(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, that is a question that of course my noble friend is right to ask. I am confident that with the joint activity of Chief Constable Mick Creedon and Mark Ellison, we now have a way to the truth. The truth may well be difficult to get to, and we know that some of the material that we would have liked to have been available to inform the judge-led inquiry will not be because it has been destroyed or lost. None the less, anyone appearing in front of a public inquiry, following the criminal prosecutions that may well follow this review and Chief Constable Creedon’s Operation Herne activity, will have to give evidence under oath. There can be no hiding place for people who have done wrong in this matter. I have confidence that we will get to the truth. The sadness in this story is that it will have taken such a long time to get there.
My Lords, I think that anyone who speaks today following the Statement repeated by the Minister will do so with a great sense of humility. It takes nothing away from the laudable actions of the Home Secretary or Mark Ellison to say that this would not have been achieved without the courage and endurance of my noble friend Lady Lawrence and her family over a period of 21 years. It is difficult to imagine the frustration that she must have felt during that period, knowing that she was right and finding it so difficult to tackle the bureaucracies, and indeed the criminal justice system, over that period.
The deputy commissioner of the Met has just said that he was shocked, saddened and troubled by the conclusions that were put out today. So he should be. That description applies to everyone in this country who wants to see a police force that is trusted and who recognises that the vast majority of the people in the police force are committed, with integrity, to defending the people of this country. He is right to be shocked, saddened and troubled because this inquiry asked three important sets of questions: about individual corruption in the initial investigation, about the withholding of relevant material and evidence from the Macpherson inquiry, and then wider questions related to that. Those questions were troubling and the answers are even more so. I suspect, even from my brief scanning of the report, that this is not the end but only the beginning of a process of a review, a public inquiry, criminal investigations and then wider aspects. It may well be that with her persistence and endurance, my noble friend has achieved something today not only for her own family but for this country as a whole.
It is natural that most of the report will relate centrally to the tragic murder of Stephen Lawrence, but there are two paragraphs that cast the issue a little wider. Perhaps I will ask a question about the case of Daniel Morgan as well. There is another family seeking the truth—in their case regarding a man who was axed through the head in a pub car park in London. There has apparently been continual obfuscation in that case as well.
It has been suggested that the allegedly corrupt policeman in the case of the initial Lawrence inquiry is in some way connected to the Daniel Morgan murder, and it is hoped that the panel looking at that will note this. Will the Minister go a little further and assure us that any information concerning the allegedly corrupt detective which has been discovered during this inquiry will fully and proactively be made available to those investigating the case of Daniel Morgan? We do not want to see another 20 years pass before another apparent miscarriage of justice is remedied.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for intervening on this. He speaks from considerable experience of the responsibility that my right honourable friend Theresa May has in looking at this matter. He will know how seriously it has been taken.
I agree with him about the Daniel Morgan case. The Statement specifically refers to the fact that the panel should be advised and should take note, and should continue its work in the light of the allegations of corruption—which must be proved by investigation—relating to the officer who has been mentioned, and in the light of any connection there may be between the Stephen Lawrence case and the police investigation into the Daniel Morgan case.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberIf I sought to reassure the noble Lord, I might make a mistake. However, I will check that out and write to him. The noble Lord makes a very good point as a loyal Member of this House, and I hope that I will be able to give him a positive answer.
We have to give these new arrangements time to bed down and to prove their effectiveness. I am certain that the committee will succeed in giving Parliament and the public confidence that the Executive and the agencies are properly held to account. As the noble Lord, Lord Soley, said, the whole business of keeping legislation up to date is a matter for the House authorities, and he made an interesting suggestion about how we can keep pace with technical change. However, that is a matter not only for the Government but for the House authorities as well.
Supervision does not stop with the ISC. The courts provide an independent avenue for anyone who wishes to complain about intelligence activity. Anyone who feels that they have been subject to improper use of intrusive powers by the intelligence agencies can complain to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which provides independent judicial oversight. If it decides that legislation has been breached or human rights infringed, it can quash warrants, order the destruction of records and award financial compensation.
One need only look at the range of activity this year alone to see that the system works. The ISC has published reports on foreign involvement in UK critical national infrastructure, communications data, and GCHQ’s alleged activity in relation to PRISM. It is now reviewing the tragic killing in Woolwich in May and will begin another review next year into intelligence legislation, which may assist with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Soley. The Interception Commissioner is investigating reports related to interception following the Snowden leaks. A judicial review of the police’s decision to stop David Miranda in August is currently being heard by the courts, and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation—David Anderson QC—will then report on the police’s use of terrorism powers in that case.
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is considering several cases arising from the Snowden leaks that have been brought by parties including Liberty and Privacy International. If these investigations and legal cases lead to criticisms, recommendations for change, or adverse judgments, the Government will listen, reflect and respond. This is how effective oversight works, and this is how we can best ensure that Parliament and the public can have confidence in the work of intelligence agencies while protecting the secrets that need to remain secret.
I will now comment on some of the points made by noble Lords in the course of the debate. I welcomed all the contributions, which were good. I do not necessarily share the views of my noble friend Lord Blencathra on the proportionality of different levels of terrorism. I thank the pre-legislative Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill, which did Parliament great justice in its scrutiny. The ISC undertook similar scrutiny of that Bill; it took evidence from the intelligence agencies and was briefed on GCHQ capabilities in this area. From its informed position, it considered there was still a communications gap requiring legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Reid of Cardowan, paid right and proper tribute—
Given the Minister’s accolades for all the work done by both the ISC and the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, can he tell us what has happened to that Bill? What is the blockage?
I do not think that there is a blockage, but I think it is sensible that we reflect on the two committees’ contributions to the legislation. No doubt the Government will bring forward legislation in due course to cover the gap that was detected in our ability to handle modern communications.
I am grateful, but given that a gap has been identified, that means there is a gap in counterterrorism, surveillance and national security. Can the Minister explain why it is taking so long to reflect on that, when so much work has already been done? Will he comment on the suggestion that the blockage is actually the Deputy Prime Minister?
I think that the noble Lord is being a little mischievous on this particular issue. Heaven forfend that he should be so. He knows the background against which the issue is being debated. All I can say is that the challenge to be effective in the real world, and maintain a proper balance, is what the Government are seeking to do. That is why we are so supportive of having proper scrutiny of the security services. I have been interrupted. I hope noble Lords will forgive me, but I must rush because otherwise I will run out of time.
I reassure my noble friend Lord Strasburger that the ISC has very much increased resources, and is now responsible not just to the Prime Minister but to Parliament itself. The communications data gap relates to what is happening in the UK. GCHQ is a foreign intelligence-gathering agency, and this is its core mission. The Communications Data Bill focused on the communications gap in this country.
The noble Lord, Lord Judd, made one of his usual passionate contributions. I noted his call for a longer debate on these issues. I would welcome this. However, the shortage of time has not inhibited noble Lords in the expressiveness of their contributions.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his contribution. It is not technical capacity that governs intelligence gathering but the need for intelligence. I cannot comment on the Foreign Secretary’s statement applying to overseas activities, but all of GCHQ’s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework which ensures that its activities are legal, necessary, proportionate and targeted. I hope that we can say that of all the activity that is done in our name by these important parts of our national security apparatus.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this has been a good and useful debate. I thank noble Lords for presenting their arguments, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. Perhaps I can reassure her that this is not about the Metropolitan Police any more than it is about any other of the territorial police forces in this country. This is about a procedure whereby we can use or consider using the National Crime Agency as a co-ordinating body within any future counterterrorism measures. That decision has not been made; it is subject to review. Many noble Lords have made speeches that are quite valid and contain valid points regarding that review. I listened to noble Lords in that regard.
I referred to our disappointment at our inability to gain a legislative consent Motion from the Northern Ireland Executive. It is a matter of disappointment but it does not remove the opportunity, as we will find when we discuss the next series of amendments, for the National Crime Agency to operate in Northern Ireland. That is not the point at issue. It has always been recognised that in counterterrorism matters the Police Service of Northern Ireland has a particular role of its own, and this legislation respects that role. We are not making a decision about the future of counterterrorism. We are putting in place an opportunity for Parliament —my noble friend Lady Hamwee is quite right about this—to put the conclusion of a future review in place without undue delay so that there is an opportunity, perhaps for the first time, to consider fully the implications of how counterterrorism is co-ordinated on a national base. It would not be understood by people outside this place if, having conducted a review, and that review having been announced to Parliament, we had to wait as long as a year for a suitable legislative vehicle to hitch primary legislation to. We all know that secondary legislation is a more efficient way of presenting issues to Parliament; it is not a method by which Parliament is bypassed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about the timing of the Commons amendments. At Second Reading my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced to the House that she was proposing to extend the commitment to reinstate this clause. At that point we were considering the debate in the House itself, and were also in discussion about seeking legislative consent in Northern Ireland. It was only at the conclusion of those elements that we were in a position to present it on Report in the Commons where, as the noble Baroness herself said, two and a half hours were devoted on the Floor of the House to considering this issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Condon, doubted whether it was proper for a change of this type to be considered in anything other than primary legislation. Much of what the noble Lord said covered the sorts of issues that will be relevant to a future review, of the type that we have not had before, into the way in which we co-ordinate CT and might involve the National Crime Agency. I hope that such a review would consider the very points that the noble Lord made.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, mentioned the complexity of the issue. Of course it is complex. This is about trying to find a mechanism for making a decision. In effect, all chief constables are responsible for ensuring appropriate and effective counterterrorism in their force areas. All force areas maintain a Special Branch, for example. There is already considerable activity at every force level. This enables the review to consider whether there is a role for the National Crime Agency in co-ordinating the activity at national level. It does not question the fact that the role of the Metropolitan Police, for reasons that have been stated in the debate, will be very important before, during and after the review.
I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Harris, who asked me what problem I was trying to fix. It is clear that we already have in place very effective structures for counterterrorism policing. This is about reviewing those structures in the context of the National Crime Agency. We do not have a National Crime Agency at present but we will have one in place. We are considering what if any role the National Crime Agency should have in further enhancing our response to terrorism. To seek continuous improvement does not suggest that there is a problem. Until there is a review, we cannot say whether there should be a role for the National Crime Agency to play.
The noble Lord, Lord Reid, emphasised that the fight against terrorism is complex. I hope that nothing I said suggested that I believed otherwise. I hope also that I did not say anything with which he fundamentally disagrees about the nature of terrorism and the resources that need to be devoted to countering it. It is right that Parliament should have in place a review mechanism for considering how it implements these things.
The noble Lord, Lord Soley, took the view that there should be primary legislation. I disagree with him. One thing that we have all learnt is that much of the decision-making on an issue such as this will be quite detailed. It is almost bound to be dealt with in secondary legislation, because if there is to be a transfer of resources, funds or whatever, it will be based on a secondary legislation-type activity.
The noble Lord, Lord Blair, asked a very pointed question about whether there was party-political consideration in this, and whether it was a measure to appease the Mayor of London and gain some party advantage. I admire the noble Lord and I think that the question was unworthy of him. That is not what we are considering here. We are considering a proper mechanism whereby a national force designed to co-ordinate the fight against crime might also at some future date be asked by Parliament to have a role in counterterrorism. That is what we are considering today, and the question is about the procedure that we offer.
There are two legitimate points of view. It can be said that this is such an important thing that primary legislation is the only way to bring it about. I would say the most effective way of bringing it about is through the super-affirmative process following a review, which is precisely why I am arguing the Government’s case here.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee perhaps summed it up as well as anyone: no decision has yet been made or will be made until after review, and there will be no review until the NCA is up and running. This is about future-proofing national policing through the NCA, about a future role for the NCA with the additional flexibility made through the order-making power, and about what the NCA might be able to bring to enhance the counterterrorism response in the future if such a decision is made.
I am very grateful to the Minister. Indeed, he is right that there is almost nothing I disagree with in what he said, with one exception: his lack of explanation as to why one could not have legislation following a review. It is quite possible to have consultation in a review and then parliamentary scrutiny. He is presenting it as if one can only have a review and consultation if one is going to the affirmative procedure. What he has not explained is the need for that mechanism and the avoidance of further parliamentary scrutiny, not in the detail but on the major issue, should it arise, of the transfer of the lead on counterterrorism. That is a substantial issue.
I am certain it is the nature of these things that following the review, Parliament would have an opportunity to debate the issue before the super-affirmative proposal is laid. I made the point earlier that any party affected by this secondary legislation has the right to be consulted. Parliament itself is likely to express a view when that decision of a review is made, before a super-affirmative procedure is even tabled. I cannot imagine an issue of this importance passing noble Lords’ attention and not being brought to the attention of the Minister in this House to account for what was being proposed. I cannot see that being a realistic scenario. I would expect to have to answer to this House for a decision of that nature. Indeed, the super-affirmative procedure provides for an opportunity for full consideration of the detail, as the noble Lord has said, of what is going to be required in the transfer of these powers.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked about tasking powers in the NCA because they apply to police forces in England and Wales and they would apply to the functions of the NCA. For the moment, that is limited to serious and organised crime, but in future it could include counterterrorism if such functions were confirmed through secondary legislation, or the super-affirmative procedure, in the future.
This has been a useful debate. I do not waver from my conviction that the House has a role to play in debating the issues, but I think that the provisions of the Bill, as amended by the Commons, provide the right mechanism for doing so.
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberIndeed, it has. At the moment, we are evaluating a consultation that we have had on a new code of practice for CCTV and its use. It is an extremely useful tool when properly used, and it is very important that we recognise that it needs to be properly used in our communities.
With respect to a previous answer on the costs of international travel, will the Minister please recognise that crime is no longer local? It is international and, indeed, transnational, and that trend is being accelerated by cybercrime. When he looks with a sceptical eye at these costs, will he make sure that he does not debilitate the police in carrying out their job of tackling international crime?
The noble Lord makes a very good point. Indeed, we have police officers embedded in and working in overseas countries because of the international nature of many crime networks. It is greatly to the advantage of this country’s fight against crime in this country that we have intelligence about these things. On the other hand, I think my noble friend was right to challenge expenditure. It is right that all public bodies are challenged on costs, because it is up to them to evidence why it is important that this money is spent.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe can, of course, always review the circumstances of this particular incident in the light of experience, but we know that the resources available to deal with people such as Magag are considerable, and that they have been designed to prevent things like this from happening. As I said, it is very difficult to prevent people from absconding. We know that it happened under the old regime; this is the first—unfortunate—case under a TPIM.
Does the Minister not understand that he misses the point? We all understand and accept that control orders and TPIMs are extraordinary measures. We understand that the ideal is to have a trial in a court of law with sufficient evidence. That is agreed. Nevertheless, the point is that, although control orders were inadequate—the Minister pointed to some absconding under them—the power to relocate was the biggest weapon in that inadequate arsenal. After the use of that no one, to my knowledge, absconded. However, the point is that the Government removed that one effective vehicle in the control orders when they brought in TPIMs. Will he now bear that in mind and at least assure the House that he will review the operations of TPIMs to see whether what I am saying is correct?
I cannot accept what the noble Lord says, but I accept that he speaks from considerable experience in this area. Governments would be very foolish not to learn from experience. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the fact that Magag was here in London particularly assisted his absconding on this occasion. I accept, as the noble Lord said, that incidents like this should be reviewed, and they will be.
(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberUnfortunately, the noble Lord has given me anything but reassurance. To argue partly on bureaucratic grounds, partly on the grounds of process and partly on the one substantive contention that there is no difference between a Permanent Secretary and the head of MI5, MI6 or GCHQ, is to me entirely unpersuasive. I have known, I think, 14 Permanent Secretaries in my relatively brief ministerial career, all of whom were excellent and very able Permanent Secretaries. They fulfilled a role, had a function and an importance in the life of this nation which was not the same as that of the heads of MI5, MI6 or GCHQ, on whom the very security of the nation depends. I hope that the Government will at least say that they will go away and reflect on this matter because, if there is a political will, all the apparent obstacles to procedure can be overcome. However, if the Government are saying that there are insurmountable bureaucratic obstacles to the ISC carrying out pre-appointment interviews, which are carried out in many countries of the world, I am afraid that they will be seen to be hiding behind process and lacking a real understanding of how substantial these positions are.
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention but, as I have explained, the reality is that these posts are special and important. They are exactly as a Permanent Secretary’s post is in terms of the continuity of Government over changes of Government. There is nothing bureaucratic about this. This is the way in which public servants are appointed. I hope that what I am describing is clarifying the Government’s argument—namely, that these posts, important though they are, are Civil Service posts occupied by servants of the Crown performing the duties of particular posts. Procedures are in place for making sure that those appointments are made on merit. They are not political appointments subject to political scrutiny. I hope noble Lords will accept that argument.
I note my noble friend’s guidance and assistance. However, I do not flinch from presenting the Government’s position in this respect. These are not conventional public appointments. They are Civil Service appointments which provide for political impartiality and, indeed, are outside the scope of Parliament. Once we start to argue for public scrutiny of an appointment, we argue for a political process. However, we have always sought to avoid such a political process in Civil Service appointments.
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He devoted almost all his argument against my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, to stressing the uniqueness of these particular positions and organisations and explaining why, because of that uniqueness, you could not involve a Select Committee, as was being suggested, and that his argument had many benefits. Now, in order to defend the status quo, he is stressing not the uniqueness of these posts but their similarity with other departments and departmental heads. However, this is not a matter of what we have done in the past but of what we might do in the future. If the Government had the will to see the benefits in the suggestions of the noble Lord, Lord King, and in what I have said, a way could be found in the future to allow the ISC, at least in a permissive sense, to interview appointees prior to final ratification. That would have enormous benefits for everyone involved in the process. The uniqueness of these positions has been recognised in a previous debate. However, that is now apparently being put aside and they are being compared with other appointments in the Civil Service.
I do not wish to prevent the noble Lord intervening but we are on Report. Therefore, I remind noble Lords—