Republic of Cameroon: Economic Partnership Agreement Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Purvis of Tweed
Main Page: Lord Purvis of Tweed (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Purvis of Tweed's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to the take-note Motion in my name and in so doing declare an interest, in that I co-chair the All-Party Group on Trade out of Poverty, and through that I co-chaired a commission on trade and development in the Commonwealth.
I thank the Government Whips’ Office for facilitating this debate. I have been pleased to work very closely with the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, in ensuring that this joint debate takes place. Perhaps he did not have the opportunity to say so, but if he seeks to test the opinion of the House on his Motion to Regret, we on these Benches will support him, for reasons that I will outline in a moment.
My Liberal Democrat colleague Sarah Olney secured an Adjournment debate on the UK agreements with Cameroon and Ghana in the Commons on 9 June. Had she not done so, the Commons would not have debated them at all. Sarah Olney and the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, raised human rights concerns in Cameroon. He raised them very well, and I need not repeat what was said, as I agree with his views. I have been following these abuses with despair since I visited, a number of years ago, the Africa group of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, where I met both anglophone and francophone MPs from Cameroon.
I am not alone in wanting the Government to have taken a less passive role in this area. As the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, said, on 1 January 2020 the US took the decision to terminate Cameroon’s eligibility for the trade preferences under its African Growth and Opportunity Act. However, the UK Government seem to disagree with the United States that there should be restrictions on access to trade with them. Can the Minister explain why the UK Government disagree with the US Government?
In his reply to the International Agreements Committee’s report, the Minister in the Commons stated:
“Our long-standing relationship with Cameroon allows us to have open, candid discussions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/6/21; col. 1070.]
He cited the Minister for Africa’s meetings and said that the UK is monitoring the situation. Today, I ask for clarity, as I did in our debates on the Trade Bill, on what processes the UK has in place to transparently judge human rights compliance. In the UK-Cameroon agreement there is a so-called nuclear option of the essential elements clauses for human rights violations. However, we still have no idea what escalation-triggering mechanisms the UK would seek to use in any successor agreement, or indeed any agreement at all. My frustration is that the Government, having been given many opportunities through the Trade Bill, have resolutely refused to publish a trade and human rights policy which sets out human rights criteria, observation and monitoring mechanisms, public reporting, and a staged process of escalation that could lead to suspension or removal of preferential access to UK markets.
During the passage of the Trade Bill, I stated repeatedly—and, indeed, had amendments to the Bill referring to—the need for the UK to have a successor to the Cotonou agreement. On 15 April the EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries agreed a replacement to the Cotonou agreement, and the UK has been left in a vacuum. The new EU-OACPS partnership agreement covers the priority areas of democracy and human rights, sustainable economic growth and development, climate change, human and social development, peace and security, and migration and mobility. It has a structure, including an ACP-EU council of ministers, a committee of ambassadors, a development finance co-operation committee, a ministerial trade committee and a joint ACP-EU parliamentary assembly, but there is nothing from the UK. Can the Minister therefore explain what the Government’s intention is? Are we to have a UK agreement with the ACP states?
On trade facilitation, I agree with the Minister when he says, frequently, that these agreements mean nothing if they cannot be operationalised. The reality for developing countries is that we have added more burdens on them for continuity of trade and have committed ourselves to supporting their implementation, but the Government have not said how.
On Cameroon, paragraph 3 of Article 9, on the financing of the partnership, states:
“The UK will provide funding through mechanisms such as the UK Prosperity Fund to support implementation of this Agreement.”
But a letter of 3 June from the Foreign Secretary to the International Development Committee in the Commons states that Cameroon will receive no—that is, zero—bilateral development assistance from the UK in 2021-22. What precisely is the support of the UK in this treaty obligation? Similarly, for Ghana, paragraph 2 of Article 4 states that
“supporting the implementation of this Agreement shall be among the priorities.”
Paragraph 5 commits the UK to providing
“funding to support implementation of this Agreement with a view to ensuring a simple, efficient and quick implementation.”
I hope that that is not simply a reference to an existing UK-Ghana partnership for jobs and economic transformation scheme, which I saw elements of for myself when I visited Accra. Can the Minister confirm that funding for this has not been cut, what new funding exists to honour this treaty obligation, and over what timescale?
The burden on Ghana and its Fairtrade farmers was felt immediately at the end of the transition period when the UK applied tariffs on imported goods. Some of the goods were turned away because the UK ports were not ready. I had warned of this before the end of the transition, when the Minister said there was no problem, and afterwards I raised it in the House, as the IAC report has highlighted, and the Government said that it could not have been helped. There was a problem and it could have been prevented.
In response to the justified conclusion of the IAC on the lack of a bridging mechanism to avoid this, the Minister said in his letter that Her Majesty’s Government
“could not use a bridging mechanism to maintain Ghana’s duty free quota free access during this period, as negotiations on the agreement were ongoing.”
But the department’s letter is directly contradicted by its information note of December 2020, which states in paragraph 5:
“Where we or our treaty partners are unable to fully ratify or provisionally apply an agreement, we will seek to give effect to the preferences under the signed UK agreements (or, if necessary, under the existing EU agreements) through alternative bridging mechanisms.”
So, as the department states itself, it could have bridged the existing EU mechanisms but chose not to. Can the Minister say why it did not?
Finally, by definition these agreements are already out of date, but the UK has not signalled any clear intention of renewal or expansion. I hope that the Minister will respond positively by giving a clear signal of the successor agreements and that he will find time to meet me, members of the all-party group and other colleagues who believe that there is great potential in our trade with these countries, specifically Ghana. There are barriers to overcome but by working together, we should be able to realise that potential.