Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Pannick
Main Page: Lord Pannick (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Pannick's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords again for their constructive engagement on this group of amendments. The government amendments I have tabled have been heavily influenced by the discussions we have had. Amendment 28 would require regulations to include provisions on notifying a person once designated and how to publicise designations. I am happy to say that government Amendment 27 does exactly that. When a person has been designated, or had their designation varied or revoked, the Minister must, without delay, take such steps as are reasonably practicable to inform the person. Sanctions regulations may also include further provision as to the specific arrangements for notification or publicity. In this regard, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for their assistance.
Amendment 29 would require a person to be informed of their designation and to be given the fullest possible account of the reasons for designation and the steps required to address the concerns. Amendment 30 covers similar ground, while also requiring that the designated person be given the evidence underlying the designation or a gist of any evidence that is withheld for reasons of national security. In response, government Amendments 32, 37 and 59 make provision across the Bill to provide a statement of reasons to designated persons. When a person is designated, the Government will be obliged to provide a statement of the matters that the Minister knows, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, have led to the designation. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that the Minister’s statement may exclude some matters, for reasons which I know noble Lords will understand and respect, such as when it is in the interests of national security. If a challenge is made in court, on those rare occasions when sensitive information is used to underpin a designation, the closed material procedure will apply. The courts, such as in the case of AF (No. 3), have long required the gist of sensitive material to be disclosed to enable an individual to understand the case against them. We accept that this is and will continue to be the case and the Bill does not seek to make any changes to the existing disclosure burden on the Government in such cases.
Amendment 38 would insert a new clause into the Bill requiring the appropriate Minister to exercise the power to designate only to the extent that it is proportionate to do so, having regard to the purpose of the designation and the impact on the person concerned. The government amendments I have tabled in response—Amendments 31, 36 and 58—use very similar language. They would require Ministers to consider that a designation is appropriate, having regard to the purpose of the regulations and the likely significant effects of the designation on the person concerned. I am again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for supporting these government amendments. While there seems to be a meeting of minds on this important issue, it may also be helpful if I briefly explain the thinking behind the Government’s revised language.
First, the European Convention on Human Rights entrenches individual rights, obliging the Government to consider the impact on an individual’s rights when making certain decisions. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 further ensures that the appropriate Minister must act in line with those convention rights, as informed by Strasbourg case law. We consider that this includes satisfying himself that the designation is proportionate, where convention rights are engaged, and I have been clear on this in relation to this Bill, including in Committee. Secondly, given that the Human Rights Act already requires proportionality to be considered where convention rights are engaged, a court might interpret the use of the word in the Bill to mean something different. Our amendments have tried to preserve the spirit of the intention underlying this amendment, without creating any difficulty of interpretation. As a result, the government amendments provide for a balancing test for designations between the purpose of the regulation and the impact on the individual, while avoiding an explicit reference to “proportionality”.
Amendment 50 requires the Government to provide specific guidance produced by the Crown Prosecution Service about the prosecution of sanctions breaches. The Government wholeheartedly support and have publicly committed to producing clear and accessible guidance on sanctions implementation and enforcement, both in this House and throughout our consultation on the White Paper. The Crown Prosecution Service already publishes guidance on how the public interest is taken into account in any decision to prosecute and this test is the same one that will be applied in decisions to prosecute sanctions offences. The procurator fiscal in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland publish similar guidance. The Government’s view is that no additional public interest guidance is necessary simply for a sanctions prosecution decision.
The Bill will provide for the Government to issue guidance on the content and implementation of sanctions. Clause 36 requires Ministers to issue guidance about any prohibitions and requirements imposed by sanctions regulations. There will be a mandatory requirement to provide comprehensive guidance for all those affected by sanctions implementation. Clause 36 is a more comprehensive duty than that specified in the amendment to Clause 16 which I have said is unnecessary. It has been drafted so as to allow comprehensive guidance on all sanctions prohibitions and requirements to be prepared and consulted on by the appropriate sources of expertise. For financial sanctions, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation has already published a comprehensive guidance document setting out its general enforcement approach. This will be fully updated to reflect the new sanctions Bill regime.
Amendment 53 requires the Minister to respond,
“as soon as reasonably practical”
to a request to vary or revoke a designation. Government Amendments 56 and 61 are fully in line with this proposal.
Finally, government Amendments 51, 52, 57 and 60 make technical changes consequential on these changes, and I hope they will be accepted. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have tabled, with the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, a number of amendments in this group on the subjects of procedural fairness and proportionality. The Minister acknowledged in Committee that these were topics that he and the Bill team would need to consider before Report. Given the adverse consequences of being designated, the Bill must provide for procedural fairness and the provisions must be applied in a proportionate manner. Again, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for some very helpful meetings on these subjects, and for tabling these amendments, which address my concerns.
In particular, government Amendments 31, 36 and 58 will require the Minister to be satisfied that any designation is appropriate, having regard to both,
“the purpose of the regulations … and … the likely significant effects of the designation”,
on the person concerned. That addresses the substance of my Amendment 38 on proportionality. It does not use the word “proportionality” but that does not matter. It contains the essence of proportionality and I am grateful to the Minister for confirming in his opening remarks that that is indeed the purpose of these government amendments.
Government Amendments 32, 37, 59 and 61 are also very important in placing in the Bill a requirement of procedural fairness; that is, that the person designated is entitled to a statement of the reasons why he or she has been designated. That is absolutely fundamental to any fair sanctions procedure. I recognise that the government amendments exclude any right to information the disclosure of which would harm interests such as national security, but they rightly provide that these exclusions will not allow the Minister to provide no statement of reasons. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that the intention here is to ensure that a person who is designated will always be entitled to at least a statement of the essence of the reasons for the designation, albeit that details which affect national security or other protected interests cannot be disclosed.
In the light of these government amendments, I am satisfied that the Bill now makes it clear that procedural fairness and the substance of proportionality are part of the administrative machinery. The Minister made it clear in Committee that this was always the intention and he made it clear—and I respectfully agree with him—that the courts would in any event hold Ministers to such basic standards of the rule of law. I am pleased that the Minister has recognised that it is appropriate to include these matters in the Bill and I thank him.
My Lords, I apologise if I caused hiccups by not moving Amendment 20. That was deliberate on my part. I did not mean to cause any hiccups, though. I thank the Minister for engaging with these issues. This is yet another example of co-operation right around the Chamber on this part of the Bill.
I must advise the House that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 46 and that, in the same grouping, if Amendment 47 is agreed to I cannot call Amendments 48 or 49 due to pre-emption.
Perhaps I may add one brief point to what was said so powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, which is to remind the House of what was said by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which he and I are members. The committee’s eighth report of this Session, which was on the Bill, stated in paragraph 21:
“We are deeply concerned that the power in clause 16 may be used to create an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment for up to 10 years may be imposed, and that rules on the evidence to demonstrate that the case is proved, and defences to such charges, are subject to ministerial regulation. We consider that such regulation-making powers are constitutionally unacceptable and should not remain part of the Bill”.
The Minister has dealt in Amendment 46 with the second part of that criticism, which is the quite extraordinary suggestion in the original Bill that a Minister, by regulations, should have power to alter defences to charges and to address rules on evidence, such as the burden and standard of proof. This was a quite extraordinary suggestion and I hope that the House will never again see such a provision presented in a Bill by Ministers. However, to his credit the Minister has accepted in Amendment 46 that that provision should be removed. What remains is the suggestion that Ministers should have the power to create offences for which a sentence of imprisonment of up to 10 years is imposed—and on that I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord said.
My Lords, perhaps I may intervene here as a non-lawyer because I see our lawyers fluttering into their places, rather like that scene in Hitchcock’s “The Birds”. I would like to make a wider point to the House, which is one I have made over the last 20 years in Parliament. It is that one of the crucial roles of this Chamber is to defend the constitution and, above all, to defend it in terms of the relative powers of the judiciary, the Executive and the legislature.
Just over 10 years ago I was on the Cunningham committee, which looked at conventions between the two Houses. If I left a mark on that committee, it was in the clause that states and retains the right of this House to say no. It is the most important power that this House has. It is a nuclear power and something not to be used very often, but it makes the other place come into dialogue and it makes Governments think again. What worries me about the process now under way is that because of the sheer volume of Brexit legislation that will come our way, with a whole flotilla of Bills, it is quite clear that the members of whatever team is looking at this in the Cabinet Office have said, “We can only do this by using secondary legislation and Henry VIII powers on an unprecedented scale”. If they were successful in doing this we would, in my submission, tilt the balance away from the legislature to the Executive in a way that was not intended—and certainly not intended by those who argued for Brexit as a way of returning power to this Parliament.
This is one of the early tests of it. Funnily enough, the earliest test was in the little-noticed Space Industry Bill where there was a whopping great Henry VIII clause which, after the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the Government withdrew. By voting for and carrying this amendment today, right at the start of this process, we will send a message that will make the Government think again—and think more imaginatively and more constitutionally—about how they are going to deal with this legislation without adopting these practices, the dangers of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so eloquently explained.
It is a real danger. If we are forced in Bill after Bill to carry amendments, the House of Lords will be accused of exceeding its powers. I do not think that we are exceeding our powers. We are doing what Lord Hailsham referred to almost 40 years ago: trying to avoid the dangers of a democratic dictatorship where the other place simply argues that we must obey. We must not just obey, particularly with clauses such as this which tilt the balance away from the way in which law, and in particular criminal law, is made, in a quite unacceptable way. By voting for this amendment tonight, we will send a message which will avoid a constitutional car crash further down the road.
My Lords, Amendment 54 is in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury. It proposes that the obligation under the Bill on Ministers to review a designation every three years should be reduced to one year.
I have reflected on this matter in the light of very helpful meetings with the Minister and the Bill team. In the light of the right of the person concerned to request a review if there are new significant matters and of the duty on Ministers under Clause 26, to be amended by government Amendment 55 in this group, themselves to review regulations every year and to place a report for Parliament, I shall not pursue Amendment 54. Simply to enable other noble Lords to participate in this short debate if they so wish, I beg to move.
I am glad that to some extent the Government have moved in this area and I hope that, in the light of the vote that we have just had, that spirit of co-operation around the House will extend to other sections of the Bill that still need addressing.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendment. As he has already indicated, it would oblige the Government to conduct a re-examination of each designation on an annual basis. I agree completely on the need for sanctions designations to be based on solid evidence. The UK has pushed hard for that in the EU, and that is widely recognised—for example, in the recent report of the House of Lords EU Committee. We are committed to maintaining these high standards.
The Bill as drafted includes a robust package of procedural safeguards, which will be further reinforced by the government amendments I have tabled, including Amendment 55. The combined package will provide a high level of protection for designated persons, at least as strong as current EU standards. The Government would review all sanctions regulations annually and present the results in a written report to Parliament. Amendment 55 makes that clear on the face of the Bill; I know that noble Lords raised that point. If the report concluded that there were no longer good reasons for maintaining a UK sanctions regime, we would lift it. Any changes made to the equivalent sanctions regimes of the EU or other international partners would be examined closely as part of the annual review.
Alongside the annual review of the regulations, the Bill requires the Government to put in place a dynamic process to reassess designations upon request; the triennial review is not the only opportunity. A designated person can request a reassessment of their designation at any time, and a further reassessment when there is a significant matter that has not been previously considered by the Minister. I take the point that a designated person, once they had requested a reassessment, challenged it in court, and failed to establish any unlawfulness, would not have a further review until either there was a significant new matter or a triennial review. But what would the purpose of a further review be when the designation has been established to be lawful and nothing has changed since then? If there are new arguments to be tested, or if the passage of time has changed the situation, a further reassessment can be requested. If not, there is no need to do so.
In response to feedback from noble Lords in Committee, I am proposing to strengthen these safeguards through government amendments. The Minister would have to deal with a request for reassessment as soon as reasonably practicable, and inform the person of the decision and reasons as soon as reasonably practicable after a decision had been made. Ministers can also instigate a reassessment at any time—for example, if the person concerned has been delisted by the EU. Ministers would have every interest in initiating reassessments proactively, both in the interests of justice and to minimise the risk and cost of legal challenges. In any case, when the EU decided to revoke the designation of a person also designated in the UK, I would certainly want to reassess the corresponding UK designation.
Taken together, these provisions will ensure that UK sanctions are under constant scrutiny and the Government are obliged to respond swiftly to new information and challenges. The triennial review then provides a further backstop, ensuring that each and every designation is looked at afresh on a regular cycle. This aligns with current practice in Australia and would put us ahead of countries such as the United States and Canada, which have no such process. It does not prevent more frequent reviews, and we have mechanisms in place that oblige us to do so when appropriate. Requiring the Government to conduct these reviews every year would be extremely resource-intensive; we have had those discussions in the bilateral and constructive meetings with the noble Lord. There are finite government resources, and the noble Lord appreciated that that would take away from other important areas. However, the amendments that we have tabled ensure that the protections the noble Lord was after have been afforded. I am thankful for his co-operation in that regard.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 62 in my name and the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, raises an important and difficult issue about the rule of law. The Bill provides, by Clauses 21 and 32, that if a person is designated in this country as a result of being placed on a UN sanctions list, the only remedy that the person concerned can obtain from the courts of this country is to require the Secretary of State to use best endeavours at the UN to have that person removed from the UN sanctions list. If those best endeavours fail, the domestic court has no power to quash the domestic designation, however strong the arguments are by the person concerned that she is the victim of procedural unfairness because the UN will not say why her name has been added to the UN list, or however strong the person’s argument that the UN has made a serious error of substance in adding her name to the UN list—for example, by confusing her with another Baroness Northover.
The exclusion of the powers of the domestic court to quash the domestic designation in such circumstances is very troubling. To be designated under this legislation will have a very damaging effect—devastating, indeed—on the life of the person concerned and their family. A number of noble and learned Lords are in the House, as well as a number of noble Lords with an expertise in law. I for my part cannot think of any other comparable context where there is no judicial review remedy in this country to quash action taken by Ministers which is directed at, and imposes a serious detriment on, a specified individual. This is all the more troubling because the person concerned has no remedy before any judicial body, or indeed any quasi-judicial body, at the UN, except in terrorist cases. There is no judicial system at the UN to which you can take your plea. The remedy for procedural unfairness or an arbitrary decision will depend, in almost all cases, on political pressure. The justice of the individual case may not—I put this point as politely as I can—be a matter of the highest priority for the UN. Let us be realistic. We are, after all, talking about an organisation whose Human Rights Council includes Saudi Arabia.
The Minister will say—and there is force in the point—that this country is committed to international law and that, if a person’s name is on the UN sanctions list, this country must faithfully abide by such a ruling until it is changed at international level. The Minister will also say, and again there is substance in the argument, that we need to be very careful indeed about suggesting to other countries that they can pick and choose whether to implement UN resolutions on sanctions. I recognise all of that, and that is why this issue is so difficult.
My answers to these points are as follows. First, under this amendment, a conflict between the UN ruling and the domestic court will occur very rarely indeed; I would hope never. The amendment provides that, if the court here concludes that the listing is a breach of the rule of law, the court in the first instance can do no more than so declare. The Minister will then use best endeavours at the UN to secure change. Only if that fails will the court have a power—I emphasise, a power not a duty—to quash the domestic listing.
Secondly, the very existence of judicial power in this country will help the Minister in using best endeavours at the UN. The risk of a judge here quashing the domestic listing will ensure that the rule-of-law concerns are given proper consideration in the political forum of the UN. Thirdly, the European Court of Justice in the Kadi case asserted its jurisdiction to quash a listing under EU law even though it was based on a UN resolution. I see no reason why the judges in this country should be denied a power which the Court of Justice in Luxembourg enjoys, especially when the very purpose of the Bill is to create domestic procedures to replace EU ones when this country leaves the EU.
Fourthly, the court in this country will take fully into account the importance of complying with international law. It would only be in a very plain case that a domestic designation based on a UN listing would be quashed by our judges. If there is a case where our judges are persuaded that a person has been designated by Ministers in this country because of a UN listing which is in defiance of basic rule-of-law standards of fairness and rationality, the judges of this country must have power to provide a remedy for the domestic designation. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, so recommended in paragraph 27 of its 8th Report of this Session.
It comes to this: the Minister’s reliance on international law cannot take priority over the rule of law. The rule of law in this country cannot be subcontracted to the political processes of the United Nations. I beg to move.
My Lords, given that I have been named here and therefore have a key interest, I ought to address this in case I get sanctioned in the place of another Baroness Northover. I am sure my kids would think that was an extremely interesting situation for me, but I am not sure that I would. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made a very powerful case on this matter, as he did in Committee. If an error is made with a designation as a result of UN sanctions being imposed then, as he said, the ECJ could, at the moment, protect that person within the EU and allow it to be challenged. There clearly should be a way of doing this. As the noble Lord said, it is a matter of the rule of law.
We have been told that the rights of British citizens will not be lessened if we leave the EU. This protection should, therefore, be carried over into British law. I clearly have an interest here and I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I recognise, as I said in opening this debate, the force of the arguments in favour of the Government’s approach. However, we have to be clear about what it comes down to. Justice for the individual who is designated, in circumstances where the High Court of Justice in this country regards the designation as arbitrary or as in conflict with the rule of law, must be sacrificed to the interests of the UN, our participation in the UN and the international legal order. There is no right answer to that question. I happen to believe that to obtain justice for the individual in that case, if and when it occurs, who is being designated in this country and who is suffering the consequences—their bank account is frozen, they cannot travel, and they are experiencing whatever the other adverse consequences are—they must have a legal remedy. There is no legal remedy available to them through the UN. There are political processes but there is no judicial procedure and no quasi-judicial procedure other than in terrorism cases. How can this possibly accord with the human rights principles and with the principles of the rule of law, which I know the Minister respects and which the Government are so keen on promulgating, and rightly so?
My Lords, Clause 39, to which this group of amendments refers, has been included to allow the UK to impose new types of sanction measures in response to new, unforeseen circumstances. Let me summarise why we think it is needed and then explain the government amendments that I have tabled. I note that this was one of the issues highlighted in the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and I know that several noble Lords have received and considered carefully my letter of last week specifically responding to the committee’s recommendations.
The familiar types of sanctions include asset freezes, travel bans, arms embargoes and prohibitions on aviation and maritime transport. These types of sanctions are included in the Bill. It is not possible to predict all the types of sanctions which may in the future be useful or necessary. We all know that as technology advances and those who wish to do us harm find ever more sophisticated ways of doing so, we may need to be able to react in an agile manner. The Government intend to continue to play a leading role in the development of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Wherever possible we will do this through the UN to ensure that the measures have global impact. On occasion, however, we will need to work with like-minded partners outside the UN framework and may need to adapt our own sanctions toolkit to keep pace with allies. On both Iran and Russia, for example, transatlantic co-operation resulted in sanctions that were substantively different from anything previously agreed.
The power in Clause 39 is designed to provide the necessary flexibility in cases where we are acting outside the UN framework. Regulations under this clause would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure as befitting a Henry VIII power of this kind. However, having listened to the concerns expressed in this House and having reflected carefully on them, I have tabled government Amendment 69, which would further restrict the use of this power by stipulating that it may be used to create new types of sanctions only where the UK is or has been subject to an international obligation to put in place sanctions of that type. This means that the new types of sanctions created by this power can only be those developed by the international community. This power, as amended, will no longer enable the UK unilaterally to put new types of sanctions in place, which was a concern that was expressed.
Government Amendment 70 also makes it clear, as requested in Committee, that Clause 39 cannot be used to alter the purposes of the sanctions regulations specified in Clauses 1 and 2. We think that this was the effect of the original drafting, but we are happy to make it explicitly clear in the Bill. I believe that this is a substantial move forward on the Government’s part, and I hope noble Lords will acknowledge this and support it. I beg to move.
Again, I am very grateful to the Minister and the Bill team. Government Amendments 69 and 70 respond positively to the concerns that I and others expressed in Committee. Therefore, I will not move Amendment 71.