Health: Folate

Debate between Lord Patel and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Thursday 1st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I do not think that the nanny state comes into it—certainly not as far as we are concerned. It is interesting that Department of Health officials have told me that its mailbag from the general public has been saying that they do not want mass fortification in their food—but that will all be part of any proceedings going forward in discussions, and it is not what is holding us up at the moment.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, the last time we debated this, I described the molecular basis for the prevention of the tragedy that the noble Lord described of two terminations a day and two babies born with neural tube defects. The only scientific basis for prevention of this is supplementation of folic acid. Do the Government know of any other scientific evidence without using supplementation that could prevent these tragedies?

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

No—I think that the noble Lord knew when he asked the question what the answer was. I can only keep reiterating that the Secretary of State is very keen to proceed and that there is no intended delay on this. As I said earlier, it is just a case of getting cross-government approval from the various departments before we go ahead.

Pregnancy: Folic Acid

Debate between Lord Patel and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My noble friend is right, but the United States adds it not only to white flour but to quite a lot of other products. It is voluntary from state to state. There has been an important study in the Republic of Ireland which I will tell noble Lords about very quickly so they do not shout “too long”. The Republic of Ireland was going to add folic acid to white flour when it was discovered that blood samples showed that high intakes of folic acid in Ireland were mainly due to the existing practice of voluntary fortification of various foods by the industry. The FSAI anticipated that folic acid food fortification would continue to increase due to health claims being authorised by food. They are likely to prompt more food businesses to fortify their products so that they can make a claim.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, I am not sure what the complexity is with this issue. The scientific evidence is quite clear that folic acid supplementation reduces the incidence of neural tube defects because of the interaction between a gene and the environment. It is a weak mutation of a gene that causes neural tube defects, and folic acid supplementation—I use that word—reduces the risk by supressing that gene interaction. The science is clear, which is why many hundreds of countries use folic acid supplementation. It also might explain why we have different incidences of the neural tube defect in different populations—because of the interaction between the gene and the environment.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I do not disagree with anything that the noble Lord says, but that is why the Secretary of State has said that he is looking at this very carefully and will come back in the new year.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Patel and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be moving the Government’s technical amendments this evening, and, in particular, Amendments 3, 4 and 5 which respond to the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and others on behalf of the UK’s universities, schools and colleges. They were worried that the Bill would restrict their ability to process the data of alumni for fundraising purposes. As the noble Baroness explained in Committee, universities, schools and colleges were concerned that being badged as public authorities by Clause 6 would mean they could not rely on the legitimate interests processing condition in article 6(1)(f). This is because the final sentence of article 6(1) states:

“Point (f) … shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks”.


Universities also doubted whether, in the context of alumni relations, they could rely on article 6(1)(e) of the GDPR, which relates to processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest. Although there is a good argument that any fundraising or similar activity which allows universities to improve facilities for students would be considered a “public interest” task, the Government can see why universities might doubt whether all their fundraising work would fall into that category. If universities could not rely on article 6(1)(e) or (f), they say they would be left without an obvious processing condition in situations where obtaining the data subject’s consent, at least in the GDPR sense of that term, was not a realistic option.

Government Amendments 3, 4 and 5 address these concerns by making it clear that public authorities will be treated as public authorities for data protection purposes only when they are carrying out their public tasks. To the extent that they carry out non-public tasks, they would not be defined as a public authority for the purposes of the GDPR and would not be prevented from relying on the legitimate interests processing condition.

We recognise that the amendment does not refer to universities, schools or colleges by name. This is deliberate, meaning that any public authority which is processing data for non-public functions will be able to rely on this provision. The education sector is not the only one to have these worries. I know, for example, that our museums and galleries would welcome the same degree of flexibility, and this amendment will ensure they have it. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this matter and I hope these amendments will provide universities and other similar organisations with the reassurance they need.

I will not go through the remaining amendments in the group one by one, but instead pick out a few which I think may be of broader interest—for example, Amendments 145 and 146. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral was among those to express concerns about the inclusion of the term “other adverse effects” in the definition of damage in Clause 159. He asked whether this was broader than the definition in the GDPR. As I set out then, the Government’s intention in including a definition of damage in Clause 159 was to provide clarity, specifically in relation to the inclusion of distress. Clause 159 does not seek to provide a wider definition of damage than is currently provided in the GDPR; nor indeed could it.

None the less, in light of the concerns expressed by my noble friend, the Government have reconsidered this issue and decided to amend the definition to ensure that it is as clear as possible and to minimise the risk of any uncertainty such as that which concerned noble Lords. The amended definition now simply states that the reference to “non-material damage” in the GDPR includes distress. The definition of damage for the purposes of the law enforcement and intelligence services regimes is set out separately in Clause 160. Amendment 146 makes a similar change to that definition so that it is as clear as possible and no longer refers to “other adverse effects”. I beg to move.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, I will comment on Amendments 3, 4 and 5. The Minister and the noble Baroness may well feel that I do not give up, and I agree: I do not. I of course understand clearly what the Government are trying to do with the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon—that they have agreed to get that into the Bill. It is helpful to know that public bodies need to be defined as such when they are processing data for tasks that are not defined as tasks in the public interest. This opens up the possibility of their instead using legitimate interests as a legal basis under some circumstances: for example, as has already been mentioned, for universities contacting alumni for fundraising purposes.

My point is different: universities and their research activities and how that is recognised, which we discussed. Here, it is more pressing to be clear on what counts as a task in the public interest, since public bodies will need to determine which legal basis is appropriate to the processing they are undertaking in different circumstances. For example, is research conducted in universities a task in the public interest, in which case the university would be considered as a public body for the purposes of the Bill, or is it not? In the latter case the university is not a public body for research purposes, and the research is therefore conducted on the legal basis of legitimate interest.

These differences matter, particularly as the GDPR requires data controllers to be clear on the legal basis they are using. How are public bodies such as universities to make this determination? The clearest answer would be, as I indicated in Committee, that the ICO gives guidance. I understand that the Government cannot direct the ICO to give guidance, so a way needs to be found to clarify which tasks fall under the public interest basis, specifically using the example of university research to provide that clarity. I would be grateful if the Minister commented on that.