Trade etc. in Dual-Use Items and Firearms etc. (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Tuesday 26th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful that the Government have responded promptly to the committee’s report in indicating that they will correct the drafting errors, which were very basic. If it is the Government’s position that they are preparing for exit day by addressing such an important issue as arms exports and controls, for there to be three glaringly obvious mistakes is very worrying. That said, I am grateful that the Government have indicated that they will bring forward another SI to correct the mistakes in this one. It is symptomatic of where we are in the Brexit process, but it is depressing given the seriousness of this issue.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

Part of my point was about exports from, rather than to, the Isle of Man. Currently I am unaware of the Isle of Man taking a very aggressive stance against the rest of the United Kingdom on cyber capability. However, I was anxious about any part of the United Kingdom or the Isle of Man being used for exports to other states. Therefore, it is not only a question of exports from the United Kingdom to the Isle of Man; it is a question of the Isle of Man being the basis for exports from the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Fairhead]

There are two points that I would like to raise on cyber capability, and to some extent they will also address the process that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, asked about. There will be an open pro forma licence for materials going to what we consider to be low-risk territories—that is, the EU. Where there will be a change is if the products go into the EU and are then exported from the EU to another part of the world. Cyber and cryptographic goods are an area that we are taking increasingly seriously. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned some of the open general export licences, but only those absolutely consistent with our consolidated criteria are included. All high-risk capabilities are deliberately excluded. As your Lordships will know, the controls on cryptography come from the Wassenaar agreement. There are various agreements that we comply with. The EU Parliament has suggested removing regulation from dual use, but we believe that we have international obligations to implement the controls and we do not agree with that. To be absolutely clear about cyber surveillance, which I believe is a key concern in the work that the noble Lord is doing, cyber surveillance equipment is not included in the open licence.

Regarding the more general impact of our exit on future co-operation with the EU, we absolutely recognise the importance of maintaining close co-operation and hope it will be a key part of the negotiation on our future partnership with the EU.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, raised a subject that is probably for another day. I can just give some reassurance that the Export Control Joint Unit has been created with the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office and DIT. DIT is essentially the regulator; the other two departments provide their input, advice and challenge. The unit is established and populated. It is a very important subject but, as I said, one for another day.

I think we all agree that it is critically important that we maintain robust strategic export controls, to fulfil our international obligations and to keep the world safe. I hope that I have been clear about the Government’s commitments to this regulation. I finish by reiterating a key point of my opening statement: that if we do not retain and amend this EU legislation, we will no longer control the export of dual-use goods or firearms. We have a responsibility to ensure the security and safety of our people, and this legislation supports that objective. I commend this Motion to the House.