romania and Bulgaria. The positioning of British troops in Estonia under the umbrella of NATO acted as a massive source of protection for that country. This is now being considered. I would be grateful to my noble friend if he could comment on this. We agree that if that were done, it may have some effect in sending out a clear message.

As a country, we have been very robust on the sanctions policy, but clearly European countries are divided about to what extent they should be extended further to Russia, given the latest abuses. Nord Stream 2 is a great challenge to the Ukrainian economy.

While Ukraine has introduced laws to increase transparency in public and commercial life, it has not succeeded in banishing corruption and there is still much to do. We have an excellent bilateral relationship with Ukraine. Our support for the country is multi- dimensional. No European country should have to endure the annexation and occupation of its territory and now its seas. Ukraine has not been brought to its knees by such aggression and violent action, and it must never be. It is totally unacceptable.

Brexit: Sanctions Policy (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Risby Excerpts

Thursday 3rd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Risby (Con)]

My Lords, first, I warmly thank my noble friend Lady Verma for introducing this discussion and so ably chairing our committee. I thank also the committee clerks, who did a magnificent job in bringing this report to fruition.

Whatever our view is of Brexit, all of us wish our country to have a standing in the world for a multiplicity of very good reasons. At the heart of that are our own important values. In the past few decades we have seen those values exported and, in varying degrees all over the world, actually adopted. That is largely due to our working in co-operation with like-minded countries. Overall, the adoption of more democratic values has been gratifyingly successful, but of course there remain countries that do not respect human rights or wish to undermine the advances towards greater democracy that we cherish, or that threaten peace and stability outside their borders.

Sanctions have been a most useful tool in reining in aggression and actually changing behaviour. At the moment, for example, we may see this process under way in the Korean peninsula—we certainly hope so. A more aggressive sanctions regime against Russia is perhaps partly why the recent missile attacks into Syria, and the appalling Skripal incident, have not resulted in some of the threatened retaliation from Russia. Targeted sanctions on individual Russians seem to be proving efficacious as we put into legislation anti-money laundering activities with a new sanctions policy in our country framework outside the EU. But during the course of our inquiry what emerged was the desirability—the absolute necessity—to find formulae for continuing to have the closest common position on sanctions with our European neighbours.

This country implements more than 30 sanctions regimes targeting both countries and violent and often fanatical groups within countries. The response may be asset freezes, travel bans, or financial or trade restrictions. It is clear that, with the experience of hindsight, while these punitive measures may arise from UN Security Council resolutions, many arise from decisions of the European Union as well. That is at the heart of what the committee’s report was all about. Apart from anything else, as we have heard already this morning, Russia has wielded its veto in the UN Security Council with no hesitation when it perceives that its own interests are being undermined. We know that, historically, it is a country that is hugely sensitive about defining and defending its own perceived interests.

What emerged in the comments of experts interviewed by the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee was a loud and clear message that the words “efficacious” and “cross-national co-ordination” were inextricably linked, and that successful multilateral action for the United Kingdom immeasurably enhanced our capacity and desire to achieve results. Indeed, the majority of UK sanctions are linked with EU sanctions as well.

I very much welcome the Government’s commitment to maintain the highest level of co-operation and co-ordination with the EU after we leave, not least because that puts us at an advantage in helping to align sanctions activity with other countries and most notably collectively with the United States, and because London remains pre-eminent—head and shoulders above in importance—over other European financial centres. In practice, it would be unlikely that we would wish to differ from EU decisions in sanctions policy even if we had no formal role, and particularly if the EU had been in direct contact with the United States—a pattern that is well developed—when drawing up a common sanctions position. So my question for my noble friend is, in building the Government’s intention to have a tailored Brexit arrangement, can he share the Government’s thoughts more explicitly on what that means? Will the Government suggest for the future a formal body to be constructed to deal with a sanctions matter? Indeed, when we enter the transitional period after finally leaving the EU, does my noble friend expect such a structure to be in place?

As a country, we have unique attributes much valued by other EU members, most notably our defence and intelligence capabilities. When the Prime Minister indicated that future co-operation in these areas would be unconditional, it was hugely appreciated.

We continue to have a remarkable global reach and much admired soft power, but the clock ticks on inexorably. In this most important area of our national life, our willingness to confront those who undertake unacceptable actions is greatly valued by EU members. Important decisions in our national interest need to be taken now. Integral to this, with our shared common values, is for us to start outlining the structures needed post Brexit to maintain those important links and deal with rogue states, targeting our like-minded European neighbours to work closely with us. We need to deal with these rogue states and individuals—criminal and terrorist—in a collective manner. I hope that my noble friend will be able to put more flesh on the bones of this endeavour, particularly in respect of sanctions in our mutual interest.